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To Tonia Tzannetakis.
What has been said of human rationality may be apt: 
"Ineviably, we start and end in the middle of our itinerary." 
May the destination be Ithaka.
Two views on the human condition.
Pray that the road's a long one 
Keep Ithaka always in mind
Arriving there is what you're destined for 
But don't hurry the journey at all 
better if it goes on for years
so you're old by the time you reach the island 
wealthy with all you have gained on the way 
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich 
Ithaka gave you the marvellous journey 
without her you wouldn't have set out 
She hasn't anything else to give.
Konstantin Kavafis, Greece, 1961.
To mate with the air is difficult - 
That sinuous invisible creature
Blows hot, blows cold, rubbing her grit of pollen 
On the bodies of ploughmen and mountaineers
Who itch and curse! To mate with a river
Or a filled-up miner's quarry, that pleases me;
My cold kind mother, Sister Water,
Has no comment, accepts whatever I am,
Yet one may think of tentacles
Reaching, searching from under the darkest ledge, 
And not want to be married. To mate with rock 
Is obvious, fatal, and what man was made for,
Whose heart of rock trembles like a magnet 
For deserts, graves, any hole in the ground 
Where he may hide from Zeus. To mate with fire 
Is what the young want most, like salamanders
Weeping in solitary flame, embracing
Red-hot stoves, walking the lava crust
An inch away from fire. Then my old gravedigger,
To mate with a woman is the choice
Containing all other kinds of death - 
Fire, water, rock, and the airy succubus,
Without parable, without consolation
Except that each is the other's boulder and victim.
James K. Baxter, New Zealand, 1974.
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Abstract.
The modern moves to a 'Just Deserts' position are considered as 
part of the responses to a late modern dissolution of consensus 
concerning the foundations of criminal justice. Just Deserts 
appears to replace notions of rehabilitation and the influence 
of the welfare state with an individualist, punishment 
orientation. However, Just deserts is not a unitary phenomena. 
Although the rhetoric is simplistic the change in social 
organisation is complex and multi-layered.
As steps towards understanding penal change and prospects for 
future development an attempt to contextualise present 
developments is made pitching the investigation primarily at 
developing models of epistemological structuring of social 
thought, providing readings of the social theory of 
representative figures and considering the influence of 
epistemological configurations upon the discourse of criminal 
justice.
The present position of modern western societies is stylised in 
two ways.
First, by reference to the time categories pre-modern, 
modernity, and the post-modern. Modernity is depicted as the 
period from the Enlightenment onwards and characterised by the 
key idea of constructing the Grand Society via the application 
of knowledge under the epistemological warrant of truth. Post­
modernity is depicted as a period of reflexivity and uncertainty, 
a time when modernity becomes conscious of the impossibility of 
achieving the narrative goals it set itself.
Second, by reference to modes of conceiving truth, that is 
by the epistemological imagination. This is stylised by reference 
to the categories rationalism, empiricism, and pragmatism. David 
Hume is taken as reflective of empiricism, Immanuel Kant of 
rationalism, and the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein of 
pragmatism. Each modality for structuring thought impacts upon 
criminal justice in differing ways and the security which both
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rationalism and empiricism is seen as providing societal 
consciousness is depicted as being undercut by reflexivity. As 
a result pragmatism becomes the modality for post-modern 
consciousness.
The thesis defends epistemological pragmatism against arguments 
which see it as a compromise position and the term 'reflexive 
pragmatism1 is adopted as a theoretical position suitable for a 
post-modern perspective. The route to this pragmatic perspective 
is outlined in criminal justice by a historical narrative of the 
development of criminal justice perspectives.
"Progressive11 criminal justice is seen as having undergone three 
stages: an early modern founding in philosophical construction; 
a modern faith in science based on the naturalist conception of 
the so-called natural sciences; and a late-modern pluralism of 
conceptions which serves as the backdrop to the rise in Just 
Deserts ideology.
The present is seen as a complex and ambiguous situation. The 
advent of the post-modern consciousness, or the pragmatisation 
of belonging, both lowers modernist confidence and allows the 
possibility of confident power plays to dominate. The allure of 
simplistic solutions is ever present and the rhetoric of Just 
Deserts is seen as one socio-political choice concerning the 
proceduralisation of justice when the foundational security of 
rationalism or empiricism is seen to be lacking. This choice is 
implicitly contrasted to a reflexive pragmatic position, which, 
although underdeveloped and only possible to conceive of as 
'notes for a potential1, is radically different to the formalism 
of Just Deserts on issues such as objectivity, fairness and in 
the self-consciousness of the relativism, and human foundation 
it offers the notion of 'justice'.
Considering contemporary penal practice, although Just Deserts
i
espouses the rhetoric of return to punishment and strict 
formalism, other factors ensure that a complementary provisions
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to imprisonment are being utilized. In the range of arguments and 
conflicting perspectives room for experimentation may well exist. 
Considering the macro-sociological perspectives of Norbert Elias 
and Niklas Luhmann there are grounds for believing that 
rehabilitation was not merely a product of criminological 
positivism or the welfare state, but is reflective of the demands 
of increasingly differentiated and interfunctional societies. 
There are grounds therefore, for seeing the rhetoric of Just 
Deserts as only one facet - the production of post-modern 
'selves' able to play their part in complex, differentiated and 
interdependent post-modern societies demands techniques of 
installing self-discipline. The catch is that such societies may 
require less selves, hence there is also the prospect of a 
developing underclass who will provide the basis of coercive 
control whilst alternative forms of social control structure the 
life games of the supra-class
x
Introduction.
This thesis is an extended essay in philosophical criminology. 
Its concern is with distinguishing different modes of conceiving 
and structuring social thought and criminal justice. It proposes 
two theses, one methodological and the other substantive. The 
overall methodological thesis is that in seeking to understand 
the present state of criminal justice, and to situate change, a 
reflexive understanding of our present is required. Thus to gain 
a proper appreciation of the confused terrain of criminal 
justice, composed only partly of interactions between criminal- 
law and the social sciences, but also by situated human fears, 
hopes and desires, we need not just attention to 'philosophy', 
but to the conceiving of and situation of philosophy. That is of 
the terrain that philosophy occupies and that this understanding 
necessarily involves a concern with epistemology.1 The 
substantive thesis is that of the models of epistemological 
imagination which could be offered, our present has developed 
into one which we can call pragmatism; further that the key to 
appreciating the context for development of the present is a 
better understanding of what pragmatism is, how it has arrived 
and what choices it may entail for criminal justice. The 
presupposition that informs this thesis is that changes in 
criminological thought (the features of criminological discourse) 
are directly implicated in the rise and subsequent development 
of the epistemological structuring of modernity.2
The anchor point for the substantive thesis is the backdrop of 
the present rise in prominence of 'Just Deserts' as the 
mainstream model for criminal justice practice. It is contended 
that in the context of the narratives which criminology presented 
the arrival of Just Deserts appears an anomaly since according 
to those narratives the process, which it was thought the 
Enlightenment had began in criminal justice, a movement in which 
Classicism first predominated to be overcome by Positivism, was 
an irreversibly progressive emancipation of man's humanism within
1
modes of social organization built under the epistemological 
warrant of impartial science. The advent of Just Deserts then may 
well be indicative of the demise of that promise: to understand 
this demise we need to pitch our concern at the epistemological 
level.3
These two theses will be developed as follows. Part One is 
concerned to offer some contextualising of criminal justice 
thought. Chapter One introduces certain themes of the present and 
two candidates for addressing them: reflexive pragmatism and
critical theory. Chapter Two offers an outline narrative overview 
of certain paths thought has taken to arrive at the present and 
deals with a number of distinctions, or choices, thought has in 
structuring its self-understanding. Chapter Three looks at 
aspects of Michel Foucault who deserves prominence for his 
particular attacks on the notion of progressive humanism and 
epistemology.
Part Two is structured around presenting various models, or 
perspectives of epistemology, and dealing in some detail with a 
major figure representative of each and his influence upon the 
imaginative structuring of modernity. Thus Chapter Four presents 
the three perspectives, rationalism, empiricism and pragmatism. 
Chapter Five deals with David Hume and his influence, Chapter Six 
with Immanuel Kant, and Chapter Seven with Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Part Three, "Developing Terrain: towards Reflexive Pragmatism in 
Criminal Justice", seeks to locate criminal justice within 
changing forms of modernity. Chapter Eight addresses itself to 
the traditional domain of criminology and with Chapter Nine 
(which re-defines 'objectivity1 and 'humanism' with the idea of 
destroying the fallacy of objectivity which sees rationality and 
objectivity as things divorced from human purpose) presents an 
account of latent epistemological structures and choices in 
criminological history and develops some alternative positions 
for viewing the context and structure of criminal justice. 
Chapter Ten concerns the social-structural context for criminal
2
justice drawing upon the work of Norbert Elias and Niklas Luhmann 
and concludes on some prospects for contemporary penal practice.
NOTES
1.Any understanding, whether of the past, of change, or any 
'idea1 in the present, is necessarily epistemological. The 
attribution of ontology, the ability to say what is and what 
happened, proceeds via epistemological awareness. There is no 
escape from this state of affairs.
2.This understanding must necessarily involve a recall of the 
past - an exercise in philosophical history - and a reading of 
the past which places the act of recognising the past as 
important. The present interest in reflexivity has, to a limited 
extent, reinstituted an interest in the past which modernity, in 
key respects at least, had relegated to a minor concern. In pre­
modernity, either in the grand narratives of Christianity or in 
the living substance of traditionalism, the past sustained the 
present and gave to the present its meaning. Modernity, secular, 
industrial and capitalist, did not need the past for direct 
substance. Its rationalities were not those of attunement to the 
message of the past but rationalities which gave orientation 
towards change rather than conservation, which stressed 
exploitation, control and consumption rather than the careful 
virtues of preservation and the mean. For the methods and 
processes, the forms of living of scientific, industrial society, 
the past holds no sanction since modernity's roots are not 
consciously in the past but in the domination of empirical 
substance and reason for the purpose of the future. The past is 
but a curiosity, its value one of nostalgia, a sentimentality, 
its rhetorical power the fact that it has past and largely 
relegated in its usage as a comfortable backdrop to progress, 
studied only in the status of an academic discipline. When it 
does have an active power, as in its impact in the metaphysics 
of religion and politics, this is labelled as the power of the 
'unmodernised' elements of modernity's totality. Reflexivity 
reinstates the past in its denial that modernity could replace 
the use of the past to grant identity by social effectiveness, 
and in its restatement that human worth and value are placed, not 
merely uncovered, created by mankind in time, not given by 
empirical reality or pure reason.
3.Although the general intellectual current of social thought was 
one of great ferment, for much of the core of criminal justice 
studies it was business as usual; the search for even more 
positivistic data and technical efficiency continued. To the 
world outside 'places of higher learning' the affairs of the 
common life placed questions of self-consciousness, or 
reflexivity, which social theorists appeared to become concerned 
with, as self-indulgent luxuries divorced from the necessary 
q rouh d ^ ncr of cr 3 m ^ n a 3 j u s t i ce in the re al wo rid c x con t a in itig 
crime, punishing offenders and rationalising the criminal justice 
system. But this is to underestimate the extent to which that
3
'real world' is actually a 'modern world' - constituted and self- 
apparent only to the heirs of the legacy of that period we call 
the enlightenment, and whose common sense status as the proper 
'grounding1 for criminal justice the activity of reflexivity 
questions and demands be justified anew.
4
Part One: Contextualizina Criminal Justice thought: 
the situation and dilemma of Social Theory.
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Chapter One: Dilemmas of the present: critical theory or
Reflexive pragmatism?
I
Reflexive Times?
In 1979 Anthony Giddens characterised contemporary Anglo- 
American social theory as experiencing a "dissolution of the 
orthodox consensus". This orthodoxy had comprised three main 
elements: a substantive 'theory of industrial society1, which saw 
class conflict as having been institutionalised and any large 
scale debate on this subject transformed into small-scale 
technical issues; a theoretical commitment to 'functionalism1, 
which characterised the subject matter of sociological analysis 
in terms of self-regulating social systems which operated on 
their own internal logic and which, we may add, encouraged a 
belief in a foundational logic to change which could in time be 
captured by laws of historical development; and a philosophical 
commitment to 'naturalism', or the proposition that the logical 
frameworks of natural and social science were essentially the 
same.1 Within this orthodox consensus 'applied social science 
disciplines’, such as those rather eclectic and fluid bodies of 
studies heuristically titled criminology and penology, were given 
a place of technical utility. In time, however, a widening 
credibility gap developed between the promise of applied 
'science1, as of crime and punishment, which would be a branch 
of the modern rationally organised society, and the actual 
performance of those intellectual practices. To Giddens social 
theory had become a "Babel of theoretical voices". In criminology 
the field of study became open to deep seated fissures holding 
diverse views as to the nature of man, human society, history, 
methodology, and fundamentally differing assumptions as to 
practice and progress. Doubts, and the tensions they created, 
could no longer be contained within a 'mainstream' criminology 
which actively discouraged detailed self-reflection over 
philosophical fundamentals, or managed selectively to diffuse the 
full force of that which actually did get through. Although a 
number of paths developed in the discourses of criminal justice
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in the 1980's the most vocal retort to the disunity which 
criminal justice thinking has experienced since the breakup of 
'the orthodox consensus' and which became reflected in policy 
appears to be the neo-classical consciousness of "Just Deserts".2
In the British context the acceptance of Just Deserts became the 
central focus of the 1990 White Paper Crime. Justice and 
Protecting The Public.3 This move was pre-shadowed in the 
underlying strains of the May Committee Report of 19794 and the 
later Criminal Justice Act of 1982. The adoption, moreover, of 
Just Deserts ideology appears common in much of the Western 
World. It is an orientative change which encompasses both the 
rhetoric of the 'common life' (for example, as manifested in the 
"Law and Order" debates), a replacement of "rehabilitation" by 
"punishment” as the central feature of official discourse and the 
concern of many intellectuals5, and a re-deployment of 
institutional arrangements of state bureaucracies (for example, 
a tightening of probation, phasing out of indeterminate 
sentences).6 However, to talk in terms of complete 
transformations is simplistic and unrewarding for it also 
appeared that in the majority of the institutional arrangements 
it was business as usual. In the case of the 1982 C.J.A. 
replacement of Borstal, for example, the Borstal had already 
effectively abandoned a 'rehabilitative/reformative' approach.7 
Indeed few could say for sure what rehabilitative practice ever 
was, and the critical analyses of the practice which took that 
name world-wide gave little confidence for mounting a defence.8 
Instead with regard to the penal system a different rhetoric was 
used: a crisis of penology which itself mirrored The Coming Penal 
Crisis9 and which demanded its own therapeutic programme. Another 
dominant theme was shrouded in ambiguity, namely the 
politicisation of criminal justice and the transformation of 
criminal justice from an arena of experts to one where 'policy' 
directives, primarily government policy, increasingly came to 
influence its day to day operation.10
The observation that Criminal Justice thought and practice is
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subject to historical change has always acted as a key pin of 
optimism - the narrative recourse to a barbaric past defended the 
present from self-doubt and gave a banner of 'progress’ . Yet much 
of Just Deserts appears as a return to the past;11 a 'neo- 
classicism* which appears, even by contrast to much of the 
discourse of the 60's and early 70's, as sudden as it was 
unpredicted.12 Its ideological suddenness may be gauged by the 
short time span from works such as Karl Menninger's The Crime Of 
Punishment f 13 wherein the criminal law was castigated as "a 
social monstrosity" and organizations or institutions founded on 
it as being part of "our present stupid, futile, abominable 
practice against detected offenders". Bittner and Platt were 
similarly providing narratives of historical inevitability, 
wherein "in the long run it could not possibly matter whether 
punishment works or not, for it has been going out of use, not 
gracefully, but inexorably." Out of phase with the path of moral 
sentiment.14
It can be argued that Just Deserts comes at a time of exhaustion. 
An exhaustion of the 'counter punishment narrative1 certainly, 
but this is not a solitary exhaustion. The time of Just Deserts, 
primarily the consciousness of the 1980’s, is also held, for 
instance by Alasdair MacIntyre, to be a time of exhaustion for 
all the socio-political traditions which the creative drive of 
our modern culture has relied upon.15 To many commentators it 
appears that the drive of modernism, manifested in the countries 
of the advanced West as the Socio-liberal-Democratic axis of 
social engineering and in the eastern Block as State Socialism 
was devoid of new ideas. As 'Liberalism1 appeared "at wits’ end", 
a libertarian revolt against the modern state looked back to 
notions associated with the theoretical structures of early 
modern western societies called classicism.16 Neo-classicism or 
neo-liberalism came into vogue throughout western political 
economy in the late 70’s and 80’s.
What must not be overlooked, however, is that at the same time 
as a return to rhetorical themes of the past occurs, the
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development of bureaucratic formations is different - no real 
return to the past is possible. In criminal justice new forms of 
alternative fomations develop in the shadow of the dominant 
rhetoric - forms which must be a development of the structures 
of modern society. Formations in criminal justice which are 
congruent to, and allowed by, the main thrust of the dominant 
rhetoric: thus in Justice for Children, a neo-classical document 
explicitly identified by one commentator as "a return to a 
Gesellschaft legal process... back to justice ideas1’17, we find 
new sets of demarcations enabled by "the proposed limits to the 
powers of the juvenile court".
"We propose that there should be a tripart division of
sanctions: nominal, custodial and non-custodial".18
Whole new sets of discourses concerning 'alternatives to 
custody1, 'supervision and control in the community1, 
'privatisation of institutions’ have sprung up at the same time 
as Just Deserts.19 The two must lie intertwined - however, their 
connections may neither be simple nor reducible to the workings 
of an inner logic of criminal justice development. Instead their 
location must be seen as operating within the complexity of 
social change and the development of the ideological forces of 
modernity. Little work in conceiving of Criminal Justice presents 
the complex happenings around the return to justice other then 
a process of dissipation and chaotic confusion, a resurgence of 
punitive mentality, political opportunism or economic stringency. 
Within criminal justice one response, which this thesis will go 
some way to explaining, asserts that Just Deserts is one 
compatible motif for interaction between Criminal Justice 
officials and offenders for a social times which can only be 
described as "pragmatic". Such a label for the present is 
recognised by many but it is also a theme of this thesis that its 
use is predominately simplistic and negative. This thesis would 
assert, in short, that the ascription of our present times as 
"pragmatic" does not need imply a superficial, rather negative 
understanding of where theory and social thought has come to in 
modernity, but calls instead for a wide-ranging reassessment, 
redevelopment and redefining of our tasks and goals; a task that
10
necessarily requires an awareness of the past and some conception 
of development.
As for the discovery of the term pragmatism in criminal justice, 
when Bottoms, for instance, introduced 'the Coming Penal Crisis' 
he identified three elements: the realization of the centrality 
of coercion to criminal justice which rehabilitation had not made 
redundant; a contemporary crisis of penological resources; and 
the supposed negative finding on searching current intellectual 
resources that there was little but a "contemporary air of penal 
pragmatism, with no clear or coherent philosophical or other 
theoretical basis". Pragmatism, Bottoms held, is incapable of 
revitalising the criminological area or producing any "ideal" in 
the light of which to understand and measure practice.20
Bottoms finds pragmatism implicit in 'official', i.e. state 
sponsored, texts where it bears a "curious identification with 
'realism' , and the complete absence of long-term or over­
reaching goals". Pragmatism is identified as the state of mind, 
which, "having implicitly accepted the decline of the 
rehabilitative ideal, has nothing much to offer in its place". 
Moreover, even when this 'pragmatic' conception takes up the 
pressing administrative issues of the present, criticism is 
voiced:
"this pragmatic preoccupation with current difficulties is 
by no means ignoble - but it is also no adequate basis on 
which to rethink the shape of the penal system of the 
future. "21
Pragmatism is thus identified as the unwelcome guest at the wake 
of rehabilitation.
This is not, however, an issue which can be addressed in the 
context of penal discourse alone. For if pragmatism came to the 
field of criminal justice discourse (i.e. criminology and 
penology), it also appears, in guises more or less understood, 
in forms stronger or weaker articulated, whenever a tradition of 
epistemological progressivism finds itself questioned.22 Indeed, 
the questioning which brought the spectre of pragmatism to the
discourse of criminal justice was by no means confined to those 
disciplines of criminology and penology but endemic throughout 
the social sciences (and as MacIntyre asserts, socio-political 
thought in general). Present social science exists in an 
ambiguous space: on its own terms it fears both impotency,
specificity, and totality.23 Such fears, and the criticisms which 
create them, have ensured that it has become almost commonplace 
to refer to the "crises" of contemporary social science. To 
Hilary Lawson such "crises" are part of the predicament of our 
time. A predicament he identifies in terms of growing uncertainty 
and relativism concerning the notion of "truth", and the 
foundational status of our values and beliefs.24
Lawson draws upon the concept of reflexivity to explain "the 
predicament" of our times. Reflexivity is a specific form of 
questioning: a movement to seek self-awareness and understanding 
by the turning of epistemological action back upon the subject 
itself. Reflexivity impacts upon the enterprise of constructing 
social theory by questioning the relationship of ourselves and 
the traditions of the intellectual projects from which and within 
which we take our bearings - but if reflexivity was entered into 
with the hope of providing a simple corrective to ascertainable 
failings such hope becomes complicated, since reflexivity soon 
leads to a de-centring and a questioning of important motifs - 
'progress* becomes contestable and 'certainty' revealed as a 
temporal supposition.
There are those who welcome this outcome and announce the opening 
of an anarchistic range of possibilities.25 However, reflexivity 
itself is a seemingly paradoxical position - a paradox which 
flows from its own grasp upon the central claims of those who use 
it to produce such uncertain freedom. In the philosophy of 
science Feyerabend, for instance, asks us to destroy the 
"objective" rationality of modern science by making the claims 
that all "objective scientific/philosophical discourse" actually 
consists of fairy tales, moreover, fairy tales which are false; 
but this claim must on its own terms be included, and therefore
12
must itself be a fairy tale which is false.
Similarly the claim offered as a scientific critique, that 
intellectual inquiry has been concerned with the provision of 
theory, rather than with practice, is itself the provision of a 
theory. Does it matter? for it is also a practice, but if that 
is so then the claim was wrong - theoretically.26
II
The "strangeness11 of reflexivity: its differing from the
tradition of stable de-marcation.
Reflexivity is an unsettling movement, for it amounts to a
disregard for the traditional action of legitimation for
knowledge - that of a purifying contrast with (an)other, that 
movement of transfer from fiction to fact, or vice versa, which 
allows the ascription of 'truth - non-truth1 to be made. It is 
a process of separation, in one form a movement from the opinion 
of the apparent to the knowledge of the refined, which 
concomitantly demands a secure positioning or location from 
whence the labelling, or 'marcation', of discourse can proceed.
Modern criminal justice disciplines, i.e. criminology and 
penology, took their status from the emphasis upon a supposed 
scientificity. Such discourse constituted itself by "scientific 
invitation" - confidently in contrast to the "prejudice"
exhibited in the political sphere - and this was a contrast 
which, avoiding prejudice, also openly limited the inclusion of 
voices of historically engaged individuals, voices such as 
Malcolme X or George Jackson, to use as raw material - as
opinion, which was, as the basic presupposition, a pre- 
Parmenidian mode of speech, opinions to be converted into 
knowledge, and which, though allowed to speak, did not require 
equality of recognition to the discourse of knowledge.
To gain proper recognition the first order for a discourse is to
establish itself as legitimate and the legitimation of the 
penological mirrors the action of the dictionary itself which 
describing 'legitimate* goes to the Latin root, expressing "a 
status which has been conferred or ratified by some authority".27
Our present rules for such a ratification are outlined via a 
process Karl Popper termed a "marcation" procedure. This process 
of (de-)marcation lays down a set of rules for each discursive 
character (literature, music, science, etc.), which allows 
certain traits to be present or absent. Scientific discourse is 
thus set apart from other kinds of discourse because it fulfils 
certain requirements - symbolic clarity, logical consistency and 
the possibility of verifying its claims, which are related to a 
set of meta rules. This broad category can be subdivided upon 
recognition that certain forms have only some of the 
requirements- the "formal sciences" only having the first two, 
the "empirical" all three. As expressed in diagrammatical form:
-( - ) (_+/- .) ( +-) .
  >
Literature Human Sciences Sciences
<--------------------------
Metaphysics
Two specific categories of discourse are visible, roughly: 
"literary" and "scientific". The middle compartment contains 
hybrid discourses showing both the provisional presence and the 
provisional absence of the mark of scientificity.28 These are 
allocated by what Popper defines as the "rules of the scientific 
game’1, demarcating science from pseudo- or non-science (which 
Popper calls metaphysics). The process ensures that the 
legitimacy of discourse must always come from some other source 
than the act of seizing itself, usually via rules to a source 
already established. Legitimation is the struggle to associate 
the source of the authority with the thing to be authorised - it 
will be done by reference to an external source of value which
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gives power to the authority. Popper states that the desire to 
correctly demarcate is provided by "the strongest (unscientific) 
motive" - the guest for truth. Popper on this point agrees with 
the Marxist and the Freudian in locating the epistemologically 
concerned actor as an individual living in a complex lived-in- 
world, but for Popper it is possible to achieve a state of 
objectivity for knowledge which transcends the demands and 
constraints of time and place or subjective experience. Using the 
epistemological tools devised over history the subjectivity of 
the 'context of discovery1 can be cleansed and the 'content of 
discovery1 preserved as objective and self-sustaining, protected 
by the epistemological warrant.
Against this 'world three1 objectivity it has been recently 
emphasised that the human subject exists not only in an 
environment composed of psycho-material factors of physical, 
behavioral, economic and geographical constraints but also a 
"semantic" space, a space composed of the effects of 
interrelations of narratives. Narratives are stories, fables, the 
recounting of past events; the rhetorical postulating of what 
was, is, and will be possible. Narratives tell man what is 
expected of him and how he is to relate to the lived-in-world. 
For Lyotard:29
"it is obvious that one of the features that characterises 
more 'scientific1 periods of history, and most notably 
capitalism itself, is the relative retreat of the claims of 
narrative or storytelling knowledge in the face of those of 
the abstract, denotative, or logical and cognitive 
procedures generally associated with science or positivism".
These grand-narratives or meta-narratives create a social space 
for science to work within. The very enterprise of "scientific 
abstraction" occurs and owes its legitimation to the existence 
of such narratives.
A prominent set of narratives embed the very act of contrast and 
movement to find truth in the supposition of an 'absolute 
source1, and of the 'founding1, and positioning of knowledge- 
claims via a journey and the coming into a relation with a realm
of absolute certainty.30
The combination of motifs of journey and encountering of the 
realm of absolute certainty is long standing: Jager derives the 
aetiology of theorist and theory from the Greek "theoros" which 
combined "theo" and "eros" to give "he who regards and observes 
the will of God".31 The theoretician is he who becomes the 
recipient of a divine message, and faithfully transmits this in 
un-distorted form back to the people. The theoretician must 
question the speaker and then transmit the response, and this 
requires a search, a journey to the home of truth.
From the beginning of the western intellectual traditions man and 
truth were narratively portrayed as involved with a journey, and 
the life of the mind/intellect/spirit depicted as requiring a way 
for it to follow for the attainment of truth.32 How was the way 
itself to be known? Again there existed a demand - a demand for 
directions.
The motif is that of journeying: but the message also depicts a 
methodology for 'Reason* to correct itself - reason, it appears, 
cannot correct itself without looking to the 'other' to do so. 
There must be some supposition of a realm of absolute certainty 
for the claim of the particular to make sense and be marcated, 
to establish its differences, to work its demarcations and to 
represent the just from the unjust, the foe from the friend, the 
dangerous from the safe. At the same time this movement is 
necessary to establish the identity of the just, the familiar, 
the same, the correct, the true. The advent of reflexivity 
unsettles this movement for it declares 'could not the story be 
told differently1? Instead of the Platonic version which narrates 
that beneath the flux of appearance and the different naming of 
things there exists a pure ontology, thus allowing language to 
construct a pure naming, there could have been the thesis of the 
non-ontological status of language. Narratives which concentrated 
upon the experience of journeying itself, with the experience of 
visual and linguistic strangeness, of the unexpected events and
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the disruptions of settled expectations, its transient encounters 
with characters whose virtues were not self-apparent and whose 
identities were unfamiliar. Such narratives could have resulted 
in ethnographic relativism. The overall narrative effect could 
have been one of non-settlement, of homelessness for the human 
spirit, of an unknowable totality upon which the individual could 
only look with an improvised dependence. To an extent these 
versions were told; but the one which conquered held that the 
whole disjointed series of images in journeying could ultimately 
and definitively be interpreted and ratified by man with the aid 
of truth. Conversely, the action of reflexivity claims that life, 
caught in the narrative form, opens itself to many versions and 
that it cannot be seen and grasped totally in a unified way, 
whatever the rhetoric of any one form of narrative. Reflexivity, 
thus defined, operates to divide theoretically and politically 
not just between specific movements but inside them as between 
their confidence and their foundational statements. But after 
reflexivity becomes utilized in some or other of its variants, 
it appears that since social theory can be exposed as resting on 
specific historical conceptions and assumptions as foundations, 
and since there is no safety of a sociology of knowledge (because 
of infinite reflexive regress), there is nothing behind it but 
arbitrariness. The dilemma then is from whence can legitimate 
guidance come?
However, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature33 the modern 
'pragmatist* Richard Rorty retorts that the western intellectual 
traditions have made the mistake of confusing what is of 
importance, the need for some "grid or relevance and 
irrelevance", with a confining and constraining conviction that 
the proper conduct of social life is dependant upon the central 
concept of the commensurability of all discourse in a scheme 
which ideally depicts scientific theory as "mirror of nature". 
Commensurability, Rorty contends, has given a presupposition that 
all endeavors are common, obeying a central "truth" function, 
such that all ideals, such as the ideal of justice or 'truth* 
itself, are commensurable. That is, that they are
"able to be brought under a set of rules which can tell us 
how rational agreement can be reached on what would settle 
the issue on every point where statements seem to 
conflict" .34
The set of such rules Rorty loosely labels epistemology, and with 
his criticism of commensurability Rorty asks us to give up the 
concern with epistemology in a move to "hermeneutics". Such a 
move does not wish to create a successor subject to epistemology, 
but rather to free ourselves from the notion that philosophy must 
centre around the discovery of a permanent framework for inquiry. 
There is, however, more than a little paradoxicality ifc this 
demand - for on what basis is it made other than on the 
epistemological basis of a (true?) narrative of the past 
performance of philosophy which Rorty*s text provides? If we are 
to accept Rorty*s claims then we necessarily accept some 
epistemological imagination - the concern with epistemology is 
not destroyed by the specific claim that one is being non- 
epistemological.
Rorty, perhaps would not deny this for in his 'pragmatic'
response he set his target thus:
"The difficulty stems from a notion shared by Platonists, 
Kantians, and positivists: that man has an essence - namely 
to discover essences . "35
Thus whatever the form of justification which could be built it
would have to be non-essential; that is it would have to be a
softer justification than those which claim knowledge of essences
or that the ultimate aim is to do so. Thus, we should not
"try to have a successor subject to epistemology, but rather 
free ourselves from the notion that [inquiry] must centre 
around the discovery of a permanent framework for inquiry... 
the point is to keep the conversation going rather than find 
objective truth".
For Rorty 'truth' is still an important factor of conversation
since truth, in the traditional epistemological sense, "is the
normal result of normal discourse."36 But we are not to be fooled
that normal discourse is all. The adversary is
"attempts to close off conversation by proposals for 
universal commensuration through the hypostatization of some
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privileged set of descriptions.... this would be... the 
dehumanization of human beings*1.
Theories of language and of knowledge which give the image of one 
privileged set of meanings, i.e. one master set for normal 
discourse to cohere to, stand behind the target, and in 
opposition we are asked to "see human beings as generators of new 
descriptions rather than beings one hopes to be able to describe 
accurately".37 The discourse of the edifying philosopher serves 
to break the confines of the 'truth' of the systematic.38
Ill
Epistemology and Criminal Justice: outline contrasts.
Forty's criticism hits directly at the question of what within
Criminal Justice was the function of the relationship between
philosophy and the operational activity of the "social sciences"
called Criminology and Penology. One image was to see them as
purposeful: that the adjudication of the 'tribunal' of
progressive reason gave a philosophy of punishment which led
practice. Thus Bottoms states that philosophy in the time of the
consensus enshrined 'the rehabilitative ideal' which strove to
give a clear foundation for practice to be labelled:
"In the heyday of the rehabilitative ideal. . . those at the 
forefront of penal policy-making formulated with pride 
Prison Rule No.l, the ideal against which everyday practice 
in prisons was to be measured. . . . But now?"39
The status of this relationship was never, however, that clear.
In his article on Punishment in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Stanley Benn commented:40
"It is not, of course, the business of the moral or social 
philosopher to provide justification for any particular act 
or system or even of the institution of punishment in 
general. Philosophers are not necessarily apologists for 
their society and age. They are interested in the procedures 
and models of argument that we are committed to by our 
fundamental conceptions of morality and in criteria and 
justification rather than in inquiries into whether actual 
institutions satisfy them."
The type of philosophy that Benn envisages appears unable to 
provide any critical impetus for transformation or change of 
actual institutional practice. In relative agreement H.L.A.Hart 
observed:41
"No one expects judges or statesmen occupied in the business 
of sending people to the gallows or prison, or in making (or 
unmaking) laws which enable this to be done, to have much 
time for philosophical discussion of the principles which 
make it morally tolerable to do these things. A judicial 
bench is not and should not be a professorial chair."
Thus it would seem that it is for them entirely proper for 
philosophical discourse and (paraphrasing Hart) the "business" 
activity to occupy separate realms with little direct co­
penetration .
Contrary to the idea that the "philosophy of punishment" would 
be the realm of discourse that provided a foundation and 
discursive "space" either authorising or criticising the actual 
operation of judicial proceedings, prison, and related procedures 
and practices, i.e. to operate as a critical dialectic of 
legitimation, Anthony Skillen, for one, criticises the 
"philosophy of punishment" for its failure to address the 
concrete reality of institutions existing, supposedly, in its 
name. The duality of discourse has abstract philosophy and 
concrete studies which inhabit separate domains. "It is difficult 
to find references other than in passing to prison, [community 
service,] flogging, or capital punishment in the works 
specifically devoted to 'punishment111.42
This criticism finds echoes in the works of David Garland 
particularly his essay with Peter Young "Towards a Social 
Analysis of Penality".43 These writers openly claim that their 
projects are also specific attacks upon the very notion of 
"penology" as an intellectual enterprise, attacks which announce 
its replacement by a "social analysis".
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IV
Correcting the mystification of philosophy (ideology?): towards 
a social analysis?
To both Garland and Skillen the division of discourse in the 
penal area is
"a symptom of the fact that what you are getting is not a 
conceptual investigation of reality but an investigation of 
concepts, whose relation to reality is not supposed to be a 
topic of polite conversation".44
To Skillen the philosophical discourse of formal philosophers 
such as H.L.A. Hart and Herbert Morris is "intoxicated by formal 
equalities and reciprocities", wherein their "only criticism of 
existing penal systems are formal ones".45 To escape "Legalism" 
(the abstract argumentation of law and punishment linguistically 
owned by jurisprudential concerns) Skillen declares we have a 
duty to analyze the discourse of punishment only as it is 
reflected in actual penal institutions in society.
For his part Garland declares his aim is to replace penology with 
a "social analysis of penality"> and both Skillen and Garland 
first oppose the earlier idea of Benn and Hart that the 
'practical' results of the business of science can be seen as 
having an independent existence from the operation of philosophy. 
In asserting this, however, they choose to create a project which 
reduces 'philosophy' to 'social thought1, to understand which 
their own guide is primarily marxist in derivation; but since the 
contributions of William James and John Dewey a demand for some 
form of seamless web imagery holding together philosophy, social 
theory and practice has been a persistent feature of pragmatism. 
It is widely shared criticism, of which Garland and Skillen are 
examples, however, that apart from the occasional rhetorical 
flourish it was not until the reflexive turn of quite recent 
years that the empirically minded social researcher showed any 
concern in his actual activity with the 'internal1 debates of the 
philosophy of social science. It certainly is fair to ask, 'who 
were the philosophers to walk the corridors of the rehabilitative 
institutions?' - 'what philosophical synthesis gave purpose to 
technique?1. Or the reflective question 'how was it possible to 
surrender so much to bureaucracy?'
21
One strand of the answer is the legacy of epistemological 
progressivism, that is to say a process whereby 
criminological/penological work was based on a non-reflexive 
acceptance of its status as an historical progression from a past 
philosophical-cum-epistemological legitimation of its role, 
central concepts and objects, and methodological frames 
(particularly concerning terms of the proper style of 
explanations and notions of causation). With such a confidence, 
and in a socio-historical environment of relative stability in 
ideology, certain themes can assume historical importance, as, 
for instance, when correctionalism - a technical administrative 
concern - became the motif at a particular juncture. Part of this 
relies upon an implicit notion of an epistemological security for 
instrumental 'rationality' based upon a steady historical 
progression, and conceiving itself as a superstructure of 
confidently legitimate 'marcated' disciplines.
Examples of the broad form of the general narratives of progress,
of the role of scientific curiosity, and the marcation of
sensible discourse, abound in more traditional criminological
texts, for example Barnes and Teeters' Horizons of Criminology.46
but evidence that this line of structure still persists more
recently lies in the preface to Nigel Walker's 1964 work. With
Walker for his text to "succeed" as "criminology" it had to
adhere to an "ascetic principle"; such that it was to be simply
"a study of our present ways of defining, accounting for, and
disposing of offenders, regarded simply as a system in
operation". Criminology must obey certain prescriptions as to its
discursive composition. Thus:
"Criminology is not, and does not include, moral or
political philosophy. It does not argue about the right of
states or societies to limit the freedom of individuals to 
rob, rape, murder, or commit suicide; or about the sense in 
which a stupid or deluded man can be said to be responsible 
for a crime. At the same time, the criminologist is 
interested in differences between, and changes in, the views 
held by legislators, lawyers, philosophers, and the man in 
the street, on such topics, and the extent to which they 
reflect the facts established and the theories propounded by 
psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists.
Nor does criminology overlap with jurisprudence. To the
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criminologist the arguments of Beccaria and Bentham, Hart 
and Wootton, are flags that show where the wind of change is 
blowing, not battle standards round which to rally and 
skirmish.11
The criminologist is also to discipline his transformative
imagination. For he is not "a penal reformer". Although:
"it is true that he is concerned to establish the truth or 
falsehood of some of the assertions upon which campaigns for 
penal reform are based - for example, the assertion that the 
death penalty is not a deterrent. But since the driving 
force of such campaigns is not a purely logical or purely 
scientific appreciation of fact, but a humanitarian motive, 
it is to that extent non-criminological."47
Such a conception of criminology lay deeply linked to the imagery 
of what Rorty called "the mirror of nature" and what has been 
called elsewhere the Received View on Theories.48 It is a 
conception of science which holds that its purity, objectivity 
and progressive nature is safeguarded by avoiding metaphysical 
entities and concepts through insisting that the only theoretical 
terms allowed are those that can be provided with correspondence 
rules to give them explicit phenomenal description. The Received 
View thought it thus successfully eliminated objectionable, non- 
empirical entities from scientific theories, and, because science 
was seen as the paradigm of rationality such a paradigm is the 
ideal and preferred mode of discussing human affairs. Criminology 
is simply a recounting: a sophisticated presentation of
'knowledge' concerning a particular field. Knowledge which grows 
and progresses reliant upon the notion that it is the environment 
that instructs us and that we must not pollute such instruction. 
In analyzing the 'Received View' Suppe was rather more narrow 
that Rorty and identified it with 'positivism', stating that it 
must be rejected as part of modern conceptions wherein "the last 
vestiges of positivistic philosophy of science are disappearing 
from the philosophical landscape".49 This was part of a process 
where "virtually all the positivist programme for philosophy of 
science has been repudiated by contemporary philosophy of 
science".50 In criminology this was earlier stated in the work
of D<5 V  i d  f" ^  g  T” i f  i p  r  ■? r* Vi T T to i ^  ^  a  t  e  S  ^  +- i t t i  o  ~  c;
Walker (1964) the critique of Matza in Delinquency and Drift was
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simple: criminology had not kept up with current developments in
the philosophy of science, and in particular positivist
criminology's key concept of determinism had to be replaced.51
Matza thus echoed Suppe1s comment that
"it seems to be characteristic, but unfortunate, of science 
to continue to hold philosophical positions long after they 
are discredited".52
V
By contrast Garland is clear on his grounding - it is a specific 
concept of an awareness of knowledge, one which seeks to raise 
what empiricism has often "subordinate(d)", that is "under what 
conditions does its specified subject-matter become an object of 
knowledge?" This is a reflexive move; a turning of the act of 
consciousness of criminological/penological knowledge back upon 
the action of cognising itself.
Garland claims his approach replaces the "empiricist or 
positivist version of social science" which, true to the Received 
View
"proceeds by taking it as obvious or as common sense that 
what it purports to investigate is naturally, and without 
further reflection, a genuine and self-evident object of 
knowledge; that social science proceeds by the gradual and 
ceaseless appropriation of one natural, empirical object 
after another." (G.p.l)
The quest for knowledge inherent in intellectual inquiry is 
viewed as "subjected to a set of theoretical and practical 
criteria", the authority of which do "not rest upon the 
correspondence they have with an immutable social world". Rather 
the impetus is
"the possibility to talk of alternative social arrangements. 
The prime reason for investigating the social is the desire 
to change it. The essence of the social analysis therefore 
can be defined by dual objectives; the need to explain, and 
the conception that this is irrevocably tied to practice. 
Moreover, it is assumed that these are unified in the very 
process of producing knowledge."(G.p.5)
Garland also sees this as purifying knowledge claims, in a sense 
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a demarcative and reconstructive criteria and this rational 
reconstruction of penology demonstrates the uncritical nature of 
the previous as an outcome of what he calls "British Pragmatism" 
revealing
"the culturally specific nature of penology... British 
penology is a determinate form of knowledge..[the].. product 
of a complex interaction between a compromised positivistic 
conception of knowledge - the hegemony of jurisprudential 
and philosophical discourse and the pragmatic demands of an 
administrative framework, on the one hand, and a tradition 
of voluntary, charitably based, social work, on the other. 
Out of this complex has emerged a form of knowledge which 
can, at one and the same time, be both precise and 
infinitely flexible. British penology has been able to both 
exclude certain types of thought of social policy as 
irrelevant, while offering, as an alternative, a type of 
knowledge which achieves its hegemony by its very obscurity, 
plurality of purpose, and indefiniteness. In short, British 
penology legitimates itself both by denying its status as 
ideology and, more simply, by fudging issues."(G. p.3.).
In these analyses it is pragmatism which is exposed as at fault
and a potential critique offered - it is an image of pragmatism
similar to George Novack's summary:
"What is pragmatism? First, pragmatism is what pragmatism 
does. It is the habit of acting in disregard of solidly- 
based scientific rules and tested principles. In everyday 
life, pragmatism is activity which proceeds from the premise 
(either explicit or unexpressed) that nature and society are 
essentially indeterminate. Pragmatic people rely not upon 
laws, rules, and principles which reflect the determinate 
features and determining factors of objective reality, but 
principally upon makeshifts, rule-of-thumb methods, and 
improvisations based on what they believe might be 
immediately advantageous."53
Garland's replacement project for penology rejects what he calls 
the "question-begging notion" of 'punishment' installing in its 
place "a less tendentious term", such as the 'field of penal 
practices' or 'penality', which would signify a complex field of 
institutions, practices and relations rather than a singular and 
essential type of social event. Moreover, the possibility of the 
contrasting space of philosophical concept as a ground for 
guiding politics is rejected as ideology.54 But what then is to 
guide action and what are our politics to be about? Without 
directly addressing this issue Garland is specific that
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Mwe must respect that analyses are (and should be) produced 
in regard to specific issues from specific positions and 
with determinate objectives in view. But concrete analyses, 
for all their detailed focus and intent, must situate 
themselves within more general frameworks, if they are to be 
well founded. They must have some reasonable conception of 
the overall pattern within which they intervene. They must 
have a reasonable grasp of the relations between their 
specific object of study (for example, a particular sanction 
or institution, or a specific ideological discourse), and 
the other elements in the penal complex. They should also be 
aware of the general contours of that complex and its 
relations with the 'outside'."
There are several items of importance here. First what Garland 
achieves is the renouncing of the 'concept' - punishment - that 
creation of philosophy, originally noted as not being utilised 
in critique, is now redundant; we are offered instead social 
theory - in particular a sociology. A sociology which will 
constitute
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"penality as a specific institutional site which is 
traversed by a series of different social relations. [A 
whole series of] social relations operate through [penality] 
and are materially inscribed in its practices. Penality is 
thus an over-determined site which relays and condenses a 
whole series of social relations within the specific terms 
of its own practices".(G. p.21)
Penality is a social institution, an institution determined by 
an interaction in which the concepts of "punishment", and 
"crime", function as ciphers of ideology, as bearers and 
depositors of the material effects of complex social 
determination.
The analysis firstly overturns the crude individualistic 
confidence of the methodological individualist camp.55 The 
Garland style political activist cannot rely upon ideals which 
are only 'abstractions' but must work upon the 'realities' 
provided by sociology. In renouncing the false light of these 
abstractions, however, must the political activist inhabit the 
terrain of theory without the 'other' of philosophic ideal?
From the Garland text, it appears that instead of ideals (at 
least instead of articulated ideals), guidance is to be had by
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a knowledge of the complex and deeply ingrained economic, 
structural, organizational, and ideological constraints which 
structure the complexity of the field. The penal is presented as 
constituted in "penality", part of a deep social framework 
wherein the concrete is an item in a process, partaking of an 
overall pattern governed by relations which constitute the 
'complex' - a complex which has general contours and set 
relations with the outside awaiting discovery. Garland replaces 
the crude institutionalization of the individualist camp with 
the rhetoric of a socially determined "institutional site" for 
the understanding of which we have the "frameworks" provided by 
structuralism, economic marxism and humanist/historicist marxism.
This, however, has its own dilemma: specifically the question of 
degree of 'determinism' these 'socialised' institutions face. 
This question takes us to the heart of what is at issue in 
Garland's text: the modern self-consciousness of "knowledge"
itself. The synthesis which the Received View may be said to have 
relied upon is that the history of science is a cumulative 
repository of knowledge to which reference can be made to support 
or complicate tactics of action. Action broadly determined in 
line with other intellectual deliberations, i.e. philosophies of 
punishment (the right to punish and the rationale), areas of 
punishment (the dictates of jurisprudence) and the confidence of 
right (political philosophy). In line with disciplinary 
specialization the day to day activity of the scientist or 
functionary need not be concerned with such broad concerns but 
involve himself with the task of a gradual accumulation of 
knowledge and administrative skills as they increasingly come to 
grips with the world through theory and experiment.
The Garland project attempts a reorientation of this on 
several levels:
First, complicating the act of conceiving the penal area by 
unsettling the acceptable categories of thought and presentating 
new categories.
Second, the question of structuring or guidance for the 
transformative desire which Garland places as a basis for
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knowledge accumulation. Our doubt on this issue is specific, does 
a purely "sociological" imagination devoid of the "concept" 
promise to provide one?
One problem is that there is a strand of thinking which treats 
the abstract as that which separates life and concepts. The 
conceptual can then be seen as a plot against man - one where 
real men are imprisoned in a false structure and obliterated by 
ideologies. And strangely it appears as if both the advocates of 
praxis and those of rigorous theory hold to a consensus that 
philosophy as the practice of concepts is not to have anything 
to do with politics, as the real science of life - as though 
'life1 were the one non philosophical, or apolitical concept
■ /j
but what is 'human life1 ,-btTET not the concept to crown all? H
An alternative position is presented by Berki who states:
"we have to grasp the point that in the last resort 
institutionalised punishment is the same, whatever its form 
and whatever label it might bear: execution, prison,
banishment, flogging, fine, psychiatric treatment or 
community service. In every case it signifies the pitting of 
the will of the state (of society in the abstract) against 
the individual. . . "56
For those who clearly defend the 'philosophical perspective’ it 
is the role of the 'concept1 to link viable empirical activities 
and to provide a locus around which classifications and modes of 
embodiment, intersubjectivity, and the betweeness of social life 
occur. In this way the concept - Justice, Law, Crime, Punishment, 
Fairness - is granted some form of transcendental role - perhaps 
always temporally ideological but viewed as social motifs 
continually engaged by men in terms of a struggle for (variable) 
presence which is brought out in human activity and modes of 
living.
The role of philosophy, or other forms of discourse made 
illegitimate by the moves to position "penality" as the focus of 
a new Weltanschauung, i.e. the progressive social analysis, is 
defended through the suspicion that the new social analysis 
achieves its progressive nature at the cost of its own
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reflexivity. This suspicion is not merely one which fears that
the engagement in political calculation which we are offered
depends upon the possibility of social explanation, and thus the
suspicion arises that our freedom to make and remake the social
world we live in is dictated by possession of knowledge as to its
function (knowledge now of depth rather than the ideological idea
of the superficial which penology had offered), but that from
this it follows that our politics are to be led by the expose of
the theory. With the successful social analysis,
"criminality and penality [are] relocated within the matrix 
of social relations and struggle from which they have long 
been isolated, and this return provoke[s] social 
transformation as well as individual corrections." (G. 
p.35.)
The traveller has returned to his community, the dilemma is now 
the understanding of his words. Is he now to lead 'enlightened' 
action, whereby the politics of this action flow from the 
possession of the logos of the theory - the implication being 
that it will be true, or correct, politics.
VI
Anti-conceptualization: an excursus.
The earlier text of Rusche and Kirchheimer,57 upon which 
"Towards a Social Analysis of Penality" explicitly draws, was 
specific as to the justification of such a guidance by a "social 
analysis":
"...it is necessary to strip from the social institution of 
punishment its ideological veils and juristic appearance and 
to describe it in its real relationships.... 
the belief that the history of punishment is to a large 
extent a history of human irrationality and cruelty [is both 
simplistic and in ignorance of empirical causative forces] 
cruelty itself is a social phenomenon which can be 
understood only in terms of the social relationships 
prevailing in any given period".(R. p.23)
In offering a complete explanation economic reductionism led 
Rusche and Kirchheimer to declare that the system of production 
discovers punishments which correspond to its productive
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relationships. Thus, the origin and fate of penal systems, the 
use or avoidance of specific punishments, and the intensity of 
penal practices are determined by particular social forces, above 
all by economic and then fiscal forces.(R. p.5.)
Epistemologically, their criticism of penological progress, and 
their realization of the necessity to develop a 'proper' unit of 
analysis, is based upon a rather specific type of 'philosophical 
awareness1: a foundation located in most articulate form in the 
preface of Marx's Capital.
In the preface to Capital Marx declares that his concern is not 
with the discussion of society "in general" but with one society 
only, modern capitalist society. His claim is to have discovered 
the laws of this society and none other - thus Capital holds 
itself, not as a study of society as such, i.e. of the 
abstraction, society "in general", but as a study of this 
particular society; the analysis concerns itself, not with an 
idea (an ideal object), but a materially determined or real 
object.
The target is the Hegelian rational basis of reality, the Idea, 
concomitant with the ability of man to know nature via the belief 
that the essence of nature is mind, and history is produced by 
the continuous struggle of mind/spirit/idea to realise itself in 
a continual process of unfolding from lower to higher degrees of 
perfection. Instead we are given the primacy of the material 
order - and guided in our analysis by the axiom of science, that 
all things behave in accordance with a principle of regularity 
and predictability and are able to be covered by "the laws of 
science" ,58
Similarly the politics of Garland demands special and specific 
knowledges which take cognizance of the "political straganums" 
behind "penality"; the indispensable premise for this type of 
"scientific inquiring" is that there are indeed these "real 
processes" and underlying objective facts concealed by the
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"metaphysics" of judicio reasoning. The corrective, offered by 
epistemological purification giving the proper theory, is seen 
as the opposing of the ideological by an investigation of society 
at its true social-discursive-material level, and through this 
to present the "real basis" of its networks and prevent the 
dissolving of penality into an idea.
To the creed of Marx (as per the preface to Capital) and Lenin 
(as per Collected Works) we clearly cannot have a concrete 
society without taking a view of nature as controlling the 
production of things, and man as being the mediating entity 
controlling distribution; society comprised thus of relations of 
production and social relations; economic structure and the 
political-ideological level; structure and superstructure. We are 
offered a perspective providing a model of explanation which 
focuses not on treating spirit and matter as separate, but as 
different manifestations not of an abstract generic idealist 
notion of society "in general", but rather as aspects of a 
determinate society, and hence can be held out as giving "facts" 
and not "abstractions".
The question then arises - what does one do with the knowledge 
of this actual determinate society? The answer, apparent in the 
preface to Capital is that Marx is concerned to study the actual 
concrete, determinate society, for example England, not for that 
actual society but for the "general" processes which flow through 
it. The determinate "actuality" is thus only of interest in so 
far as it expresses the "typical" or "classical" forms of that 
which comprises it.59
But this is more than a little paradoxical. For it amounts to the 
rejection of an "in general" only to substitute for it in the 
final analysis another "in general" - but this time a rather 
specific "in general" the nature of which the theory has 
revealed, and which without the theory is invisible to the eye 
but stands above, or behind, or below, perhaps it does not matter 
where it is, for it is that realm which is elsewhere than the
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visible - in effect it is truly the "meta" that one is interested 
in, and by sweep of the theory the meta is not, nor ever could 
be seen as, in the realm of speculative reason, but is presented 
as reality; we are to be persuaded we have done the successful 
journey within the confines of the one discourse. If we are 
persuaded we accept "the social analysis" as the overcoming of 
"metaphysics", for we are now to be guided by rational knowledge 
instead of metaphysics and false ideology, but this appears an 
acceptance which in the end can only be done on "metaphysical" 
faith (including, perhaps, the faith of the 'correct' ideology).
VII
Central to these versions of what we can call 'critical theory* 
is the* double criticism that mainstream theory suffers from 
conceptual limitation and ideological confusion. Critical theory, 
on the other hand, we are told, would somehow (normally via 
giving a statement of its own genesis) resist the ideologically 
distorting effects of the social conditions of its creation 
(modern Liberal Capitalism) and achieve a degree of intellectual 
and social power by giving a more realistic interpretation of 
social phenomena which would, in turn, provide an emancipatory 
guide to forms of human action and intervention in the 
contemporary world necessary to bring about radical 
transformation.
They target a relationship whereby functionalist social theory 
and positivist methodology are said to produce static 
descriptions and explanations of social phenomena which directly 
reinforce a one-dimensional presentation of the real patterns of 
social reality and the specific socio-cultural forms it takes; 
the criminological agenda principally suffers by falling into the 
trap of attempting to locate the causes of crime in the most 
observable phenomena, the individual who is apprehended and 
before us, i.e. the criminal, and of attempting to improve the 
operational effectiveness of the criminal justice system to deal
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with him, i.e. correctionalism; the present system being 
presented as that best fitted to the prevailing direction of 
social development (i.e. a functional fit which is thus 
essentially progressive and mostly irreversible).
As a result, it is held, the mass of individuals are denied the 
ability to formulate more imaginative visions of social reality. 
Conversely, certain academic work is regarded as privileged as 
having escaped the more restrictive confines of an ideological 
framework which mistakenly biased organizational structures of 
capitalist society as the universal and functionally required 
operationality of a rationalised modernity. Thus the knowledge 
bases of the non-critical are seen as submissive to and feeding 
into the managerial and administrative #technostructure' of 
interests operating to continue the capitalist formation whilst 
operating under the guise of the universality of modernity. Thus, 
whilst criminology and penology had gradually acquired the 
institutional and intellectual trappings of a social scientific 
discipline, its parasitic dependence upon the social control 
requirements of capitalism had largely determined both the 
character of its central concerns and the form of the individual 
resources by which it had been engaged.
The conception of criminal justice as both an instrumental means 
of class domination, and as a symbolic expression of the material 
priorities which it embodies60 is based on a specific 
methodological position which is directly contrasted with the 
empiricist (positivist) and instrumental bias of the mainstream. 
Critical methodology rests on the assumption that the goal of 
social analysis is to identify the underlying 'mechanisms1 which 
regulate social behaviour by going beyond the immediate surface 
reality and bringing out the structural processes which account 
for it, such as the fundamental relations of productive activity. 
The theorist goes beyond the interpretations of the mainstream 
concentration upon the observable phenomena by developing wider 
hypotheses about underlying causes. The bottom line, as Bhaskar 
brings out,61 is that this methodological process relies upon
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the assumption that there is a set of underlying or hidden causal 
mechanisms which generate observable patterns of social behaviour 
and which are capturable in a set of analytical categories which 
distinguish those aspects of social reality (the deep structures) 
which are causally determining as opposed to those which are 
regarded as corresponding secondary effects of the prinary 
factors. This deep realist philosophy of science requires the 
discovery both of regular relations between phenomena and of some 
kind of mechanism which links them. Thus critical theory ideally 
must refer to the categories which initiate the process of change 
(basic formations) and give a description of that change itself 
(historical categorization). Knowledge is needed both of the 
underlying mechanisms and structures of the present (i.e. 
liberal-capitalism) and of the movements in which they generate 
or explain the phenomena (for example, • classical dialectical 
materialism).
Expressly it is held that critical theory must 'go beyond' 
reflexivity replacing it with a clear sociology of knowledge, 
for, although it may well be concerned to give an account of its 
origins, it is not to become entangled in reflexive paradoxes or 
sceptical challenges which obstruct its potential to offer a 
positive solution to the reconstruction of society. Moreover, 
this reconstruction is rhetorically offered in terms of the 
realization of human potentialities by the removal of 
constraints; by destroying the limitations on praxis. The key to 
the latter is the emancipation of human life when people 'freely 
and collectively1 control the direction of change on the basis 
of a rational understanding of social progress. The false 
consciousness which results from unreflective participation 
within the existing social structure is overcome by making 
participants aware of the 'unconscious determinants' to which 
their social actions are subjected. By making them aware of the 
material, socio-organizational constraints upon their social 
consciousness critical theory will provide agents with the 
opportunity to grasp their true interests and, by provision of 
knowledge as to the deep structural nature of social process, to
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see via praxis the manner in which they would be realised.62 Such 
an opportunity, however, is limited to that revealed by the 
ontology of social existence which the 'theory' reveals. Opposed 
to any possibility of an overreaching Weltanschauung the 
pragmatic imagination is linked to the necessity for what Berki 
has called "multiple perspectives".63
There has appeared something irreducibly puzzling and perplexing 
about the history of the endeavour of human understanding, a 
difficulty the pragmatist sometimes places in the context of one 
of mankind1s fundamental problems of understanding himself - the 
mind-body division articulated in modernity as the Cartesian 
tradition. A tradition wherein the body is seen in relation to 
a set of external natural physical laws, while inversely the mind 
is viewed as consciousness being able to formulate its own 
relations and laws.64
The desire to achieve some set of perfect spectacles to view the 
entirety of the world or the image of the mirror to provide the 
perfect spectacle can been seen as correspondingly to the desire 
to surpass the tension between thought and desire, an overcoming 
- the dream of reconciliation, for which we take important models 
from Aristotle the universal Nous, and Hegel's climax of Geist. 
Yet it is also out of these divisions, perplexities, ambiguities 
and dilemmas that the pragmatist sees originating the demand to 
connect institutions and ideals, i.e. 'ideals' seen as expressed 
conceptual articulations of desire. When a totalizing social 
theory is offered, implicitly, the mind body problem is offered 
as solved65 - but if that is the case there really is no need of 
further theory.
Let us be clear of the positivist position: as the Logical
Empiricist Reichenbach put it in 1938 we must
"distinguish carefully the task of epistemology from that of 
psychology. Epistemology does not regard the processes of 
thinking in their actual occurrence; this task is left to 
psychology. What epistemology intends to do is to construct 
the thinking processes in a way in which they ought to occur 
if they are to be arranged in a consistent system ....
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Epistemology thus considers a logical substitute . . [and].. 
for this logical substitute the term 'rational 
reconstruction1 has been introduced; it seems an appropriate 
phrase to indicate the task of epistemology in its specific 
difference from the task of psychology ...[thus]... I shall 
introduce the terms 'context of discovery1 and 'context of 
justification* to mark this distinction. Then we have to say 
that epistemology is only occupied in constructing the 
context of justification."
For Rudolf Carnap rational reconstruction is
"the searching out of new definitions for old concepts. The 
old concepts did not ordinarily originate by way of 
deliberate formulation, but in more or less unreflected and 
spontaneous development. The new concepts should be superior 
to the old in clarity and exactness, and above all, should 
fit into a systematic structure of concepts."67
Positivism (both in its Logical Positivism and Logical Empiricism
extremes) distinguishes the context of discovery, which is
historically embedded and subject to tradition and prejudice,
from the context of justification, which seeks to distinguish the
'objective particulars1 of knowledge. In the final result it is
the truth of knowledge which is the justification for accepting
the propositions of knowledge. Reconstruction is the exclusion
of all truth-functionally irrelevant elements from a properly
reconstructed system. For Reichenbach the reconstruction which
"is given is not arbitrary; it is bound to actual thinking 
by the postulates of correspondence. It is even, in a 
certain sense, a better way of thinking than actual 
thinking. In being set before the rational reconstruction, 
we have the feeling that only now do we understand what we 
think; and we admit that the rational reconstruction 
expresses what we mean, properly speaking."68
However, all philosophical theories are dependant upon some form 
of concealed structuring of epistemological presuppositions - the 
logical positivist of a purity of induction, Locke*s "tabular 
rosa" theory of the mind, Wittgenstein's early attempt at a basic 
function of man and language - all assert some "moral empirical" 
statement about man and the world. As Susan James openly admits 
in her project to reconcile Holist and Individualist forms of 
explanation, disputes in social theory appear not to be strictly 
settled by the success of the "rational reconstruction" of 
purified epistemology gaining an unquestioned universal
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acceptance, but by a "moral variety" of resolution, i.e. that 
particular versions of epistemological reconstruction will be 
accepted on the basis of certain self definitions and "moral" 
conceptions of man and society, "moral" interests unavoidably 
tied to explanation.69
We cannot, however, stress enough how much this conception of at 
least part of the reason for the acceptance of theory departs 
from the declared self-conceptions of the actors, for whom it 
appears anti-theoretical to suggest that "rational" acceptance 
of a theory can have anything to do other than with meeting that 
abstract and impartial warrant of truth; or, alternatively other 
than meeting with the correct social conditions, or historical 
position. Instead such an acceptance by previous actors in 
history must always be "irrational", an action in the grip of 
"ideology" for which the cure is epistemological purification, 
or, alternatively, an evolutionary 'progression' wherein our 
understanding of the previous is "corrected" by the 'meta' 
enterprise of a "sociology of knowledge", whereby the truth of 
unscrunitised claims can be "relativised" by the understanding 
given by the knowledge presented by such sociology of knowledge. 
But not only is this suspect since whatever categories (class, 
social position) that the sociology of knowledge assigns to the 
actor are then the first order products (claims) of a further 
particular form of knowledge, which then requires subjection to 
another sociology of knowledge, but the very correction of truth 
statements by a sociology of knowledge requires a purer "reason", 
for the understanding of which we have either the historicism of 
reason raising itself to purer levels, or, the continual regress 
of a sociology of knowledge of a sociology of knowledge of a 
sociology of knowledge...70
How then does one extract oneself from this reflexively self- 
defeating state of affairs? The pragmatic turn is to assert the 
essentially 'human' aspect to being 'knowers' - to turn knowing 
into something which cannot be divorced from the qualities of 
human judgement. A move which asserts for pragmatism its status
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as truly 'modern' and as a non-respecter of the traditional
choice of either Plato or the Sophists. As Heidegger put it
commenting upon Nietzsche:
"Western history has now began to enter into the completion 
of that period we call the modern. and which is defined by 
the fact that man becomes the measure and the centre of 
beings. Man is what lies at the bottom of all things; that 
is, in modern terms, at the bottom of all objectification 
and representability."71
There are two immediate tactics. First, to turn the concern with 
epistemological purification away from the search for the 
absolute foundation or corrected authority onto a methodology of 
progress in change. This move is also implicit when Popper turns 
truth into a metaphysical concept equivalent to 'sincerity' as 
opposed to the correct correspondence language.72 Second, to turn 
the core of intellectual inquiry (philosophy/science) away from 
the domination of the pursuit of the guarantee of truth into a 
broader concept in which Reason does not have the task of 
enlightening itself into truth, as the absolute statement of 
Reason, but may instead enjoy a critical rationality without the 
presence of the "absolute", but lives with the acknowledgement 
of plurality. Indeed, to give up wholly the notion that 
epistemology is the mechanism for ascertaining the 'absolute' , 
that locus which would guarantee the grand perspective.
In earlier times a recognition of a duality, if not a plurality, 
of understanding lay behind that concept once labelled "wisdom" 
and it is as well to consider that Reason once had this 
alternative concept as its goal. To tie inquiry to the pursuit 
of truth, as opposed to wisdom, is to give up a breadth of 
conception. For, at its least, the hold of this other concept 
(whether or not we can understand the classic term 'Sophia'), is 
to state that understanding and action require more than pure 
knowledge (as with our translations of 'Sophia' which contain two 
aspects, of which knowledge was admittedly one, but the other is 
good conduct). Wisdom has had a bad press being associated with 
an even greater 'authoritianism' than the command of 'truth' 
since it appears to assert that knowledge-claims must be
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themselves positioned in an image of life, and the journeying of 
life (i.e. the hold of the narratives), the purpose of our 
communities and our own, social, existence. Thus when these are 
controlled the socio-political 'closure' of society results. 
However, this is to argue against one conception, and even 
Popper's whole approach to epistemology - rational argument and 
fallibilism as opposed to pursuit of manifest truth - can be seen 
as an awareness originating in an historical investigation of the 
'subject of truth' and its linkage to authoritianism. 
Furthermore, whilst the grip of the philosophy of knowledge is 
profoundly contemplative - the effort to see things as they truly 
are - wisdom involved a superior contemplative mode for guiding 
activity - one which not only faithfully transmitted the sights 
one had seen and so created models which imitated, or mirrored 
the actuality of nature, but conceived linkages, implications, 
and achieved a speculative depth which included, but was broader 
than what knowledge can reveal: the concept of wisdom is linked 
to contextual imagination for practical life.73
It is the achievement of an imaginative awareness - as distinct 
from a knowledge,74 which characterises the wise man in contrast 
to the knowledgeable: wisdom calls for more from the bearer of 
logos than to merely relate reality, it asks for some 
discrimination. He must make judgments concerning the relative 
significance of various aspects of "reality". All of reality is 
not of equal importance to the concerns of man - that is what the 
critical faculty means. It is in the drawing out of the most 
significant aspects of reality that wisdom works in its 
connection between the true and the good.
Hegel had already drawn out the weakness of the philosophy of 
knowledge, which he himself appeared committed to. That is, a 
realization that for the philosophy of knowledge, claims as to 
action, which flow from knowledge (and not from interaction in 
an irrational fashion with opinion) can only be made by a grand
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universality and totalizing of knowledge.
Remembering that Hegel is talking of philosophy as the 
'philosophy of knowledge1, his explanation in the Philosophy of 
Right (Law) tells a complicated story75 in which he relates how 
an intellectual consciousness of man committed to a philosophy 
of knowledge can only achieve its relevance at the end, and come 
into its own after the end.76 Perhaps paradoxically, it has been 
elements of a growing pragmatic tradition which have in varying 
ways restated this. Applying such a message one may feel that the 
predicament of modern social theory is to reflexively become 
conscious of its weakness and its closure, to have presented 
knowledge-claims under the authority of an outmoded conception 
of reality and truth; to have called for practice without- an 
imagination of transformation which does justice to the desire 
to open theory, consciousness and social institutions and to 
create revisable and human images of change and development. Such 
a comment is, of course, prejudiced: its prejudice is to state 
that social consciousness requires not just a critical social 
theory, but an adequate imaginative grasp of a foundational 
epistemology which offers a methodology of judging change and 
discourse without the either all or nothing of an absolute 
foundation; yet one which takes seriously the need to offer 
statements of essential qualities of life and consciousness, that 
is, to offer continual positive and credible modes to transcend 
the entrenched dichotomies of positioning without closing off 
itself into misplaced confidence. There is, however, little 
chance of present dilemmas being fully understood without a 
comprehension of the relationship between criminal justice 
discourse and modernity which we shall now sketch.
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Cambridge Mass., Ballinger, 1979, and our discussion in Chapter 
Ten. For the decline of the 'ideal' which had proceeded it see 
Francis Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal. Yale 
University Press, New Haven, 1981. For support of 'Just deserts' 
as the 'end-state' of contemporary criminal justice see the 
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Future Crimes r (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1985) 
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scientific economics), into a hope for selective incarceration 
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necessary to give effect to the courts1 decisions...
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desserts. Other common law jurisdictions, for example, in the 
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a helping service to offenders with a social work approach is 
redefined: "Preventing re-offending and protecting the public 
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service."(p.2)
Old penal demarcations between custodial and non-custodial 
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constructing an array of combinations of supervision, penalty and 
situations in the 'community' which involve a constraint and 
diminution of liberty are offered. The overall package is said 
to "provide a more consistent approach, so that victims are
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[Begriff], which is also history's inescapable lesson, is that 
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51
over against the real and that the ideal apprehends this same 
real world in its substance and builds it up for itself into the 
shape of an intellectual realm. When philosophy paints its grey 
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grey in grey it cannot be rejuvenated but only understood. The 
owl of Minerva spreads it's wings only with the falling dusk." 
G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right. T.M.Knox Trans., At the 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1953, p. 11-13.
76.Guidance by knowledge is the highest form of "theoria" which 
has the telos of interpreting, understanding and contemplating 
reality: but this task, which can only end with "the world 
apprehended in thoughts", leaves man the laggard drifting behind 
the natural cunning of history.
The .impotence of theory (as pure knowledge) is that it 
cannot guide practice - it can only apprehend the actual. The 
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Chapter Two: Knowledge and the Construction of Modernity: an
outline narrative overview.
I
Central to any understanding of modernity is the Enlightenment1 
and for heuristic purposes we may assert that modernity is the 
product of the transformations which the Enlightenment begins. 
The Enlightenment is most commonly described as a strange sort 
of "coming out" party. A party where there is a great deal of 
behind the scenes preparation, confusion on the night, but, once 
over, its subject "man" has "come of age", and is free to go out 
into the real (the true) world, a free man to make his own 
destiny.
In a sense stories of the Enlightenment and its resultant 
"freedoms" appear inescapably linked to certain spatial metaphors 
also found in earlier writings. The orthodox narrative of our 
progress portrays the crucial transformation of the Enlightenment 
aS) follows: Plato had depicted men as living in a cave, prisoners 
of their inability to use reason, governed by ignorance and myth; 
Plato, aided by Aristotle, had formulated an awareness of the 
glorious potentiality of reason, but this, in its turn, was 
surrendered to the forces of organised Religion and subjected to 
the politics of absolutist Authority.2 Without the proper use of 
reason, man looked out into the world and saw strange and complex 
things, and, afraid of mystery, constructed new and even more 
elaborate mythologies to make the events of the world appear 
meaningful. In the Enlightenment man thrust free of the hold of 
those mythologies and the domination of that Authority, to bring 
light to the cave - alternatively, he left the cave to construct 
a home outside in the light of the continuing knowledge he 
obtained of the real causes and springs of nature - he was no 
longer subjected to the illusions and personifications of the 
realm of mystery but became possessed of the capabilities of 
scientific reason. From then on his continuing battle was to 
separate opinion from knowledge, politics from engineering.
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Requiring a place to inhabit, man set out to develop social 
theory and to use this to construct a citadel in which co­
habitation would be possible. The enemies of successful co­
habitation were strongly identified with politics and 
metaphysics. It was felt that social and individual freedom would 
flow from proper social arrangements, and man could only discover 
these when the logos of discussion was freed from the illusions 
of metaphysics and the arbitrariness of politics.
We summarise thus: the aim of social theory was to create a
building -of objective knowledge that would not be at the mercy
of metaphysical speculation or of political storms. Modernity was
a constructivist project. Bacon, an epistemological empiricist,
and one of the strongest figures in the early construction
project, identified the task thus: "Knowledges are as pyramids,
whereof history is the basis...3 The History Bacon had in mind
was a "well-ordered Natural History [which] is the key of all
knowledges and operations". Little progress was possible until
this had "been prepared and constructed". Without this secure
grounding of ascertained fact as to man's past and the historical
process he found himself in, intellectual endeavour would be a
mixture of unreliable and abstract theories, where everyone would
have his favourite fancy and would philosophise "out of the cells
of his own imagination, as out of Plato's cave". New and solid
structures could be raised upon "a true and copious history of
nature and the arts", the building to be guided by this "first
philosophy.... [being] a receptacle for all such axioms as are
not peculiar to any of the particular sciences, but belong to
several of them in common." This was a methodology for use also
"in civil business", and including not only "natural philosophy",
but also "the other sciences, logic, ethics, and politics". In
this process, the illusionary fancies of the imagination (the
constructions of metaphysics) were the enemy, and, thus:
"The formation of notions and axioms on the foundation of 
true induction is the only fitting remedy by which we can 
ward off and expel these idols."4
Bacon proposed an anchoring as the archimedean point of truth
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itself - not now an external vantage point from which to survey
the reality of the cave but an inherent entity in the nature of
the central subject (man), and his relation to the external
object (the world).
"Truth is not sought in the good fortune of any particular 
conjuncture of time, which is uncertain, but in the light of 
nature and experience, which is eternal".5
Descartes, a philosophical rationalist, while differing from the
empiricist approach of Bacon, openly reduces the terminology of
wisdom to the project of construction through knowledge.
Descartes first makes a classical statement of the aim of wisdom:
"the end of study should be to direct the mind towards the
enunciation of sound and correct judgments on all matters that
come before it", but he then goes on to state that "the sciences
taken together are identical with human wisdom". The task is. to
combine the various disciplines to achieve a comprehensive
edifice for the purpose of secure life. Thus:
"if, therefore, anyone wishes to search out the truth of 
things in serious earnest, he ought not to select one 
special science; for all the sciences are conjoined with 
each other and interdependent: he ought rather to think how 
to increase the natural light of reason, not for the 
purposes of resolving this or that difficulty of scholastic 
type, but in order that his understanding may light his will 
to its proper choice in all the contingencies of life."6
The activity of choice, however, is seen as directed by "what we 
can clearly and perspicuously behold and with certainty deduce; 
for knowledge is not won in any other way". Progress is assured 
for man if he applies the scientific method to attain knowledge 
of every sphere of human life, and the foundations of our project 
are secured by the benevolence of God's gift of basic innate 
ideas. Hence the transformation of wisdom into knowledge is for 
Descartes a part of an imaginative grasp of the "order of things" 
in which God provides the anchoring point - man comes out of the 
cave by the grace of God.7
Whether guided by the empiricist or the rationalist approach, 
concomitant with man coming out of the cave into the light of 
true knowledge he also slowly comes out of the social relations
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which the German theorist Tonnies was later to label as the 
Gemeinschaft and into the Gesellschaft - this transformation 
replaces the legitimations and ideologies of the Gemeinschaft 
incorporating domination-submission as the habitual acceptance 
of tradition or the authoritarian stipulation of the significant 
relations of the world, and the centrality of the exercise of 
parental responsibility with its accompanying submission to 
parental will. The growth of Gesellschaft law and rationality is 
inimical to set relations of dependence and status and the 
transference of supposed hierarchies from nature requiring a new 
way of relating to the world - a way in which the hold of 
tradition and authoritarian stipulation over practice gives way 
to a new style; of openness to truth and to 'problem1 as the 
drive of practice.8
Modernity breaks from the grip of the past via an act of self 
definition wherein it conceives itself as a 'problem': a
complexity which determines both the nature of the structure of 
being - the problem of the 'what is it?1, and the methodology of 
action, 'how is it/the other to be done?1. Modernity becomes a 
series of problematics, and the achievement of this status is 
itself the harbinger of modernity. The symptoms of modernity, are 
thus the very things which bring it about.
The problematics of modernity stand linked and indicative of the 
constructivist project. The 'solution1 of the one impacts and 
interacts with the nature of the other and the framing of the 
construction of the future. The life of the cave of the 
gemeinschaft rested on the 'social space/terrain’ of a perceived 
harmony constructed out of the ties of friendship, tradition and 
the habitual/common acceptance of religious ordering and a telos 
of nature; the destruction of that 'natural harmony1 throws open 
the 'nature1 of modernity's 'nature' as a problem to be resolved. 
The problem of modernity consists, among others, as the problems 
of:
1) how is one to conceive of society - the methodology of 
vision and understanding?;
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2) how is one to organise society?;
3) how is one to control power?;
4) how is one to achieve social control?;
5) how is one to understand oneself?
where the solution of each relates to the others.
II
Mystery and Problem: a background contrast.
For modernity to place prominence in 'problem' as the modality 
of conceiving of the relationship of man and existence may result 
from a latent choice; other possibilities are at least dreamable. 
For the French existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel there 
were two paths to follow in pursuing the question "what am I?", 
or "what is X?" Under the first the answer is sought in the 
reduction of the question to a problem and the analyzing of its 
parts to produce a solution. A 'problem1 implies that we lack 
some information or knowledge and that all we have to do is look 
for this, engage in 'research1 and thereby overcome our temporary 
ignorance. The question of relating is secondary and is directly 
led by or responsive to the product of the first. What is 
important is the provision of knowledge, and, almost as an 
invisible transformation, the arrival of this knowledge is seen 
as itself guiding the solution.
Using these concepts our model of 'problem1 lies within the 
confidence of ongoing epistemological purification orientating 
man to take on a 'societal1 organizational mode of development 
in which progress is closely related to attainment of knowledge. 
Applying this model to the development of social theory we see 
post enlightenment man as actively reasserting Plato's 
distinction between knowledge and opinion so that he may use 
knowledge to relate to the world via the mediation of 'problem' - 
thus side stepping the realm of politics with its inherent need 
to decide between opinions - and building an epistemologically 
secure social order.
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Methodologically, to produce such explanation it is absolutely 
crucial that the pursuit of truth must be separated and preserved 
from those various psychological, sociological, economic, 
political, moral and loose "ideological” factors and pressures 
which directly affect the process of thought in society. 
Obviously such factors will influence the creation of thought, 
but this can be transformed into reliable knowledge via the 
distinction between the context of discovery and rational 
reconstruction and further understood by the various critiques 
of the "sociology of knowledge". Moreover, the model of 'problem' 
is self-sustaining since problem solving is seen as the 
justification of taking action based upon theory - but this is 
in fact determined already by the bind of truth - for truth is 
what justifies the acceptance of the theory and if we have truly 
stated the conditions of the problem, i.e. set out the entities 
to be correlated, then a topology of solutions can be set out - 
and that which most closely corresponds to the nature of the 
entities rationally accepted.
Under this model the grasp of 'problem' is to constitute certain 
profiles of reality as its object; to state the determinants of 
its view of the object at any one time, and to seek out the laws 
which cover the operation and 'being' of this object with the 
criterion of 'solvability' paramount. There are in principle no 
areas beyond the scope of problem. Success for this path lies in 
the resolution or attainment of control over the determinants 
which "caused" the specific sub "problems", and total success 
will be achieved only when the totality of the conditions and the 
laws governing the realm of 'problem' can be arranged into a 
logically connected whole. This activity, which corresponds to 
the overcoming of such separations, will be the intellectual, and 
in turn by praxis the actual, coming-together of what-is with the 
what-it-was, and the what-it-will-be (the full knowledge of 
covering laws). Theory combines with practice and upon achieving 
this man will obtain a stable home, a permanent order allowing 
an harmonious existence.
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The style and history of 'mystery' on the other hand is 
different. 'Mystery' grants itself a situational context the 
nature of which can never be fully known, nor controlled. The 
journeying of 'problem' is engaged in for an outcome (a 
conclusion) which ideally can be specified with the proper 
knowledge, but, with 'mystery' there can be no finite conclusion 
to this journey, only a temporal direction, and, rather than 
guidance by concentration upon the method of 'problem', a style 
which involves the continual exercise of judgement, wherein 
discretion is used and choices made, in the recognition of the 
impossibility of the perfect dwelling. Instead, for 'mystery' any 
stoppage is but a breaking off, an arbitrary interruption in an 
open-ended process. Explanation is not seen as the search for the 
definite answers and the allocation of the correct words, but an 
interaction with knowledge-claims and opinion, which, 
correspondingly, requires meaningful interpretation and 
clarification of the possible significance of their aspects.
The existence of man is seen as in a world of immediate problems, 
but throughout that world, and above the resolution of the 
immediate, will always be the fact that the world is to be a 
lived-in-world. Conditions of relation supersede in importance 
the perspective on the gaining of secure knowledge. The advocates 
of 'mystery' , state that concentration on 'problem' can only ever 
produce knowledges linked to a temporal-spacial position, which 
indeed may appear adequate to the task in particular, but which 
are necessarily narrow in their scope and should not bear claims 
to universality. Almost in paradox, it will be argued that the 
more harmonious order will be that made possible by renouncing 
the idea of the completely understood and ordered state of the 
world demonstrating a 'truthfulness' visible to all men. As 
Marcel put it:
"Perhaps a stable order can only be established on earth if 
man always remains acutely conscious that his condition is 
that of a traveller. Does not everything happen as though 
this ruined universe turned relentlessly upon whomever 
claimed that he could settle down in it to the extent of 
erecting a permanent dwelling for himself."9
Man's uniqueness for Marcel was that "the essence of man is to
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be in a situation", and with this concept of situation comes a 
recognition of the moral dimension of existence.10
'Mystery1 states that any statement of "final reality" is the 
reality of 'mystery1, for we are never to be absolute "knowers" . 
Herein lies the dilemma: for if we are to be of necessity (and 
this is an 'of necessity' that we cannot give the reasons for - 
as that would be to give a vision of a final reality that we 
cannot know), and to all eternity, never to set out a system 
which locates the 'objective' position of man and the cosmos, 
and mirrors the complete being of man, then what is the role of 
the multi-various words, groups of words (sentences, paragraphs, 
texts), theories and explanations, and 'knowledges' in human 
activities? Furthermore, what is the proper relation to those 
"descriptive frames of reference" which 'problem' constructs, and 
tells us to use as guides in social arrangement and practice?
Ill
Linguistic mediation on 'mystery' and 'problem'.
On the one hand the voice of 'problem' declares that even if we 
were forced to renounce the security of some absolute or God 
given foundation, we are safe in the resulting frames, we need 
not despair nor despise them, for these products of 'problem' are 
our constructions, not those of 'God' or any other, but made by 
us, in partnership with the tool of language as we relate to the 
external world. For Vico the fundamental security of the 
descriptive frames of social theory was that "minds are formed 
by the character of language, not language by the minds of those 
who speak it". The independence of language allows us to 
concentrate upon the reality of the world, the impartiality of 
language enables 'problem' to resist arbitrary domination, and 
understand both the natural and the historical-social. The latter 
is open to our understanding as we are men and therefore can 
understand all that men are and have done and postulated, 
including history and the content of history. We can discuss and
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rationally resolve our particular situations - men as men
wherever we temporally stand. As a modern interpreter of Vico,
J.L.Gorman, put it:
The only way of avoiding the problem [i.e., despair at the 
prospect of viable not universal foundations] is if the 
principles have an independent ground of support, and 
this....is provided by the fact that man made the world of 
nations - 'men' not as they but as we - and we have 
privileged access to its principles, which we may rediscover 
within the modifications of our own human mind. Although man 
is historically conditioned in large part, we know, in a way 
which transcends any empiricist skepticism, what we are 
like, and this provides the ultimate rational constraint. 
This last is our substantive commitment.... the
epistemological foundation [of Vico is] when the theorist 
understands himself, he may understand others".11
By contrast Nietzsche argues that this reliance upon the self as
stable or knowable is reflexively open to 'perspectivism':12
"But how do we recognise ourselves? How can a man know 
himself? He is a dark and hidden thing; whereas the hare is 
said to have seven skins, man can take off seven times 
seventy skins and still not be able to say: 'That is you as 
you really are, that is no longer mere external
appearance1" .13
This later move not only denies the transparency of consciousness 
to itself and the existence of an absolute 'common-sense', but 
also leads to the denial of human consciousness to make 
knowledge-claims as to the 'objective' reality of the human
condition, other than trapped in the historical nature of its
varying world views .14
This reflexive concern is not new; the understanding that the 
conception of the self and its powers of cognition structured the 
perception of the 'object1, and thus the resolution of the 
choices of relationships was a target to be contained. Kant, for 
example, to bring forward aspects of our later discussion, sought 
to remove the use of reason by the human self from any necessity 
to be founded upon a particular empirical theory of human nature. 
As human desire was empirically subjective Kant declared that a 
danger came with 'problem's1 myopia or partial blindness, in his 
words, "die zweckvolle Zwecklosigkeit" - the aimful aimlessness. 
Against this Kant held it was possible to construct, on the basis
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of certain key tenets (for example that we must treat "nature1
as "formally purposive" with respect to empirical laws, and that
we can make sense of nature not only in general but also in
particular) an edifice of purity. Reason was strictly systematic:
"but there is yet another consideration which is more 
philosophical and architectural in character, namely to 
grasp the idea of the whole connections and therein to view 
all... parts in their mutual relations."15
From Kant onwards the idea of living in a building of knowledge 
is linked to Reason taking charge of the quality control of the 
construction and the materials used. Tasks are distributed - 
surveyors, architects, and builders - people to ensure that the 
land is not likely to subside, the requirement of strong 
foundations, and that the structure knits firmly together but all 
are guided by the impartiality of 'rationality'.
That is not to say that man is not deeply involved. For Kant the 
construction of the building was a 'critical task’ - man could 
not passively rely upon deciphering the word of God - but instead 
must become actively and critically involved usurping the central 
position in a process wherein his powers of creating scientific 
theory come as an extension of the cognitive powers of the human 
mind and logical inference.
Kant divides reality into two - a phenomenal realm which science 
can cover, and a noumenal realm about which we can never have 
knowledge. Man can only have knowledge about the phenomenal and 
the ordering of that knowledge is related to the essential 
conditions of man's contact with this phenomenal realm.
Objective knowledge is the creation of the interaction between 
the direct sensations we receive from the outside world and the 
object, transcendental conditions of cognition - the mind of the 
scientist is crucially involved, as an operative source, in the 
production of the universal laws we discover in nature.
Further, this is no chaotic, arbitrary form of subjective 
experience, but an objective experience to be reflectively
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understood at the level of man's 'universal' interaction with the 
world. Thus for Kant 'the a priori conditions of experience are 
also the conditions for the existence of the objects of 
experience.' An absolute frame of reference exists now which 
structures the mind of the subject (man) himself. The object (the 
world) no longer unfolds its written laws for man to correctly 
interpret, but man as active cognitive subject moves to the 
centre and the world is understood in the language of that 
subject's cognition. Science does not simply take receipt of 
nature's script but neither does it dialogue with nature; it 
imposes its own language upon it. Still it must discover, in 
every case, the specific message expressed in this general 
language - simply knowing the a priori concepts is pointless. The 
construction process is legitimated upon the foundational belief 
that nature is rightly subjected to the laws that the scientists 
succeed in creating - whatever the area of investigation, 
whatever the relevant question science asks, it will obtain a 
commensurable answer, i.e. one translatable into the master 
language. The basic certainty is that there exists a single 
universal syntax which includes all possible answers.
There can be no need for political reconciliation of differing 
conceptual schemes: for science now can claim to have found the 
definite form of all possible positive knowledge, while at the 
same time philosophy takes at best an epistemological function 
with respect to science. It is no longer necessary to look for 
the philosophic significance of the results of scientific inquiry 
- because from a transcendental perspective those results cannot 
lead to anything 'new'. It is the proper conduct of science, not 
its results, that is the subject of philosophy; science taken as 
a repetitive and closed enterprise provides a stable foundation.
'Problem' seizes upon Kant's 'Copernican Revolution' to use 
philosophy to ratify the results of science - alternatively the 
realm of the noumenal can be the area of philosophical 
'speculation', but that is all it can be, abstract speculation 
which cannot produce positive knowledge.
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Individual men are active in cognition - but their active role 
is in interaction with others to conduct experiments which must 
all have their results subjected to the critical analysis of a 
philosophical purification utilising the a priori principles - 
thus any diversity of possible scientific points of view must 
only be temporary. The diversity of presuppositions will be 
corrected in the rational reconstruction of theories.
The mind is in partnership with language, but the Kantian mind 
is after the unique language with which science covers nature; 
a language to which man is essentially joined via the unique set 
of a priori principles on which science is based and which are 
identified with the categories of human understanding. The 
Kantian project unifies the sub-projects: the vital subject man 
is in the centre imposing the design of his cognition, and the 
world relates to the language of this subject. Thus science can 
describe the world from an external, almost divine point of view, 
and basing his construction upon such knowledge man can create 
a citadel which not only 'is strong1 but which is correct for 
man.
IV
Differing conceptions of language are crucial to the distinction 
between 'problem' and 'mystery'. 'Problem' took a particular 
conception of the Aristotelian definition of man as the rational 
animal. It down-played the fact that Aristotle's actual 
definition, in terms of man as that animal which possesses/uses 
logos (i.e. the rational use of words), was open to a range of 
meanings. It created a reading whereby the destiny of man was to 
become possessed of the correct words (and knowledge of the right 
usage) - then, and only then, would man live up to the promise 
thought implicit in his possession of logos. This notion sides 
with a set of theories about language called "designative". These 
theories explain the meaning of words, and sets of words, solely 
in terms of their correspondence to things, or states of affairs,
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in the "objective" world. The acceptance of these theories is the
enemy of 'mystery' , as they make the meaning of language, and the
items words concern, something entirely assessable and
unpuzzling. Words simply have the meaning of signifying, or
pointing to, the things they are about. There can ideally be no
mystery about what language conveys, and, when the correct way
of speaking is engaged in, there can be no mystery about the
world. The alliance with 'problem' is demonstrated in the
expectation that true knowledge will be the correct
correspondence of a set of words to a set of things in objective
reality. On this view:
"True knowledge is that knowledge which the knower would 
have if the proposition which he formulates about the 
objective reality were exactly isomorphic to the reality."16
A clear illustration of this alliance is seen in the mainstream
reading of the early work of Wittgenstein. This reading holds
that in the Tractatus the positivist phase of Wittgenstein sought
to prove that the constructions of science successfully banished
metaphysics. The role of the philosopher was as a sort of police
officer who ensured that everyone used language correctly and
engaged in the construction of a sensible world. The building
methodology distinguished between "the sayable" (science), and
"the unsayable" (das mystische), and was premised on the nature
(designative) of language itself. Thus:
"The correct method in [construction] would really be the 
following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. 
propositions of natural science - i.e. something that has 
nothing to do with [this process of building] - and then, 
whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, 
to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning 
to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not 
be satisfying to the other person....this method would be 
the only strictly correct one."17
For Wittgenstein: "What can be said at all can be said clearly, 
what we cannot talk about we must consign to silence."18 The 
propositions of which language consists are essentially pictures 
of reality, of states of affairs in the world, and the truth or 
falsity of a proposition consists in the agreement or 
disagreement between the states of affairs which the pictures
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purport to cover, and the actual states of affairs. Once this 
quality criterion is established it becomes clear that
"most of the propositions and questions to be found in
philosophical works are not false but nonsensical".19
Mankind is causing itself pain and confusion by misusing language 
and engaging in nonsensical speech-acts - the implicit meaning 
of the Tractatus is that once mankind understands the proper use 
of language it will recognise that it is suffering from "the 
bewitchment of language" which it will throw off and proper 
social engineering will proceed. This is the dream of 'problem' 
and its domination has enabled adherents like Hobbes to think 
that "clear definitions actually uncover what justice is, because 
they remove the ambiguity which grows onto a word in vulgar usage 
and restore to it its proper or necessary meaning."20 On this 
view the proposition "human nature", necessarily relates to a 
state of affairs in the objective world, and, once known, it 
follows then that the "true" meaning of propositions such as 
"human rights", or "human needs", can be conclusively 
established.
'Mystery', is linked to those theories about language called 
"expressionist". With expressionist theories, meaning is not 
reducible to a correlation, but is something inhering in the very 
practice of expressing itself. The meaning involved with an 
expressionist concept of language can not be explained by any 
analytical reduction. Marcel partly meant by 'mystery' the 
inability to translate aspects of man and the experiences of 
being in the lived-in-world into objects "out there", as these 
experiences always include the subject and cannot be captured in 
objectivity. Similarly, the technique of isolating terms and 
tracing correlations cannot be successful when we are dealing 
with expressive meaning. Expressive theories side with 'mystery' 
and undercut the claims that science will produce objective 
accounts of the objective world divorced of subject-related 
properties. Under the designative conception of language, when 
it is claimed that the logos of science is objective it is meant 
that it is able to give an account of the cosmos, and the
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entities in the cosmos, in terms that do not involve subject- 
related properties, that is, to use properties that things have 
without the experience of subjects and which would exist if the 
subjects of experience did not exist.
By contrast the expressive account, and the path of 'mystery1, 
cannot avoid subject-related properties and a subject-related 
account and process. Moreover, because expression is the ability 
of a subject, and the process of expression is a process in which 
a thing becomes manifest, both the process and the resulting 
things refer us back to the subjects for whom the process and the 
things manifest were important. Crucially, those things which 
come out of expression, the resulting manifestations of 
expression, owe their existence to the process of expression, and 
their meaning cannot be accounted for independently of that 
process of expression. Acceptance of these theories gives a 
totally different orientation in any consideration of the 
ontological status of words such as "crime" and "human rights".21
In this later, pragmatic, conception the crucial consideration 
is the use we make of words and sentences rather than some 
supposed capacity language has for picturing meaning directly 
from reality. Instead of guarantee by pure reason, or essential 
features of reality, the basis of such meaning becomes the socio- 
historical methodologies by which such uses come into existence 
and the human desire and activities which create and defend them.
VI
The Dictate of modernist authenticity.
To see man as basically creative, as the central instigator of
social change, is an enlightenment perspective. The
constructivist project of modernity relies on a creativity which
locates itself in the self. As Taylor has put it:
"the modern subject is self-defining, where on previous 
views the subject is defined in relation to the cosmic 
order" ,22
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To Morse Peckham the changes of the Enlightenment heralded
"the power of the individual mind to create, on its own, a 
vision or order, to discover by itself a true ground for the 
sense of value, its own source of identity.’*2
The self is to be stripped, laid naked from social role or 
structured ends, free to begin the task of realising its true 
desires and facilities. By contrast, the pre-enlightenment, 
intellectual endeavour of medieval Christendom, demonstrated a 
use of reason grounded in the acknowledgement of doctrinal texts 
and beliefs, and one which sought to offer man the reconciliation 
of a scheme of life with the cosmos (albeit reconciliation 
predominantly in obedience to authority). The cosmos was a text, 
a text provided by God for man to read and relate to; movement 
was limited, there was no question of man being able to reshape 
the world contrary to God's design. Rational interest by man in 
man and the world observed the creatures of the world as God's 
creatures, acting in good or evil, threatening or reinforcing, 
the correct order of things.24 Important requirements were the 
demands of communion and connection, or attunement with the 
cosmos; this in turn reinforced and yet also controlled the 
desire to attain an adequate picture of the true state of 
affairs. Conceptual schemes were in essence controlled by the 
certainty accorded to either authoritarian pronouncements of the 
true state, revelation, or enshrined texts; but even as they did 
this they also served to back up the central task of man - to 
live well, that is, in accordance with the rhythm of the cosmos, 
the terms of the grand narrative of design and purpose whose 
syntax lay around us in the ontology of the world. Post- 
Enlightenment theories of human nature and the constitution of 
man, have as their backdrop the continuing decline of 
Christianity.25 Neither was man any longer able to describe his 
reason as engaged in seeking out the beauties of the mystery of 
God's creation and purpose - man could no longer see the world 
as God's textual creation - instead man's curiosity was tied to 
a new conception - the idea that man could take control of his 
own fate and the actual world of his future issue. Crucially he 
thought himself free to arrange language to mirror a non-
68
theological universe. At the same time however, he did not give 
up a reliance upon an external authority whose truth was 
indubitable .26
Creative authenticity came from varying factors, among them: the 
freeing of man's reason from the authority of religion 
(Voltaire's cry to crush the infamous thing - "ecraser 1'infame", 
aimed not only at the practice of torture but at the 
epistemological legitimacy behind it); the freeing of nature from 
God's control, rendering nature neutral; and, quite dramatically, 
the notion of progress changed to become tantamount with the idea 
that "we" are going somewhere, and this was a somewhere within 
this world. Previously man had believed the future of the world 
would either repeat the past (Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Cicero, 
Lucretius, Vico, Ibn Khaldun), or that there was a "golden age" 
from which progress was regression (Christian fall from grace, 
Hesiod, Ovid), change in this life being for the worse, with the 
possibility of radical change suddenly occurring by supernatural 
intervention.27 Hope for the betterment of the human condition 
was expressed in salvation from this world, rather than salvation 
within it. By contrast the new conceptualising combined the old 
images of journey with a new practical interpretation of 
progressive ascent through knowledge.
Part of Christianity's previous constraint on 'problem' was the 
narrative holding of this life as preparation, a lesser ante room 
to the realm of true, meaningful existence. It is valid to claim 
that the theology of Christianity gave to the official ideologies 
of Europe a common frame of reference with a sense of overall 
meaning, and provided them with a pattern which gave substantial 
form to life. Those who moved to forms of atheist humanism 
desired, and predicted, secularization, not merely in the sense 
of the abandonment of religious belief and practice, but also in 
the sense of a transformation of the verbalization of human goals 
and hopes from 'other-worldly', into 'this-worldly', and, thus, 
the present could be judged and transcended, not by the 
expectation, or seeking of justice in heaven, but by looking to
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the justice of "our11 world future. The hope of glory in unity 
with God was sought to be replaced, and, in many respects was 
replaced, by the hope of Utopia.28
Moreover, after the optimism of Bacon and Descartes, progress 
became a participatory event.29 With all the flush of Eighteenth 
century optimism Saint-Simon declared:
"The Golden Age of the human race is not behind us but
before us; it lies in the perfection of the social order.
Our ancestors never saw it; our children will one day arrive
there, it is for us to clear the way".30
Two versions of the methodology arose. One was a structure 
founded upon the model of Newtonian physics. It was a vision of 
the slow, steady progress in scientific knowledge and culture. 
Culture was seen as linked to progress in science; progress in 
scientific knowledge leading to progress in moral affairs.31 
This quite secular vision found an alternative version in the 
more openly transcendental scheme of Hegel, where a total unity 
was the final goal. The power to mobilise both individual and 
collective experience and offer commitment could be founded and 
united around the modern concept of 'progress1. This coherence 
was obtained specifically by the narrative technique since to 
contain the diverse outcomes possible, disaster as well as 
emancipation, demanded a created past in order to position the 
development of the present and gauge the movement into the as yet 
only latent future.
VII
The ambivalence of the reaction to Voltaire's cry "ecraser 
l1infame" illustrates the concern with social control. What 
authority could control the mob with the power of the church 
destroyed? This fear had been voiced before - Machiavelli in 
"The Prince" had defended Religion as a social bond, even if, he 
stated, it be a false one.32
The issue of social control in modernity is one of the most 
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ambiguous issues - cast free of a settled framework, i.e. the 
will of the other as in Christian models, or tradition, the issue 
of freedom appears to have discipline and control as its flip­
side. In the backdrop to the freeing of reason in the 
Enlightenment sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe was 
developing a concept of good government which explicitly required 
techniques of establishing predictable, steady, obedient and 
industrious behaviour among its citizens. Policing, in the sense 
of a formal body of investigators and supervisors specifically 
charged with maintaining good order via the criminal law of the 
society was not so much at issue, instead policing in the sense 
of developing a knowledge led technology for establishing and 
maintaining a good order for the society and every person in it 
was developing.33 Hobbes' dicta was simple: "Man is not fitted 
for society by nature, but by discipline".34 Recently, as we 
shall see, it has become the fashion to see these moves as solely 
instrumental in creating a disciplined and manageable, docile 
social body. This line of thinking critically analyses what has 
previously been taken as progressive enlightenment. Thus those 
voices which opposed the direct reference of developing a formal 
technique of external control (i.e. a police apparatus), and 
argued for the path of moral and educative reform which would 
follow from increasing knowledge and the power of this knowledge, 
which claimed that the authority of knowledge of truth would be 
impartial but secure, are seen to be ideologically in the grip 
of power. But this revisionist approach may be too post-modern 
in its conception,35 it may take too seriously the instrumental 
effects of self-conscious social engineers such as Bentham, and 
underplay the effect of being inside the meta-narratives of 
modernity. Late modern revisionist perspectives, such as Bauman, 
may simplify in reducing the range of desires and emotional 
states which the inhabitators of early modernity experienced, and 
in reducing the power of the grip of the progressive meta­
narrative to a strictly instrumental project - modernity has non­
instrumental, romantic and tragic aspects to it as well. Progress 
by science may well have been believed in to a degree and in ways 
not reducible to #a grip of ideology thesis'. Rousseau's dicta
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that "vices belong not so much to man as to man badly governed" 
allowed the promise for a science of government which could be 
both humanitarian and romantic as well as demanding a rationality 
for government. Certainly however, although seeing government as 
an object of political philosophy was nothing new what was new 
was that government could in many respects become a question of 
'facts'; a question of normalacy and social health. The 
development of social statistics provided a power to be employed 
and encouraged the notion of governmentability; governmentability 
depended upon the assumption that technologies of social 
organization and control could be developed, and this flowed from 
improving our knowledge of the lawfulness of natural phenomena.36 
In this way the spectacle of the mob could be overcome; man's 
evil, it was argued, was not original but consequential. It did 
not flow as a result of man's, past or present acts in relation 
to God, but from present conditions in the natural world. As 
Foucault summarised this it was the birth of "man" as an object 
of study, for now man stood complete, no longer part of God but 
a full being by natural composition, knowable by the 'human' 
sciences.
But governmentability had to overcome the implicit threat of 
anarchy and relativism latent in the notion of the individual 
being free to product his own 'grounding' for judgement and 
value. Government in at least some of the Greek conceptions, 
Plato in particular, was closer to the rule of the wise, and such 
wisdom could be led by the concept of the happiness of man, the 
fulfilment of the virtues linked to man's nature; the Christian 
could also be led by happiness as the fulfilment of God's 
purpose, the enlightenment appeared to offer the concept of 
freedom - freedom itself as the virtue, the co-partner of 
knowledge. Indeed, could truth really be 'truth' if man was not 
free to allow the presence of truth alone to bind him? One of the 
greatest scholastic and practical studies of antiquity - the 
study of rhetoric - was conclusively abandoned by the eighteenth 
century. Truth was expected to be self-sufficient.
The key concepts are objectivity and tolerance - it is the duty
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of the individual, when forming a moral judgement or opinion, 
first of all to observe, assemble and examine the facts similar 
to the scientist. This objectivity is not Nietzschean 
perspectivism but an understanding that the individual is to 
'distance' himself from the object under consideration. He or she 
should take the greatest care to allow no taint of evaluation to 
infect the factual description of the situation. If this 
essentially scientific method is followed, it should be possible 
for all concerned to agree on the facts of the situation, to look 
out upon the very same mirror of the world, and thus narrow down 
the room for potential disagreement to a limited "question of 
evaluation". Even with the supposition of individual grounding 
for judgement the chances of moral consensus are vastly enhanced 
since it is felt that many moral disagreements spring either from 
ignorance of the full facts, or from a mistaken conception of 
definition (i.e. a misuse of language), and will, therefore, 
disappear when a more rational and scientific approach to the 
formation of moral judgement is widely adopted. The resulting 
edifice of knowledge can be made even more empirical and 
scientific, and create the almost paradoxical location of 
individual yet common grounding which 'problem' achieves, by 
accepting that the scientific approach can also reveal 
fundamental objective data about the central subject 'man', as 
individual and species member.37
VIII
Reflexive revisionism.
One reason for reflexivity is that even on its own terms the 
foundational claims of the enterprise of developing an 
epistemologically secure citadel of knowledges has become 
doubtful. The first difficulty is reflected in some of the 
language of the directive metaphor - the need for solid 
materials, firm ground, and so forth. It seems that certain 
aspects of the diversity of human experience, together with their 
associated fields of "knowledges", lend themselves to inclusion
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into any potential structures of "justified true beliefs" much 
better than others. Thus any edifice of knowledges will be 
prejudiced in favour of those which mesh into the 'already 
existing part’ of the construction. Indeed, once the first stage 
of construction of the edifice has been undertaken, only 
compatible material will be seen as fitting in, or suitable. 
Types of knowledge that are solid, objective, and visible 
according to the lines of inspection employed, will be used. 
Doubt arises in our present situation, as varying theses vie with 
each other as to the nature of this process. On the one hand, it 
is thought that the gate-keeping, or suitability criterion which 
grants relevance to possible knowledges, has been that of 
historical naivety, of the materials doing the gate-keeping 
themselves, of their own performivity and so forth. On the other, 
an array of ideas are held, often carried to a contrasting 
extreme, speculating that the development of these bodies of 
knowledges, of the disciplines, has been controlled by the 
interests, and their compatibility with, specific human groupings 
or supra-human structure.38
One objection is the question of power - who or what controls the 
process of inclusion, or non-inclusion, of possible candidates 
in that edifice? Another takes an almost aesthetic form; it is 
that the resulting structure lacks a sensitivity to a range of 
language we have used, in various forms, to describe motivations 
and feelings we associate with ".man"; language that some wish to 
put back in (among these are faith, hope and love). Could dignity 
still be 'dignity' in a fully rational language?
Certainly the structure did not deny the question of embodiment 
but, in doing so, the risk is ever present of reducing man to a 
collection of physical properties, and nothing else. At least 
nothing that it is allowable to talk about, or have a 
commensurable language of. Thus statements in more 'general' 
languages describing 'man' become reducible and translatable 
into those of a more specific 'scientific' kind; as the logical 
positivist Carnap once said, "because the physical language is
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the language of Science, the whole of science becomes physics11.39 
This issue of reductionism cuts in differing ways; in the hands 
of the crass analytical methodological individualist, for 
example, it appears to mean, that not only is talk of social 
entities and holistic forms of explanation outside the allowable 
discourse of uneducable entities, making individuals the only 
truly discussible units of society, complete, of course, with 
their relevant brain states, but, these individuals are only a 
mass of sensory nerves, responses, and brain states, in effect, 
an electrochemical complex.
Then there are those mixed bags of 'motives' previously 
restricting curiosity and the free flow of technology - motives 
which did not simply flow from a demonological framework, but may 
have made a rough kind of human sense. Motives such as 
conventionality, respect for tradition and the experience of 
elders, the fear of hubris and excess, the longing for 
proportion, loyalty, and a general awe at the mysterious 
'otherness' of nature. One may feel these fitted a certain kind 
of 'betweenness'; one which allowed human positioning in a form 
of personal milieu and that the surplus of impersonal, rational 
safeguards, hypothetical role exchanges, veils of ignorance (or 
whatever else can be 'rationally' constructed in freed 
contractual ethics), in their place produce a profound ambiguity 
and tension. As both Nietzsche and, implicitly at least, 
Durkheim pointed out, the ambiguity of the modern conception of 
freedom is the ambiguity of the unsupported, backgroundless, 
individual, but an individual who was also, Janus faced, always 
supported, acting against some background, facing another - where 
moreover, to take one's home in the dwelling place of rational 
knowledge, was to live within the dilemma of promise and 
performance, and where both the ideal and the actual were 'this 
worldly' and where the grounds were discovered by man.
This ascetic objection is reinforced by the attack on the 
security of progressive epistemological certainty itself. One of 
the reasons why recent writers, such as Foucault, Althusser, or
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the Frankfurt School, seemed so foreign to Anglo-Saxon 
sensibilities was the quite different approach to epistemology 
which they, in their varying ways, presented from the Anglo- 
Saxon. The Anglo-Saxon tradition has been dominated by the 
logical empirical tradition; a tradition based upon the 
designative legacy of sense-data theory (the Received View on 
Theories) which was designed to represent the content of science 
as maximally constrained by the nature of its external object as 
those objects are empirically revealed. No proposition not 
sustained by the available empirical evidence, or logically 
derivable from propositions that, in turn, may be so sustained, 
can count as scientifically validated on this normative 
conception of science. Thus, in so far as science can be said to 
have a history, it must be thought of as a process of gradual, 
piece-by-piece, accumulation, of validated propositions, 
approximating ever more closely to a complete representation in 
propositional form of the structure of empirical reality. This 
has been the organising principle for mainstream criminology.
The drive to accumulate valid knowledge claims1 reinforces the 
primacy of epistemology as the results of the search for 
knowledge must pass the accountability test of the canons laid 
down by epistemology, thus epistemology will also, to a large 
extent, determine much of the form which any successful inquiry 
must take. Concerning this the Anglo-Saxon tradition has in the 
main held that within epistemology there are two intersecting 
concerns in operation. One is how we gain knowledge of the 
material objects of the outside world; the other is what goes on 
inside the mind of the individual knower. The route to knowledge 
lay within a combination of the as yet unknown, external world, 
and the capacities of the knower's mind and body. Everybody 
agreed that the knower set out endowed with sensory receptivity, 
the rationalist also gave him a set of innate principles of 
inference (i.e. the instinctive skill to comprehend that which 
is given to the senses), the empiricist to a large extent denied 
this. The empirical knower had to be more industrious, having 
simply to rely on the senses and his ability to use the simple
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rules of logic to build up, via the activities of construction 
and inference, a body of theory. However, the reflexive turn 
complicates self-description and introduces uncertainty. One 
can, in a sense, see that the empiricist foundations of theory 
have gradually been caught up by a developed consciousness of 
their assumptions; a self-awareness which has tended to weaken 
the foundation of what, in retrospect, appears as contestable 'a 
prioris1. The empiricist cause, particularly, has been driven 
back to see how deeply the legitimacy of their scheme rests upon 
assumptions concerning the relation of the subject, and his sense 
organs, to the world. This has had the effect of converting key 
questions into a form of philosophical psychology. In this 
respect, however, the whole idea of using epistemology as the 
tool for evaluating our knowledge-claims becomes compromised: 
for, irrespective of how good a supportive argument can be raised 
from within philosophical psychology, the very fact that such a 
course is necessary destroys the arbitrator status of the 
epistemology empiricism relied upon. As, to be an impartial 
arbitrator of knowledge claims epistemology would have to be 
capable, of itself, to show what they are founded upon, and to 
evaluate what these foundations truly establish. It seems that 
the process of epistemologically verifying can only get 
operational on the basis of massive assumptions about the nature 
of experience, i.e. the subject man, his mind and relation to the 
world. These assumptions cannot, however, be tested by the 
canons of epistemology, for they have to be held steady for the 
very enterprise of generalising these claims to get under way. 
The position is further complicated by the realization that these 
assumptions, far from being established and stable, are 
themselves problematic concepts and open to differing 
interpretations. Thus recourse to epistemology as a neutral, 
totally encompassing enterprise demonstrating the non subjective 
'objectivity' of foundational claims appears hopelessly flawed.
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IX
Epistemolocrical criticisms of the ' scientific1 constructionist 
projects and thoughts as to the present situation.
Progress in the construction project inherent in modernity has 
traditionally been seen as a piecemeal accumulation, and this 
process can be loosely described as the cumulative account of 
scientific growth. This view, which we have loosely labelled 
progressive epistemology, is still the common sense view of 
science, sees the process of growth as one where new theories 
refine the observations and conclusions of the old, and build 
upon the strength of the old theories. The underlying assumption 
is that our theories and observations refer to an external 
reality which exists independently of our vision, and that 
theories succeed each other as closer approximations to the whole 
truth (Realism).
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Criminology texts normally follow this pattern in explaining 
their scientific growth. Specific individuals, or closely 
connected groups, are attributed with substantive new discoveries 
or the creation of new insights. For example the Classical School 
is linked to Beccaria, the Positivist School to Lombroso, 
Symbolic Interactionism with Mead and Becker. Sometimes disputes 
concerning such attributions flare up, as with Leonard Savitz’s 
pleas on behalf of Franz Gall as the "founder criminologist",40 
but this only reinforces the notion of the scope of history as 
being the interrelation between inquirer and objective terrain. 
To read one's way through a student criminological text, and 
J.E.Hall Williams' Criminology and Criminal Justice may serve as 
an example,41 is to undertake a reading of names, labels, i.e. 
Sociologists/Psychologists, British/American, dates and knowledge 
claims. "Contributions" to criminology come either from 
individuals or from other disciplines, for example 'Sociology'. 
The terminology used reflects the construction idea; "building 
up", "expanding our understanding" (p.5.), "careful and patient 
exploration" (p.7.); the process of specialization is expressly 
noted as being an implicit consequence of advancement from a 
"past, when knowledge itself was more limited but what was known
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was more generally shared" (p.8.). Earlier approaches give way 
to "a more sophisticated form", although they still may contain 
"vestiges" (p.12) of the former. Building methodologies are 
presented, wherein earlier false visions appear as obstacles 
which the criminological enterprise had to surmount, to defeat 
to gain access nearer to the truth. "The Lombrosian doctrine has 
been relegated to the status of a myth", quoted with approval 
from Radzinowicz (p.12). The history of criminology becomes 
"littered with corpses of dead theories about crime" (p.5). True 
to the Popperian route of falsification, this overcoming is seen 
to be beneficial. "Even negative kinds of knowledge, i.e. knowing 
that such and such is not true, provide some assistance in 
building up a picture of the nature of crime and expanding our 
understanding of offenders" (p.5).
This we may safely call the autonomous theory of knowledge- 
growth. It postulates that criminological theory develops via the 
creative process of the interaction between the Inquirer, 
observations deriving from a 'real' reality, and epistemology. 
Ideologically such a process accords both with the liberal 
position and the corresponding postulates made possible by the 
Kantian synthesis. Such a position also provides a view of the 
individual as able to overcome the dictates of ideological 
distortions, i.e. able to separate knowledge from mystification, 
able to subject official knowledge, such as propaganda of a 
totalitarian state, to the powers of critical reason. The 
individual is cognitively autonomous. He achieves this autonomy 
when he as an individual has achieved the capacity to criticise 
both authorities (i.e. previous theories, statements or 
testimony) and his own personal beliefs. Although his basic tools 
in this process have themselves been learnt from authority, i.e. 
both the rules of the language used, and the principles of logic, 
they do not depend for their validity upon the status of those 
who taught them, as both language and logic are neutral. 
Although knowledge has a social aspect, in that it exists in 
society where it is used by social beings, and also by reason of 
the fact that, at any one time, most of what the individual may
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hold as knowledge has actually derived from others, as is the 
methodological tradition he exists in, nonetheless, the creation 
of knowledge (as opposed to opinion and beliefs) is independent 
of society.
This version of the "game of individual knowledge" has, however, 
been severely challenged. The view that scientific development 
represents a basic continuity with previous positions finds 
critics in the language of so-called 'scientific revolution1 
(Kuhn42), or 'total transformations' (Foucault43). In these 
schemes the originality of the individual is taken from him, and 
instead of asking why the individual made a breakthrough, or, 
what occasioned the new view, we might just as justifiably ask, 
why he could not see in this way before, or, what prevented this 
way of viewing. Discovery is thus the intersection of two forces, 
the intersection of that which was preventing, with that which 
allowed and brought about the new view. Such positions appear to 
present quite a holistic conception of intellectual discovery and 
"knowledge" production and present the 'inventor' as the 
plaything, or mediator, of underlying forces, elevating claims 
for general or collective phenomena which instigate and shape the 
viewing of the individual. Combined with the logic of 
determinism, the directional dictates of holism becomes 
productive of a web of total causality. Within this system for 
the identification or arrangement of theoretical entities, the 
reader is conscious that the. individual ceases to be a relevant 
"scientific concept" (Althusser44) in the development of 
knowledges, neither as a unit of theory, nor in the epistemology 
of the developing sciences (Levi-Strauss45) .
Within the sociology of knowledge, the main stream of reaction 
to the individual conception was derived from Marx, whose 
statement in the Introduction to the Critique of Political 
Economy, set the scene for the strongest version of the Marxist 
anti-individualist positions. The world divides up into two with 
a clear contention; the material forces of production which 
comprise the base determine changes in the superstructure, i.e.
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in knowledges, or political ideology, which themselves have come 
about from a previous determination by the base. This view, 
endorsed by Engels in his speech at the grave-side of Marx and 
elsewhere, became enshrined as the "fundamentalist" position 
within Marxism. Although the notion of economic determinism has 
always been criticised and developed in Marxist circles with the 
advent of relative autonomies and like arguments, the original 
analysis of Marx provided the starting point for the modern 
contention of the social determination of knowledge. At once 
truth becomes problematic; for if society totally, or even only 
partially, determines knowing and thinking, how can we obtain an 
objective stance so that we may gauge the validity of knowledge 
claims? In this line of argument traditional individualist 
epistemology seems replaced by forms of social epistemology, with 
attempts to create differing epistemologies and species of truth 
for each theorist, depending on which seat he wishes to claim on 
the determinist, relatively autonomous, or autonomous, merry- 
go-round .
In contrast to the central positions of Marxism, the French 
structuralists, or post-structuralists as evidenced by the 
example of the enterprise of Foucault, present a different 
proposition. Foucault set out to transcend the weaknesses of 
those methodologies which made explicit their epistemological and 
ontological propositions. He attempted no delineation of his base 
ontological or epistemological claims, but held such discourse 
"suspended", "displaced" or "in abeyance", in favour of, 
allegedly, philosophically non-committal analysis. To declare and 
base the writing of the text on an epistemology, would, to 
Foucault, be only to imprison the subject within another bind of 
commitment. His practices of "Archaeology" and "Genealogy" occur 
without any reference to the foundational stance of the critique 
- but it is apparent that the exercise of staying "suspended" 
cannot but be part of a trajectory. Further, his implicit 
resolution to the problem of the change of epistemes and of the 
motor of social change, what some has described as a form of 
"beyond hermeneutics and structuralism"46 seems to allow the
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existence of a totalising social mechanism, and hints at an 
epistemology. Foucault openly sought to avoid Marxist 
determinism, yet he could never espouse individualism, nor the 
centrality of subjective consciousness, he provided the seeming 
paradox of concrete critiques which also had as their internal 
contrast an all-embracing vision derivative in its heritage from 
the Nietzschean will to power. But in this he risked walking the 
tightrope between Nietzsche and Hegel, between individualism and 
a journey of The Universal. He offered the paradox of what in 
effect, if not in rhetoric, was a 'critical reason* which did not 
see the necessity for a position of its own, but which claimed 
it could journey at will alighting variously to appreciate the 
internality of differing epistemes without stating the difficulty 
of translaterability.
Foucault declares himself an "archaeologist", and yet denies the 
necessity to explain the position of this archaeologist, or of 
his role. But this denial of reflexivity regarding his own role 
in his explanation is caught, for, by being non-epistemological 
one is being epistemological, and in not stating one's position 
one's text moves and does it for one. The very tactic of 
genealogy itself, and, as the Foucaultean practice of genealogy 
demonstrates, a multiple of readings are possible - irrationalism 
the danger, if not perhaps, the goal.47
We must also note that, in an important sense, neither do any of 
these approaches give up the enlightenment tradition of placing 
the pursuit of knowledge before all else. All approaches show the 
applicability of "scientific analysis" and the presentation of 
'recognised claims' - individualism to the utilitarian science 
of Bentham, Mill, and so forth, or to the rational economist. 
Causal to the structuralist, or historicist; the spiritual almost 
appeals to the vitalists, yet still feels the need to cast its 
speech in "scientific" terms, even if this is. a "new" science of 
genealogy or "epistemes". And Foucault's refusal to position the 
'archaeologist' appears as highly symptomatic of the fetish to 
cleanse the post-enlightenment projects of any subjective
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elements, of any inclusion of the desires and feelings of the 
inquirer in the production of knowledge.
The security of the constructivist project was also shaken when 
investigations over structuralism reached an emotional level of 
debate, when it was seen as other than "questions of method" as 
Sartre labelled it in 1961. Earlier Karl Popper,48 and I.Berlin49 
had attacked historicism for its social repercussions (i.e. the 
appeal to either extremism or inactive submission). From his own 
perspective Nietzsche had done likewise. Structuralism was, 
however, not a simple historicism as the hysteria held, but 
sought to position the individual, who believed he was acting in 
a rational fashion, within a wider mechanism. Levi-Strauss 
defined its aim as "a sort of super-rationalism",50 and Merleau- 
Ponty had said: "thus our task is to broaden our reasoning to 
make it capable of grasping what, in ourselves and in others, 
precedes and exceeds reason".51 Others talked of it as the 
"unconscious of society." Foucault's all-persuasive power plays 
a similar role, bringing in both the rational and the irrational, 
the mistake as well as the success, all the Janus face of the 
spirit (for example the claim of failure being built into the 
early prison).
As with the aesthetics of the structures of knowledge, opposition 
to structural explanation was to focus on the deriding of the 
status of man. Not 'man' but 'structure' was decisive! Man was 
forgotten, he was redundant, man no longer walked the streets of 
his own land! This objection assumed the humanist mantle in 
response. On the one hand it was now attempted to take the 
insights of a multiple of approaches and to combine them into a 
multi-facet vision of man - Freud, symbolic interactionism and 
phenomenology, were purportedly fused to peer into the 
individual's world and create a science of interpretation; man 
as the interpreting subject. To a large extent these still 
called themselves sciences, but, from the Hume-Mill-Hempel 
approach the term seemed strained to breaking point. On the 
other hand there existed a demand to renounce the very
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possibility of a science of human conduct. Within the broad 
rubric of intellectual thought, a substantial theme became the 
contrast between the attempting of a deductive system of 
universally applicable propositions (i.e. science as, at least, 
the opposition defined it), and an open, 'non-scientific' 
account. This took many forms - in history the attack upon the 
covering law model was central, but it was wide spread. Even 
economics, the "Queen", joined the rest of the social sciences 
"in crises".52 In political 'theory', now simply called 
"thought", a focus with the development of "ideas" became more 
important - works such as The Foundations of Modern Political 
Thought.53 (which sought to locate the grounding of the 
'humanists' and their opponents freely stepping outside of the 
notion of epistemological rational reconstruction in giving 
primacy importance to the context of 1 theory'/thought; Wealth and 
Virtue54 which revised the foundations and formation of classical 
political economy; and The Noble Science of Politics55 which 
threw into focus the operation of nineteenth-century 'political 
science1. All were examples of attempts to institute a self- 
conscious and non-scientific account of human behaviour. In the 
criminological area attention also focused, albeit almost as an 
aside, upon the historical foundations in early modernity of 
punishment and social control. At the same time critical thought 
displayed a concern with the 'meaning* of language. Especially 
in French thought, the power of discourse was placed at issue, 
and this ranged from the re-interpretation of psycho-analysis, 
at the hands of Lacan, to the rise of discourse in importance in 
a 'politically' related sense via semiology, which, by attempting 
to reveal the heterogeneity of signifier and lived experience, 
claimed that much of the hold of institutions over individuals 
could be traced to the ascendancy of language (Foucault et al).
X
Criminology and penology were directly implicated in this partly 
revisionist, partly reflexive, questioning, but so was law. The
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practice of legal theory was now analyzed as an ideological 
entity. First the contradiction was announced between programmes 
for a legal science, and an acceptance that such a thing cannot 
be achieved. The rationalist epistemology of natural law and the 
rights of man had been largely replaced by the broad tradition 
of legal positivism as variously expressed by Bentham, Austin, 
Kelsen and Hart which, although each theorist perused vastly 
differing projects, their epistemological foundation was 
substantially based upon the empirical methodology of scientific 
positivism. Latterly, the developing hermeneutical approach 
argued that these theories of law were incapable of giving an 
adequate picture of the process of interpretation which is a 
prominent aspect of our experience of law,56 and recognised that 
they were limited by a failure to examine the preconditions of 
'problem's' designative theory of the meaning of words. In 
addition, it was argued that traditional legal theory failed to 
recognise the historical and social position of the interpreting 
subject. Even survivors of rationalism (for example Dworkin's 
early rights approach to law57), were held to be similarly 
afflicted and, in addition, were claimed to be methodologically 
incapable of giving a coherent account of rules and principles. 
The lesser version of the criticism argued that by contrasting 
scientific positivism with hermeneutics, it was possible to see 
plainly the deficiencies of scientific and legal positivism. The 
stronger version implied that law and legal theory, happy in 
their existence within the confines of a supposed shared and 
universal language, obscured the domination and falsehoods 
underlying its operation. The earlier attack mounted in the name 
of sociology under the banner of "legal realism" having been 
successfully swallowed by the dominant positivist tradition in 
jurisprudence, at times a new appeal was to "de-construct" even 
the language of legal theory. Law and legal institutions were to 
be seen as texts - texts now 'understood' as without a stable 
meaning but capable of many, diverse, and conflicting readings 
demonstrative only of a core of non-stability.
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XI
At such a time there is the asking of the question - what is the 
result? Does all this discourse and knowledge make any 
difference? Has the journey which the Enlightenment began a 
coherence, or has it - and any text which investigates it - 
become a maze without meaning. The question has been a perennial 
one since the Enlightenment with the lament for a fixed 
foundation of meaning arising as the counter desire to 
autonomy.58
What those who earlier asked the question highlighted was that
philosophy, the sciences, and man were interrelated, and with the
destruction of the epistemology of the Aristotelian cosmos man
was cast into a world where he was to construct his own values
within a cosmos which was in itself simply an 'inhuman
objectivity' devoid of value; beneath the individualism early
modernity espoused to counter tradition was the first sight of
the metaphysical "abyss" of moral emptiness. It was Nietzsche who
reminded us recently of this abyss and his words are repeated
today: as Marshall Berman stated in a book on modernity he
entitled All That is Solid Melts Into Air:
"To be modern is to experience personal and social life as 
a maelstrom, to find one's world in perpetual disintegration 
and renewal, trouble and anguish, ambiguity and 
contradiction; to be part of a universe in which all that is 
solid melts into air."59
What is also apparent is that specie of epistemology, or, 
alternatively, the claims which comprise the epistemological 
imagination, have crucial, if opaque, political implications. The 
rise of a 'politics of semantics' and textual deconstruction 
relies upon the notion that if such a foundational security is 
questioned then so too are the related styles of politics 
questioned. The space is then open to the doubts of the post- 
foundationalists and the questioning of universal politics - a 
new dialectical space of hope, despair, and tortured promises.
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XII
Without a confidence in foundationalism coherence is problematic. 
Praxis is at issue. Rationally, the choice of action depends on 
the imaginative grasp of the human enterprise; a grasp which is 
increasingly divided and often only united amongst those who turn 
critically against the modernist constructivist programme or deny 
foundationalism by the rhetoric of the "post".60 Politically, 
this analysis, that is to say, this definition and positioning 
by the rhetoric of the ' post' is problematic in many senses. 
Firstly this very way of defining may be a product of 
reflexivity, that is it recognises the present as living in the 
af-termath of something which now can be coherently expressed as 
an entity as a project which has not so much finished but which 
has realised itself as incapable of fulfilment. The very ability 
to speak of 'modernity' as something, as a project, indicates the 
difference - since it indicates that sufficient distance exists 
between action and comprehension to speak in these 'objective1, 
or distanced terms. But if that is so then modernity lives on 
since post-modernity can only define itself by the inclusion of 
modernity in its status and thus may be seen as modernity 
reflexively aware of itself; of modernity becoming aware of the 
impossibility of its own projections. But if the narrative 
projections of modernity are abandoned, if the projected goals 
stand empty, if the times require a new "public philosophy" 
rather than what was now 'exposed' as the "faith" of the 
Enlightenment, where are the styles of collective goals that 
would give the human enterprise a form and meaning to be 
generated from?
Without religion or confidence in epistemological universal 
foundationalism what truly was the nature of the "in common"? 
Recourse to individualism is problematic also - for the 
"narratives" of emancipation have more than succeeded in crying 
that the "self" must be free to be its own creation and have gone 
on to offer an array of choices - the times, if we may use 
another spatial allusion, can be seen as suspended between Hegel 
and existentialism - a position which gave the "self" the curious 
paradox of being both empty and the site of a totalization - both
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lacking a stable identity while also sharing in the socialisation 
of all the available identities.61
Lyotard diagnosed "the postmodern condition" in terms of a lack
of a grand unifying theoretical discourse; an absence of
commensurability whose earlier acceptance had only been possible
due to the grip of "grand narratives" providing the legitimacy
for modernity. Postmodernism is ushered in via the crises of such
legitimating power.
"The obsolescence of the metanarrative apparatus of 
legitimation [arises as] the narrative function is losing 
its functions, its great hero, its great dangers, its great 
voyages, its great goal. ...it is being dispersed in clouds 
of narrative language elements - narrative, but also 
denotative, prescriptive, descriptive, and so on. Conveyed 
within each cloud are pragmatic valencies specific to its 
kind. Each of us lives at the intersection of many of these. 
However, they do not necessarily establish stable 
combinations, and the properties of the ones we do establish 
are not necessarily communicable".62
With the meta narrative relationality questioned another dilemma 
of our late modernity becomes that we develop more and more 
"knowledge" about the social world, and that "knowledge" helps 
change it, and continually offers technologies which claim to 
allow us to control it, yet a successful methodology of relating 
appears unattainable.63
Conversely, the desire for lineages of relations, means that the 
motif of a stable dwelling, becomes either subjected to the grasp 
of a "historical destiny" which the deep structure of the world 
has for the chosen,64 or converted into a form of disassociation 
from the course of time, producing the modern feeling of 
lurching, of history and man's use of reason as an erratic 
course,65 which reflexively demonstrates our present inability 
even to coherently characterise the nature of the social 
journey.66
Thus it is possible to argue that "the old pretensions of 
comprehensive knowledge and social control"67 are defunct. In 
the face of this, however, there are a number of paths which
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various voices urge us to take: we shall refer to these options 
as (a) the retreat to the common life; (b) the recourse to 
religion; (c) the new minimalism (both deconstructive and de­
statist); and (d) to come to a self-conscious understanding which 
enables us to preserve much of the hopes for rationality inherent 
in the enlightenment and yet develop our social imagination in 
more fruitful and 'human' ways.
The theme of the common life is very much in modern times the 
property of David Hume,68 and we may characterise the type of 
social participation relating to this option as part of his 
legacy. This is symbolised in the actions Hume himself took when 
faced with the 'end of his personal journey of rationality1 , i.e. 
the resort to "backgammon, the playing of cards, dining and 
talking with friends11.69 As we shall see, for the legacy of Hume 
that movement is partly linked to a narrative perception of the 
cosmos, i.e. some notion of a 'current of nature1, but without 
that narrative support it accepts a working rationality of the 
common life; a rationality of common sense it defends against a 
politics of philosophical concepts.
The recourse to religion and, implicitly, authoritarian 
metaphysics, takes many forms. Perhaps, after all, modernity 
never left the security of its embrace. It seems apparent that 
even some strong founders of the individualist conception of the 
journey, via judicious social engineering, relied upon the tacit 
assumption that this enterprise would be contained and guided by 
the traditional Christian idea of a higher moral law.70 The 
project of criminology is partly guided by an axis deriving from 
Hume, Kant (who took a related and somewhat similar view on the 
matter as Locke), and, in its more dialectical forms, Hegel, 
whose totalistic pantheism makes the Marxist input highly 
religious in its underlying emphasis.71
Of the sociological father figures, Durkheim is increasingly 
resorted to for his assertion that religion is essentially a 
symbol of the consciousness of society, and that social meaning
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arises out of the cleavage between the realms of the sacred, and 
that of the profane. The Durkheimean thesis is taken as holding 
that the true decline in religion does not refer to the 
institutionalised churches, but the dissolution of common frames 
and effective linkages. Thus the area of shared norms, 
particularly of the moral, and the capacity to partake in 
widespread symbolic understandings, is effectually curtailed.72/73
This turn to religion makes much of the difference between
religious and secular cultures; Bell held that the religious
"has a greater unity than most because all the elements of 
the culture are directed towards some common end: to
emphasise mystery, to create awe, to transcend. This unity, 
emphasised in mood, runs like a thread through the 
architecture, its music, its painting, and its literature - 
in its spires, liturgies, litanies,' spatial representation 
of figures, and sacred text. Secular cultures rarely have 
this conscious design."74
We may summarise Bell as calling for the revitalization of "a new
sense of the sacred", in the task of "saving modernity from
meaninglessness". On this option we shall not spend time but
accept Habermas' analysis that this form of "neoclassicism" hopes
"religious faith tied to a faith in tradition will provide 
individuals with clearly defined identities and existential 
security. . [It is to] recommend a return to some form of 
premodernity, or throw modernity radically overboard.1,75
To defenders of modernity, conscious of the latent 
incompatibility of modernity and community, the appeals to the 
authority of tradition and the religious methodology of secure 
community is both populist and reactionary. In the cultural 
sphere the rejection of the stark architecture of modernism in 
favour of the 'neo-classical1 which reasserts the central power 
of church architecture (see the Prince of Wales' vision for 
London's skyline) is labelled by critics such as Frederic Jameson 
as reactionary anti-modernism. Nor, in the return to community 
and tradition perspective, is the question of power structures, 
interests and influences in modern societies substantially 
addressed.
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The new minimalism ranges from a quasi-religious withdrawal from 
the politics of the state, combined with a form of opposition (as 
MacIntyre's ‘tradition plus locality1 solution in After Virtue 
can lead us to) to a form of new fiddling whilst one hopes those 
aspects of modernity which one has sufficiently "deconstructed" 
fall apart (as in the 'playful' elements of "deconstruction" 
theory) . The danger with this minimalist position is that in 
dancing to the tunes of a localised relativism, while denying the 
need to offer any reflexive contextualising of its position, its 
playful, ironic relativising cannot offer any opposition to the 
exercising of power becoming the actual arbitrator of truth and 
praxis. Independent of modernity minimalism denotes the retreat 
from any universalist claims for reason, and gives up much of the 
hope of the Enlightenment without being able to offer any 
replacement.76
The fourth option involves a speculative grasp of the traditions 
in which we find ourselves and of the use of reason in them. 
Further to this, the demand of self-consciousness entails a 
comprehensive reappraisal of the nature of the journey the world 
has taken since the Enlightenment came about, and its meaning. 
Such reappraisals are beginning, and it is not the intention of 
this work to give a comprehensive account of them, however, in 
the midst of the collapse of the meta-narratives (Marxism, the 
citadel of knowledges, historistic social evolution, the 
unveiling of "nature", etc.,) the terminology of pragmatism, and 
of the epistemology which is associated with it is becoming more 
f r e q u e n t .  T h a t  i s  t o  s a y  t h a t  w e  c o m e  t o  f a c e  r e c o g n i s i n g  o n e ' s  
necessary placement within a conceptual scheme and that the 
rationality of action comes out of our inhabiting such a scheme. 
Pragmatism, moreover, specifies the dangers in the neglect of 
implementation, which, assuming a universality to 
foundationalism, we have tended to relegate to a separate 
compartment from knowledge itself and to assume followed 
successfully. However, pragmatism is in an ambiguous stance as 
t o  i t s  o w n  ' s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' . F o r ,  a d o p t i n g  a n  h i s t o r i c a l  
consciousness, it necessarily re-supposes that which it states
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cannot be; i.e. when reflexivity turns itself upon pragmatism it 
cannot solve the reflexive paradox, the foundation is always 
'soft', not absolute. With Lyotard, after all, where his 
portrayal of the collapse of the grand narratives creates in its 
mechanisms a fairly 'grand narrative' with its own vision of 
utopian function. It may also be understood, in its 
retrospective, that the epistemology of pragmatism has actually 
been part of the operative epistemology of much of the past (i.e. 
mistaken as rationalism and empiricism by its adherents). 
However, this is not a popular notion, for to many pragmatism is 
a defeatist banner, utilizable in textual rhetoric as the straw 
man "pragmatic", the taken for. granted space devoid of a critical 
empiricism or rationality. Pragmatism stands condemned as that 
position man is forced into either through lack of application 
and integrity in perusing the use of reason, or, as a cautions, 
self-serving and cowardly response to the difficulties of the 
times. Such commentaries are, however, misplaced and the label 
pragmatism needs a far better hearing; it may well be a better 
'space* than its detractors would have us believe. Its own 
utopia, implicit in its denial of utopia, is apparent in the hope 
which Lyotard found "in the pragmatics of language particles". 
Namely, that
"postmodern knowledge is not simply an instrument of power.
It refines our sensitivity to differences and increases our
tolerance of incommensurability."77
That is to say it is a utopia of journeying and not one based 
upon the idea of finally coming to rest.
NOTES.
1. Still the best overview of the history of social theory written 
with the Enlightenment as its central theme is Geffrey Hawthorn, 
Enlightenment & Despair: A History of Sociology. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1976. This chapter will present a 
narrative in a more universalistic rhetoric of enlightenment that 
Hawthorn's more detailed and analytic investigation of "progress 
and despair". This chapter's rhetoric is, thus, somewhat 'de- 
contextualised'.
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2.Although pre-Enlightenment understanding was not devoid of 
'traditions of rationality' and of dialectic between them, it is 
an appropriate referent to roughly accept that "in Medieval 
European thought, the epistemological authority was the word of 
God as revealed through the teachings of the Roman Church". 
Enlightenment and Despair, p.8.
3.Francis Bacon, Collected Works. Vol 3, p.356. Following 
references unless indicated are from this volume.
4.Francis Bacon,"On the interpretation of nature and the empire 
of man". In Curtis and Petras (eds.), The Sociology of Knowledge. 
London, Duckworth, 1970. p.89.
5.Ibid.. p.93.
6.Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in Vol.I, The 
Philosophical Works of Descartes. Edited and trans. by Harldane 
and Ross, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1931, p. 1-2.
7.Bernard Williams locates the absolute foundationalism of 
Descartes in Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry. Penguin, 
London, 1978. Bacon also incorporates God, as Hiss puts it, Bacon 
identifies Nature as "bear[ing] the signatures of, and it is 
these, the true forms of things, which are the goal of natural 
philosophy, and not the false images imposed by man's mind". 
M.Hesse, "Francis Bacon", in D.J.O'Connor (ed.), A Critical 
History of Western Philosophy. Collier-Macmillan, 1964, p.143.
8.This contrast is the terminology of the German Social Theorist 
Ferdinand Tonnies (1855-1936) and stems from his Gemeinschaft 
und Gesellschaft (Community and Society, first published in 
1877) . This terminology is admittedly European and the conceptual 
differentiation behind it central to any understanding of 
European social theory. In his recent The Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity [Polity Press, Cambridge, 1987.] Jurgen Habermas, 
for instance, places it as the pivotal distinction determining 
the character of modernity. The motifs, feelings, and the "life 
world" experiences incorporated in the notion of the Gemeinschaft 
are seen as closely expressed "in the Aristotelian tradition". 
Habermas is dealing somewhat in 'conceptual history' seeing that 
"the old European concept of politics as a sphere encompassing 
state and society was carried on without interruption into the 
nineteenth century. On this view, the economy of 'the entire 
household', a subsistence economy based on agrarian and 
handicraft production and expanded through local markets, forms 
the foundation for a comprehensive political order. Social 
stratification and differential participation in (or exclusion 
from) political power go hand in hand - the constitution of 
political authority integrates the society as a whole. The 
conceptual framework no longer fits modern societies, in which 
commodity exchange (organised under civil law) of the capitalist 
economy has detached itself from the order of political rule. 
Through the media of exchange value and power, two systems of
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action that are functionally complementary have been 
differentiated out. The social system has been separated from the 
political, a depoliticized economic society has been separated 
from a bureaucratized state".(p.37) In this analysis of 
modernity, the Enlightenment posed, from the very beginnings of 
its attempts at self-consciousness, the need for wholeness in a 
world torn asunder: a quest, which for Habermas, led Hegel to 
provide a "philosophical solution for the self-grounding of 
modernity" in the encompassing development of "Reason" as the 
"power of unification". As well as this concern with the image 
of modernity as particularities in need of unification, as 
opposed to a unification in need of particularities, post- 
Enlightenment European social theory (and Jurisprudence) is also 
written in the context of the struggle to overcome the old 
patriarchal, traditional society in the task of constructing the 
'modern'. In this respect American social theory does not have 
the concomitant struggle to overcome, but has the task of 
construction over the image of the frontier and the abyss of the 
state of nature.
9.Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator. Harper and Row, New York, 1969, 
p.153.
10.Marcel contended that Nietzsche had discerned man's 
fundamental moral phenomenon in his contention that "man is the 
only being who can make promises"; which for Marcel highlighted 
the qualitative difference of man from an object and meant that 
man must always live his life under a certain usage of non­
objective reasoning. With Marcel this took the form of a 
'rational' reliance upon a sort of faith in unknowable aspects 
of existence which allow the relations of trust and fidelity of 
man to man. Marcel, Creative Fidelity. Noonday Books, Farrar, 
Straus & Cudahy Inc., New York, 1962. [Although Marcel wishes to 
make a rather Kantian point(and ultimately a Christian one) out 
of this ability which Nietzsche seized upon, it is as well to 
remember that Nietzsche had given a social evolutionary (and 
cultural) explanation for the creation of this ability. Nietzsche 
held that the ability to keep promises was a creation of the 
'civilizing' of man. Promises enabled men to keep to the 
regulated and predictable aspects of modern life (contracts, 
timetables), but to create this western societies had utilized 
draconian methods of punishment and ascetic procedures. The 
German civilization, to acquire "trust, seriousness, lack of 
taste and matter-of-factness", had resorted to stoning, breaking 
on the wheel, piercing with stakes, trampling with horses, 
boiling in oil, flaying alive and cutting off strips of flesh. 
The Basic Writing of Nietzsche. Walter Kaufmann (ed.), Modern 
Library, New York, 1968, p. 498.] Through fidelity man continued 
to use his subjective powers to shape his life in the expression 
of a faith that he is open to the radical otherness of existence 
- an otherness always the opposite to the reduction of Being to 
an object.
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1 1 .J.L.Gorman, The Expression of Historical Knowledge, Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 1982, pp.112-113.
12.At stake is the grounding of the transformative imagination. 
The passage of Vico actually ran as follows: "...in the night of 
thick darkness enveloping the earliest antiquity, so remote from 
ourselves, there shines the eternal and never failing light of 
a truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has 
certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore 
to be found within the modifications of our own human mind. 
Whoever reflects on this cannot but marvel that the philosophers 
should have bent all their energies to the study of the world 
of nature, which since God made it, he alone knows; and that they 
should have neglected the study of the world of nations, or the 
civil world, which, since man have made it, men could come to 
know". [Vico, The New Science. T.G. Bergin and M.H. Fish 
(trans.), New York, 1968, par, 331.] The passage provides fruit 
for varying interpretations. In one the radical openness of the 
possibilities of transformation stem from the idea of civil 
society as an artefact created by man - thus man is radically 
free to create and change his social order - but this is tempered 
if it can be shown that man has an absolute 1 human nature1, 
particularly if it can be shown that this human nature is 
embedded in the natural process of history, a history subject to 
the laws of science. Fundamentalist marxism is a clear example 
of the tension which holds man the creative force of society but 
places social organization as distinct stages of a determinate 
historical process. Thus we are left with the theoretical vision 
where man's creativity is only the expression or mediation of 
deeper forces. From another perspective the solution to the 
Cartesian dualism is to give the unacceptable dilemma of an 
infinite spiritual entity temporarily residing in nature - thus 
man is crucially not part of the natural world - but his is to 
deny the linkage of man and nature. The hints of a resolution to 
this dilemma can be seen in the modern philosophies of nature 
which present a new picture of the very creativity of nature 
itself. Hard science is talking of "creative dialogues" within 
nature. For a recent argument of man's creativity within our 
ideas of evolution see Tim Ingold, Evolution and Social Life. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986.
13.Friedrich Nietzsche, Merold Westphal gives an indepth 
examination of this and related statements of Nietzsche in 
"Nietzsche and the Phenomenological Ideal", The Monist. April, 
1977.
14.Reflexively, however, there is an inherent difficulty in the 
absolute denial of any secure claim, for upon what terms is this 
denial made? - only from the position of such a claim. This 
denial of man's ability to know himself is actually a claim of 
that very knowledge. What then must be asked is what sort of 
p t e ^  s e i s it m^  ^ e  ~ ^  ~ ^ ’''—  ~ o
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15.The Kant referred to here is the Kant of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. [See our Chapter six for detailed references.] In the 
recent analysis of Jeffery Berger, the crises in the Social 
sciences and the rise to prominence of a "Sociology of Knowledge" 
come about because of social sciences' failure to perform the 
Kantian task and create what Berger calls an "archetectonic" 
social science. Berger Jeffery, The Origin of Formalism in Social 
Science, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1981.
16.Gerard Degre, Science as a Social Institution: an introduction 
to the sociology of knowledge. Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 
1955, p.165.
17 .Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, London, 1961, p.74.(6.53) This is seen as a growth 
from the Kantian position earlier outlined.
18.Ibid.. p.3.
19.Ibid.. p.19.(4.003.)
20.John W. Danford, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978, p.42. Danford takes 
as his main theme the relationship of language in the political 
theory of Wittgenstein and predecessors. We may note that Bentham 
shared the dream and attempted to construct a universal 
encyclopedia of moral terras, the acceptance of which he thought 
would lead to clear speech and meaning, and thus the avoidance 
of politics and opinion. The dream reaches its high point with 
Bertrand Russell and the search for a pure language - the aim for 
Russell is peace on earth.
21.The centrality of language to man's social existence is 
recognised in a wide range of theories which provide an 
evolutionary perspective on the emergence of language. Monod, for 
instance, in Chance and Necessity asserts the development of 
language is the key event which "changed the conditions of 
selection for the human species". [J. Monod, Chance and Necessity. 
Collins, London, 1972, p.150.] Popper agrees with the central 
significance of language but argues against versions of the 
'linguistic turn' taken by 'structuralists' and those in the 
Anglo-american context who have spent vast energy in analyzing 
the way words are used and the various meanings thus engendered. 
For Popper such time would be better spent considering the 
various "functions" of language, in particular what it enabled 
us to achieve rather than in worrying about the medium. The 
contrasting emphasis upon the medium is influenced by the latter 
Wittgenstein's move from a 'picture' theory of language to a 
'spectacle theory'. Whereby, depending upon the conceptual frame 
or scheme the viewer inhabited, the world took on a radically 
different set of meanings - man could be said to inhabit 
different social worlds depending upon his spectacles. Social 
life conducted with sincerity and good faith could not be
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universalised in all its meanings so that one master frame could 
be ascertained but must be conceived as an array of differing 
conceptions and projects - language games. For Wittgenstein and 
the pragmatic imagination it was a valid intellectual task to 
bring to light the internal sets of meanings and life forms of 
these games but one could not construct a master set of 
spectacles - one could clean spectacles but not do without one 
or other - such was the 'therapeutic' consolation in the demise 
of the 'absolute'. For Popper, however,
"one shouldn't waste one's life in spectacle cleaning or in 
talking about language, or in trying to get a clear view of 
language, or of our 'conceptual scheme*. The fundamental thing 
about human languages is that they can and should be used to 
describe something; and this something is, somehow, the world. 
To be constantly and almost exclusively interested in the medium 
- in spectacle cleaning - is the result of a philosophical
mistake " [Quoted by Magee in "Conversation with Karl
Popper", in Modern British Philosophy. Seeker and Warburg, 
London, 1971, p. 138.]
Instead we should have concern with the functions of language. 
These Popper lists as on two levels: a lower level of basic 
functions namely 'symptomatic' or 'expressive', and 'releasing' 
or 'signalling'; and a higher level of 'descriptive' and 
'argumentative' functions. The lower level functions are 
characteristic of all linguistic activity and are always present; 
the higher functions are coupled with the evolution of reasoning 
and rationality, with the development of knowledge and the growth 
of science. They are concerned with the making of "descriptive 
statements; and these statements would be factually true, or 
factually false". Science depends upon the descriptive function 
as this is what allows the abstract formulation of descriptions 
of the world, of actual and possible states of affairs, and in 
turn leads to concern with concepts of truth and falsity. Every 
genuine report contains within it a moral commitment - to tell 
the truth. The argumentative function allows the criticism and 
evolution of theories - it allows the distinction of validity and 
invalidity to discussion and modes of action which proceed from 
such positions. Thus language forms a system of responsible and 
critical intellectual activity: problems are objectively
formulated in language, particularly in propositional form, and
most often arise out of descriptive propositions. Language can
be used in its descriptive function without the argumentative 
function, but when reasons are given for or against the truth of 
descriptive statements, the argumentative function comes into 
play. This is the picture of the 'liberal' approach to rational 
discussion. Ultimately change will be lead by the world; the
pragmatic concern is with a more radical conception of
transformative and creative ability which is human centred.
22.Charles Taylor, Hegel. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1975, p. 6.
23.Morse Peckham, Beyond The Tragic Vision, p.69.
24.We repeat the narrative referent already used in reference to 
Hawthorn, Fay states: "A Christian understanding of natural
events, as well as Human history is one which views phenomena as 
episodes in the story of God's relationship with his creation, 
so that to understand these phenomena is to grasp their meaning 
in terms of this story, is to see how they fit into the pattern 
of revelation, consolation guidance and judgement which are 
chapters in God's overall plan for mankind". Brian Fay, Social 
Theory and Political Practice. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
London, 1975. Similarity, Michel Foucault's argument in The Order 
of Things. Tavistock, 1970, London, is that the Middle Ages in 
particular looks upon the world as a text waiting for its proper 
allegoresis. See Chapter Two, "The Prose of the World".
25. It is, for example, the central thesis of Peter Langford that 
modern conceptions of human nature are not mainly the result of 
methodological innovations but primarily stem from the decline 
of Christianity. Cf. Peter Langford, Modern Philosophies of 
Human Nature: Their Emergence from Christian Thought. Martinus 
Nijhoff Philosophy Library Vol.15, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
The Netherlands, 1986.
26.See our earlier reference to Bacon and Descartes for instance.
27.Cf. Charles Van Doren, The Idea of Progress. Frederick A. 
Praeyer Inc., London/New York, 1967, for a comprehensive survey 
for ideas on the nature, properties, and man's relation to 
'progress1.
28.There is much to be said for the Popperian reading which gives 
the history of the developing disciplines of social theory, i.e. 
sociology et al., as strongly linked to utopianism, if not 
necessarily Popper's claim of "radical utopianism". Popper's 
writings on this point are scattered but see The Open Society and 
Its Enemies. Vol.II. The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel. Marx, and 
the Aftermath. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1945.
29 .Henceforth the darkness of the mind was to be viewed as 
temporary, to be filled in the process of participation and 
acceptance of the gradual building of the structure of 
knowledges; a vision given substantive confidence by the 
scientific discoveries of the time: Lavoisier expounded his
theory of the elements, Dalton reformulated the atomic theory 
of nature, and Wohler synthesised organic material from 
inorganic, thus demonstrating that the organic and inorganic were 
not, as previously thought, two entirely different worlds: social 
science could be seen as an offshoot of the "natural".
30.Henri Comte Saint-Simon, Selected Writings. F.M.H. Markham 
(ed.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1952, p.68.
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31.The rational for this is stated by the voice of Godwin, for 
whom "everything must be trusted to the tranquil and wholesome 
progress of knowledge", for man's "moral improvements will keep 
pace with his intellectual". The intellectual is solely the 
advance in knowledge. William Godwin, An Inquiry Concerning 
Political Justice and its Influence on general Virtue and 
Happiness. quoted in The Idea of Progress, p.337.
32. Branson traces the fact that a substantial proportion of 
later sociology specifically seized upon the problem of 
collective behaviour (eg. Le Bon, The Crowd. 1895; Gabriel Tarde 
and others) in response to the fear of nineteenth-century 
conservatives that populist democratic movements would unhinge 
society and result in chaos and disaster. He, therefore, provides 
a conservative explanation for at least some of the rise of the 
social sciences, and provides an alternative to the Popperian. 
However, the main features of the Enlightenment project are 
unaffected. Popper is basing much of his approach as to the basis 
of the social sciences in the optimistic Eighteenth century 
writings, whilst Branson looks more at the nineteenth century 
fears and the battling with specific problem' issues, 
particularly social control. See L.Branson, The Political Context 
of Sociology. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.
33. See our discussion on Foucault, as well as Discipline and 
Punish other texts which have reference to this theme include "On 
Governmentality", Ideology and Consciousness. Vol 6 (1979); "The 
political technology of individuals", in L.Martin et al. (eds.), 
Technologies of the Self. Tavistock, London, 1988; P. Pasquino, 
"Theatrum politicum: police and the state of prosperity", 
Ideology and Consciousness. Vol 4, (1978).
34.Quoted in Governing the Soul: The shaping of the private self. 
Nikolas Rose, Routledge, London, 1990, at page 222. See this 
text, in particular Part Four "managing our Selves" for the 
positive aspects of this process, Rose is clearly of the opinion 
that the managing of the self is tied to the project of autonomy 
and freedom which modernity gives various permutations to. Other 
work which also draw upon Foucault take a more critical view of 
control. Zygmunt Bauman, for example, in Legislators and 
Interpreters: On Modernity. Post-modernity and Intellectuals.
Polity Press, Oxford, 1987, directly argues that the narrative 
of modernity, that of bringing knowledge to the people, to 
restore clear sight to those blinded by superstition, to pave the 
way for progress, is ideological cover for statist, authoritarian 
and disciplinary forces. Bauman sees the substance of 
enlightenment radicalism as the drive to legislate, organise, and 
regulate, rather than disseminate knowledge. The project of the 
Enlightenment was two edged: simultaneously reorganizing the
state around the function of planning, designing and managing the 
reproduction of social order and creating an entirely new, and 
consciously designed, social mechanism of disciplining action, 
a i m e d  at recru latincr a n d  re mi ] ? ’'i ^  nrr t-bp c n o i p i  iv 1 ’f p
of the subjects of the teaching and managing state.
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35.Since the spelling of this term in the literature is so 
inconsistent the expressions postmodern', post modern', and 
post-modern' are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.
36.European Positivism (in particular French Positivism) emerges 
in the context of the struggle over "constitutionalism", and the 
nature of the social order which will replace the ancien regime. 
Its particular manifestations arise thus as a result of 
criticisms of contemporary practice and seek to overcome 
(surpass) rationalist idealism by building new schemes with the 
opportunity presented by the data of the developing forms of 
social institutions (for example, the prison, the census, the 
examination room), the result is to link rationalist conceptions 
to a belief in real data, thus giving a reduction of expressive 
outcomes (for example "crime") to a misdirected empiricism based 
on a designative theory of language. Its submission to the ends 
of the state which appears to quickly befall its 'knowledges' was 
partly due to the fact that the productive site of data (for 
example the prison) was state-sponsored and thus already in the 
context of state ends.
37.Utilitarianism is one 'scientific' result: human behaviour is 
revealed as determined by human desires and appetites, and 
liberal "wisdom" now becomes the recognition that each person 
calls "good" that which*he or she desires. But the potential 
anarchic and relativist direction of this finding actually 
strengthens the approach of 'problem', for it vastly simplifies 
the substantive content of "morality" itself. Morality now 
becomes totally anti-'mystery', and is perfectly soluble by the 
scientific technique of ascertaining the objective weight or 
importance of one desire or aversion relative to others, and the 
adjustment of each person's satisfaction to those of all others. 
Given the possibility of translating all desires and aversions 
into terms of sensations of pleasure and pain, then both of these 
questions become matters for essentially empirical and 
quantifiable calculations. This receives its most open program 
in Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation where the matter of the first principles, the 
foundation, receives scant but confident preliminary attention 
as a prelude to the task of chronicling the material. If we ask 
where do values go when they leave their embedment in the cosmos? 
the answer appears to be the very process of scientific 
rationality itself. It becomes the only master value - acceptance 
of the virtue of freedom under the approach of reason leads to 
scientism, the philosophy of knowledge provides its own internal 
and uncritical 'wisdom'.
38. This is at the root of the argument between the neo­
rationalist Habermas and French 'post-structuralists' such as 
Foucault and Derrida. For habermas language is a medium of 
communication and through communicative action the truth of 
statements can be conclusively adjudicated. Consensus, which is 
both the universal humanly desired end state and essential 
requirement for social harmony, requires an agreed functional 
status for knowledge - ultimately 'truth' has philosophical 
foundations independent of humanity. Conversely for Foucault
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there are no philosophical foundations instead truth becomes 
established ultimately through power; for Derrida there can be 
no edifice of objective knowledge possible, no positive 
constructive project with a coherence knowable to itself, instead 
there are only texts, and 'knowledge' is but a product of 
'intertextuality'.
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47.Foucault is the subject of our next chapter, his place in our 
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Foucault's writings, concerning the relation between power and 
knowledge, arose out of his attack on the visions of the post-
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put salvationary faith in the emancipatory power of knowledge 
with its instrumental conception of the power/knowledge relation. 
Foucault injects dialects into the usual liberal and Baconian 
reading that knowledge gives power, transposing this to read 
power gives knowledge; and, in wishing to avoid total dialects, 
reserved resistance for the micro. Thus "strategies of power" are 
those which formulate cognitive discourses, and, in turn, are 
thereby constituted as "regimes of truth". Moreover, for 
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73.An example of this tendency and one which William Sullivan 
analyses in Reconstructing Public Philosophy. is the 
contribution of Robert Heilbroner. In a sense Heilbroner asks 
us to reframe the mandate that the constructivist project of 
knowledge gave Cultural Anthropology in the Nineteenth Century. 
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turn away from storing up the 'imperium' of modernity and adopt 
a sort of Epicurean care of virtuous settlements whilst the whole 
dissolves; his actual endeavour (the writing of After Virtue and 
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Chapter Three: Complicating Progressive epistemology: Michel
Foucault.
I
The great success of the post-Enlightenment period is surely 
science - and science is aided by instrumentation. The relation­
ship is dialectic. The progress of seventeenth-century science 
was conditioned by such tools as the telescope, microscope, ther­
mometer, and so on.1 Correspondingly the instrument which 
developed with criminology/penology was the prison. Whilst the 
image of an institution is found earlier (schemes for 'prisons' 
were proposed by Plato, for instance, particularly with reference 
to religious re-education), the Enlightenment saw the 
predominance of public physical punishment, press-ganging, and 
transportation, which temporally co-existed, incorporated and 
then gave way to placement in the solitude of the hulk, the 
penitentiary and the prison. The debates which so enthused the 
late Nineteenth century, as between those who wanted the system 
of Elmira or Auburn (New York), or those who wanted the 
Panopticon proper, cannot hide the central configuration which 
was the rise of the institution as the embodiment of progressive 
penology. The relationship cannot but be complex and it is not 
our purpose here to seek a determinate story of its conditions.2 
However, it is as well to note that for David Rothman the penal 
change of the Nineteenth century expressed the rise of an idea 
that it would be the experience of punishment in the institution 
which was to matter as much if not more than the likelihood of 
punishment. This rhetoric of progress stated that the effects of 
the well ordered prisons with their routines of bell ringing, 
punctuality and steady labour would reduce and in the view of 
many eliminate crime. The well ordered penitentiary was a panacea 
in just the sense that every form of deviant behaviour could be 
corrected within its walls. This 'methodology1 allowed the 
institution to be free from requiring that those sent to it 
display a limited set of 'particulars' to act upon. Thus 
sentencing could still focus upon the 'crime', while acting upon 
the criminal could become the internal subject of the prison.3
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It was a 'subjection' which was to be of profound consequence and 
debate.
In producing knowledge about crime the criminological positivist 
openly acknowledged the prison as the main data resource - the 
site of the investigation of the 'criminal' .4 As this became 
subjected to the criticism of a limited data base the refined 
positivist preserved the confidence of early positivism through 
requiring epistemological allowance for the effects of such 
imprisonment upon the data and corrections to be made for 
selection processes. This text will not consider the positivist 
debate, instead we shall take briefly some strands of the recent 
Foucaultean analysis of this institutional dialectic with 
knowledge; an analysis which took aim at the vision of the 
institution as the embodiment of progressive epistemology.
II
Foucault states that his analysis of the "birth of the prison", 
its placement in the social body, and its historical in­
strumentality in the service "of the power of normalization", is 
"a chapter in the history of 'punitive reason1". Panopticism, or 
the grip of a social control/punitive "discipline", is the 
outcome of modern rationality applied via 'problem' in one arena. 
Its effects, however, are penetrating, ambiguous, and far 
reaching.
Foucault is specific that Panopticism does not flow from
capitalism: we are to adopt instead a Nietzschean/Weberian
analysis, wherein modernity finds itself in the bind of a social
rationality which both allows and gives rein to capitalism, and
also allows and gives rein to Panopticism. Thus as
"the economic take-off of the West began with the techniques 
that made possible the accumulation of capital... the 
methods of administering the accumulation of men made 
possible a political take-off in relation to the 
traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power, which 
soon fell into disuse, and were superseded by a subtle,
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calculated technology of subjection".5
Foucault develops his narrative making great use of the 
Panopticon, the 'model' institution of Bentham. Bentham designed 
the Panopticon as the institutional partner for the instrumen­
tality of 'problem': it was a mechanism providing multiple and 
multi-purposive solutions to the social problems of the day: it 
was not simply for 'criminals' but an adaptable institution for 
the demands modernity made in the name of utility.6
For Foucault "the Panopticon functions as a kind of laboratory 
of power",7 it is more than a model, for "it must not be 
understood as a dream building; it is the diagram of a 
mechanism..."8 constitutive and productive of the ensuring 
reality of our late-modern social body. We live in a 'social 
reality' which itself is produced in the life of the panoptical 
city.9 It is a grand transformation which reinterprets the
enlightenment replacement of the arbitrary, coarse power of 
tradition and opinion by the scientific patterns of rationality 
and disciplinary knowledge (psychiatry, penology, sociology).
The routine of the planned panopticon, and lately of the prison 
and reformatory, corresponds to a materialization which feeds 
upon the nature of modern science, the grasp of rational
reconstruction upon reason, and its partnership with 'problem' 
productive of a 'crime/delinquency' knowledge spiral. The con­
verse side of 'problem' is the kingdom of control, the estab­
lishment of order: it is a feature implicit in the modern con­
struction project from the beginning and implicitly acknowledged 
by Bacon and others.10 As Fay brings out, the desire for control 
is the key constitutive element in the scientific enterprise 
itself: the link between science and control draws upon a link 
between explanation and prediction. Prediction is best when it 
is unconditional, and if longer term unconditional predictions 
are the aim then these are only possible if the systems to which 
they apply are well isolated, preferably stationary, and recur- 
i e n L . . m e  c l o s e i  o n e  s  u o j e c t s  c o m e  t o  t h i s  m o d e x ,  m e  ^ i o a L c i
the power of prediction. The openness of the social order, which
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counters this tendency, results from a continual state of change 
and adjustment, due to its variable and often chance filled 
inter-relationship with natural phenomena, the interaction of so­
cial units with other social systems, and the growth of knowledge 
and changes in ideas and values of the constituent members: to 
cover this observation is crucial. The continuing success for the 
enterprise of science is tied up with establishing a relation 
with vision: Comte put it plainly; "From science comes prevision, 
from prevision comes control."11 Graphically, the structure of 
the panopticon perpetrates this emphasis. A slim central tower, 
from which can be seen all of the surrounding segmented prison 
cells and their occupants, but whose occupants themselves cannot 
in turn be seen by the prisoners provides the ultimate in the art 
of surveillance, an act of continual demarcation founded upon the 
space of its own law of power:
"power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the
inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline 
of the central tower from which he is spied upon. 
Unverif iable: the inmate must never know whether he is being 
looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may 
always be so."12
The panopticon spreads in those aspects of science, and the 
scientific approach to the activities of everyday life, which 
mark out the "world" as a world of observable phenomena subject 
to the coverage of general laws, and able to be localised in the 
determinate co-ordinates of time and space, and in so doing it 
thereby re-constitutes the "world" from the viewpoint of 
maximising control.13
Since this new order declares itself as founded on principles of 
disinterested rationality, the rationalization of constitutional 
governability, and the grappling with "criminality" via 'problem' 
(under the influence of 'justice' and moderation instead of 
arbitrary desire), it offers itself as engaged in the progressive 
spread of the good of all men (and even in its rhetoric the good 
of those it exemplifies - for instance, the criminal) - the self- 
consciousness which the panoptical vision of this eye holds out 
as its public manifestation is therefore benevolent.
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From every point in the life of the city "approving eyes" and 
"protective glances" will come to proliferate, yet these are also 
the eyes of suspicion as well as benevolence; a double vision in 
which the apprehended concurs in the joint creation of 'normal 
stability'. The stability of a social linked to a 'common sense1 
and a common vision which is answerable to the law of power since 
in the public space the common vision can but see objects in the 
pervasive light which makes them visible - a 'light' which is a 
double for the individuals own stare, itself reflecting and bound 
up with the desire of the gaze.14 Individuals from all social 
"classes" internalise the objectifications of the gaze, and in 
their differentiations, their movements apart, the typologies of 
the social are created.
The normalcy of the social body produces its social 'order', an 
order which is not legitimated and laid down by the will of an 
external figure (God, Sovereign) but is the "will" of a social 
life productive of that order. The co-ordinates which every in­
dividual relate themselves to are transformed - they no longer 
reflect the 'will' of any traditional sovereign but the 
disciplinary co-ordinates of time and space which flow out of and 
reflect the growing expectations of the properly cognised, and 
thus 'normalised' social. On the one hand, in the time table of 
the disciplinary institution (the reformatory), comes the 
meridian of science's political function - unprecedented 
precision is granted to the valuable political component of time 
itself. Time is freed from the cyclic rhythm of 'nature' and the 
timetable becomes the ultimate political instrument, insofar as 
it grounds, and gives form to time, the necessary stability and 
referent for proper mapping. Further, this time which is the 
institution's, is necessarily altered time, as Cohen and Taylor 
put it in their study of long term imprisonment, the prisoners'
"own time has been abstracted... and in its place they have 
been given prison time. This is no longer a resource but a 
controller. It has to be served rather than used".15
On the other hand, the panopticism of moral consensus arises;
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Foucault implicitly presents an antimony to the view that freedom 
is better served by emphasising sanctions employed by peer groups 
and social intermediate functionaries as opposed to the formal 
agents of police - specifically such panopticism entails that 
people in modern society may be more closely controlled by new 
intermediate groups than they were by the old repressive 
hierarchies of power.16
The executive functionaries of Imperial Authority become 
transformed into recorders concerned with tracking down informa­
tion and tracing movements - the bodies of those whom they watch 
become dissected, and posited into an arsenal of information as 
do their own - the triumphs of seemingly disinterested science 
concern in action the double eye of benevolence and suspicion em­
bedded in the modes of surveillance and the uncovering of 
secrets: this knowledge is power, but it is power which gives 
knowledge.
Ill
But why? Why the rise of, or the need for, panopticism, how has 
this come about? The answer lies in the breaking out of the 
classical (including Christian) episteme in the transformations 
to modernity and the establishment, by the 'reason' of the new 
episteme itself, of a mechanism of social order.17
Centrally the Humeanised object released in the 'birth of man1 
of the Enlightenment is linked to the destruction of the regime 
of status, role, character, and possession by man of good and 
evil, that existed inside the total configuration of the 
classical episteme and which enabled "structure to be ordered as 
character". By the mid nineteenth century a new "philosophical 
space" has emerged in the place of the set ordering of the 
objects of classical knowledge which has dissolved. In classical 
thought,
"man does not occupy a place in nature through the
intermediary of the regional, limited, specific 'nature'
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that is granted to him, as to all other things, as a 
birthright... in the general arrangement of the classical 
episteme, nature, human nature, and their relations are 
definite and predictable functional movements.... The modern 
themes of an individual who lives, speaks, and works in 
accordance with the laws of an economics, a philology, and 
a biology, but who also, by a sort of internal torsion and 
overlapping, has acquired the right, through the interplay 
of those very laws, to know them and to subject them to 
total clarification - all these themes so familiar to us 
today and linked to the existence of the 'human sciences' 
are excluded by classical thought".18
It is a transformation from "classical language [which] excludes 
anything that could be a 'science of man1"19 Classical language, 
and the discourse it engenders, i.e. the expressional of that 
episteme, held itself out as privileged in being able to present 
the order of things - under the accepted grammar of essentialism 
things obeyed the laws of essential representation, and the 
grammar of teleos. The societal mechanisms largely in place by 
the nineteenth century danced to a transformation of episteme - 
an episteme which, disowning teleos, and creative of another 
total structure needed to avoid a self-consciousness of its 
moving to the linguistic tunes of a complex nominalism - instead 
it offered a regime of 'positivities1 wherein things seemingly 
obeyed laws of universal flows of development, and man took his 
place in an alternative relationship of words to things, i.e. the 
'positivities' caught and isolated by science.20 This modern 
episteme resolved the potential crisis of the absence of 
confidence in essentialism by the detailed division, and 
creation, of grids - time and space co-ordinates which subjected 
entities to constant surveillance and marcation as 
'positivities'. The rational 'imprisonment1 of individuals in 
modernity is as a corollary to individuals positivistic location 
in the time and space co-ordinates of this science. The inability 
of man to become mysterious - what we can recognise as a possible 
alternative outcome of the demise of the classical episteme - and 
simply privately anonymous, is the result of a world where 
peoples' behaviour, and presentation is subjected to scientific 
scrutiny as a key to their composition as publicly verifiable 
types: delinquent, insane, psychopathic, average (normal).
113
Correspondingly, the line between private individual and public 
type becomes blurred, and the stability of identity de­
categorised from the capacity of 'character' - and this, in turn, 
contributes further to the acceptance of the surveillance to 
ensure adequate 'knowledge' of the positivities of a 'post- 
character' age.21
The link between 'social control' and panopticism is revealed at 
the beginning of Foucault's discussion of panopticism in the 
description of seventeenth-century measures traditionally taken 
to deal with a town stricken with the plague.22 The strict 
partitioning of space into quarantine, the constant surveillance 
and routine questioning of all the families in the plague town, 
were all techniques employed as responses to the plague situa­
tion. Responses already in existence but not central to the 
government of the social. The social is ordered by other, tradi­
tional, methodologies. The nineteenth century turns these fringe 
responses into a social technique with an ambiguous difference, 
for the daily application of these techniques entails the further 
consciousness that the 'plague' can spread to anyone. The 
question as to what the plague consists of, whether actual 
disease, criminality, or insanity, is less relevant than the fact 
that this 'problem'-condition is increasingly viewed as the one 
to be assumed. The social rationality which spreads the urge to 
total surveillance, is based not only on the understood 
possibility that others might spread the plague but, also, in the 
recognition that everyone is susceptible to contamination; that 
the boundaries between the healthy and the diseased members of 
the society can not be simply drawn as a permanent 
categorization.
The crucial change is at the level of social epistemology, and 
in a milieu where anyone can be a criminal, or an informer (later 
policeman), and where the public space is primarily recognizable 
as a one way gaze (i.e. a place of concealment of the focus of 
the gaze, the seat of power), the need to fix people in both time 
and space, and so establish a regime of "docile bodies" increases
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in direct attack upon the possibility of mystery which 
individuals try to cultivate.
Above all it is 'mystery' that is feared - the desire is to 
subject motives, human personalities, the unplaced potentiality 
of decision, to arrangement within the grid of panopticism. There 
are different levels of influence, more or less open to 
signification and analyses. On one level the fear of the 
surveying gaze is to be turned into the internalisation of the 
rational calculator, not an individually transcendental con­
science - for that would be to escape the co-ordinates and tech­
nologies of tracking - but the calculating fear of the scien­
tific, yet benign, rational encompassment of modern penology and 
utilitarian ethics. This calculation, the calculation of 
penological deterrence, moves site from the public executions of 
the eighteenth century which took place as a form of theatrum 
mundi, functioning as a dramatic presentation of the place of 
sovereign's power in the order of things, through an emptying of 
that space, and blurring of the order of things, wherein the very 
terms 'punishment' and 'criminal' fall into the various ploys of 
nominalism, to another positioning. Executions may continue, but 
they now take place in a calculated secrecy, open to the 
reportage of the media, coexisting with the technologies of 
reformation. The technologies of deterrence, for instance, 
employs, and engages within, a different space. This space is no 
longer the overtly political domain of public life and the open 
spectacle, but, rather, the mind of every private citizen. The 
gallows no longer inhabits the 'famous site' but, instead, the 
pages of the newspaper, entering the thoughts of the interior 
theatres of the populace. Henceforth, the power of deterrence no 
longer draws upon the severity of punishment but the ever present 
possibility/inevitability of detection and outcome. The deter­
rent equation shifts to a new theatre, with new actors - the pos­
sibilities of jury acquittal, or public rebellion against the 
enacted spectacle, exit, in their place enters the spread of 
police and the inducement to reportage aided by the panopticism 
of moral consensus and the stabilization of the 'normal1.
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The technique of the reformatory aids in its attempt to inscribe 
on the minds of its inhabitants the template of 'normal' action; 
this site of the disciplining of individuals combats the 
potentially anarchistic effects of nominalism, and, by so doing, 
produces in the common 'social epistemology1 the essential sub­
ject itself - the criminal is again constituted in the order of 
things, this time, however, linked to the institutional con­
figurations of penology as a social subject - 'the delinquent1.23 
While the new 'disciplines of the self1 socialise the 'normal1 
individual into a modality of 'normal' reactions and 
expectations, creating a knowledgeable desire which disciplines 
itself according to the canons of 'self-discovery' and 'self- 
advancement'.
Thus Foucault unpacks the dominant mirage of criminology and 
penology. It undercuts the understanding that penology's 
historical development mirrored the growth of a body of 
criminological theory, which itself had been derived from the 
logical structure and methodological conventions found within the 
natural sciences. Thus Foucault directly contridicts the notion 
that these applied sciences are merely putting into practice the 
potential for a rational society via its organizational 
technology (developing bureaucratic organization of criminal 
justice with associate mechanisms of functional differentiation 
and hierarchical co-ordination focused on the foundation of an 
entity being better developed via knowledge). Penology's positive 
legitimation was ideally founded in criminology's ability to 
formulate typologies of knowledge, factual law-like 
generalizations which would provide the knowledge reserves for 
the modern functionnaires to control and develop the social 
environment.24 Foucault seeks to demonstrate that criminology 
and penology are themselves social activities through which, it 
implicitly appears, those who are not directly involved (i.e. the 
normal, the non-delinquent) are led to act in routinised ways 
which further particular interests under the guise of acting in 
accordance with rational and open general interests (the 
scientific organization of modernity) and technical imperatives
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(solving crime, preserving the peace, dealing with the criminal), 
or are mistakenly impressed into following the routines and 
expectations of a social vision which provides, without critical 
scrutiny, the normative foundations of the institutional 
relations which dominate.
IV
The wider cutting edge of the Foucaultean analysis lies in his 
ascription of modernity as #positivistic1 society. Man is 
"heralded in positivity"25, 'the mode of being of life', the fact 
of life, and of the mode of being produced, are presented in 'the 
empirical positivities1 . And the things which indicate themselves 
"as a concrete limitation of man's existence" are finitudes 
betraying a
"limitation expressed not as a determination imposed upon 
man from outside (because he has a nature or a history), but 
as a fundamental finitude which rests on nothing but its own 
existence as fact, and opens upon the positivity of all 
concrete limitation."26
This progress of modernity is founded upon the demarcation of the 
( + ) from the (-), a demarcation which asserts the 'facticity' of 
the ( + ) and the limitations thereby exposed, at the same time as 
it leaves unrecognized the act of marcation itself. Marcation is 
held as self evident due to the nature of positivity instead of 
being seen as actively processurally engendered and, in turn, 
engendering 'positive' outcomes.
The progress of penal reason is but a new form of marcation
procedure - a new form of the rational reconstruction of the
penal subject. For post-enlightenment Europe the symbolism of the
physical marcation of torture and execution was becoming
'uneconomic'. "In punishment-as-spectacle a confused horror
spread from the scaffold". The post-enlightenment transformation
achieves a certain distancing whereby
"the scandal and the light are to be distributed 
differently; it is the conviction itself that marks the 
offender with the unequivocally negative sign".
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The site of demarcation shifts
"to the trial, and to the sentence.... the execution is like 
an additional shame that justice is ashamed to impose on the 
condemned man; so it keeps its distance from the act, 
tending always to entrust it to others".27
Justice distances itself from the punishment it imposes through 
the "autonomous sector" of "a bureaucratic concealment of the 
penalty itself". The position of marcation must remain out of 
sight:
"the prison, that darkest region in the apparatus of 
justice, is the place where the power to punish, which no 
longer dares to manifest itself openly, silently organises 
a field of objectivity... inscribed among the discourses of 
knowledge.1128
Discourses which contain and constitute the transformative 
imagination within the structured sense allowed by 
epistemological canon. The transformative imagination need not 
obey the boundaries of the sole discipline allocated to it to be 
constrained by positivism. To so confine it is to confuse the 
power which discipline exercises through the canons of explana­
tion and the power of disciplinary boundaries which is only 
superficial. The positivist actually admits this: "The confusion 
which needs to be cleared up is between the subject matter of a 
discipline and the subject matter of explanations".29 The 
positivist admits the two are not identical - instead it is the 
canons of proper explanation which guide - not the 'labels' of 
discourse. The 'reason' apparently internal to a discipline is 
shared in social epistemology.
When discourses contest social terrain it is not the grasp of one 
discipline but the structured coverage of explanation and the in­
ternal "correspondence rules" of positive science which is at 
stake. The human sciences are the site of a marcation, of an 
establishment of identity and difference where the archaic 
potentialities of the 'other' (the allure of metaphysics) is 
separated out being pushed to the (-) side. Discourse is sub­
ject to an interrogation concerning the generation of meaningful 
statements. All ambiguity or paradox must be exposed and the
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movement to the right (i.e. the (+)) made. Such demarcation is 
the epistemological task of philosophy where it takes it role to 
operate under the image of the philosophy of knowledge and thus 
of marking discourse as positive knowledge by a specific set of 
rules - conversely it de-marcates those (-) discourses by the 
withholding of the positive mark. The structure of correct social 
discourse becomes the structure of such marcation.30
Such a philosophy which guarantees epistemology creates a split 
in the heart of potential knowledge, which contrary to such mar­
cation may be subject to the immanent norms of its community; of 
its production as a medium of communication and guidance of 
practical action for a given communal setting.31 Modern marca- 
tions give a positive knowledge which transcends the community, 
is openly anti-traditional and which is public, verifiable, and 
universal - it creates a universalistic split between scientific 
knowledge and the pseudo-scientific or non-science. The accumula­
tion of positivities becomes viewed as the growth of knowledge; 
as the course of progressive epistemology. The product of this 
progressive epistemology is a structuring of zones of inclusion 
and exclusion within the realm of knowledge, which is, however, 
but one instance of a general structure of modern western thought 
and practice. Consequently, science as a specific character of 
reason, is no longer created and responsive to, but nor is it 
restricted to, the guidelines and norms of a living community and 
arising as a response to that communities' needs, since from this 
time on discourse can only be called science once it has 
submitted to the impartial regulation of the proof of 
demarcation; a proof whose impartiality is indicative of its 
universality, of its characteristic whereby it becomes a chief 
purveyor of modernity's structuring of sense; a modality 
characterised by the structure of inclusion and exclusion.
The fate of metaphysics (reflection on the nature of being not 
caught by positive science) is already sealed since the character 
of judgments which it invites appears paralogical, for they lead 
to unsolvable antinomies, and create arguments which seek to go
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'beyond the limits and conditions of human experiences'. This
seems an abuse and the creation of illusions. Thus metaphysics
is denounced by the prosecution counsel of philosophy
"as a pseudo science that tends to set forth on a 'shadowy 
ocean1 where reason goes astray and, once it has gone beyond 
its own limitations, dissipates and disappears."2
The epistemologically acceptable is given a green light and 
channelled towards further development, the "unacceptable" is 
passed over. This is two-edged, however, for how is "being" 
known, if not by that which it-is-not. The existence of the ( + ) 
also requires the (-). To achieve the coherence of the (+), the 
presenter of the (+) must already, albeit engaging in a situated 
temporality, have an idea of what he takes to be non-science or 
pseudo-science and some form of accounting for their externality. 
The internality of the grouping and activity of the ( + ) makes 
sense in comparison to a shadowy "other", and a notion, of the 
other is constantly occurring - the various attempts to overcome 
metaphysics,33 in fact safeguard it and keep it alive. It is 
needed, for without it how can the sign of science be 
distributed; the ritual needs the reference point of the other 
to enact the self.
The control of the structure leads to a continual transformation 
and zoning of knowledge and society rather than progression - for 
Foucault the very term 'social progress1 is impossible to 
utilise. The image of domination and freedom are structurally 
implicated, but under the domination of the path of the (+) we 
cannot think of alternatives other than as a vague questioning 
wondering what would a 'free culture be like if those discourses 
which are passed over in silence were allowed to be sharing with 
us their dangerous knowledge?1. Philosophical awareness can only 
attain a guiding force too late, for our social awareness is but 
a superstructure, which fits not upon the classical economic base 
but the base of economy like epistemological production of 
knowledge. Social consciousness is incapable of 'correct1 
direction being concerned with the raising to the conceptually 
acceptable that which has already been created or to propound
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what is already accepted if only unconsciously. The prospective 
range of our rationality is limited in obedience to the dictates 
of the ( + ). What then are the consequences of the strength of the 
(+)? Specifically what is the function of the split other than 
the granting of signification?
One function is social determinism - similarity to the central
incest taboo the act of prohibition has perscription as its flip
side. Law enables as it prohibits.34 The effect of the
structuring is the creation of 'social-cultural reality'. A
reality it appears difficult to oppose since the realm of the (+)
also presents apparently rational action for modern man. In a
related analysis of "Positivism" Bryant argues:
"The opposition of the positive to the negative take(s)
three forms:
(a) The ontological: the positive is equated with the 
scientific and is marked off from the metaphysical, i.e. 
there are right methods and techniques of inquiry and there 
are wrong ones.
(b) The epistemological: the positive is equated with the 
scientific and is marked off from the unscientific, i.e. 
there are objects which are accessible to science and there 
are objects which are not.
(c) The practical: the positive is equated with the con­
structive and opposed to the critical and destructive."35
The semaphore points the road ahead, obedience to the rules of 
the (+) leads forward. The overcoming, indeed the sublimation of 
reflection leads society to value highest:
mixed opinions ---> knowledge — > scientific knowledge SI — >
scientific knowledge S2
As Trias presents this Nietzschean analysis this is the 
prerogative of the West. The social evolution of the West's 
social-cultural complex has occurred by the sublimation of the 
values of the "other" via the logic of binary opposites and the 
placement of one side as the positive and the other the negative. 
Nietzsche's hypothesis points to the doubling of norms - this 
structure is the maintenance of the path for the West's "highest 
values"; but these are only the values which correspond to the 
'positive'.
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Other societies: nature ---> culture.
The West: nature ---> culture Cl ----> culture C2
(where C2 is the totality of highest values, i.e. the greater 
abundance of the products of the ( + ) ).
The binary logic relations of inclusion and exclusion are 
emphasised by the logic of modernity - as the early positivistic 
Wittgenstein put it. "Every proposition is essentially true - 
false". This is because contradiction is the "outer limit" of 
propositions.36 The imposition of logical form is at base the 
rule of non-contradiction - simply put, you cannot have both 'A' 
and #not A 1- simultaneously. Thus there cannot be the possibility 
of more than one of the same form being present simultaneously. 
We cannot think these possibilities and the world cannot con­
tain them. This results in the splitting of all realms of human 
existence into dualities.
Realm: Western Culture Included Excluded
Sexual liaison
Social behaviour
Personal behaviour
Psychology
Religion
Legality
Penal
Knowledge
Cognition
Writing/discourse
Exogamy Incest
Normalcy Deviance
Health Madness, illness
Waking life Dreams
Sacred Profane
Prescribed Illegal
Accepted Prosecuted
(+) science (-) non science 
Sense Nonsense
Utterance Silence
The determinism of social epistemology thus interacts with a 
sociological insider - outsider opposition (established 
outsiders). The implicit emancipation apparent in the structure 
of marxist class analysis - that is of the prospect of freedom 
in the overcoming of the dominant class, the destruction of the 
dominant class and consequent elevation and spread of the 
oppressed class - cannot be engaged in since there will always 
be a system of demarcation and preferential action (an 
establishment - outsider) inherent in the logic of western 
knowledge and practice. At the end of Foucault's analysis 
emancipation can only become "the care of the self".37 On the
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personal level we are asked to avoid, to disrupt avowal of one's 
person in already patterned ways. To deny the expression of the 
self and of one's theory as a mode of social regimentation in 
which ultimately the power of individuality has no part. In the 
later works Foucault appears to offer more than simply projects 
of resistance whenever a patterned set of expectations and a 
claim of progress is made but projects of what may be called 
'pragmatic creativity' . The self is not something which is 
completely given to us, but neither can it be made, Sarterian 
style, out of freedom; instead it is made in the games of 
bondage.
Life is part of games of bondage and the role of theory, 
analysis, and activity as a result of analysis, is to uncover the 
modes of group domination and subjection as well as the 
distinguishing features of types of domination. Thus action can 
be entered into, action and practices of life, but life must 
always be some or other form of practice, and one is always 
constrained in that practice. There is no escape from this, no 
innocent space. The text of the writer too is bound: the binary 
oppositions which bind us to the constructions of rational - 
emotional, mind - nature, and which Foucault turns against still 
appear to bind the texts of Foucault. As Minson points out 
Foucault, compared to the knowledges other social historians give 
us, makes a tactic of "essentialising the sovereign power in the 
legal instance", and presents at times "dubious continuities" and 
"essentialising tendencies, with their torsion towards a unified 
past pitted against an equally unified present".38 Much of the 
Foucaultean narrative technique consists of setting up 
antagonisms and oppositions within which action proceeds; yet 
much of the aim of this tactic is to alert us to the dangers of 
any totalizing. Even the aims of 'genealogy' were itself to allow 
us to
"entertain the claims to attention to local, discontinuous, 
disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of 
a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchize and 
order them in the name of some true knowledge. "39
The analysis of panopticism is one aspect of the new technologies
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of social control. To Foucault there are two aspects: one is 
'discipline' ; the other is surveillance. These roughly correspond 
to two distinct sites of 'will' . One is the will of the 
individual considered individually, the other the will of 
individuals considered 'en mass' as the social body.
The disciplining of the will of the offending individual is one 
technology displayed "directly through the mechanics of a 
training",40 another is the administration of the will of the 
individuals in society. The grasp upon the individual who has 
already offended is but one application of penal reason, the 
other is the 'societal' grasp of individuals in society. Penal 
reason is a subset of disciplinary reason which is implicated in 
the constitution of the normal for modernity; the avenues by 
which it permeates modernity flow both from the common-sense of 
modern reason and the fear of the conditions of modernity.41
The common sense of modernity plays a game in that it expresses 
itself through the empiricism of the 'common sense' philosophers 
- those who ultimately trust to the truth of individual desire 
and sensuality. Foucault's attack on sexuality as the focus of 
modernity's lingage of truth, authenticity, self-expression and 
empiricist sense undercuts the narrative which progressive 
epistemology told of the freeing of the techniques of self- 
knowledge from the religious into reason by replacing the 
submission to the religious to a submission into a medico- 
scientific power-knowledge framework. This, revisionist, "history 
of sexuality" is subversive since to the modern consciousness the 
concept of the self has changed from that which befits office and 
strategies of honour to the position where "the conception of the 
naked self, beyond institutions and roles, as the 'ens 
realissium1 of human being, is the very heart of modernity".42 
Yet how can the self be naked? Is not the nakedness of modernity 
only the clothing of a self-knowledge and desire stimulated and 
mediated by forms of modern 'self' and 'other' consciousness? 
Foucault points us to the historical creation of the 'truth' of 
any such notions.43
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The basis in 'common sense1 is crucial since social control is 
more than the containment of types of conduct, it also is the 
source and acceptance of the power of normality. On the stylised 
narratives of developmental legitimation the Gemeinschaft 
village, to borrow the terminology of Tonnies, was ruled 
primarily by custom, its towns ordered by personages enjoining 
a status legitimated by religion and authority 
(personal/charismatic). There was little emphasis on any 
abstract, formal criteria for concepts such as 'justice' - 
references to 'justice' have specific connotations. The will of 
the Gesellschaft individual is "freer", its subjectivism 
demanding subjection not to traditional subordination but 
rational understanding and the dictates of authenticity. But this 
is a freedom to be subjected to the requirements of rational 
choice in a framework of rationality and knowledges which will 
apply equally well in Paris, New York, or London. The 
organizational problem of social control is seen as essentially 
similar - social order is divorced from the confines of any par­
ticular society or any particular locality - instead penal con­
sciousness must become transformed into concepts of modernity 
which resulted in the images of solutions pertaining to modernity 
per se, rather than conscious of being localised temporal con­
structs. This task is contextual also in that it must find new 
theories and visions of society which face the scene of the 
consequences of the individualism necessary to underpin 
industrial capitalism's growth. The obverse of confidence in the 
self as the core of modernity's 'methodological individualism' 
is the fear of chaos. In reviewing recent histories of punishment 
Ignatieff states:
"the massive investment in institutional solutions would 
have been inconceivable unless the authorities believed they 
were faced with the breakdown of a society of stable ranks 
and the emergence of a society of hostile classes. This 
diagnosis of the malaise of their times in turn suggested an 
institutional solution."44
An institutional solution conducted, ultimately in England after 
1879, by penal 'authorities' in the name of 'society', to a 
problem divorced from the 'pragmata' of a social setting in a
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specific community location but transformed into the abstract 
'rationalization1 of modernity's scientific knowledge, the image 
of which Foucault sees in 'individual pathology'. A pathology 
which could play a game with fear inviting the visage of an 
'other' as target and which standing in the presence of so much 
developing knowledge as to 'pathology' did not need to question 
its own foundations, or to acknowledge the possibility that 
reflexivity would undermine this image of society 'objectively' 
correcting itself through impartial knowledge.
The demand for new forms of control is repeated today,45 a 
similar dilemma is faced, but now the confidence in the power of 
the 'black-box' of the institution to effect change has gone, and 
even amidst demands, such as the Dahrendorf demand for concentra­
tion upon citizen rights and civic participation as revitalised 
social democratic responses to the late modern reformulation of 
social order, the institution is in danger of being forgotten as 
a site of 'progressive penology'. Interestingly Foucault points 
us into a realm of practical politics: a politics aimed at the 
institution as a central site. Foucault's use of the Panopticon 
is pragmatic in a strong sense; for it is the claim that 
knowledge is so linked to practice in its 'meaning' that the 
distinction is largely irrelevant.46 Conversely, the narrative 
paraxial interaction of the panopticon producing the normalcy of 
modern life points us to is the question of the possibilities of 
usage and constitution of the institution in 'post-positivism'. 
Are the regimes, conduct, and the pragmatics of the modern 
institution to be hidden from articulation and investigation, or 
could there be an attempt to place the institution as a site and 
example of a different modernity? To function, that is as a 
expressional indice of the most extreme structures of the 
exclusion - inclusion polar opposites. The regimes and ideology 
of the prison offer a critical site of reflection and action. For 
if 'discipline' is a modality for creating parts of social order 
the prison cannot be seen as outside the flows of the normalacy 
of that order - the regimes of the prison are a necessary 
participation in the social order and should reflect it. Such a
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d e m a n d  w o u l d  f o l l o w  f r o m  t h e  m o d e r n  p r a g m a t i s a t i o n  o f  s o c i a l  
t h e o r y ' s  ( n o n ) c o n f i d e n c e  -  i t  w a s  a l s o  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  d a y  t o  
d a y  c o n c e r n s  o f  t h e  l i f e  o f  M i c h e l  F o u c a u l t .
On others, however, we are led to expect the medium of the prison 
as the expression of a different form of inclusion/exclusion with 
the changing demands for the usage of the institution under the 
discourse of Just Deserts where nothing 'positive' is demanded 
of it .
NOTES
1. "Historically, the thesis can be maintained that more 
fundamental advances have been made as a by-product of 
instrumental (i.e. engineering) improvements than in the direct 
and conscious search for new laws....Witness: (1) relativity and
the Michelson-Morely experiment, the Michelson interferometer 
came first, not the reverse; (2) the spectroscope, a new 
instrument which created spectroscopy; (3) the three-electrode 
vacuum tube, the invention of which created a dozen new sciences; 
(4) the cyclotron, a gadget which with Lauritsen's linear 
accelerator, spawned nuclear physics. . . etc", Robert A. Millikan 
(Nobel Prize winner in atomic physics), quoted in George Novack, 
Pragmatism verses Marxism, p.29.
2.The literature of both the 'traditional Whig' view of penal 
history and the developing 'revisionist' approach is now large 
and references are contained in this text at relevant points -
much of the literature is addressed in the recent collection 
Social Control and the State. Stanley Cohen and Andrew Scull 
(eds.), Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1983.
3.Cf. David J.Rothman, "Sentencing Reform in Historical 
Perspective", Crime & Delinquency. Oct., 1983, pp. 631-647.
4. Sheldon Glueck gave the historical evaluation of the positivist 
as "the Lombrosian School will always be credited with one very 
important contribution: instead of speculation about human 
freedom verses determinism and spinning out theories of crime 
causation and criminal responsibility in the abstract, the 
Lombrosians went to the prisoner for the evidence". The Problem 
of Delinquency, p.35. Lombroso himself states "when.. I realised 
how inadequate were the methods hitherto held in esteem, and how 
necessary it was, in studying the insane to make the patient, not 
the disease, the object of attention. In homage to these ideas, 
I a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  c l i n i c a l  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  c a s e  of m e n t a l  
alienation the study of the skull, with measurements and weights,
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by means of the esthesiometer and craniometer. Reassured by the 
result of these first steps, I sought to apply this method to the 
study of criminals. . . the a priori studies of crime in the 
abstract, hitherto pursued by jurists, especially in Italy ... 
should be superseded by the direct analytical study of the 
criminal.. I, therefore, began to study criminals in the Italian 
prisons., [and whilst conducting one postmortem I made a 
discovery which impressed upon me] not merely an idea but a 
revelation. At the sight of that skull, I seemed to see all of 
a sudden, lighted up as a vast plain under a flaming sky, the 
problem of the nature of the criminal..." From Introduction to 
Criminal Man. quoted in Glueck, The Problem of Delinquency.
5.Discipline and Punish, pp.220-21.
6.Discipline and Punish, pp.195 ff. Bentham stated: "Morals
reformed, health preserved, industry invigorated, instruction 
diffused, public burdens lightened, economy seated as it were 
upon a rock, the guardian knot of the poor-laws not cut but 
untied - all by a simple idea in architecture." Bentham, 
Panopticon, or the Inspection House, p.39 fin Bentham's Collected 
Works. Bowring edition, Edinburgh, 1838-43, vol. IV.) Foucault, 
however, discerns a commonality: these were "different
projects...but not incompatible... coming slowly together [in 
the productive use that the power to punish] applied to the space 
of exclusion..." (p.199)
7.Ibid.. p.204.
8.Ibid.. p.205. The very singularity of the visible Panopticon 
ensures its grasp. For the actual fact that it is only the model 
of Bentham, the fact that the concrete buildings of actual 
individual Panopticons were only constructed in isolated examples 
(for example in America at Statesville from 1926-35 in 
particular, in France Petite-Roquette in 1836 and Rennes in 1877; 
see also discussion by Gilbert Geis in Pioneers in Criminology. 
Hermann Mannheim (ed.), Stevens & Sons, 1960, pp. 63-67.) betrays 
the reality that the Panopticon is reason's Freudian penal slip. 
The archaeological itrace1, which reveals the 'truth' of the 
insidious web of reason. Its reality lies in its grasp on the 
family, the school, factory, communications and transport 
regularities of modernity.
9.The reality of modern social welfare and its knowledge demand 
is thus Bentham's "cells, communications, outlets, approaches, 
there ought not anywhere to be a single foot square, on which man 
or boy shall be able to plant himself - no not for a moment - 
under any assurance of not being observed. Leave but a single 
spot unguarded, that spot will be sure to be a lurking-place for 
the most reprobate of the prisoners, and the scene of all sorts 
of forbidden practices." "Panopticon, Postscript", p. 86, in 
Bentham's Collected Works.
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10.Bacon writes in a small piece called The Sphinx: "Now of the 
Sphinx’s riddles there are in all two kinds: one concerning the 
nature of things, another concerning the nature of man; and in 
like manner there are two kinds of kingdom offered as the reward 
for solving them; one over nature, and the other over man". In 
Gateway to the Great Books. R.M. Hutchins and M.J.Alder (eds.), 
Encyclopedia Britannia, Chicago, 1962, Vol 8, p.3.
11.Quoted in Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, p.37
12.Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p.201.
13.The very structure of the Panopticon flows from a similar 
structure as post-Kantian science demonstrates the theme of 
centre and outer, of the imposition of the correct syntax from 
the centre.
14."The scarcely sustainable visibility of the monarch is turned 
into the unavoidable visibility of the subjects. . .We are entering 
the age of the infinite examination and of compulsory 
objectification." Discipline and Punish, p.189.
15.Stanley Cohen and Laurie Taylor, Psychological Survival. 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1981, p.99.
16.Cf David Garland, Punishment and Welfare, for a thesis of the 
development of the 'welfare sanction', and Jacques Donzelot, 
The Policing of Families. Pantheon Books, New York, 1979, for a 
model whereby the modern family is enclosed in varying layers of 
discipline centered on the social-work body of knowledges. 
Panopticism of moral consensus is also becoming used in critical 
narratives focusing upon the growth of the modern Police as an 
institution. The rise of the modern police is linked to 
"surveillance". The new Police forces are not at all as their 
early forms but began to be organised in bureaucratic modalities 
and to be controlled by strict rules of procedure. Earlier 
'police' [nightwatchmen, parish constables] were ad hoc and 
irregular, but the modern police took as their task the rational 
surveillance of the whole population. To achieve this acceptance 
by the populace was required as to the need for such 
surveillance. Further, the need to combat crime allowed as a 
function of that purpose, the development of centralised criminal 
archives specified in the name of rationalising and categorising 
the flow of information.
17.No set of individuals, no specific social class of rulers, 
control the process of panopticism; the panopticon itself, as 
Bentham declared was to be "open to the democratic tribunal of 
the world". It is the episteme of modernity itself which 
dominates.
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18.Foucault, The Order of Things. p.310
19.Ibid.. p.311.
20.Extreme nominalism throws into question the Kantian syntax, 
holding that items are chairs, criminals, lunatics, only because 
they are called 'chairs, criminals, lunatics*, and no answer at 
all can be given to the question as to why certain objects are 
(or are about to be) called 'chairs, criminals, lunatics' while 
others are not (as so to do would be to introduce some form of 
realism: possibly a reduction to a relation of some form of 
common identities as in the classical Aristotelian strain where 
these recurring identities give rise to the name). Foucault never 
declared a realism behind the linkages modern societies have 
constructed, or announced their ideological demystification - to 
do so would destroy the ambiguous 'rational irrationality1 of the 
nominalism his texts portray modernity as preforming, and indeed, 
his own as continuing. The centrality of the issue of nominalism 
is becoming increasingly recognised among Foucault's 
commentators, see for example John Rajchman's Michel Foucault. 
The Freedom of Philosophy. Columbia University Press, New York, 
1985, footnote 6, pp 73-4.
21.The gaze is necessary to cope with the earlier discovery of 
Locke, that objects, and their features, were not divided by 
nature or God into real and objectively delimited classes. [John 
Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, especially Book II Section 
XI, and Book III Section III.]
22.Discipline and Punish, p. 102.
23.We should note that this occurs at the same time as the 
multitude of 'philosophies of punishment1 prevent the total 
capitulation of the political-judicial strands of episteme to a 
regime of disciplinary logos. Thus the criminal and the 
delinquent can, ambiguously, co-exist. Foucault does not simply 
ignore the 'juridico' in the name of the totality of the 
'delinquent' as Bob Fine states he does in Democracy and the Rule 
of Law: Liberal Ideals and Marxist Critiques. Pluto Press,
London, 1984, see pp. 189-203. Fine shares there a particularly 
popular interpretation of Foucault's notion of the delinquent in 
the idea that the prison produced "in the form of 'delinquency' 
a politically safe form of resistance that is easy to 
accommodate, supervise and control". Ibid.. p. 196. The idea that 
'delinquency' was productive in the marginalisation of a section 
of the working class appears an important strand in Garland's 
"social functions of Victorian penality", see chapter two 
"Punishment and Social Regulation in Victorian Britain", in 
Punishment and Welfare. For Garland the notion of delinquency 
changes somewhat and expands in new forms as the institution of
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the prison comes into crisis in the 1890's. Garland takes this 
crisis of imprisonment in the 1890's and, as a response, the 
development of novel penal discourses in the twentieth century, 
as a crucial site for a developing modern punitive reason to 
create a Welfare-punishment complex. One is, however, free to ask 
whether there was anything novel about the so-called crisis of 
imprisonment in the 1890's, has not prison always been in crisis?
Interestingly, it is Hume in the Treatise who appears to set out 
the conditions for the Foucaultean thesis. Foucault argues that 
the institutional site of the reformatory, or penitentiary, was 
specifically implicated in the creation of the "delinquent'. The 
delinquent was a new form of discourse - the "criminal' had been 
created by the abstract discourse of the criminal law and was 
thus an analytical creature; he was the obverse of the "false' 
divine right of the sovereign. However, the destruction of that 
legitimative methodology of reason ensures that the new creation 
of scientific reason, the delinquent, must be a synthetic, actual 
empirical, creature; but how was the nominalist dance of words 
and universals to be controlled? How was "the delinquent" to be 
fixed into a systematic play of words ensuring its domination 
over people? Here Panopticism produces a normalization of the 
social body by means of surveillance. The creation of the normal 
follows from the creation of the institutional public type of 
deviant, the delinquent - he is first constituted inside the 
institution which abstracts from the array of individuals 
"selected identities" (Locke), these are then disseminated 
throughout daily life and secured through surveillance monitoring 
for "resemblances" (Hume). Any possibility of the prisoner being 
seen as an agent of political struggle, and thus the necessity 
for political discourse was quashed. [The new episteme 
substitutes "for a power that is manifestated through the 
brilliance of those who exercise it, a power that insidiously 
objectifies those on whom it is applied, to form a body of 
knowledge about those individuals, rather than to deploy the 
ostentatious signs of sovereignty". Discipline and Punish, p. 
220.] The science of criminology, deriving from penology, 
produces over time "knowledge(s )' about the criminal 
"predisposition, characteristics, milieu' etc., which are in turn 
reinforced by recidivism. The fact of recidivism being explained 
by insufficiency of information, and further surveillance 
t h e r e f o r e  d e m a n d e d  i n  t h e  n a m e  o f  t h e  e m e r g i n g  b i o l o g i e s  a n d  
psychologies. The power of the functionary to dominate comes not 
from his superiors but from below - the brilliance of this ploy 
of power is that it is achieved by the banishing of politics and 
metaphysics from the building of knowledges. This, however, 
creates a political power in that it classifies and typologies 
people in the service of governmentability; thus power is 
enhanced by the spectacle of removing politics.
As if to explain the mechanisms of panopticism Hume had earlier 
stated: "The application of ideas beyond their nature proceeds 
from our collection ^ all their possible degrees of quantity and '!
q u a l i t y  i n  s u c h  a n  i m p e r f e c t  m a n n e r  a s  m a y  s e r v e  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  
life... When we have found a  resemblance among several objects, 
that often occur to us, we may apply the same name to all of
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them, whatever the differences we may observe in the degrees of 
the quantity and quality, and whatever other differences may 
appear among them. After we have acquired a custom of this kind, 
the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these 
objects, and makes the imagination conceive of it with all its 
particular circumstances and proportions. But as the same word 
is supposed to have been frequently applied to other individuals, 
that are different in many respects from that idea, which is 
immediately present to the mind; the word not being able to 
revive the idea of these individuals, only touches the soul, if 
I may be allowed so to speak, and revives that custom, which we 
have acquired by surveying them. They are not really and in fact 
present to the mind, but only in power". Treatise on Human 
Nature,(see Ch. Five for references, p.20. Power here, for Hume, 
is that "power of producing such an idea" (Treatise, p. 23), 
which is also central to Foucault. Hume continues: "nor do we 
draw them out distinctly in the imagination, but keep ourselves 
in a readiness to survey any of them, as we may be prompted by 
a present design or necessity".
24.Foucault's distaste for criminological writing leads him to 
the tactic of 'going beyond' criminology by denying the necessity 
of engaging its forms on its own terms. Discipline and Punish 
affects mainstream criminology by its very refusal to debate 
'issues' on the traditional terms of reference and relegates the 
status of its knowledge claims to a status similar to what 
MacIntyre called in After Virtue the 'fictions' of modern social 
science - behind Foucault's analysis there is, however, the 
oppression of a 'will to power' which MacIntyre does not, at 
least openly, imply.
25.The Order of Things, p.314.
26.Ibid.. p.315.
27.Discipline and Punish, p.9.
28.Ibid.. p.256.
29.Nigel Walker, Explanation and Non-explanation. p.101.
30.For much of the following analysis see Eugenio Trias, 
Philosophy and Its Shadow. Kenneth Krai) Benhoft (trans.), 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1983, especially Part II, 
"The Structure and Function of Philosophy".
31.See MacIntyre, After Virtue, and Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?.
32.Trias, Philosophy and Its Shadow, p.33.
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33.See the analysis of Gillian Rose in The Dialectic of Nihilism: 
Post Structualism and the Law. Basil Blackwell, 1984, for a 
portrayal of recent attempts to overcome metaphysics which serve 
to bring it back to life. The similar process where "Metaphysics 
is replaced by science; science returns to metaphysics" (from The 
Dialectic.. . p. 7) becomes the conclusion of Unger in Law and 
Modernity, pp. 266-267.
34.The positive function of the incest prohibition is the 'social 
law* of exogamy. This is the fundamental basis of the creation 
of 'exchange' and a series of social and cultural relationships. 
This law of exchange enables groups to work out a stable 
relationship based on the principle of reciprocity, and different 
structures of limited exchanges and general exchanges come about.
35.C.Bryant, Positivism in Social Theory and Research. MacMillan, 
London, 1985, p.174.
36.Lonico-tractatusf 5. 143.
37. So runs the core of the Foucaultean analysis - but the notion 
of social epistemology as the result of epistemes produced in an 
essential link between discourse and power (and where the logos 
of social theory flowing from the productive foundationalism of 
power itself) encourages the reflexive question 'what is the 
status of Foucault's text?' Interestingly, Foucault appeared to 
turn at one time to the social theory of Marxism in an effort to 
temporally locate those who controlled the power/knowledge nexus, 
those who guided the panopticon, but Foucault increasingly 
distanced himself from it; no over-reaching social theory is 
proposed. But what then is the status of Foucault's claims? We 
are left with a confused, and confusing, array of complexity, 
visions of power and language, specifically, the confusion of men 
in history in the play of power between nominalism, essentialism, 
designative and expressionist conceptions - in a sense the 
logical positivists are right, mankind has indeed been suffering 
from the bewitchment of language; but it is also certainly more 
complex than the positivist answer (to speak clearly, with due 
regard to definitions) would also have us accept.[The standard 
way of understanding Foucault's interest in language in The Order 
of Things is as a Structuralist. There is, however, a 
metaphysical difference in the approach to language which 
Foucault takes, as opposed to, say, the early Levi-Strauss. Levi- 
Strauss approaches language as a neutral, innocent medium whose 
internal mechanisms are to provide a key to the scientific 
unpacking of the social body whereas to Foucault language is 
never innocent, but is always implicated in the service of a 
regime of power. ]
As one commentator has noted Foucault's rejection of general 
categories and the need of an explicit total analysis ensures 
that his key concept(s), such as "discourse/practice is not 
inserted into a totalized theory but floats like a hawk over the 
social historical process, ready to swoop down upon any topic 
that seems appropriate" - such tactics that particular 
commentator endorsed as a viable tactic of a free floating use
of "critical theory".[Mark Poster, Foucault. Marxism & Historyf 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1984, p.39.] But what this may lead to 
is the inability to distinguish between areas or projects of 
resistance: as Foucault has been read by another commentator to 
propose any and every resistance in stating that "critique... 
should be an instrument for those who fight, those who resist and 
refuse what is., it isn’t a stage in a programming." [Quoted in 
Jeffrey Minson, Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche. Foucaultr
Ponzelot and the Eccentricity of Ethics. MacMillam, London, 
1985, at p.221.]
38.Ibid.f pp.90-91.
39.Foucault, Power/Knowledae. Harvester Press, 1980, p.83. See 
I. Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister and 
my brother. Michel Foucault (ed.), Frank Jellinek (trans.), 
Pantheon Books, New York, 1975, for a scene of opposing 
disciplines seeking to lay claim to the 'truth* of Pierre, and 
Pierre's own 'unheroic* text.
40.Discipline and Punishr p.180.
41.The need to formulate and lay open to administration the will 
of the individual and position the wills of individuals is 
implicit in the fear that Tonnies expresses in his 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft distinction. This fear arises as the 
social world of the Gesellschaft is seen as primarily unnatural -
the ties, or lack of ties, are forced and must be constructed. 
Gesellschaft society is an artifact but it is one that must be 
feared for it is an "artificial construction of an aggregate of 
human beings which superficially resembles the Gemeinschaft in 
so far as the individuals peacefully live and dwell together. 
However, in the Gemeinschaft they remain essentially united in 
spite of all separating factors, whereas in the Gesellschaft they 
are essentially separated in spite of all uniting factors." To 
such a nineteenth century writer the image of urban life implies 
that the visage of Hobbes is present, but now it is 
industrialised society that is the scene of a always possible war 
of all against all. The need is pressing in the Gesellschaft of 
modem urban life for a framework of social routine.
42."In a world of honour the individual is the social symbols 
emblazoned on his escutcheon. The true self of the knight is 
revealed as he rides out to do battle in the full regalia of his 
role; by comparison, the naked man in bed with a woman represents 
a lesser reality of the self. In a world of dignity, in the 
modem sense, the social symbolism governing the interaction of 
men is a disguise. The escutcheons hide the true self. It is 
precisely the naked man, and even more specifically the naked man 
expressing his sexuality, who represents himself more 
truthfully....In a world of honour the individual discovers his 
true identity in his roles, and to turn away from the roles is 
to turn away from himself... In a world of dignity, the
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individual can only discover his true identity by emancipating 
himself from his socially imposed roles - the latter are only 
masks, entangling him in illusion, 'alienation1, and 'bad faith' . 
Berger, Berger, and Kellner, The Homeless Mind, Vintage Books, 
New York, 1974, p.90 - 91. For Foucault this is part of "a 
process of knowledge that obliged one to look for and to tell the 
truth about oneself". "Le Combat de la chastite", CommunicationsP 
35, p. 17, quoted in Poster, Foucault. Marxism & History.
43.On the relationship of the self to history Berger states: "the 
two worlds have a different relation to history. It is through 
the performance of institutional roles that the individual 
participates in history, not only the history of the particular 
institution but that of his society as a whole. It is precisely
for this reason that modern consciousness, in its conception of
the self, tends towards a curious ahistoricism. In a world of 
honour, identity is firmly linked to the past through the 
reiterated performance of prototypical acts. In a world of
dignity, history is the succession of mystification from which 
the individual must free himself to attain 'authenticity'." The 
Homeless Mind, p.91.
44.Michael Ignatieff, "State, Civil Society and Total
Institutions: a Critique of Recent Social Histories of
Punishment", in Social Control and the State. Stanley Cohen & 
Andrew Scull (eds.), Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1983, pp. 89-90.
45.See, for example, Ralf Dahrendorf, Law and Order. [The Hamlyn 
Lectures] Stevens & Sons, London, 1985. Also King and 
Radzinowicz, The Growth of Crime: the international experience. 
New York, Basic Books, 1977.
46.For it must not be forgotten that the prison is as a site of 
practice - not simply the materialization of certain beliefs 
about practical rationality, theoretical reason, and societal 
conceptions of 'justice* but also an active instigator of these.
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Part Two: The Epistemological Imagination and the 
Imaginative Structuring of Modernity
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Chapter Four: Species of Epistemolocrv.
I
The techniques of formal epistemology begin earlier than the 
Enlightenment in the context of the Sophist*s general scepticism 
concerning certain knowledge - a scepticism premised upon the 
results of their travelling and the doubts they voiced upon 
returning. They questioned all idols, and one of these was the 
taken-for-granted status of ordinary common-sense knowledge. 
Before such doubts were raised the appearance of the world could 
take the form of local knowledges and, as both MacIntyre (with 
particular reference to the Homeric narratives) and Lyotard (for 
the general narrative form) express it, the narrative formation 
of existence. But once doubts have been raised as to the security 
of these, one tactic of response has been to provide answers 
within the provision of formal frameworks.
Post-enlightenment man faced not the Christian narrative of the 
world and man' s purpose but a world in which secure knowledge was 
to be the key - he attempted to mediate existence by knowledge. 
Epistemology came of age as the secular response to the authority 
of the oracle and religious revelation - it was to provide the 
rationale for man to say 11 It is warranted for me (or X) to
believe that......... ”. What follows the "that" was the
itemization of the world - an itemization which could be ranked 
in significance depending on the goals which man set himself. 
Primarily itemization was crucial to identify problems, to 
sociologise, psychologise, naturalise, materialise, philosophise 
(in its modern sense) - departmentalise existence into actions, 
policies, envisaged goals, constraints, opponents, obstacles, 
frameworks, routines.
The drive of epistemology was, thenceforth, to provide a common 
framework, a generalization, a universalistic grounding upon 
which to appraise particular statements (knowledge-claims).
The dominant approach to modem epistemology has been 
individualist (i.e. to see itself as providing corrective 
guidance for 'subjectivism* ) - the individual is seen as the 
primary entity of concern and emphasis is placed upon identifying 
the psychological input into the ultimate sources of knowledge 
so that the psychological may be distinguished from the true 
fruits of man's cognition.1 With both the stress upon perception, 
memory and inference of the empiricist side, and that upon the 
innate ideas of the rationalist the emphasis is on man's 
abilities, particular yet universal to him as species member, in 
his personal interaction with the external world.2
This is, however, to take a particular approach to the issue of 
epistemology and the being of man, for, as Karl Mannheim stated, 
there are two aspects to epistemology, of which the subject (man) 
is but one: "All epistemological speculation is orientated within 
the polarity of object and subject."3
Engels earlier claimed in the Essay on Ludwig Feuerbach: "the 
great basic question of all philosophy...is that concerning the 
relation of thinking and being."
The issue is the relationship of man to the world - which to
place as the basis of concern, the external object, or man as
subject. As Mannheim put it, our concern
"either starts with the world of objects and with this as a 
basis explains the position of the subject in this world 
order,....from which are derived known cognitive powers, or 
else it starts with the subject as, the immediate and 
unquestioned datum and seeks to derive from him the 
possibility of valid knowledge".4
Roughly speaking the main stream of individualist epistemology 
is divided between the two approaches of Rationalism and 
Empiricism. Crudely put, under Rationalism (sometimes called 
logical form), a claim to knowledge is valid/legitimate only if 
it exemplifies a certain accepted logical form which is based 
upon an indubitable bedrock. The mode of testing knowledge- 
claims is the coherence theory of truth, and emphasis is placed
140
upon the overall systematic edifice of knowledge. Under 
Empiricism a claim to knowledge is legitimate only if it can be 
justified in terms of experience. The usual mode of testing is 
the correspondence theory of truth.
Non-individualist epistemology which claims that knowledge is 
formed within the machine-like interactions of objects has 
assumed a variety of names - materialism, mechanism, and 
structuralism are examples. Within these modes a claim to 
knowledge is legitimate only if it is a specification of a 
publicly reproducible structure. However, all versions of these 
epistemologies involve a flow through the individual (even in 
class position), and all see man as a crucial link, or as Ernest 
Gellner (following Koestler) once put it, as the ghost in the 
machine - the problem for them is always how to flesh out the 
ghost without destroying their social mechanism.5
Another approach, which attempts a mediating position, is 
Pragmatism. Pragmatism was born out of mixing apparent 
incompatibles: that of the Rationalist and Idealist tradition 
crying 'mind, mind*, and the Empiricist and materialist calling 
'matter, matter*, with a sceptical approach which saw the claims 
of both as not completely bourne out. The pragmatist saw 
epistemology as derivative of our need as creatures living in 
situations to find our way about the lived-in-world. The 
pragmatist shifts the emphasis from claims about uncovering the 
secrets of nature, of uncovering manifest 'truth*, to claims as 
to how best to handle the situations in which man finds himself. 
The problem is, and this is shared with all the other approaches, 
how to identify reality, but the pragmatist holds that reality 
is rich, multiple, and ever-changing; this developmental approach 
implies that a static epistemological approach is incorrect for 
man. To the pragmatist, men under the epistemologies of 
empiricism and rationalism seize upon aspects of this diverse and 
developing reality frozen in their experience, claiming anything 
from direct intuition to a mere represention of past experience. 
Such men thus fix upon one or some of the innumerable qualities
or relations of existence and thence build up a system for which 
they claim correctness. The pragmatist questions all of these 
'accepted true knowledges', redefining them as sets of contextual 
rationality in man's necessary strategy of existence. In this way 
the medieval certainty of revealed faith is reinterpreted as 
projected belief, fundamental bedrocks are exposed as tentative 
presuppositions. Moreover, for the pragmatist this does not 
destroy 'reason' but demonstrates the contextuality of reason; 
that is to say that the function of both projected belief and 
tentative presuppositions is to serve as positions upon which to 
base action whereby it may be verified in resulting practice.
A. The Rationalist Imagination.
Stress is placed upon the primacy of reason as opposed to the 
senses, and the path of intellectual insight is thought capable 
of grasping the overall structure of reality (which is thought 
to cohere in a mathematical structure). The activity of 
theorizing, and the creation of theories, is seen as inhabiting 
a level, or making a conceptual leap, above the activity of 
observation or generalities able to be drawn from them: because 
of this rationalist theories can be tested and utilized without 
reference to observation and sensory data. The strongest 
rationalist position sees the senses as totally superfluous and 
misleading, the weaker, that they can aid but are not sufficient 
of themselves to develop knowledge.
The rationalist edifice of knowledge is founded upon the 
actuality of 'a priori' knowledge, and rationalism marks out its 
most specific domain as the investigation of what is 'a priori' 
knowledge - this 'a priori' knowledge can be known if its truth 
can be established without use of sensory observation.
Strong emphasis is placed upon the possibility of innate ideas: 
man is seen as having the capacity for recognising truth
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somewhere deep inside his very nature. Where do these ideas come 
from? Descartes postulated this "inner light" as coming from God, 
and all rationalists must have some equally good/bad answer. 
Plato held these as deriving from previous incarnations - from 
the historical implantation of the tradition of truth. It is in 
the nature of this ability, and the reality of these ideas that 
the strength or weakness of rationalism lies - as the whole 
system is coherently built upon the bedrock of the certainty of 
these. The certainty of the rationalist building is the security 
of its base claims.
The claims which rationalism holds as its base it perceives as 
substantive - their delineation a matter of crucial definition. 
The empiricist retorts that the only knowledge covered is mere 
tautologies which give no real knowledge but are only contingent; 
the rationalist replies in turn that such knowledge transcends 
the words used. It is contested that 'a priori' reasoning can 
provide us with not just conceptual truths which follow from 
given definitions and postulates, but substantive truths about 
reality. The organization of these into a system via the 
mechanism of coherence is held as giving the possibility of 
constructing an overall vision of the world.
Crudely, rationalism can be reduced to the following tenets:
i) the path of reason is the true method to knowledge of 
reality;
ii) knowledge is systematic, and thus knowledge claims must 
cohere in systematic requirements;
iii) the building of knowledge proceeds with deductive 
reasoning from first principles which may be innate;
iv) such a system can cover the whole of reality.
Ill
B.The Empiricist Imagination.
The battle cry of the empiricist imagination is simply "from
experience".
Empiricism holds that all knowledge which contains substantive 
matters of fact, as opposed to matters of definition, is based 
upon/comes from/derives from/has its source in experience 
irrespective of the application of concepts which are used in 
connection with this knowledge-claim. Concepts are simply labels, 
reference terminology, neutral and inexpressive in themselves - 
true knowledge of the world is tested via correspondence to 
sense data, and thus the world is uncaring of our concepts and 
tales of its existence.6
Following the influential terminology of Kant's "Kantian 
synthesis", crucial distinctions are used as classifications, 
thus:
i) an 'a posteriori* judgement (derived from ordinary sense 
observation) deals with questions and statements which can be 
adjudged true or false only by reference to how as a 'matter of 
contingent fact* something is/was/will be; e.g. "Frank is 
presently driving a red car.".
ii) an 'a priori' judgement is based upon necessary 
consequences and covers something which is universal and is 
adjudged true or false without reference to experience; for 
instance it is normally thought that the axioms of mathematics 
are such a case.
iii) analytic judgments are statements where the predicate 
is contained within the subject; e.g. "all bachelors are 
unmarried" (being unmarried is contained within the concept of 
being a bachelor, as is the criminological usage such that "all 
criminals are law breakers").
iv) a synthetic judgement is any other judgement which takes 
us beyond tautologous statements to give us substantive 
information about the world.
Under the empiricist imagination:
- all 'a priori* truths are analytic. David Hume made a 
crucial distinction between "relations between ideas" - the truth
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of "all breaches of the criminal law are crimes", where the 
statements necessity and universality arises simply from its 
being a tautology, and statements describing relations between 
facts (which comprise synthetic judgments).
- all synthetic truths, that is, all propositions which give 
real information about the world, are arrived at 'a posteriori1, 
and are thus never necessarily but always contingently true.
For the empiricist, all empirical knowledge is of the latter 
mode, and thus empiricism is the only methodology which gives 
real information about the world.
Against the sceptic both Empiricism and Rationalism propose an 
essentially similar path, yet from opposite ends. Empiricism 
attempts to construct its edifice from certain basic elements 
whose certainty is found in their production from the senses, and 
their relation to a secure external world. Rationalism specifies 
certain basic axioms which are indubitable and deductively builds 
upon these.
IV
C.The Pragmatic imagination.
Pragmatism pictures that man as knower is never the receiver of 
the 'truth1 of reality, either through the correct interpretation 
of the messages of his senses, or the direct apprehension of the 
essential meaning of a concept. Instead man is always in a 
situation, and that situation is the conceptual scheme, or 
paradigm, which casts an interpretive context for his speech- 
acts (words, concepts, theoretical sets, and so forth). These 
conceptual schemes do not exist divorced from life (as in 
Popper's third world), where man can- 'objectively' view them, but 
are always connected to the practice of life.
In summary the important claims of pragmatism are:
i) the significance of statements and the ranking of
statements depends upon their degree of entrenchment in a 
conceptual scheme.
ii) Concepts do occur in experience, but the meaning of 
these concepts is defined not by synthetic 'a priori's', but by 
absolute presuppositions. For example, in discussion of 
causation, the statement "every event has a cause" is not a 
synthetic 'a priori* (as Kant thought he showed), and thus is not 
a necessary truth of experience, but is actually an absolute 
presupposition which operates to define in practice people's ways 
of thinking and conducting both science and predictable life. 
These foundational suppositions or paradigms are not held as 
absolutely 'true', as with rationalism, but it is acknowledged 
that some such suppositions are .required as necessary and active 
positions upon which to base any scheme. No claim of absolute 
truth, or certainty, is made for these - but they may be arrived 
at by agreement, whether consciously or not, and be therefore 
conventions. They are always historical artifacts.
iii) the primary requirement of paradigms is internal 
coherence. Thus the internal 'policing' of the 'truth* of 
statements is the application of logic (similar to rationalism), 
and operates so as to provide 'immanent critiques'. That is, if 
the agent claims to hold certain beliefs as his foundations, and 
yet appears to hold to conclusions logically incompatible with 
these, a third party is at liberty to point out the discrepancy.
iv) truth-value is thus a property within paradigms, of 
logic operating upon the conventions of people. As the 
conventions of people are crucially related to their modes of 
life, differences in meaning of these conventions are expressed 
in practice. Thus: "..there is no distinction of meaning so fine 
as to consist in anything but a possible difference in practice", 
as Charles Pierce put it in his How to Make Our Ideas Clear 
(1878).
v) facts are dependent upon the conceptual scheme, and are 
not theory-neutral. Man as observer always has on a pair of 
spectacles through which he observes the world - it is impossible 
to observe without wearing some or other pair of spectacles.
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In philosophical terminology the term pragmatism (and another 
related term pragmaticism) was coined by American philosophers 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries although 
similar ideas developed elsewhere. It has never become defined 
into a comprehensive system, and it is against its nature to be 
so easily defined (if it is even possible to speak in this way). 
Instead it has become a group of loosely associated theoretical 
ideas and attitudes developed over a period of time and which 
contain a fluidity which has both provided a refuge to some, and 
grounds for its dismissal to others. It is most easily confused 
with an avoidance of theory, and this misuse of the term is most 
common in British writing, which 'detheorises1 even the 
philosophy of pragmatism. Latterly there has been a range of work 
which seeks to develop pragmatism into a comprehensive 
perspective.7
The pragmatic imagination is closely related to sensibilities of 
the unconventional, the new, the marginal and anarchic in 
experience, and fixes its sympathies with the adventure, the risk 
and the path of innovation. At the same time it can veer in its 
politics from demonstrating, on the one hand, a distrust with any 
concept of elitism and actively favouring egalitarianism (as with 
the American James), to a distrust of conventional norms and 
favouring an elite form of innovative morality (as with the 
German Nietzsche) - its common stress is upon picturing an 
individualism which sees life as a constant stream of effort, and 
of continual choosing between alternatives, with the everpresent 
'imperative* that the good or evil (bad) of actions, and beliefs, 
is to be found in the consequences which these have upon the 
practice of life.
The American Dewey absorbed much of the drive of the rationalist 
imagination *s emphasis (as portrayed by Kant, and then Hegel in 
particular) upon the universality of the foundation of reason to 
unite all men; but added the criticism that this unity is a unity 
of reason, self, and practical world. It could only be achieved 
by man actively combining men and events in a continuous process
"of communication and participation", in which all men were 
included as participating individuals. Thus ideas were not viewed 
as the constituent stuff of the world, nor as submissive to 
matter, but were active instruments and organs of integration, 
adaptation, continuity and survival which man relied upon as his 
most essential characteristic.
In all its forms pragmatism denies the existence of a final and
closed system - it holds that people act in life upon their
acceptance of an operative system of beliefs, but denies the
'truth' of the foundations of these, at the same time as
asserting the necessity to 'believe' some set of 'opinions' - it
denies that a closed system can ever be established giving the
ultimate nature and destiny of man and the universe. Yet it also
recognises a form of realism; for James pragmatism
"turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal 
solutions, from bad 'a priori' reasons, from fixed 
principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and
origins It means the open air and possibilities of
nature, as against... dogma, artificiality, and the pretence 
of finality in truth."3
The problem always for pragmatism is that given the historical 
dominance of the pursuit of "truth" as something absolutely 
guaranteed (existence in the sight of God), how can an 
imagination that denies this notion of truth be accepted as 
"true"? And, if it denies the validity of this dilemma, upon what 
'grounds' does it claim its validity? Pragmatism answers that it 
requires a complete 'change of imagination' out of the Platonic 
conception of "truth" (i.e. the perfect form), to a radical 
vision of "truth" in a different concept of "agreement" and 
justification.
NOTES.
l.For a brief essay on this theme see Anthony Quinton, "Authority 
and Autonomy in Knowledge", in Thoughts & Thinkers. Duckworth, 
London, 1982, pp 65-75.
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2.As Karl Popper put it: "Bacon and Descartes set up observation 
and reason as new authorities and then set them up within each 
individual man. But in doing so they split man into two parts, 
into a higher part which had authority with respect to truth - 
Bacon's observations, Descartes' intellect - and a lower part. 
It is this lower part which constitutes our ordinary selves, the 
old adam in us. For it is always 'we ourselves' who are alone 
responsible for error, if truth is manifest. It is we, with our 
prejudices, our negligence, our pigheadedness, who are to blame; 
it is we ourselves who are the sources of our ignorance.
Thus we are split into a human part, we ourselves, the part 
which is the source of our fallible opinions (doxa), of our 
errors, and of our ignorance; and a super-human part, such as the 
senses or the intellect, the sources of real knowledge 
(episteme), whose authority over us is almost divine." From "On 
The Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance", in Conjectures and 
Refutations. p.17.
3,Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the 
Sociology of Knowledge, p.12.
4.Ideology and Utopia, p.12.
5.Cf. Ernest Gellner, Legitimation of Belief. Cambridge 
University Press, London, 1974.
6.Newton is the grand enlightenment model for Empiricism. Between 
man the subject and the world as object we have the opposite to 
the Kantian imposition of syntax. It must be always the world 
which reveals itself, not man imposing a language upon it. The 
world comes first, thus:"the best and safest method of 
philosophizing seems to be, first, to inquire diligently into the 
properties of things and to establish those properties by 
experiments, and to proceed later to hypotheses for the 
explanation of things themselves. For hypotheses ought to be 
applied only in the explanation of the properties of things, and 
not made use of in determining them." As Anthony Arblaster 
summarises it the claim is simple: 'Hypotheses non fingo'. I do 
not construct hypotheses. The empiricist merely records the way 
the world is. Quotation from a letter of Newton to Oldenbury, 
quoted by Arblaster in The Rise and Decline of Western 
Liberalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984. p.180.
7.Richard Rorty and Jean Francois Lyotard are notable examples 
we have already mentioned. The work of Joseph Margolis provides 
a grand tracing of what he terms "pragmatic" themes in a large 
body of contemporary thought, see Pragmatism without Foundations: 
Reconciling Realism and Relativism. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1986. His version of pragmatism is on his own terms "a colonial 
abuse of labels" and is used to cover currents of thought which 
have praxis and historicity as their guiding centers. He sees the 
central point of pragmatism as the rejection of foundationalism 
and forms of "cognitive transparency", or in other words the 
thesis that "tb^re is a determinate match or adecuation between
the cognisable properties of the real world, and the cognizing 
properties of the human mind such that the distributed truths of 
science or of other disciplined inquires may be assured that the 
inquiring mind does not, by its very effort, distort, or alter 
or fail to grasp the world's independent (cognizable) 
structure", (p.xvi) His own approach can be seen as a form of Neo- 
Kantianism in style.
8.Quoted in "Pragmatism", Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Vol 6, 
MacMiliam, New York, 1967.
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Chapter Five: The Epistemological Imagination of David Hume and 
the Empiricist influence on Modernity.1
Section A 
I
Was Hume a Modern?: David Hume and the narrative content of the 
Treatise.
In his most recent work, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity. Jurgen Habermas feels no qualms in beginning the 
philosophical discourse of modernity with the work of Immanuel 
Kant. In a wide sweeping work Habermas implicitly relegates David 
Hume to the status of the pre-modern; at best a preparatory, 
preliminary yet peripheral, episode in the transformations around 
the enlightenment but not partaking in the progressive 
problematics of modernism.
In this work Habermas analyses the problematic of modernism in 
terms of an opposition between what he calls "the paradigm of 
consciousness" with its associated "philosophy of the subject", 
contrasted to a thoroughgoing intersubjective paradigm of 
"communicative action". For Habermas the development of 
philosophical understanding since the enlightenment contains 
certain crucial junctures where a choice became vaguely apparent; 
chances which were, however, misconstrued and a potential path 
not taken. The central juncture is claimed to be where Hegel 
trumped the subjectivism of the Cartesian-Kantian legacy with the 
notion of Absolute Knowledge capable of reconciling all dispute 
and sublimating all difference. At this point the strength of 
reason became dressed in the clothes of absolute security 
fashioned on the model of a pure self-consciousness (of oneself, 
and ultimately of social history to social history) as opposed 
to any lesser task for reason linked to discursive understanding.
Hume's absence is understandable, after all in historical terms 
the dominant image of Hume is that of the destructive sceptic - 
the analyzer of the failure of claims to knowledge - a position 
in which he takes on the appearance of a counter personage to the
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gigantic optimism that the enlightenment placed in the power of 
truth and of the advancement of knowledge. As David Faith Norton 
points out:
"David Hume's philosophy has been exciting responses for 
nearly 250 years. The overwhelming majority of these 
responses have been negative, based on the understanding 
that Hume's philosophy is itself negative, a dogmatically 
sceptical denial of man's knowledge of truth and value."2
Such a reading would not be conducive to Habermas's sympathy, nor
however, would the counter reading bequeathed by Kemp Smith.3
This line of interpretation sees Hume as offering a positive
doctrine; but it is a doctrine which so "empiricizes" man as to
make the path of knowledge (and thus of action) one which resides
only in the passions of man and not in his powers of reason. Key
statements such as "Reason is and ought to be the slave of the
passions", are summarised by Kemp Smith to show Hume's thesis as
contending that we are truly only within "Nature's guidance,
operating ... not through reason but by way of feeling..." Hume
is seen to present a thoroughgoing naturalism as both the reality
and the proper aim of man's relationship with the world. In this
context Barry Stroud summarizes Hume as claiming that "reason,
as traditionally understood, has no role in human life";4 instead
Hume begins to look as belonging to the conservative strain of
the common sense philosophers. Again such a view would be deeply
repugnant to the rationalism of Habermas whose own lineage would
hold such positions disposed of by the Hegelian critique whereby:
"since the man of common sense makes his appeal to feeling, 
to the oracle within his breast, he is finished and done 
with anyone who does not agree; he only has to explain that 
he has nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and 
feel the same in himself. In other words, he tramples 
underfoot the roots of humanity. For it is the nature of 
humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human 
nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds. 
The anti-human, the merely animal, consists in staying 
within the sphere of feeling, and being able to communicate 
only at that level."5
Habermas accepts that the Hegelian legacy has turned to ruin. We 
are thus to be seen as contemporaries of the young Hegelians, 
some of us attempt
"to compensate, by way of temporalized originary powers, for
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the lost order of things that the metaphysically isolated 
and structurally overburdened subject tries in vain to renew 
from its own forces."6
Others indulge in nihilist fanaticism, a frantic toing and froing
between empirical and transcendental modes of dealing with
issues, between radical self-reflection and an incomprehensible
element that cannot be reflectively retrieved. Against which
"we should drop the sentimental metaphysics of homelessness 
and .. understand the puzzle of all these doublings for what 
it is: a symptom of exhaustion. The paradigm of the
philosophy of consciousness is exhausted. If this is so, the 
symptoms of exhaustion should dissolve with the transition 
to the paradigm of mutual understanding."7
Habermas claims that "in the philosophical discourse we are still 
the contemporaries of the young Hegelians", and for Habermas to 
turn to the ideas of Hume would be to return of a pre-modern 
conception. Such a view, however, neglects to counter the extent 
to which we are the inheritors of the Humean legacy and the 
possibilities that we may still be in certain effects the 
contemporaries of Hume. A Hume, however, broader than the Hume 
of traditional interpretation.
The two traditional views have become the victim of the 
mushrooming of Humean scholarship and the widening of the modes 
of interpreting Hume. To the names of Kemp Smith, or 
alternatively those who saw only the classic sceptic, recent 
names have been added such as Duncan Forbes,8 Donald Livingston, 
David Faith Norton,9 and Frederick Whelan,10 not to forget the 
chapters by Alisdair MacIntyre in Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality?. The result is an increase in perspectives and 
modalities of understanding, the effect of which is to enrichen, 
as well as make more difficult, the task of coming to grips with 
Hume.
In Humean scholarship much of the recent works are openly 
concerned, not with breaking down the texts of Hume as the 
analytical tradition has historically done, but with 
contextualising - of repositioning the living acts of synthesis
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which Hume himself undertook in the compilation of each and every 
one of his texts, whether they be properly philosophic, for 
example the Treatise11, or the Enquiries.12 or essayist, for 
example The Histories, the Dialogues. and the Essays.
We shall concentrate upon a small passage of the Treatise; namely 
Section VII of Book I; the Conclusion to that Book entitled Of 
the Understanding. These thirteen pages contain some of the most 
quoted phrases of the Treatise and are usually noted for being 
the place where Hume collapses any possibility of using reason 
as a guide in life and retreats instead to his philosophical 
naturalism and to his daily pursuits of backgammon and playing 
cards.
These pages relate how Hume pursued the Enlightenment commitment 
to demanding rationality in place of arbitrary authority and 
superstition, but was in the end forced to the security of the 
embrace of a beneficent nature and her backing to habit and 
custom. Hume betrays some disappointment with his ascription of 
"our taste and sentiment" as the ultimate basis of rational 
justification, as this placed all talk of rational foundations 
of knowledge "without a meaning", (T.p.267) and when finding the 
basis of causal inference as "nothing but", or "merely", a 
psychological basis. However, when he had faced the choice 
between "a false reason and none at all" it was only "the current 
of nature" which saved him and it is our metaphysical faith in 
this current that ultimately makes our every day life possible. 
(T.p.268)
Hume begins these pages as if pausing for a momentary breath in 
the midst of a grand enterprise. He claims to have finished his 
"examination of the several systems of philosophy, both of the 
intellectual and natural world" and that it is "now time to 
return to a more close examination of our subject, and to proceed 
in the accurate anatomy of human nature, having fully explain'd 
that nature of our judgement and understanding". The basis for 
the pause Hume presents as "inclination" - the natural flow of
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t h e  w r i t i n g  o f  t h e  t e x t  l e a d s ,  s o  H u m e  w o u l d  h a v e  u s  a c c e p t ,  t o
a moment of reflexivity.
"But before I launch out into those immense depths of
philosophy, which lie before me, I find myself inclin'd to 
stop a moment in my present station, and to ponder that 
voyage which I have undertaken, and which undoubtedly 
requires the utmost art and industry to be brought to a 
happy conclusion." (T. p.263)
This 'pondering' turns, at least for the section to come, the 
action of the text and of the resultant synthesis of knowledge, 
the outcome of the Treatise, into a juncture consisting of the 
personal subject of Hume and the production of the text.
Moreover, we are told by Hume himself that this juncture comes 
after the presentation or rendition of the systems of philosophy 
themselves. We move therefore, from the task of the expose of
'system' to the presentation of the 'experience' of the writer
of the text, Hume himself. What then is Hume up to by this 
movement?
II
A template of Hume's technique is presented in his own
introduction to "The sceptical and other systems of philosophy"
in his description of the tactics required for scepticism to take
on "Reason". Hume states:
"Reason first appears in possession of the throne, 
prescribing laws, and imposing maxims, v/ith an absolute sway 
and authority. Her enemy, therefore, is oblig'd to take 
shelter under her protection, and by me King use of rational 
arguments to prove the fallaciousness and imbecility of 
reason, produces, in a manner, a patent under her hand and 
seal. This patent has at first an authority, proportion'd to 
the present and immediate authority of eason, from which it 
is deriv'd. But as it is suppos'd to be contradictory to 
reason, it gradually diminishes the force of that governing 
power, and its own at the same time; till at last they both 
vanish away into nothing, by a regular and just diminution." 
Hume can only sum up in the face of this that "'Tis happy, 
therefore, that nature breaks the force of all sceptical 
arguments in time, and keeps them from having any 
considerable influence upon the understanding."(T. pp. 186- 
7)
This is both a pattern and a plan - both a description and a
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template for action. It is essentially reproduced throughout the
Treatise. Hume's tactic is continually the rhetorical portrayal
of the strength of rationalism in terminology which he then
borrows to infiltrate and internally dismember the very structure
which grants it strength. From the very first the Treatise is
built upon rhetoric - Habermas points out in The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity that the aim of rhetoric is to open a
space for argumentation to proceed. To reveal, that is, a terrain
upon which the activities of synthesis and analysis can proceed.
The Introduction begins:
"Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who 
pretend to discover anything new to the world in philosophy 
and the sciences, than to insinuate the praises of their own 
systems, by decrying all those, which have been advanced 
before them." [If we, 18th century men, were] "content with 
lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the 
most important questions, that can come before the tribunal 
of human reason, there are few, who have an acquaintance 
with the sciences, that would not readily agree with them." 
[But] "'Tis easy for one of judgement and learning, to 
perceive the weak foundation even of those systems, which 
have obtained the greatest credit, and have carried their 
pretensions highest to accurate and profound reasoning. 
Principles taken on trust, consequences lamely deduced from 
them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the 
whole, these are everywhere to be met with in the systems of 
the most eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn 
disgrace upon philosophy itself."
In this process
"disputes are multiplied, as if everything was uncertain; 
and these disputes are managed with the greatest warmth, as 
if everything was certain."
Rhetoric is actually the sole victor:
"Amidst all this bustle 'tis not reason that carries the 
prize, but eloquence; and no man needs ever despair of 
gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, who 
has art enough to represent it in any favorable colours. The 
victory is not gained by the men at arms who manage the pike 
and the sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and 
musicians of the army." (T.pp. xi - xiv)
By contrast we are asked to
"leave the lingering method...and.. to march up directly to 
the capital or centre of these sciences, to human nature 
itself; which being once masters of, we may every where else 
hope for an easy victory.. [Through the exposition] of the
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principles of human nature, we in effect propose a compleat 
system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost 
entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand 
with any security.”
Hume here appears to obey all the dictates of enlightenment
subjectivism, moving the very basis of epistemology itself onto
the shoulders of the subject, man. Moreover, the claim is
conducted in the name of system building - this however, will be
a system alternative to either "the ancient” or the "modern
systems" as proposed by the propositions of external reason.
Henceforth, the bottom line of the 'systems' of knowledge, the
grounding, must be the principles and structure of the operation
of the subject - human beingness. Moreover,
"as the science of man is the only solid foundation for the 
other sciences, so the only foundation we can give to this 
science itself must be laid on experience and 
observation."(T .p .xvi)
Furthermore, there are certain preconditions, or structural 
frameworks for the freedom to engage in such 'experience and 
observation’, namely as Hume witnesses from the predominance of 
Scottish and English writers in the recent rise of scientific 
studies of human nature, "a land of tolerance and of liberty". 
What this implies is that not only is there the probability of 
a direct link between metaphysical systems of absolute certainty 
and intolerant politics, but that the socio-political world may 
strongly constrain the activities of thought and discussion 
within it.
One must ask, however, how it is at all possible for Hume to 
present this section, this turning of the subject back upon 
itself, in the language of the first person directly after his 
attack upon the very concept of personal identity in the pages 
which immediately proceed this section? For has not Hume 
succeeded in denying any rational validity to the use of the word 
"self" and its various manifestations? How can he then go on -the J-nb 
employ this phrase in presenting the material of the next 
section?
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It is as well to note that this criticism is at times advanced 
in connection with the supposed inconsistency of Book I with the 
other books of the Treatise; namely, the use which Hume makes of 
the concept of the self in dealing with his theory of the 
passions and of morals. It is central, for instance, to Hume's 
concepts of virtue, of the use of sympathy (see pages 318 and 
320), and of the attributes of pride (see page 287), and 
protection of property. It is not coincidental that much of 
Hume's use of the self in Books II and III is linked to the 
explanation of the concept of sympathy, the concept which is 
perhaps the basis of the entire social fabric as Hume presents 
it. But Hume cannot be drawn into any charge of inconsistency as 
Between Book I and the others, for the inconsistency, if there 
is to be any, resides within twenty pages of Book I itself. What 
then did Hume do in the immediately proceeding section to the 
concept of the self?
Hume began, as usual, with a rationalist conception of the self, 
but this time presented in such a way that we are fully conscious 
that Hume is not one of those
"certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of
its perfect identity and simplicity".(T.251)
Hume subjects the concept of the self to the test of experience
so that we can uncover its true composition. A quest which,
undertaken in search for the impression of the self, finds that 
no distinct impression corresponding to the notion of the "mind" 
or the "self" is encountered. Hume is also certain of the stakes
of this quest - for it is not only those who easily fit into the
rationalist framework who have used the notion of the self or 
mind as a foundational entity. Indeed, we must bear in mind that 
the very distinction "empiricist - rationalist" is a 
problematical distinction to use in any other way than as an 
intellectual series of "ideal types". For if Liberalism, for 
example, is to be seen as beginning with the work of Locke and 
Hobbes, both roughly labelled as empiricist, its beginning placed 
great reliance upon a notion of the individual’s private 
consciousness (a conception of the self) as the foundational
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basis upon which the political entity of the autonomous
individual could be fashioned.13 Thus the intellectual soul which
Descartes discovers, through the introspective voyage of
sceptical doubting, as a self-contained ego of reason, is matched
by the Hobbesian conception of the seat of desires and volition.
But as is well known, Hume demonstrated in his analysis that the
self is not to be found in experience. Instead, Hume tells us
"when I enter most intimately into what I call myself .... I can
never catch myself" other than the series of perceptions which
are present at that time (T.252). Thus:
"the mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions 
successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide 
away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and
situations there is properly no simplicity in it at one
time, nor identity in different." (T.253)
It is this impasse, and the reflexive paradox involved in the 
statement that "I can never catch myself" . which Kant is said to 
have resolved for Liberalism by taking Hume as succeeding in the 
task of demonstrating that the self is not derivable from 
experience, but must be recognised as a condition of the 
possibility of experience. Thus the unity of consciousness is a 
postulate of both theoretical and practical reason, not something 
to present us with a cause of anxiety.
However, this movement to Kant as the 'positive' overcoming of 
Hume's 'negativity' on this subject is to overlook Hume's actual 
solution, cast in terms of the active role of the memory. Hume's 
doubts as to the composition of the self threaten the very 
composition of Liberalism and the readings of his saving turn to 
memory have been interpreted as a key example of his naturalist 
turn. Hume, read in this way, moves to the conservative side of 
Liberalism, relying upon a psychologism sitting atop a beneficent 
flow of nature. The turn to psychology is seen to demonstrate via 
the propensities of the imagination the activity of a belief, 
which although it is not justified by any analysis of reason 
still carries out an essential function. But what is it that Hume 
t e l l s  u s  t h e  m e m o r y  d e e s ?  H u m e  e x p l a i n s  it a l l o w s  t h e  i m a g i n a t i o n  
to shape a series of somewhat related perceptions into a unity
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and creates a fiction of the self, through the use of which order 
can be made of otherwise chaotic presentations. The fiction of 
the self is a product of the memory, via the faculty of recall 
and reflection on our past perceptions, which represents them as 
linked together in a network of relations. The memory, via this 
act of recall and fictional creation, transforms a "bundle or 
collection of different perceptions" into the fiction which 
provides us with a notion, an idea, representing diverse 
perceptions into a patterned entity which is the only possibility 
of continuous identity that there is. What sort of presence does 
the self then have? Here we must be at pains to remove the 
interpretation which holds that Hume treats the memory as giving 
us the weakened presence of the object, for Hume demonstrates in 
the case of the self at least that there is no single perception, 
no object, which corresponds to the self, and as the demand of 
weaken presence demands a presence at some time in the past, this 
interpretation is simply not valid in the case of the self. 
Instead Hume is at pains to stress that although the belief in 
the self is a "natural belief" and thus demanded by the 
functioning of nature, the claim that it amounts to a real 
personal identity is a "confusion and mistake" (T.254). Moreover, 
Hume states that the fiction of the self has another function. 
For when we do not utilise this fiction "we are apt to imagine 
something unknown and mysterious". In other words the use of the 
fiction of the self, and the reflexive acknowledgement that it 
is a fiction, saves us from the trap of metaphysics, that is from 
the enthusiasm of metaphysics.
To summarise this point: what is at issue is whether Hume goes 
any further in this area than a simple failure in the project of 
a subject trying to catch 'himself' via the objectifying attitude 
that an observer assumes towards entities in the external world. 
Or, is there any possibility that Hume can be seen in a similar 
context^ which Habermas takes as our present: namely that the 
objectifying attitude by which the knowing subject regards itself 
as it would entities in the external world is no longer 
privileged? Hume himself was only partially aware of the
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potentiality of his own distinctions. Hume remained extremely 
perplexed by his own writings on the self - as his reflections 
in the later appendix to the Treatise show, while he was 
convinced that his analysis was not incorrect, he was not totally 
sure in what way it was actually correct. (T. 633-36) In fact his 
purported summary in the appendix actually runs counter to what 
may well be the crux of the use of this fiction - the centrality 
of the act of narration to making sense of life.
This consideration, however, appears contrary to much of the
traditional interpretation of Hume's depiction of the cognitive
process._Hume, is normally associated with attributing a large
degree of passivity to the operation of the understanding -
cognitive processes are embedded in "relations of resemblance,
contiguity and causation" and "the essence of these relations
consists in their producing an easy transition of ideas". Thus:
"it follows that our notions of personal identity, proceed 
entirely from the smooth and uninterrupted progress of the 
thought along a train of connected ideas".
Hume turns the activities of the memory into a passive process. 
Since the
"memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent 
of this succession of perceptions [it is] the source of
personal identity  memory does not so much produce as
discover personal identity, by shewing us the relation of 
cause and effect among our different perceptions".(T.262)
But the act of narration, the making sense of entities in life 
via the positioning of meaning as in the presentation of a story, 
containing, perhaps, an imposition on the events of the past of 
a form which they otherwise do not have, is essentially an active
process. In what way then can Hume be said to implicitly rely
upon the structural formation of narrative?
Hume uses narrative in two ways.
First, as an essential element of small scale social 
interaction which gives meaning to impressions which would 
otherwise just be relations of quantity, indeed, as the 
precondition for much of the causation of those quantitative
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ascriptions. Thus the receptivity of the individual to his 
social environment is centrally bound up with his concept of 
himself and of his others which is a product of his social and 
other memories and of the sets of meaningful behavioral patterns 
that he has absorbed from communication with other people. These 
include the ideas that a person receives regarding other people's 
opinions of him and of his action - a feature Hume places central 
under the notion of reputation. Reputation is for Hume a cause 
of the passions of pride and humility, he calls it a secondary 
one but in practical terms it is the most important. (T. p.316- 
7) The notion of reputation is placed alongside the notions of 
character and name, all of which as Hume uses them in the context 
of his moral psychology, imply a strong concept of self-identity. 
But the context of these considerations, as opposed to the 
context of the destructive analysis in the early parts of Book 
I, is social life. Outside of society, and in the context of 
isolated metaphysical speculation, the scientific methodology of 
subject-objectification makes the self something of no meaning. 
Being inside society means, however, being susceptible to other 
causalities (influences) not capturable in the terms of an 
isolated object-subject relationship. Moreover, these reinforce, 
rather than go against, the skeletonal findings of human nature. 
For since there is no distinct human self there can be no pre­
social humanity - since there is no distinct individual mind, but 
only perceptions associated in various patterns, individual 
identity is something which is strongly determinate upon social 
experience, including socially installed habits of thought and 
of interpretation of action, i.e. forms of narrative 
understanding of relationships in the social world.
Ill
This interpretation is only implicit in Hume (it is the 
potentiality which is taken up in strains of symbolic 
interactionism) but it may account for what most interpreters 
have seen of a mysterious inconsistency. Historically analysis
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appears to have fallen into a dualist trap. Either we keep to a 
subject-object relationship whereupon understanding depends upon 
the perspective of observation, or we proceed into a modality of 
entering into the interiority of the phenomena. Henry Home, or 
Lord Karnes as he is otherwise known, a kinsman of Hume, for 
example, attempts to demonstrate what he takes to be Hume's 
sceptical position on identity as a result of applying only the 
first method. Karnes states that if we only have the perceptions 
of the external sense to rely upon then we "never could have any 
consciousness of self", but would be lost in a range of ideas 
which cannot give a notion of personal identity. However, he 
claims, individuals have the capabilities of 'internal senses', 
one of which can give "an original perception or consciousness 
of himself, and of his existence". Karnes holds that this is of 
the liveliest kind of perception and dissolves any puzzle over 
personal identity as it is this immediate, intuitive, and 
unanalyzable
"consciousness of self, carried through all the different 
stages of life, and all the variety of action, which is the 
foundation of personal identity. It is by means of this 
perception, that I consider myself to be the same person, in 
all the varieties of fortune, and in every change of life."14
Hume, however, given the totality of the Treatise has denied the 
dominance of either of these two modalities. The social reality 
of identity, contained in the social existence of character and 
name, of virtue, of pride and humility, is something whose 
present existence depends upon the understanding derived from the 
interpersonal associations and interactions of the relationships 
of life. The individual keeps his character, his name, by 
behaving in his habitual manner. Through his customary activity, 
through his conditioned sentiment, his reactions to stimuli, his 
ongoing social reputation is continued as ascribed identity. The 
"heaps and bundles" of the impressions of his activity, are 
constituted into the character of an honest man, a man of 
integrity, or alternatively, by the acts of social memory 
received and constituted by testimony, precept, habitual 
understanding, and other modes of social communication. The 
testimony and opinions of others, are part of the general "bundle
of perceptions” but they also help structure this bundle into 
coherence. Via sympathy, understood communicatively, the 
individual stands always within interpersonal relationships which 
allow him to relate to himself as a participant in that 
relationship, the essential meanings of which cannot be fixed 
either from the perspective of some exteriority or from some 
absolute intuition, but depend themselves upon the performability 
of their interaction. And this activity is dependent upon an 
ongoing, mostly recapitulating, reconstruction of knowledge 
already employed (to use a phrase of Habermas). For Hume it is 
absurd to think of absolutely new conceptions making sense in 
social relationships. The mind simply rejects them. So it is that 
the ascriptions of character draw upon and are dependent upon the 
elements of already existing social understanding. This we can 
call the narratives of social life - those conjunctions of words 
and expressions that tell us that such and such an activity is 
fit for such and such an occasion, that present us with images 
and expectations of behaviour for character and situations, and 
which mean that the mind has only comfortable impressions when 
the narratives are followed, and upsetting ones when the 
narratives break down or when the behaviour we encounter is at 
odds with the narrative expectation.
Hume*s second use of narrative builds on the first being the 
structure of his message of Book I, a message he presents via 
what is expressly the narrative which forms this section.
As we have seen Hume phrases the conclusion in terms of an event 
- a moment of pause and reflective pondering on the "voyage" that 
he has taken in his writing. The rest of the conclusion is taken 
up with Hume relating the course of this "event". The central 
theme is that of a voyage - and Hume, epistemologically 
consistent with his portrayal of psychological naturalism, is 
read as presenting merely a passive chronicling. A simple 
rendition of what happened, of what ideas and impressions imposed 
themselves upon the imagination of David Hume himself. Again it 
has been seen as central that reality take on the form of a mere
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sequence without meaningful beginnings and ends for the
'scientific' rather than the metaphysical/theological analysis
to investigate them. Hume has, however, even when he is denying
a structure to the world available to the analysis of pure
reason, been engaging in something more than mere chronicling.
Take his treatment of reason as the servant of feeling. For Hume:
"Reason can never shew us the connection of one object with 
another, tho' aided by experience, and the observation of 
their constant conjunction in all past instances. When the 
mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one 
object to the idea or belief of another, it is not 
determined by reason.(T. p .92)
....Reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. 'Tis 
not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our taste and 
sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am convinced 
of any principle, 'tis only an idea, which strikes more 
strongly upon me. When I give preference to one set of 
arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my 
feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. 
Objects have no discoverable connection together; nor is it 
any other principle but custom operating upon the 
imagination, that we can draw any inference from the 
appearance of one to the existence of another."(T. p.103)
However, when Hume seeks to illustrate this he transforms the
situation into a narrative example. Hume asks us to consider
"a person, who stops short in his journey upon meeting a 
river in his way, foresees the consequences of his 
proceeding forward; and his knowledge of these consequences 
is convey'd to him by past experience, which informs him of 
certain conjunctions of causes and effects."
Hume determines that the individual does not, as an act of
reflective reason, call to mind all the previous instances of the
interaction of water and animal bodies. Instead, Hume tells us,
"the idea of sinking is so closely associated with that of 
water, and the idea of suffocating with that of sinking, 
that the mind makes the transition without the assistance of 
the memory. The custom operates before we have time for 
reflexion. The objects seem so inseparable, that we 
interpose not a moment's delay in passing from the one to 
the other".
This discussion Hume tells us destroys the notion that the mind
"is convinced by reasoning of that principle that instances 
of which we have no experience, must necessarily resemble 
those. of which we have. For here we find that the 
understanding or imagination can draw inferences from past
experience, without reflecting on it; much more without 
forming any principle concerning it, or reasoning upon that 
principle.” (T.p.103-4)
Hume goes on to argue for the subversive role for reason - but 
this is a reason which has a certain characteristic. The reason 
which Hume takes aim at here has a form of autonomy purified of 
the unreflective customs of ordinary life. It is a reason for 
which much is expected, it is to be a form of authority logically 
independent of the unreflective maxims and standards which 
constitute the normal modes of acting. Hume's attack upon the 
pretensions of this reason demonstrates that life does not allow 
reason to be independent of, and superior to life, but instead 
requires a mode of understanding which seeks to operate from 
within the activities of life. He implicitly demonstrates that 
everyday life proceeds not via independent reflection on abstract 
principle but more via the internalisation into unreflective 
acceptance of narrative structures in the framework of common 
existence. For in his example, the traveller will make the 
connection between the categories of river, human bodies, sinking 
and death, and may or may not desist from his aim of continuing 
his journey. He will not lose his conception of action to a 
passivity awaiting further external pressure, for his everyday 
experience will follow certain possibilities of narrative 
structure and coherence. Given the weights of various elements 
in the stories in which he is participating - how urgent is the 
journey? What is the purpose of his journey? - various scenarios, 
which to the external observer may be chronicled as "mere 
sequence", take on the role of fitting "consequences" into an 
already presented story which is at our disposal. Hence our 
traveller may turn south, for instance, on the expectation that 
there is a bridge that way with some customary reliance upon what 
a bridge entails to a project of crossing a river.
This example actually is more than an act of chronicling taking 
on the characteristics of narrative in the fact that all 
"events", even when they are considered to be real occurrences 
of the past, disclose their lack of self interpretation. We
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cannot refer to events as such but only to events under a 
description and the description is a function of the narrative 
the events make up. Hume, after all, had to begin with a 
meaningful description which sets a coherence to everyday reality 
by permeating it with narrative - it was "a person who stops 
short in his journey upon meeting a river in his way" who was at 
question.
Similarly with the conclusion. What is at issue here is a
reflective stock-taking temporal grasp of what Hume will present
us with as a narrative whole. A whole which serves to give a
larger story providing the context for particular acts and
decisions, actions and events. Hume is clear, in his various
letters concerning his philosophy for example, that one of the
tasks of his writing is to instruct others as to the correct way
to do philosophy and to engage in the reasoning of the world. The
voyage of the section is thus no unadventurous enterprise. The
whole is the journey of the inquirer armed with the weapon of
philosophy but for Hume this takes on the form of
"a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having 
narrowly escap'd ship-wreck in passing a small firth, has 
yet the temerity to put out to see in the same leaky 
weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his ambition so far 
as to think of compassing the globe under these 
disadvantageous circumstances." (T.p.263)
In After Virtue Alasdair MacIntyre having introduced the 
perspective of the human agent as both actor in and author of his 
own story immediately states the essential sociality of this 
phenomena: "We are never more (and sometimes less) than the co­
authors of our own narratives".15 The authenticity of Hume in 
developing his statement lies not in a creativity from an 
absolute self-consciousness or self-centeredness but in the 
developing and refining of social roles and ongoing stories which 
represent the process of doing philosophy and of analyzing the 
role of understanding in human affairs. Hume's target here is the 
series of narratives which have combined the notions of 
travelling with those of autonomy and of gaining the authority 
of an absolute guarantee. Hume grasps the nettle of autonomy
stating:
"I am first affrightened and confounded with that forlorn 
solitude, in which I am placed in my philosophy, and fancy 
myself some strange and uncouth monster, who not being able 
to mingle and unite in society, has been expelled all human 
commerce and left utterly abandoned and disconsolate.... 
When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, 
contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my 
eye inward, I find nothing but doubt and ignorance... such is 
my weakness, that I feel all my opinions loosen and fall of 
themselves, when unsupported by the approbation of others. 
Every step I take is with hesitation, and every new 
reflection makes me dread an error and absurdity in my 
reasoning." (T.p.264)
This is a different journey than the grand narratives of the pre-
enlightenment. As opposed to the narrative of Parmenides and the
Platonic allegory of the cave for example, the spacial
connotations are radically different. Hume asks:
"can I be sure, that in leaving all established opinions I 
am following truth; and by what criterion shall I 
distinguish her, even if fortune shou'd at last guide me on 
her foot-steps?" (T.p.265)
HYowever, the narrative does not represent the Being of truth by 
the presence of the other, the sun goddess or the emancipator 
from the chains of the cave, but as facilities internal to the 
being of the subject himself. Thus:
"after the most accurate and exact of my reasonings, I can 
give no reason why I shou'd assent to it; and feel nothing 
but a strong propensity to consider objects strongly in that 
view under which they appear to me".(T. 266)
The guide can only be experience and habit, and this is an
upsetting guide for it leads us to ridicule that desire to
encounter "the original and ultimate principle", which is "our
aim in all our studies and reflections".
"How must we be disappointed, when we learn that this 
connection, tie, or energy lies merely in ourselves, and is 
nothing but the determination of the mind, which is acquired 
by custom..."(T. 266)
When we desire to know the ultimate principle as something which 
resides in an element external to ourselves "we either contradict 
ourselves or talk without meaning". This is a deficiency of ideas 
which Hume says is not perceived in the common life but is a
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result of "understanding when it acts alone and according to its 
most general principles", understanding which However, "entirely 
subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in 
any proposition, either in philosophy or in common life". 
Ultimately:
"we have, therefore, no choice left but betwixt a false 
reason and none at all...
I know not what ought to be done... I can only observe what 
is commonly done; which is that this difficulty is seldom or 
never thought of.."(T.268)
Hume, however, tells us that he has entered into the search for
ultimate foundations with an intensity of subjectivism that has
now wrought its revenge. The result is the chaos of a
multipilicty without any semblance of sense.
"I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look 
upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than 
another. Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive 
my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose 
favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What 
beings surround me? and on whom have I an influence, or who 
have any influence upon me? I am confounded with all these 
questions and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable 
condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness, 
and utterly deprived of the use of every member and 
faculty." (T.p.269)
"Nature" intervenes at this moment of metaphysical absurdity 
dispelling the tension by either weakening the intensity of the 
dilemma or transferring the attention to more practical concerns. 
Hume returns to dining, back-gammon, and conversing with friends. 
He finds himself "absolutely and necessarily determined to live, 
and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of 
life".
This return to the common life, and the psychologism which 
appears to underpin it, provides the point of departure at which 
Hume has been taken by many to despair finally of reason and 
reduce progressive effort to a hope in the current of nature, 
that is, to metj/a functionalism wherein the metaphysical faith 
in God is replaced by faith in function and progressive 
interaction.
IV
For Kant Hume had failed, not suspecting the existence of a pure
science of reason he
"ran his ship ashore, for safety*s sake, landing on 
scepticism, there to let it lie and rot; whereas my object 
is rather to give it a pilot, who by means of safe 
astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe, 
and provided with a complete chart and compass, may steer 
the ship safely, whither he listeth."16
Kant's narrative follows the terminology of Hume transforming,
however, the barren rock of skepticism into
"an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable 
limits. It is the land of truth - enchanting name - 
surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of 
illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting 
iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, 
deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty 
hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never 
abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion."17
His own system must also encounter the crises, the occasion which
"we cannot put aside and yet cannot endure. All support here 
fails us and the greatest perfection, no less than the least 
perfection, is unsubstantial and baseless for the purely 
speculative reason, which makes not the least effort to 
retain either the one or the other and feels indeed no loss 
in allowing them to vanish entirely.1,18
Ultimately:
"the thing itself is indeed given, but we can have no
insight into its nature."19
Hegel describes the crisis of grounding:
"in fact one finds oneself in a kind of witches circle in 
which determinations of reflection, ground and grounded, 
phenomena and phantoms, run riot in indiscriminate company 
and enjoy equal rank with one another."
For Hegel the crisis is but the final evidence of the superiority
of the logic, for it is the logic which will guide the journey.
"The end itself, this falling to the ground of the
mediation, is at the same time the ground from which the 
immediate proceeds. ...the abyss for finite reason is 
[found] insofar as finite reason surrenders its finitude and 
sinks its mediating movement therein; but this abyss, the 
negative ground, is also the positive ground of the
emergence of simply affirmative being, of essence which is
in its own self immediate; mediation is an essential 
movement. "20
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One only takes this solution with the logic!
Nietzsche's implicit retort to Hume was that the desire to return 
to the Common Life from the crisis was no more than one of the 
many symptoms of human weakness; a symptom of our inability to 
rely upon ourselves, a denial that we are alone as individuals 
and thus must carry the burden of our solitude; a failure to 
assert our individual will as the ultimate ground for everything 
and to realise that we self grounded and not constrained by any 
external order of things.
The Nietzschean solution transforms Hume's current of nature into
"an inner will" which he "designate(s) as 'will to power'".
Basing himself upon a critique of Kant, Nietzsche tells us:
"The sore point of Kant's critical philosophy has gradually 
become visible even to dull eyes: Kant no longer has a right 
to his distinction 'appearance' and 'thing-in-itself'".2
Pragmatically Nietzsche holds:
"the categories are 'truths' only in the sense that they are 
conditions of life for us: as Euclidean space is a
conditional ' truth' ".22
The image of the abyss is every present with Nietzsche - it is 
the remembrance which stimulates Zarathustra in his message that 
the play of life must continue over this suspension. A message 
which continually brakes the impasse of the lack of grounding in 
the 'fact' that "the criterion of truth resides in the 
enhancement of the feeling of power."23
The alternative pragmatic solution is that of the later 
Wittgenstein, who in a "therapeutic" overturning of subjectivism 
denies the need to attempt either of the twin paths of autonomy 
and the ultimate principle. Thus in On Certainty Wittgenstein 
holds:
"All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a 
hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this 
system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of 
departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the 
essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so 
much the point of departure, as the element in which
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arguments have their life."24
Such a dicta appears very close to Hume’s return to the common
life. Hume’s dicta that philosophy must have stock with the
"gross earthy mixture" of the common life, does not mean,
however, that all we can do is analyze the rules and live by them
as Wittgenstein appears to some to offer (and, as it must be
admitted, the conservative politics of Hume claimed 'Justice*
consisted of). For although thought, philosophy, must begin
within the common life and thus the problem of grounding becomes
pragmatic in a sense: As Hume put it in the introduction after
the return to the common life we freely recognise:
"we can give no reason for our most general and most refined 
principles, besides our experience of their reality; which 
is the reason of the mere vulgar, and which required no 
study at first to have discovered."(xviii)
Our acceptance of the natural ways of the world is, however, 
mitigated. David Faith Norton calls this a mitigated naturalism 
to accompany Hume’s mitigated scepticism. For not only does Hume, 
as soon as he claims nature returns him to the life of indolent 
belief, claim nature also fits him to stir again, but his very 
narrative portrayal of the overcoming of the sceptical crises 
is a moral decision. As Hume states in the introduction, this 
decision is not made by those who hold to the "modem systems of 
philosophy" - for they instead impose "their conjectures and 
hypotheses on the world for the most certain principles".(T. 
xviii) The proper attitude to such claims is the sceptical one - 
but the sceptical attitude must itself be guided by an 
understanding of its social role. That is to say, epistemological 
scepticism must be socially responsible. It must co-exist with 
social belonging and here Hume is rather conservative seeing the 
ongoing journey of the intelligent individual as one who defends 
the ongoing traditions of the time, his non-sceptical moralist 
positions likewise participate in what Hume presents as the 
proper narrative of intellectual progress.
In summary this is a narrative which Hume pitches against the 
currents of his time. Currents which as Popper summarises taught,
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via the epistemological optimism after Bacon and Descartes,
"that there was no need for any man to appeal to authority 
in matters of truth because each man carried two sources of 
knowledge in himself; either in his power of sense 
perception... or in his power of intellectual intuition..."25
It is a narrative in which Hume, however, tells us that the 
faculties of man are incapable of themselves, as isolated 
subjectivity, of providing the ultimate foundation.
The return of Hume to the common life still has strong elements 
of subjectivity, but now it is a subjectivity acutely conscious 
of its reality as limited. Limitations, however, which cannot be 
fixed or positioned in some absolute boundary as Kant envisages, 
but whose limits are expressed and constituted in their temporal 
positioning in social progress.
Thus the epistemological scepticism of Hume returns to the 
framework of the common life - this movement is natural - indeed 
it is proper - but this return is not irrational. It is not 
irrational, but rational, to base one's life and intellectual 
arguments within the narratives of the social world. Exemplified, 
for Hume, by moral belonging. But the claims of the participants 
of the common life can themselves be subjected to the mitigated 
scepticism proper to such life.
Thus we must enjoin the narratives of the social world, for we 
must use them both as the framework, and as the dialogical 
opponents of our activities. My social existence not only puts 
me into social interaction with a coexisting range of 
contemporaries in a geo-economic position, it also connects me 
with a peculiar form of temporal continuity, an existence in 
time/space coordinates mediated by recall of the past, strongly 
felt for Hume in custom, which runs from predecessors to 
successors. It is a sequence which extends beyond the boundaries 
of my life, both into the past before my birth and into the 
future beyond my death.
This is a sequence which finds itself expressed in a form of
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communicative interaction of the social world. To the extent to 
which Hegel took this up he was right - to the extent to which 
he absolutivised it into the philosophy of absolute self- 
consciousness encompassing the motif of a complete consciousness, 
and thus to the teleology of consensus, he was anti-Humean and 
wrong.
However, the Humean form of communicative narrative activity 
rhetorically puts forward certain 'metaphysical assumptions' 
which underpin the Humean legacy and determine that this need not 
be reflexive pragmatic 'communicative reason1 but may pass over 
the question of its underpinnings in an acceptance of its 
functionality. Therefore, we may suggest, if Habermas really 
wants to find the juncture at which the Enlightenment ignored the 
potentiality of reflexivity and forms of communicative reason in 
favour of establishing a trust in the paradigm of consciousness , 
then he should return before Kant to the narrative of David Hume 
and to the weakness of the empiricist metaphysics which gives 
rise to the coarseness of the traditional interpretation of Hume. 
One that has, perhaps, crippled Hume's prior overcoming of "the 
sentimental metaphysics of homelessness".
Section B 
I
The metaphysical assumptions of Humean Empiricism.
Modernity begins at the rupture of the metaphysical guarantee 
that religious authority holds over the identification process 
between language and the world. At this stage the subject, man, 
requires a new legitimation for his apparent ability to speak 
accurately and to capture the process of the world. Hume's 
introspection, whilst in part an obedience to the Socratic demand 
to know thyself and upon that 'certainty' to base your 
relationship to the world - a demand which transcends epochs or 
systems of thought - is specifically modernist in its primary use
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for epistemological clarification. The subject doing the 
representing, including the presentation of theory as in the 
micro politics of the Treatise. seeks to hold himself out as an 
observable object so that he may make clear the very process of 
representation. Thus for both Rationalism, as with Descartes, and 
empiricism, here with Hume, self-reflection as the primary move 
replaces the look to an absolute external authority. The fruit 
of such self-reflection, the identified relationship of the 
subject doing the representing to the self, becomes the 
archemendian point through the use of which epistemological 
certainty is granted. All knowledge of things beyond the self 
depends on two key assumptions: the notion that we apprehend real 
objects that can exist independently of ourselves requires that 
our sense impressions can accurately represent such objects; and 
all knowledge of things beyond what is immediately present to us, 
i.e. knowledge of the past and future, and of relations that are 
held to be generally true, assume the validity of inductive 
inference which in turn presupposes the uniformity of nature. 
Hume appears to hold that these assumptions, generally referred 
to as the assumptions of objectivity and uniformity, pertain to 
matters of fact. If their truth be assumed then it is possible 
to engage in reasoning concerning matters of fact combining the 
evidence of experience with adherence to strict rules of 
inference - such knowledge must, however, be methodologically 
probabilistic in nature and thus subject to future modification 
as evidence is adduced.26 Modesty as to knowledge claims, thus, 
cannot be overcome, even though some degree of security can, and 
must, be practically relied upon.
We have moved, therefore, from the pre-Enlightenment position of 
Christendom where knowledge claims ultimately relied a faith in 
the language of God to a position of belief in objectivity and 
uniformity. But, further reflection reveals that these two basic 
assumptions cannot themselves be validated by experience, for 
their reliability must be held constant to substantiate 
experience itself. They are, therefore, necessary matters of 
belief, and it appears to Hume that the strength to which they
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are ordinarily held (the strength to which they 'naturally
impress themselves upon the mind') suggests that there is some
form of natural psychological explanation for this. Without some
form of naturalist explanation the lack of logical justification
for these two central beliefs occasions the sceptical crisis.
Under the concept of "mitigated scepticism" (sic) our theorizing
must return to the naturalness of the common life, wherein:
"Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has 
determined us to judge as well as to breathe and feel." In 
returning to the common life: "I may, nay I must, yield to 
the current of nature".
It is not in pursuit of a program of reason which drives
questioning but a form of passion; the love of truth being one
particular passion. What gives rise to this passion or changes
in passion? Changes and disruptions in the common life, the pains
and pleasures of common existence; indeed,
"whatever supports and fills the passions is agreeable... 
whatever weakens and enfeebles them is uneasy. As opposition 
has the first effect, and facility [Hume's concept covering 
the source of pleasure] the second, no wonder the mind, in 
certain dispositions, desires the former and is adverse to 
the latter." Custom usually produces "facility", hence 
"'tis a quality of human nature... common both to the body 
and mind, that too sudden and violent a change is unpleasant 
to us, and that however any objects may in themselves be 
indifferent, yet their alteration gives 
uneasiness."(T.p.270)
How can we be sure we can judge the correctness of our feelings 
about change and stability and our reaction to social happenings? 
In the Enquiries. Hume expands upon the idea of Nature quoted 
earlier:
"as nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without 
giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which 
they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, 
which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course 
to that which she has established among external objects; 
though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which 
this regular course and succession of objects totally 
depends." (E.p.55)
Moreover, it is nature herself that enables us to distinguish 
between "just philosophy" (i.e. the path of proper discourse) and 
"false philosophy". Since:
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"philosophy, if just, can present us only with mild and 
moderate sentiments; and if false... its opinions are merely 
the objects of a cold and general speculation, and seldom go 
so far as to interrupt to course of our natural 
propensities". (T.p.272)
Nature, it appears has made ample provision for us.27
Hume thus gives a grounding for the very feasibility of
(empirical) science which Whitehead was later to recognise as the
impossibility of science without the supposition of a "beneficent
nature". But for Hume man does not correctly understand this talk
of 'nature1 and in the Natural History of Religion Hume
demonstrated that the traditional relation between 'God' and
transcendental relations at the heart of postulations of "eternal
justice" and transcendental categories of good and evil were the
products of man's psychological fears and, implicitly, the
institutionalization of these fears by the Church. This fear, and
the legacy of the appropriation of it by the institutions of
Church and State, obstructs the development of 'true' reactions
of man to moral situations. Any penology is constrained since men
"must be careful not to form expressly any natural sentiment 
of blame and approbation [but instead are guided by 
rationalist abstractions]. Popular monotheism...[is] a 
species of demonism".
In the penal realm the result is the subjection of man to semi­
religious discourse which legitimates modes of official vengeance 
by the authorities under the name of the state. The people are 
constrained from developing a natural penology:
"The heart secretly detests such measures of cruel and 
implacable vengeance; but the judgement dares not but 
pronounce them perfect and adorable. The additional misery 
of this inward struggle aggravates all the other terrors, by 
which these unhappy victims to superstition are for ever 
haunted."(Natural History, p.67)
ThB power of the pre-Enlightenment, the power which focused upon 
feir and ignorance to sustain authority, should be transformed 
in:o a power of knowledge; a knowledge-sentience complex which 
woild guide progress. But how was that knowledge, and that power 
ac:ually possible when the sceptical critique could bite so well?
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Only by an implicit natural rationality in the developing course 
of that common life - yet in the common life the prejudices of 
the populace are divided: Hume's knowledge of "Natural History" 
demonstrates to him an operative distinction between a 
political/religious, and a legal/moral obligation. Hume held that 
it was possible to construct a 'naturally recognizable1 system 
for the operation of law, and in turn morality, in the natural 
operation of the sentiments, and in time to replace the existing 
transcendental and religious basis of obligation with this 
'natural basis1. Hume is clear that this enterprise implicitly 
goes against certain forms of power, specifically the religious. 
In the Dialogues he holds that the true use of religion was to 
take advantage of the psychological situation where "motives of 
morality and justice [need reasoned support] but nature compels 
man to set religion up as a 'separate principle1", which 
inevitably becomes "only a cover to faction and ambition" 
(D.p.114-5). This abduction of reason cannot be held in check by 
the false recourse to rationalist techniques, nor countered by 
the falsehoods of revelation, but only by the knowledge of 
natural history. Through the growth of knowledge, the passions 
in men can be identified and manipulated by "artifice", so that 
unreasonable motivation might yield reasonable result. In time 
the scientific knowledge of moral sentiments, i.e. a knowledge 
of psychology and the natural composition of man and his 
environment, will develop and be effectual because of the 
weakening power of religion over public opinion. This victory 
will not be achieved by man’s power of abstract reason, but by 
his recognition of his actual guidance by his passions and 
natural desire. It is as a consequence of these that civil 
society has come about, and it is through their operation that 
the institutions of civil and political society should be guided.
In the terms of Hume's friend, Adam Smith, our survival and 
developing happiness has not been
"entrusted to the slow and uncertain determinations of our
reason...[but to]..original and immediate instincts".
The knowledge of the larger scheme is within this process
(Natural History) and of the science of moral sentiments can put
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the question of obligation on a grounding which is strictly 
'empirical' . As Adam Smith specifies it# the question now "is not 
concerning a matter of right, if I may say so, but concerning a 
matter of fact."28
This empirical emphasis is linked to another key prescriptive
rule of the imaginative domain: for both Smith and Hume the
inquiries of man should not be directed to obtaining conceptions
of the 'whole' , but focus instead upon the situations of the
common life and the knowledges empirically obtainable which can
guide this. 'True' philosophy is not concerned to give totally
encompassing theories, indeed it can only focus upon the
empirical appearance and does not plan to tell the whole story;
it claims to leave the world ultimately a mystery.
"The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable mystery. 
Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgement, appear the only 
result of our most accurate scrutiny concerning this 
subject." (Conclusion to Natural History of Religion)
Yet this is in a sense a false "mystery" - for Hume provides a 
notion to fill this absence: it was "nature" herself that broke 
out of the trap of reflexivity in approaching the abyss of reason 
- what then is this "nature" and how is it that it is so 
powerful?
The confrontation with nihilism, with the radical undecidiability
and uncertainty in which the reflexive questioning of the
subjectivist self-inquiry of the empiricist 'self' ends is
outflanked by creating the image of a naturally evolving world-
society complex whose own internal mechanisms suffice to correct
its own, natural, self-determination. Inside this new view of the
world, this new paradigm, lies an overturning of the strength of
rationalism to express the coherence of the world's structure.
This image specifically overturns the
"established scheme of human knowledge in the Scottish 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.... a unitary and more 
or less integrated scheme the articulated disciplinary parts 
of which involved continuous reference to each other." 9 
It was a scheme whose unity and coherence was then mirrored in
the curriculum of proper education. The "understanding" which
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Hume offers, and to a limited extent Smith and Ferguson, turns 
away from this scheme in response to the demands of a surfacing 
modernity with its inescapable question of how to grapple with 
the effects and needs of an expanding economy impacting upon the 
moral and intellectual life of citizens - a question of pressing 
immediacy for the Scottish context Hume faced and whose response 
was formulated in specific modernist terms. Namely the 
universality of 'natural' human nature, a concept which presented 
a universalistic context of the human subject in an (abstract) 
world, and which further led to a new form of political 
legitimation. A formation, which divorced from the narrow 
confines of a particular time, place, and tradition bound 
"cultural debates in which the philosophical presuppositions of 
[its specific] institutions were at stake"30 could 'de- 
pragamatise' conceptions into a more abstract legitimation. 
Consequently, the 'traditional' values of kinship and of local 
community could be eroded as the need for values comparable with 
the market, growing wealth and commercial utility asserted 
itself. A need answered in the Humean model of a complex 
functioning mechanism as the socio-historical body of "natural 
society"; and a technique of change offered in the practical 
politics of philosophical moderation.
Moreover, the "secret springs and mechanisms" of social life 
necessarily link to the potential uncovering of the operative 
forms of a determinism31 and this conception evokes a change in 
our attitude towards the world - our previous superstitious 
'admiration' for the natural order of things is replaced by a 
more mundane relationship, which sees all objects merely as items 
governed by the laws of nature. Respect, or religious fear, in 
the face of mystery is overturned; it is only the weakness of our 
conceptual and investigative tools which prevents us from 
uncovering the operative mechanisms of nature.
In applying this to the human personality, Hume appears confident 
"of an entire victory. . . having proved, that all actions of the 
will have particular causes" (T.p.412). An understanding of human
180
nature seen as applying the lessons of the physical sciences 
which Bacon had provided. The causal principle is thus central 
and if there is a mistake in the causal principle then we have 
no certainty of knowledge, but if the causal principle is 
independent of subjective desire we can look forward to an 
expansion of knowledge and sound improvement in the ordering of 
human affairs. Hume first subjects the causal principle to 
sceptical attack but ultimately holds that the causal principle 
is secure from scepticism because it is not founded in reason but 
in 'nature'; the structure of the world is not built upon truths 
of reason but is a variable mass of entities in interaction 
obeying ultimately only the flow of causality. Such appears as 
the confidence of the empiricist imagination.
From the centrality of causality the crucial focus of "moral 
science" concerns the doctrine of "necessity". This is what makes 
possible a science of history and of politics.32 Hume provides 
a vision whereby entities have, under similar conditions, set 
ways of action, ways which give rise to predictability and 
characterization of effect. Moral condemnation does not rely upon 
a notion of what we call "free will" but the reality of 
determinism.
In obedience to our will we do not exist outside the pattern of 
causality, but inside. The logic of determinism is applicable to 
the operation of the will as in time, under the empiricist 
imagination, is the notion of reducibility. Hume had previously, 
in the Treatise. appeared to reduce the mistakes man made in the 
association of ideas to a question of physiology (cf.T. 
especially pp. 10-13). Thus the Humean comment that "the same 
motives always produce the same actions" begins the slide of 
modernity into behavioral psychology.
Thus liberty and necessity are reconciled as being different 
sides of the same coin: that coin being the determination of the 
will by motives. Motives for their part are presented as causal 
entities operative in the reality of events. Hence these motives
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themselves are inside the pattern of causality, and thus the 
action, caused by the will, subject to motives, which are in 
their turn caused by previous events and occurrences, starts a 
chain of determinism for the theorist to uncover.
II
What of the relationship which knowledge takes to the world? Man 
is part of the flows of that world and the world is to be 
conceived of naturalistically. There simply is nothing outside 
the world which influences, which can be kept steady as the 
ultimate frame of reference to understand and rank particulars. 
Instead the principles of science, i.e. the causal principle, 
perform this function and sense is made of the world through the 
observation of the phenomena of the world with this principle 
kept constant. This conclusion to modernities problem of 
grounding - scientific naturalism - impacts on the role of 
intellectual endeavour directly and of the fruits of that 
endeavour. Specifically individual man can not have possession 
of 'truth' in such a way that he may 'lead others to the truth' , 
and similarly participation in social life must be based on that 
understanding. This will lead men to value intellectual modesty 
and encourages men to moderate their enthusiasms and temper their 
expectations; expectations otherwise unduly aroused by fictions.
As Livingstone summarises, Hume presents a picture wherein 
authority, and in turn social order, holds together by the many 
and various manifestations of the social consciousness of 
individuals and the narrative structure of the social whole. 
Thus social and political standards exist as a temporal conflux 
between future and past experiences and hopes. Ideas and motifs 
are positioned by the narrative recall of the past. As opposed 
to arguments for the timeless essences of the natural law and 
social contract positions then current, Hume sees that the 
narrative standards that constitute the present political and 
social order are a mixture of the traditional and the contingent;
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they are not the objects of "autonomous" reason.
This reliance upon the narrative technique means that Hume is 
often mixing the descriptive with a confidential prescription.33 
The political imagination of Hume draws us in to concur that 
individual man has only a limited sphere of political interest; 
the model of the ancient polis is not one to be aspired to. 
Hume1s critique of the arguments for a reconstituted polis are 
presented as fundamentally epistemological: those who recommend 
it produce ideal visions, produced out of the abstract flight of 
reason where
"every man framed the model of a republic; and, however new 
it was, or fantastical, he was eager in recommending it to 
his fellow citizens, or even imposing it by force upon 
them".34
Hume is clear as to what is responsible for this conceptual
confusion, referring to the Levellers in the Enquiry as "a kind
of political fanatics, which arose from the religious species".
A political awareness based upon a proper study of natural
history will provide an alternative path. For Hume participation
cannot be personally experienced by all, constitutional
representation will be the successful method of political
process, and, instead of notions of the polis, recourse to the
encompassing rules of justice (law) will best ensure the
establishment and continuance of good authority. The passions of
man are capable of moving man with many conflicting feelings
requiring subjection to ordered repetition (the control of law) .
Law, in its turn, is most just in reflecting its growth from the
structures of habit and custom - its primary role in normal life
is the protection of the rules of property and reinforcement of
mutual respect and reciprocity. As man moves away from the
restraint of custom and tradition the restraint of law is vital:
"good laws may beget order and moderation in government 
where the manners and customs have installed little humanity 
or justice in the tempers of men."
Only in the orderly State, made possible by the laws of justice, 
supporting the authority of government with the natural loyalties 
of the people, could liberty, commerce, and progress in the
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social 'ease' of arts and science be possible. Moreover, private 
happiness, secured through the cultivation of the private 
virtues, could only be enabled via such civic foundations. 
However, modern politics were for Hume, being exposed to 
metaphysical social currents at odds with the task of maintaining 
political stability and the rules of justice.35
Movement and gradual reform was possible, perfection through
revolution or other events not; thus "men must, therefore,
endeavour to palliate what they cannot cure". The framework of
contemporary social order, i.e. the rather rigid rules of
justice, is necessary because of certain empirical features of
the human condition. Notably the scarcity that nature has made
for man's provisions, limited generosity in the spirit of man
tempered by the reality of sympathy.
"If every man had a tender regard for another, or if nature 
supplied abundantly all our wants and desires [then] the 
jealousy of interest, which justice supposes, could no 
longer take place"; [nor says Hume would there be need for 
the rules of property per se... (T.p.494).
"increase to a sufficient degree the benevolence of men, or 
the bounty of nature, and you render justice useless, by 
supplying its place with much nobler virtues, and more 
valuable blessings".
If we could replace material scarcity with plenty:
"or if everyone had the same affection and tender regard 
for everyone as for himself, justice and injustice would be 
equally unknown among mankind" (T. P.485).
The rationalist may, however, simply produce these solutions out 
of the "fancies of the imagination" and man will have neither 
security nor reality. We should turn away from the constructs of 
the rationalist and instead "look abroad into the world" basing 
our political and social aspirations upon the real, empirically 
operative foundations of authority instead of living with the 
desires and fruits of the old religious or semi-religious 
traditionalist doctrines and fictions. Authority cannot claim 
justification by any reference to a rationalistically defined 
essence, but by its observable actions in the natural movement 
of society. The authority of politics is the authority of 
functional integration, wherein
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"the happiness and prosperity of mankind [is as] a wall 
built by many hands, which still raises by each stone which 
is heaped upon it... [Society is to be an edifice of 
happiness] raised by the social virtue of justice; ... the 
building of a vault where every individual stone would fall 
to the ground [without] the mutual assistance and 
combination of its corresponding parts".(E.304-5)
The slowly constructed building which is the proper societal 
existence for man is fragile and constructed over time. Life in 
it, the progressive social life of modernity, is to be not so 
much a question of 'ethical* participation in a common, over 
reaching framework of social identity, but rather a process of 
studied indifference by individuals which avoids grand universal 
claims and related styles of politics. Movements such as the 
Levellers, which proposed state intervention over the question 
of the allocation of property and a politics modelled on 
participation in a reconstituted polis type republic, offered 
utopian visions of radical democracy deeply repugnant to Hume. 
First, their epistemology was wrong; it was not only wrong it was 
unnecessary. In the project of overcoming the forms of 
legitimation which previous rationalist systems joined to the 
power of sovereign and church the motif of rationalism should be 
discontinued. Moreover, even if some of their 'progressive* faith 
in man could be shared in moments of optimism, this did not deny 
that there was great danger in change, thus the second feature 
was the need for some form of tradition and authority. Rather 
than optimistic and heady calls for participation and freedom 
Hume*s response can, retrospectively, be summed up in one phrase: 
Institutionalism. Institutionalism was the slow victory of 
political moderation; a denial of party political fanaticism and 
a process which retained certain of the mechanisms of past 
legitimative strategies for authority in that it placed the 
citizen*s primary duty solely in terms of maintaining the rules 
of justice: in particular the rules of property and the
established rights of citizens.
The rationale for institutionalism is both historical and 
epistemological. The empiricist imagination for human action is 
one of constant conjunctions and determinism - the implication
is that human behaviour is contextualised. Thus human action, 
beliefs, political power need to be regulated, positioned, 
engaged in frameworks and located amidst rules and patterned 
expectations. In a broad sense acceptable ('moral*) behaviour is 
only possible in a structured society, and, combined with the 
principle of parsimony (which here means that we have a natural 
disposition to respect established authority) providing 
systematic frameworks for social life will enable social 
stability to prevail.
Historical knowledge, as Book III of the Treatise outlines, 
demonstrates that liberty, commerce, refinement and progress in 
the arts and sciences only arose in countries with good laws and 
constitutions, thus there was an historically demonstrable 
relationship between these two variables.36
One current of the Eighteenth Century was to use history to bring 
about societal changes, to help generate those sorts of upheavals 
of which the French revolution stands as the supreme example. 
Here history is as a branch of polemics and serves to give 
sanction to political contest. For Hume that was fictitious 
history - a weaving of webs of dreams and of new utopias. Instead 
history must be approached as something 'scientific*. This 
history, however, conceived of a study of growth and development, 
could in turn become a counter revolutionary force; a 
"philosophic history** in the service of a politics of moderation. 
Here Hume, as Duncan Forbes brings out, differed from the other 
key writers of the Scottish Enlightenment in appearing to lack 
a degree of "sociological sophistication". Hume allowed a greater 
role for chance, accident, and the intentions of key actors in 
politics than a structuralist sociology, i.e. a through-going 
depth deterministic approach, would allow. But this difference 
is ambiguous, for on the one hand Hume appears to have had some 
aversion to the very idea that sufficient knowledge of the 
'reality* of determinism could ever be arrived at that would 
enable such a structural analysis of history as Marx was later 
to provide, and yet on the other he feels the need to state that
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there must be some scheme of natural flow, even if we are never 
to be a party to it. The first can give us a notion of history 
as resulting from decisions that men as individuals and temporary 
groupings have carried out, rather than presenting these men as 
giving decisions which however, result from intentional states 
implicit and understandable in their nature as objects and where 
these intentions result from causal conditions which must be 
carried out and are inexorably fulfilled by man. Man thus 
becoming the tools of other forces. Hume cannot, however, be seen 
as a champion of radical openness in human affairs, as an early 
proponent of the 'pragmatic' contingency of human affairs - the 
demand to give a proper foundation inherent in empiricism becomes 
too strong.
Man's choices are empirically explainable within the "natural" 
product that is society. Moreover, although the rules of justice 
are "artificial", this is an artificiality that has "naturally" 
come about and owes its necessity to natural process. The 
necessity of the rules of justice is not a utilitarian argument 
whereby man chooses as in a contract, as a mass act of will, but 
as participant in the machinery of social change. However, this 
understanding of participation in natural depth can itself be 
conservative, for if the constitution of the rules of justice was 
a process of utility then man could freely change the rules of 
justice as his abstract arguments from utility led him, but 
Hume's concept had an almost unchangeable notion of the rules of 
justice. The prospect of nihilism is denied but the price is a 
recourse to assumed function. As society has come about as a 
natural product, its structure is essentially superior to those 
ideas of social organization which any rationalist approach could 
give us.37
What then are we to be guided by? The natural bonding of society 
flows out of the interaction of everyday life, and operates best 
when the naturalness of sympathy is undistorted by rationalist 
speculation. There is thus little cause for man needing to use 
reason to address 'the question of government', indeed "vulgar
sense and slight experience are sufficient11. (E. p. 195) "Justice" 
is not something which has its foundation in a body of first 
principles, but is basically the empirical interaction of single 
pieces of social behaviour, namely the "abstaining from the 
possessions of others". (T. p.489)
We can be secure in this, however, for although the "remedy" to
the problem of "justice., is not deriv'd [directly] from nature,
but from artifice", the reality is that
"nature provides a remedy in the judgement and under standing 
for what is irregular and incommodious in her affections. 
(T. p.489)
As opposed to social contract theorists, the "convention [of 
justice] is not of the nature of a promise" but comes out of "a 
general sense of common interest": the actual mutual expression 
of which may produce resolutions in the nature of a promise, but 
any conception of a "state of nature" out of which man contracted 
"is to be regarded as a mere fiction" similar to the notion of 
"the golden age" which Hume refers to as an invented poetical 
notion. Reliance upon the notion of an original state, or state 
of nature is, for Hume, an alternative usage of the golden age 
motif.38
To those "liberal" writers of the seventeenth century who are
often thought of as Hume's predecessors, "civil society" -
modernity's early presentation of a concept for its self-
understanding - came about as a sudden act of individuals in
pursuit of individual ends. For Hobbes
"the final Cause, End, or Design of men.. in the 
introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in which we 
see them live in Commonwealths), is the foresight of their 
own preservation... "39
For Locke
"the great and chief end.. of Men's uniting into 
Commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the 
preservation of their Property".40
For Hume there is no sudden decision - no break with the slow and 
gradual processes of nature. Instead the performance of the
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virtue of justice, i.e. obedience to the rules of justice, is
best conceived of as lying inside the gradual flow of nature
which has operated through a vast amount of individual human
actions. Nature has performed the task with great subtlety since
these "rules by which property, right and obligation are
determined, have in them, no marks of a natural origin, but many
of artifice and contrivance". They appear "too numerous to have
proceeded from nature" and "are changeable by human laws", yet
"all of them have a direct and evident tendency to public good,
and the support of society". Hume states that "this last
circumstance is remarkable upon two accounts" and it is
illuminating to follow his statement through. We read:
"first, because, though the cause of the establishment of 
these laws had been a regard for the public good, as much as 
the public good is their natural tendency, they wou'd still 
have been artificial, as being purposely contriv'd and 
directed to a certain end. Secondly, because, if men had 
been endow'd with a strong regard for the public good, they 
wou'd never have restrained themselves by those rules: so 
that the laws of justice arise from natural principles in a 
manner still more oblique and artificial. 'Tis self-love 
which is their real origin; and as the self-love of one 
person is naturally contrary to that of another, these 
several interested passions are oblig'd to adjust themselves 
after such a manner as to concur in some system of conduct 
and behaviour. This system, therefore, comprehending the 
interest of each individual, is of course advantageous to 
the public; tho' it be not intended for that purpose by the 
inventors." (T. p.528-9)
Thus the intentions of the "inventors" - judges, legislators, 
'class-interests' and so forth - are not sufficient as causal 
entities to truly explain the evolution and operation of the 
system of justice. Even when we may observe evidence that law­
makers create law for their own interest, for their own 
"interested passions" they are within the flow of nature with the 
result that they "adjust themselves" to "a system of conduct and 
behaviour": the whole of which gives a social benefit "not
intended... by the inventors".
This idea that the actions of personally interested, selfish 
individual actors create in the totality of their actions a 
system of unintended consequences of natural benefice is Hume's
presentation via natural jurisprudence of what Smith gives us in 
commercial economics. By this move the understanding, i.e. the 
use of reason, that man may apply in the 'public sphere1 is 
deemed the same as that applied in the understanding of 
economics.41 The other function of the Aristotelian style system 
- the concern with moral well being and development of the 
citizens as oppose to their physical protection or economic 
welfare is also shown redundant. For Hume's "natural history of 
morality" sets out an alternative edifice to that where morality 
is taught through the abstractions of rationalism, i.e. what he 
identifies as the medium of religion. Through this we have 
avoided the fear of the mob, for it is now shown as not 
'empirically' true that 'Si dieu n'existe pas, tout est permis* - 
the rules of justice still bind and the foundation of their hold 
can be demonstrated by the proper investigation of "natural 
history".42
The knowledge of natural history and of the operation of the 
passions means that Hume can present against radical 
revolutionary change and the arbitrariness of the simple 'command 
version' of legal positivism the grand notion of an empirical, 
evolutionary "natural law" which preserves the strength of the 
law from easy change and charges of arbitrariness or partiality. 
In this there is no need for some fundamental set of innate ideas 
or external reference point, such as the existence of God, to 
give a basis to the moral sense of man. The growth and operation 
of natural justice can be accounted for by the facilities of 
human nature (self-love and some benevolence), the capabilities 
of human action (communication via sympathy and the restraint 
from seizing the possessions of others) and the entirety of 
social interaction (mutual recognition). In sum, as Duncan Forbes 
has commented, we have the first exclusively sociological 
conception of society and social change.
Hume does not expressly address the penal realm but an approach 
is implicit in his discussions of the progress from .the 
'unnaturalness' of the religious notions of equivalence to a
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growing system of natural responses made possible by sentience - 
the response to offenders is becoming 'more natural' as the hold 
of religion decreases. The position of Law is an essential 
feature enabling the proper operation of the social body, and the 
modem creation of 'civil law' is an advancing product of the 
stream of nature placing together "industry, knowledge and 
humanity... by an indissoluble chain."43 Social control is linked 
to social relationships and the interaction of the individual 
with his fellows, the tremors of social change can and will be 
contained through the expansion of the middle class, that 
"middling rank... who are the best and firmest basis of public 
liberty".44 Through their participation in industry, and the 
indulgence in the "luxury" which follows men are socialised for 
peaceful cohabitation even with the greater social power and 
opportunities which the division of labour allows. Hume is 
somewhat dubious about the extent to which the crude power of 
government can be the instrument of social control. Naked 
government force, the visible coercive instruments at its 
disposal, are limited in their scope, instead custom and habit 
are the true restraining forces on man's rather asocial 
tendencies. Furthermore, it is the always present micro­
situations in which man is interacting with his fellows that 
provide the actual restraint on his conduct, with individual man 
feeling the need to preserve his reputation, while being 
responsive to his internal sentience concerning the action of 
others. It must, then, be in the area of influencing "opinion" 
that true control lies. Adam Smith was even more specific in his 
argument that knowledge of the "natural sentiment of justice" 
(i.e. psychological impulse), could allow the substitution of 
either clear coercion, or the hold of religious belief and the 
transcendental idealism thereby associated - the influencing of 
the "collective judgments" of society was the key. Indeed, both 
Hume and Smith are united in seeing that the decline in the power 
of religion was giving a more 'natural' bent to social 'opinion', 
or in Smith's phrase the "moral sentiments" of society.45 Hume 
holds that moral sentiments are common to all humanity and are 
empirical instincts "absolutely universal in all ages and
nations” . The limited reflexivity of the common subjects is a 
problem as their superficial reflection results in religious 
feelings; moral sentiments are truer since they are a consequence 
of our active engagement with the reality of our social and 
material world.46 An engagement which allows us "little leisure 
or inclination to think of unknown invisible regions".47
Ill
As the true province of law, morality, and even the production 
of Hume's thesis lies for him 'within the current of nature', 
such a foundation throws into question the whole enterprise of 
doing 'moral theory' at all. What then is the role of 
philosophical discussion concerning moral distinctions under 
Humean empiricism?48
Again Hume's target in describing morality is a pure model of
rationalism: a model which gives man a morality which is the
product of reason alone - a table of "abstract rational
difference[s] betwixt moral good and evil" (T.p.466). Hume's
first argument is that as morals have to do with practical life
then 'moral philosophy' must be something which will
"influence our passions and actions, and go beyond the calm 
and indolent judgments of the understanding^ and]... since 
morals have an influence on the actions and affections, it 
follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that 
because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never 
have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce 
or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in 
this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not 
conclusions of our reason". (T.p.457.)
The role of reason is secondary to the empirically operating 
mechanism of the world - Reason must serve only to bring to light 
what nature has decreed.49
Hume now makes a further move, for not only is the distinction 
between good and evil not something that exists in the categories 
of reason but it is not even something that depends upon "any
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matter of fact" discoverable by a simple positivistic 
investigation:
"Take any action allow*d to be vicious: wilful murder, for 
instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find 
that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. 
In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain 
passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other 
matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, 
as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, 
till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find 
a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you toward 
this action. Here is a matter of fact: but *tis the object 
of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the 
object. So that when you pronounce any action or character 
to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the 
constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment 
of blame from the contemplation of it" (T. p.468-9).
Moral theory is only talk, its elements of 'reason* a
superstructure which fits over the true, subjectivist economy of
"certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts" which run
thoughout and structure the reactions of the self. The naturalist
'truth* of the discourse of virtue or vice
"defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality 
gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation; 
and vice the contrary*'.
Punishment or reward, "the good or ill desert of virtue or vice" 
is a direct consequence of the moral sentiments - the sentiments 
produce a passionate reaction "attended benevolence or anger" and 
we desire to make happy the person we love and miserable the 
person we hate. The strength of these reactions will, Hume 
believes, be attenuated by the structure of the common life where 
continuing interaction with our fellow men is best suited to mild 
reactions
We thus return to where this chapter began; into the 
consideration of the Humean self and the interaction of social 
theory, conceptions of the self, and the interdependent 
structuring of the 'sense' of social relations. As in the chaos 
which the search for the self experiences in moving beyond the 
rules of everyday life so the justice of the social depends upon 
adherence to the settled rules of the social to prevent chaos.
The rules of the self and the rules of the social reflect the 
precepts of that epistemology.
IV
Postscript: Aspects of the modem legacy of Hume.
It is unnecessary to go at any length into the vast influence 
which the Humean imagination has had upon the subsequent 
development of modern ethics, moral and social theory. The 
is/ought division is but the most obvious reminder that above all 
Anglo-American society has been dominated in its moral thought 
by a Humean era. In that emotivism and many aspects of 
'conventionalist* accounts of justice, however, depend upon the 
notion of men interacting together and simply pooling their 
statements of the **I feel..." or the "I think....** being the 
foundationalism they are somewhat of a development and departure 
from Hume.50
Hume demanded rational (in the empiricist sense) justification
for all layers of epistemological warrant. The epistemological
tradition he has been seen as bequeathing has increasingly been
unhappy with fictitious foundations for conventionalist accounts
of justice. Subsequently fully explanatory accounts of empirical
conditions need to be produced for the institution of justice,
as for example, in the minimum content of H.L.A.Hart * s
empiricised Natural Law, which draws upon the Humean demand for
justice as rules to depict the scientific constitution of a
'legal system* as the "union of primary and secondary rules".
Hart's "minimum content of natural law", draws upon Hobbes and
Hume to "see in the modest aim of survival the central
indisputable element which gives empirical good sense to the
terminology of Natural Law".51 Thus, assuming that
"our concern is with social arrangements for continued
existence, not with those of a suicide club  Reflecting
on 'some very obvious generalizations - indeed truisms - 
concerning human nature and the world in which we live, show 
that as long as these hold good, there are certain rules of
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conduct which any social organization must contain if it is 
to be viable. Such rules do in fact constitute a common 
element in the law and conventional morality of all 
societies which have progressed to the point where these are 
distinguished as different forms of social control."
Hart specifies "the salient characteristics of human nature" as 
a "content" which gives men the "reason for obeying voluntary" 
social rules. Society requires a "minimum of co-operation given 
voluntary by those who find it is their interest to submit to and 
maintain the rules" for without this "coercion of others who 
would not voluntary conform would be impossible."
Moreover, Hart now proposes a division of labour. The 
philosopher, of the empiricist type, operates "to stress the 
distinctively rational connection between natural facts and the 
content of legal and moral rules" for which the minimum content 
suffices. Separately, the sociologist or psychologist has the 
task of investigating the empirical conditions of how a 
population develops or maintains such a moral code. They are not 
interested in the rationality (the debatable 'reason for') of 
their doing so as this has already been ascertained (at least in 
outline). Thus the positivist criminologist may search the 
schools, the sports clubs, the family rearing practices of the 
society with the aim of finding observable correlations as to the 
differentiations concerning behavioral outcomes (compliance 
regularities). This investigation and uncovering of the "causal 
connections" as to the maintenance of the social code must, 
implicitly, offer power to be placed in the service of the 
appropriate rationality of that code. The rationality of the code 
is a process which relates the content of legal and moral rules 
to the set of minimal truisms.52
These are:
(i) Human vulnerability (i.e. the requirement 1 of 
forbearance from violent activity, especially those concerning 
bodily harm);
(ii) approximate equality as a species characteristic (of 
personal bodily strength, in the face of death) (thus the 
requirement of mutual forbearance and compromise);
1 Qf:
(iii) limited altruism (which makes the rules of forbearance 
necessary);
(iv) limited resources which produce the "static rules" 
which protect property and allow the production of food and goods 
without fear of disturbance. Dynamic rules flow from the division 
of labour required for the creation of adequate supplies and make 
possible the exchange of goods, the creation of obligations and 
promise keeping (contract). These obligations are not limited to 
private concerns but the system of social law itself wherein 
"individuals are enabled by words, spoken or written, to make 
themselves liable to blame or punishment for failure to act in 
certain stipulated ways." Thus "a standing procedure providing 
for such self-binding operations is required in order to create 
a minimum form of confidence in the future behaviour of others, 
and to ensure the predictability necessary for co-operation.
(v) Limited understanding and strength of will, for while
"the facts that make rules respecting persons, property and 
promises necessary in social life are simple and their 
mutual benefits are obvious [and] most men are capable of 
seeing them and sacrificing the immediate short-term 
interests which conformity to such rules demands.... neither 
understanding of long-term interest, nor the strength or 
goodness of will.. . are shared by all men alike.... All are 
tempted at times to prefer their own immediate interests, 
and, in the absence of a special organization for their 
.detection and punishment, many would succumb to the 
temptation."
This acknowledgment of what is known in criminology as "control
theory", i.e. that crime is caused by the absence of restraints,
is linked by Hart to a theory of punishment which accepts another
rationale for the act of punishment, namely, "as a guarantee that
those Who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those
who would not". Punishment ensures on behalf of those who do obey
that no advantage shall be gained by not obeying. "The core of
good sense in the doctrine of Natural Law" determines that
"given the setting of natural facts and aims which makes 
sanctions both possible and necessary in a municipal system, 
that [punishment] is a natural necessity".53
Two points: first the image of doing social theory, in this case 
the jurisprudence of 'descriptive sociology' (as Hart terms his
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project), that is presented is one of 'reading the facts of the
world' in the light of our overriding interest (in this case
survival) and then using the human facility of reason marcating
proper content from the irrelevant. In the construction of theory
the 'aim of survival' is held as the referential point and the
facts of the world studied, interpreted by our reasoning
facilities and specific projects of action result. Moreover,
"it is important to observe that in each case the facts 
mentioned afford a reason why.. law and morals should 
include a specific content. The general form of the argument 
is simply that without such a content laws and morals could 
not forward the minimum purpose of survival which men have 
in associating with each other."
It is the content of these facts that provide the reason for
observation of the law - this is a reason which Hart tells us is
to be viewed differently to flows of determinism for it is the
making apparent the link between the facts, survival, and the
content of law and morals which serves to mediate between the
facts of the natural predicament of man and the products of his
activity, i.e. law. But what are we going to be instructed? The
second point is how are these facts known to man, what is the
construction of the methodology whereby they reveal themselves
and what is the warrant for accepting them? (i.e. the
epistemological question). Hart does not turn to any 'sociology*,
this is no confrontation of disciplines, there is no exercise in
translaterability, no demonstration of the foundations by which
commensurability is accomplished. Instead this is an exercise of
the mind, essentially the facts of the world do not need to be
positioned in some explicit methodology of revelation since they
are (assumed to be) self apparent to reasonable reflection.
Moreover, it is apparent that
"contrary to Hart's claim that he is providing us with an 
empirical version of natural law, the relationship which he 
asserts to exist between a society and the existence of 
mutual forbearances is true analytically, and we do not have 
to go beyond his specification of 'society' in order to find 
the idea of 'mutual forbearance' as inextricably bound up 
with it, and this would be true independently of any 
observations we might make."54
The movement of the intellect is thus a movement in the present,
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for the present, i.e. it serves to make the operation of the 
present 'rational1, and, in the tradition of empiricist 
metaphysics, 'natural1. This is, in the end, the internal 
manoeuverings of a world view, i.e. the organization of the 
conceptual framework of the inquirer, which, because it is denied 
as such, closes itself off to pragmatic conversation.
John Rawls, in his influential Theory of Justice, links directly
with the Humean contention of the primacy of moderate scarcity
and limited generosity. Although drawing important distinctions,
for example on the role of the self, for Rawls "given the limited
role of reflection, the virtues of benevolence and love, as
features of the good, are forms of sentiment rather than insight,
ways of feeling rather than knowing".55 Michael Sandel concludes
that for Rawls it is essentially an "epistemological deficit"
which makes necessary the rules of justice rather than any
shortage of benevolence. It is thus this epistemological deficit,
which is in the nature of the subject (i.e. the relationship
between man and inquirer) and insurmountable, rather than the
question of benevolence which is something "variable and
contingent", that requires justice for its remedy and so accounts
for its pre-eminence.
"Where for Hume, we require justice we do not love each 
other well enough, for Rawls we need justice because we 
cannot know each other well enough for even love to serve 
alone".56
This, however, is to overlook the fact that it is an 
epistemological deficiency that drove Hume back into a 
privileging of the common life. A very denial of pure knowledge 
and truth other than as inherent in the apprehensions of the 
common life - justice must come out of and reflect the moral 
presuppositions of that common life; and although we do not have 
the kind of knowledge capable -of creating an absolute justice, 
indeed the very notion is absurd, we do have the forms of 
knowledge of the common life. What creates the sense of justice, 
in a truly Humean sense rather than a Rawlsean, is that 
background set of popular conceptions and ideas which the Humean 
history was itself to contribute to. For Hume it is essentially
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local knowledges embedded in the historical order which provide 
the substance for the rules of the present and wherein the 
framework of the present is justified by a narrative relation 
with the events of the past - the dilemma is that for Hume the 
justification, as opposed to the sense of the rules, must 
transcend the shallow foundations which localism appear to 
condemn us to, a justification he can never demonstrate. 
(Although pragmatism is latent in Rawls Theory of Justice57 we 
saw see in our discussion of pragmatism in Chapter Seven Rawls* 
latter articulation of his theory of justice is expressly 
pragmatic.)
This legitimative strategy is most dramatically demonstrated in 
the work of Karl Popper. In The History of Our Time: An
Optimist1s View58 Popper uses historical narrative to achieve 
the granting of pride to the present, and thus distinguish the 
'providentialist Historicism* he elsewhere criticises,59 and 
which serves up an array of narrative relations between present 
and future existences.60
The question of Participation.
The line which Hume*s contemporary, Rousseau, took on political 
participation was in many ways the opposite to Hume and has 
become enshrined in much of the political rhetoric of modern 
democracy. For Rousseau a full moral life for individuals in 
society is inconceivable without active participation in 
political society, the general will, participation in "the common 
unity1*. The spread of the right to vote now encompasses all - and 
participation appears as a strong candidate for the primary 
political ideal of modern "democratic" society, indeed Daniel 
Bell has called it the motif of the post-industrial order.61 
Participation has been identified with voting in elections, and 
further with party affiliation. The state of voting at elections 
ani the membership of political parties can thus be used as a 
mirror reflecting the general social health of various societies, 
ani, crucially as a measure of 'alienation'. Thus the reported 
decline in percentages of people voting, and membership of
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political parties, correlated with the increase in the crime 
rate, can be used as an index of growing social alienation 
(including a lessening identification with dominant social 
institutions, which then becomes a plausible criminogenic 
variable).
The Humean perspective is radically different. The main political 
stage is but one arena and the individuals who dominate there are 
seen as extreme in their interest - political activity and 
involvement is not the route to social progress, indeed Hume' s 
neostoicism portrays central government more as a vice to be 
endured rather than an opportunity for progressive 
participation.62 The alternative route for social progress is 
increasing the level of education in society and membership of 
associations and clubs and developing one's self. Modem society 
is an organizational society and the Humean thesis holds that 
sensible participation is more likely to be achieved through a 
range of memberships of these organizations. Thus voting figures 
may not be an adequate guide to participation. Further, the 
Humean attitude to the institutional mode of modernity is 
instrumental - a certain distance is to be kept from the official 
ethos of the very organizations that one inhabits. ' Society' is 
in reality a term used to cover the terrain of these various 
manifestations, it is, therefore, impossible to talk of the 
'social good', or of the ranking of public goods to achieve the 
'just state' - that rather is the outcome of interaction and 
compromise. Not only is this picture of the composition of 
society radically at odds with notions which stress a complete 
identification with the ranking of goals but also in the 
conception of law which is engendered. It is much more conducive 
to a notion of law as resulting from bargaining and compromise 
among various organizations and individuals than any notion of 
the glorious rationality of law, a notion which appears, for 
example, to be present in some descriptions of the codification 
process of Continental Europe. Reaction to breaches of such laws 
in the Humean legacy can then be much more instrumental and 
'sensible' than the 'morality bound', primarily retributive,
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strategies of figures in the legacy of Kant and Hegel, for 
instance. However, to deny the emotional and common sense 
responsive elements to punishment is to ignore Hume's 'natural 
legitimation1 for punishment.
Liberal tolerance is a sentience which Hume's neostoicism can be 
seen to help put into place. For to Hume the spheres of one's 
interests extend outwards in circles from one's self, the control 
of one's destiny and thus the achievement of happiness is best 
assured by the control of one's self, by the proper mastering of 
one's emotions, and by the running of one's family, friendships, 
associations, and only latterly by affairs of government. The 
conduct of government should, therefore, not be seen to interfere 
with the operation of the common life without good reason. The 
mastering of one's emotions allows an increase in the range of 
activities which the individual can observe in society without 
feeling outrage and moral turpitude.
Furthermore, the concentration away from the notion of a truly
public participatory realm of the 'political' means that there
need be no truly comprehensive "public philosophy", or
substantive political philosophy. There can instead be as many
varying conceptions as there are organizations, clubs, or other
kinds of 'interest groups' to voice them. But in acknowledging
this the stability of the static justice of Hume is given up for
a non-reflexive development of Humean institutionalization. A
resultant social order in which justice becomes equivalent to the
'Criminal Justice System*, or 'The Institution of Justice',63
with a stress upon Hartean style rules of recognition, change and
adjudication and in which an appeal 'to doing justice' is an
appeal to observing the correct procedure, the correct
observation of rules. MacIntyre complains that
"the function of that system is to enforce an order in which 
conflict resolution takes place without invoking any overall 
theory of human good."64
Of course a great deal of the criticism of what has been 
elsewhere called the 'consensus' school of criminal law, and what
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has often focused around a simplistic reading of Durkheim (who 
can be seen as combining many features of both Hume and Kant), 
is that the rules of criminal law do reflect the moral principles 
and feelings of the society. To the reflexive pragmatist the 
problem is not the denial of some monolithic conception of social 
existence but that this operation of 'justice* refuses to 
acknowledge that its rules are methodological guides of social 
existence whose existence points us always to the questions of 
how life is to be lived, rather than to the sanctity of rules.
We may amplify this by saying that the rules of justice should 
be seen as 'expressive* and are not themselves the reality. 
Durkheim touches on this when he talks of the rules in terms of 
mediation. For Durkhein, following Hume, human passion and social 
sentiment are the core of punishment. Punishment is the effect 
of the arousal of reactive instincts, the emotional response to 
the occasion of deviance, to the observation of wrongdoing by 
individuals. It comes about because the sight of crime, the 
impact of deviance, offends against the sensibilities of the 
individuals apprehending; collectively it offends against the 
'conscience collective* which, and here is the grand assumption, 
all individuals of the society have apprehended, intituited and 
partaken of. The punitive reaction comes about as a sense of 
disequilibrium experienced in the individual psychic, in the 
upsetting of that sense of settled expectations concerning 
behaviour which the individuals of a society share. The nature 
of penal organisations and the severity of punishment is a 
reflection of the forms of social organisation within a society. 
As a society moves from a simple undifferentiated form to one 
characterised by complexity, functional specialization and 
increasing interdependency of societal tasks, a movement from 
"mechanical solidarity** to "organic", the forms and intensity of 
punishments change. Durkheim*s early writings clearly display a 
realist epistemology behind his positivism; his work has spawned 
an ideology of viewing punishment wherein punishment is a 
necessary function of the social body to regulate itself and to 
protect itself from disintegration. The varieties of punishment,
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or penality in Garland's terminology, are seen to be 
naturalistically reduced to a unitary phenomena which protects 
a coherent society from the harm of the every present crime. This 
early writing clearly demonstrates the weaknessness of an 
empiricist metaphysic and has been justly criticised.65 An even 
more rewarding task, however, would be to trace the self­
deconstruction of Durkheim's realist and naturalist conception 
of society into the complex contingency of his proto-pragmatic 
later writings where society becomes the creator of 
individuality, but the society which individuals are subordinated 
to is not a naturalistic reality with set functions, not an organ 
devised to satisfy material needs in some version of Hart's 
natural law, but a system of ideas evolving into complexes of 
greater complexity, differentiation and contingency.66 That 
analysis would have the task- of showing that in the hands of its 
greatest exponent empiricist methodology can but offer 
descriptions of human phenomena, its ambition to offer us the 
truth of the human condition, becomes, under the impact of 
reflexivity, the ambition to offer greater and greater ranges of 
questions, data, and imponderables.
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30.Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p.258.
31."The actions of matter, are to be regarded as instances of 
necessary actions: and whatever is in this respect on the same 
footing with matter, must be acknowledged to be necessary." 
(T.p.410). Moreover, "in the communication of their motion, in 
their attraction and mutual cohesion, there are not the least 
traces of indifference or liberty. Every object is determined by 
an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion, 
and can no more depart from that precise line, in which it moves, 
than it can convert itself into an angel, or spirit, or any 
superior substance". (T.p.400)
32.In the Enquiries Hume states: "What would become of
history.... How could politics be a science, if laws and forms 
of government had not a uniform influence upon society? Where 
would be the function of morals, if particular characters had no 
certain or determinate powers to produce particular sentiments, 
and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And 
with what pretence could we employ our criticism upon some poet 
or polite author, if we could not pronounce the conduct and 
sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such 
characters, and in such circumstances? it seems almost impossible 
to engage either in science or action of any kind without 
acknowledging the doctrine of necessity, and this inference from 
motives to voluntary actions, from characters to 
conduct".(E.p.90)
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33.The conclusion to modernity's problem of grounding 
scientific naturalism, which Hume portrays as the resolution to 
his sceptical crisis, involves in the terms of Hume's narrative 
the operation of nature behind this choice [i.e. of the return 
to the common life], but the signification of Hume's act of 
narration - the required effect upon the audience - is one of 
normative acceptance and acquiesence as to the naturalness of the 
audiences likewise behaviour.
The program for political moderation, a program for some 
reliance upon habit, custom, caution and diffidence in reasoning 
and a critical stance toward all non evident contentions amount 
to a program derived from Hume's analysis of the way the world 
is. Either that is the case or Hume' s normative stance is but the 
beginnings of a tradition for modernity the ultimate foundation 
of which is a considered act of philosophical choice. Note that 
Hume does not fall into the logical premisses of his #is' 'ought' 
trap. He does not base his normative stance upon his possession 
of a certain number of absolute truths in a positive sense. 
Indeed his position derives from the skeptical crisis entailing 
the absence of such truths, but out of this he provides a 
solution which in itself must amount to some form of claim to a 
"truth of Hume's empiricist meta narrative".
34.The History of England. Oxford, 1826, vol vii, p.136. The 
substance of this argument is reproduced by Popper in his The 
Open Society and its Enemies.
35.Individual freedom can be best ensured by making clear the 
relationship between the public and the private worlds in which 
individuals found themselves. We must not expect too much from 
the promises of the public, for if we were to commit the fallacy 
of pinning our hopes and fears upon the external public realm of 
the politics of the state we risk losing the moral control we 
have over our own lives and happiness. it was not the role of 
government to instruct as to the proper ethical formulation of 
the social order, instead the proper role of the state should be 
to react to and help further the functional needs of the natural 
social body - to obey the imperatives of empirical operation and 
naturalist desire.
36.Duncan Forbes reads Hume as offering the contrast between 
"modern regular government and medieval irregular government, 
where the personality of the king was all-important and respect 
for the rule of law, as such, weak or non-existent. In such 
circumstances men who would have made excellent kings in a modern 
monarchy were bad kings". Forbes suggests Hume as "a remote 
ancestor, in a general sort of way, of Max Weber's essentially 
bureaucratic modern state". See "Hume and the Scottish 
Enlightenment", in Philosophers of the Enlightenment, pp 94- 
109. This attribution, however, can only be right in the sense 
that Hume links regularity and constancy of expectation within 
boundaries to a constancy of behaviour.
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37.A key example is the idea of distributing property according 
to the principle of desert, as opposed to the Humean defence of 
present possession (lawful possession that is). In the Treatise 
Hume had suggested that the sentiment of sympathy would lead men 
to consider equality type considerations (his own version was 
that a deserving man would be given goods over an undeserving 
man), however, this appears as an anomaly to the rigidity of the 
rules. In the Enquiries Hume considered the rationalist 
imagination as giving rise to social change by inducing men to 
pursue an abstract ideal - again that of distribution by desert. 
"A creature, possessed of reason, but unacquainted with human 
nature, deliberates with himself what rules of justice or 
property would best promote public interest, and establish peace 
and security among mankind: His most obvious thought would be, 
to assign the largest possessions to the most extensive virtue, 
and give everyone the power the power of doing good, proportioned 
to his inclination. In a perfect theocracy, where a being, 
infinitely intelligent, governs by particular volitions, this 
rule would certainly have place, and might serve to the wisest 
purposes: but were mankind to execute such a law: so great is the 
uncertainty of merit, both from its natural obscurity, and from 
the self-conceit of each individual, that no determinate rule of 
conduct would ever result from it: and the total dissolution of 
society must be the immediate consequence".(E.p.192-3) Hume thus 
gives some recognition to the argument from desert but counter 
poses arguments based upon his 'empirical1 knowledge of human 
nature and the conduct of history - its overturning of the 
Treatise position where in the conflict between sympathy and 
justice, justice wins, may reflect his growing concern with 
historical analysis. It also can be seen as an argument that the 
use of reason must necessarily take place in an imperfect world 
and be combined with the evidence of the empirical investigations 
and information thus created as to the operation of the world. 
The correction of reason by experience.
38.Hume draws us into a distrust for rationalist approaches to 
the notion of justice by the rhetorical use of a social principle 
of parsimony - he states that if the "rule" of justice "be very 
abstruse, and of difficult invention" then society must "be 
esteem'd in a manner accidental, and the effect of many ages". 
Hume's position is that a low degree of rational speculation is 
required to grasp the concept of justice for the rule of justice 
is nothing other that "the rule for the stability of possession"; 
a "simple and obvious" position such "that every parent, in order 
to preserve peace among his children, must establish it; and that 
these first rudiments of justice must every day be improved, as 
the society enlarges".(T.p.489) Man's natural condition require 
such rules of justice since what is "to be regarded as certain, 
is that it is only from the selfishness and confin'd generosity 
of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his 
wants, that justice derives its origin".(T.p.495) Although the 
operation of justice may involve the articulation of principles 
which assume the character of universality and generality these, 
important as they may become for the continual operation of the 
system of justice, cannot be considered essential to its origins 
or its actual binding force: since "'tis certain that the
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imagination is more affected by what is particular than by what 
is general: and that the sentiments are moved with difficulty, 
when their objects are, in any degree, loose and 
undetermined".(T.p.580) The defence of the institution of justice 
is essential and this is superior to the possible wrongness of 
the particular: "Whereas a single act of justice, considered in 
itself, may often be contrary to the public good... 'tis the 
concurrence of mankind, in a general scheme or system of action, 
which is advantageous". Thus "before any tribunal of justice" it 
may be "an instance of humanity to decide contrary to the laws 
of justice... the whole scheme, however, of law and justice is 
advantageous to the society".(T.p .589) Further, once the rules 
of justice have been established they are "naturally attended 
with a strong sentiment of morals; which can proceed from nothing 
but our sympathy with the interests of society".(T.p .579-80, 
emphasis in the original)
39.Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1909, Part III, ch.17, p. 128.
40.John Locke, Second Treatise on Government. Peter Laslett 
(ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1960, para 124.
41.The effect of this is to transform the importance of the 
knowledge which, for example, a 'jurisprudent' can lay claim to. 
Jurisprudence, began in the position of 'the Queen of the social 
sciences, it will end the period of the dominance of Hume as 
"descriptive sociology". (H.L.A.Hart, The Concept of Law.)
42.Smith is often more cutting: his own foundationalism includes 
at times the hint of religion. In the Wealth of Nations Smith 
presents arguments for increasing the general level of prosperity 
of all citizens - but he is also minimising the role of politics. 
As if to go beyond Hume and expose the underbelly of modern 
society Smith states "civil society so far as it is constituted 
fcr the security of property, is in reality instituted for the 
defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some 
property against those who have none at all". (Quoted in Gey, The 
Enlightenment: an interpretation, p.366-7) The growth and
extension of the middle classes is crucial for social order since 
"no society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far 
greater part of the members are poor and miserable". Grey also 
brings out the extent to which Smith related the condition of 
individual men to their experience of the division of labour and 
the environment they experienced.
43. "On Refinement in The Arts", in Essays. Moral. Political, and 
Literary. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966, p.278.
44. Ibid.. p.284.
45. Smith' s iurisDrudentia1 pro^r>r'4' tt?.o to create a "T^cor'v of 
Moral Sentiments" without reference to the grid templates of 
theology - thus the task was to throw open the terrain of civil
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society to investigation and plotting in such a way as the 
resulting information occupied the same plane of commensurability 
as information of human nature - thence could be produced psychic 
maps of men's sentiments and a scheme for the mapping (and by 
extension, prediction and control) of their opinions and conduct. 
Moral sentiments differ from religious because they are direct 
passions while religious conceptions are secondary effects of 
such passions.
46.For "industry" we may read early capitalism, and the link 
between humanity and knowledge appears as the empirical version 
of man's assent via guidance by knowledge. To a certain extent 
Hume is concerned to make sense of what appeared to many as the 
softer sentiments of the times. It was only seven years after the 
death of Hume that Samuel Johnson was bemoaning the loss of the 
convincing effect of public hangings (1783; 1746 being the last 
that the heads of traitors were struck at the Temple Bar) and one 
can see Hume as reflecting that movement whereby "humanity was 
acquiring the status of a practical virtue".(Grey, The 
Enlightenment. p.36.) It must be an ongoing subject for analysis 
to ascertain the extent, and under what conditions, did the 
fashionable participation in the spectacle of the hangings or a 
good torture and the cheering of the punishment of religious 
dissenters - those feelings which the civilized characters of 
Moliere's plays experienced - become reduced in the imagination 
of the theorists to a phenomena which was addressed to the mob 
alone. Both Hume and Smith demonstrate how the concept of 
"compassion" or "sympathy" was developing and becoming 
fashionable as part of the conservative imagination - even in the 
individualist texts of Defoe, for example, as his description of 
the young thief in Colonel Jack (1722) as the product of his 
environment shows - at the same time as it was being 
theoretically reduced to "natural sentiment".
47.Natural History, p. 21 and 31.
48.In the Enquiries the problem is set thus: are morals "derived 
from Reason, or from Sentiment; whether we obtain the knowledge 
of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate 
feeling and finer internal sense; whether, like all sound 
judgments of truth and falsehood, they should be the same to 
every rational intelligent being; or whether, like the perception 
of beauty and deformity, they be founded entirely on the 
particular fabric and constitution of the human 
species".(E.p.170) Hume's aim is to achieve a "reformation in all 
moral disquisitions and reject every system of ethics, however, 
subtle or ingenious, which is not founded on fact and 
observation".(E.p.175)
49.Thus Hume declares that the process whereby incest is allowed 
in the animal kingdom and not in the human is not because man has 
through his reason declared its "turpitude" stating he ought to 
be bound by a mode of action, as this is to argue in a circle 
"for before reason can perceive this turpitude, the turpitude
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must exist; and consequently is independent of the decisions of 
our reason, and is their object more properly than their effect". 
(T.p.467)
50.See A. MacIntyre in Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p.339.
51.The Concept of Law, pp. 189-95. Following quote is from pp.188-
9.
52.Note that under this division of labour the role of the 
criminologist is extremely narrow. He cannot be involved in the 
debate over the content of legal and moral rules - which we may 
on other occasions call the question of setting out the socially 
acceptable conceptions of the social, human good - that instead 
is, somehow, to rest upon a set of rather barren "very obvious 
generalizations". What is a task readily available is the whole 
task of collecting, measuring and correlating the various 
preferences and behavioral regularities, the sense of which 
requires the assumption that the first process has previously 
been successfully accomplished.
53.Ibid., p. 195. Emphasis in the original.
54.Robert N. Moles, Definition & Rule in Legal Theory: A 
reassessment of H.L.A.Hart and the Positivist Tradition. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1987, p.217.
55.Michael Sandel in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, p.170. 
56.Ibid.r p. 172.
57.Rawl's 'reflective equilibrium1 is a notion in line with the 
pragmatic reading of Hume, his 'original position1 is, however, 
an attempt to escape the pragmatic imagination by construing a 
set of points outside of what we later call living language 
games. These serve to preserve a notion of 'consensus1 and enable 
the games to be judged and a foundation to be conclusively 
established. But these points cannot but be postulations, 
suppositions required for the logic of the project to bite, their 
strength therefore is determined, in pragmatic terms, by their 
persuasive force.
58.In Conjectures and Refutations, pp.364-376.
59.Cf. The Poverty of Historicism. London, 1957.
60.See the discussion in Livingstone, prev. cit.. Chapter 11, 
"Politics and providential History", pp.285 ff.
61.Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, p.12.
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62.See on neostoicism generally, Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicism 
and the Modern State. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1982. Oestreich specifically ties neostoicism into the 
development of a social individual whose inner psychic makes 
possible an easy subordination to the external authorities of 
politics.
63.See works such as H. Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justicer 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979.
64.Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, p.344.
65.See, for example, David Garland, "Durhkeim's Theory of 
Punishment: a Critique", in The Power to Punish. In many texts 
of 'traditional criminology' Durhkeim is the standard 'straw man' 
wheeled out to present 'consensus theories of law and 
punishment1.
66.The later writings referred to are The Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life. Allen and Unwin, London, 1976; and the essays in 
Sociology and Philosophy. D. Pocock (trans.), Cohen & West, 
London, 1965, particularly "Value Judgments and Judgments of 
Reality".
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Chapter Six: The Kantian project and its relation to the
"edifice" of knowledge.
I
For Kant it was central to the post-Enlightenment construction 
project to distinguish the Social1 from the 'natural'. The 
development of man's 'humanity' lay in terms of self-imposed 
rather than naturally conditioned ends and activities. The 
Kantian man
"was not guided by instinct, not nurtured and instructed by 
ready-made knowledge; rather he should bring forth 
everything out of his own resources. Securing his own 
shelter, food and defence....all amusement which can make 
life pleasant, insight and intelligence, finally even 
goodness at heart - all this should be wholly his own work."1
Man stands alone - his special dignity is something he creates, 
social interaction is 'human' and not under the tutelage of 
'natural flow'. Whence then did man stand? Man the reasoning 
being stood within the space between progress and knowledge - 
movement was based upon knowledge and this required a self con­
scious awareness as
"reason does not work instinctively but requires trial and 
instruction in order to gradually progress from one kind of 
insight to another."2
Hume's project is exposed as being of limited ambition, his
dilemmas overcome if we choose the rationalist path where our
guide is the light of "pure reason...a sphere so separate and
self-contained"; one not liable to subjective contamination or
arbitrary desire, and is also one complete where
"we cannot touch a part without affecting all the rest. We 
can therefore do nothing without first determining the 
position of each part, and its relation to the rest; for as 
our judgement cannot be corrected by anything without, the 
validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in 
which it stands to all the rest within the domain of 
reason.... In the sphere of this faculty you can determine 
either everything or nothing".3
For his part Hume
"did not suspect [the existence] of such a formal science, 
but ran his ship ashore, for safety's sake, landing on 
scepticism, there to let it lie and rot: whereas my object
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is rather to give it a pilot, who, by means of safe 
astronomical principles drawn from a knowledge of the globe, 
and provided with a complete chart and compass, may steer 
the ship safely, whither he listeth."4
Kant's reaction to the developing edifice of knowledges was 
ambivalent. The image of power was unmistakable, but Kant 
understood the aim of this advancing edifice as being to embrace 
all of reality, all events and activities, both of physical 
substance and man's actions, into a unified system, explainable 
in terms of the universality of cause and effect. Furthermore, 
the dominant model, which took Newtonian physics as its guide, 
meant that the style of the structure that was gaining as­
cendancy was undoubtedly the inclusion of knowledge related to 
actual sense experience and primarily generalizations which could 
be derived by induction from such experience. This threw into 
question the role of those concepts formally identified as 
metaphysical. Notions such as "God" and "freedom" - Hume had said 
of books containing metaphysics to consign them to the flames, 
as they contained "nothing but sophistry and illusion" - was 
"God" and "freedom" then to be renounced? What then would be 
universal and absolute about the 1 human1?
Response was doubly problematic, as this new edifice was 
superseding other, extremely rigid structures: namely those
models loosely based upon the scala perfectionism, either of 
Christianity, or continental rationalism as exemplified by 
Spinoza or Leibniz. The new empiricist approach was occasioning 
discoveries and methodologies at odds with the primarily mathe­
matical model of those rationalistic structures and their strong 
emphasis on the relation of ideas to each other, especially as 
many of these ideas were increasingly shown to bear little 
resemblance to things as they were coming to be 1 objectively 
demonstrated' by the empiricists.
There could, however, be doubts. Firstly Kant could not 
metaphysical concepts could actually increase our knowledge in 
the way empirical science was showing itself able to. Secondly 
Hume's anti-inductionist argument appeared to render scientific
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knowledge actually a form of non-knowledge. The certainty of 
empiricism relied upon the principle of causality and the success 
of inductive inference; but the criticism of inductive inference 
appeared to lead inextricably to scepticism. There appeared need, 
therefore, of a structure which would overcome both the dogmatism 
of current rationalism and the implicit scepticism of Humean 
style empiricism. Furthermore, this structure would have to face 
the problem of what to do about that area of "reality" the 
character of which was distinctly "human". Notably, the 
experiencing of choice, the self-consciousness of the 'self1, 
self-reflection on human behaviour and the 'meaning' of that be­
haviour as well as the concepts of freedom, God, duty and norma­
tive law. Were these to be absorbed into a mechanical world? 
Kant also thought any successful structure should be self 
referring; in other words, it should contain an explanation of 
the relation of human understanding in the construction of such 
a structure. Both this understanding, the materials of the struc­
ture, and by extension the character and style of the enterprise, 
were to be supplied by the path of critical philosophy.
The preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason
had set this out clearly:
"Our age is essentially an age of criticism, to which 
everything has to submit. Religion, on account of its 
sanctity, and legislation on account of its majesty, both 
try to withdraw themselves from it. But they then 
straightaway arouse just suspicion against themselves and 
cannot claim that sincere respect which reason grants to 
whoever has been able to withstand its free and open 
examination."
Critical understanding also addressed the question of what, and 
how, can understanding and reason know, apart from experiences. 
In this way critical understanding did not destroy metaphysics, 
but provided a "single and sudden revolution" which cleared the 
way for true metaphysical understanding.5 Philosophy was asked 
to turn its critical attention to the constitution, power and 
structure of human reason itself - to perform a "Copernican" 
reversal of perspective.6 The primary examination of science was 
the scope of the Critique of Pure Reason, and the handling of
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this knowledge of the nature of the world, and man's moral 
responsibilities and social obligations which constituted his 
special 'humanity', that of the Critique of Practical Reason.7
II
Predecessors to the Kantian System.
The Descartean definition of philosophy found in the Principia 
was "the study of wisdom", which he equated to "the perfect 
knowledge of all one can know", in effect a constriction to a 
philosophy of knowledge which demanded a secure reference point 
(and thus not wisdom). This knowledge, in a form of self 
revelation, was utilizable "for the conduct of life"(morals), 
"the conservation of health" (medicine), and "the invention of all 
the arts"(mechanics).
Descartes drew a metaphorical picture of the edifice of 
knowledges with his "tree picture", the roots of which were 
metaphysics, the trunk was physics, and whose branches were com­
posed of morals, medicine and mechanics. In his explanation of 
this edifice stress is placed upon the trunk (physics: as it was 
for Bacon and Galileo), with the "roots" being only investigated 
in so far as they provide a firm foundation for the trunk. Thus 
the substance of the Discours de la methode. which provides the 
conducted tour of this structure, is revealed to be a physics 
based upon a presentation of the grounding of metaphysics. 
Physical/natural science was grounded not upon sensation and 
probability, as with Bacon, but in the logical position of a 
principle of absolute certainty.
His construction method was the dovetailing of a threefold 
specification.
(a) To apply the quality control testing of the subjection 
of each and every candidate to the complete and systematic proce­
dure of doubt, and to eliminate every belief that does not pass 
this test of indubitability (scepticism);
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(b) To accept as material only those ideas which are clear, 
distinct, and free of contradiction (mathematicism);
(c) To transform any doubts on metaphysical grounding into 
the bedrock certainty of self-consciousness, so that the state­
ment "I think, therefore I am", is the articulation of the only 
innate idea unshakable by doubt (subjectivism).
From the indubitability of the self, Descartes was able to deduce 
the existence of a perfect God, whose very perfection prevented 
any path of regression, resolved the questions of falsification 
or deception, and guaranteed the validity of the ideas flowing 
from the frame of reference he allowed man. It is a building 
process that is distinctly anti-empirical and the empirically 
minded Bacon rather deprecatingly described rationalist builders 
as "reasoners [who] resemble spiders who make cobwebs out of 
their own substance".
The substance need not be simple, however, the common 
characteristic was the similarity of building style which 
rationalism engaged in and the absolute certainty claimed for the 
foundations. The Spinoza statement made in 1714 in the Principes 
de la nature et de la grace fondes en raison highlights this. 
True reasoning depends upon necessary or eternal truths, such as 
those of logic, numbers or geometry, which establish an in­
dubitable connection of ideas and unfailing consequences. To the 
rationalist this appeared both myth destroying and carefully 
destructive: "to expose the illusions of a reason that forgets 
its limits". Yet empirical "facts" had little place.
Ill
The Kantian Reconciliation.
Kant constructs a distinguishing between the 'a priori' forms of 
the understanding and the 'a posteriori1 sensuous content of 
experience - certainty of knowledge is founded upon the very 
capabilities of the understanding.
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The investigation proceeds opposite to Hume. We accept that we 
cannot help but make use of certain bottom level features in the 
epistemological process. The trick is to understand how exactly 
we do use them and how they serve to structure human knowledge. 
It is only after this knowledge is obtained that we may properly 
aPPly our critical orientation. Our questioning is firstly - how 
is pure mathematics possible? How is the pure science of nature 
possible?8 We then apply this understanding to analyze candidates 
for inclusion in a "pure" system of reasoning. The process is 
repeated in the Critique of Practical Reason. We start from the 
fact of our actual use of morality; we do not wish to come out 
with the concept of 'morality* as our final product but its 
reality is accepted or "presupposed" - from our recognition of 
moral demands and duties we then move, via the assumption that 
we must be free to fulfil them, to the conditions of their 
operation.9
The entire scope of mental operations divide into induction 
(roughly that aspect which grasps things entire as with the truth 
of first principles and accompanies them on their process of 
demonstration), understanding (that aspect which enables the 
reworking of what is or can be given in perception and which per­
ceives likeness and unlikeness), and reason (the primary faculty: 
which goes beyond the order of things given to provide an ideal 
order of systematic connection of experience. This does not pas­
sively occur but is as a result of the active participation of 
the mind acting according to regulative ideas. Examples of 
regulative ideas are "freedom" in Practical Reason and "casual 
inference" in Pure Reason. With Practical Reason a connection is 
forged between "will" and "reason1*, whereby will is the faculty 
of acting according to a regulative ideal called "law". This 
regulates and distinguishes will from the capacity of acting to 
rational desire [seen as the clear presentation of the object of 
desire] which itself is passive and reactive. The operation of 
the will vis a vis "law" is the active engagement of the realm 
of practical action with regulative idea.).
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The justification for those ideas which we rely upon as providing 
the foundations of scientific knowledge (the 'a priori' 
concepts) is achieved in our recognition of them as the bottom 
level conditions of thought - they are the "categories" of 
thought.
"Now I maintain that the categories.... are nothing but the 
conditions of thought in a possible experience, just as 
space and time are the conditions of intuition for that same 
experience. They are fundamental concepts by which we think 
objects in general for appearances, and have therefore a 
priori objective validity."10
Their function is dual: both bedrock and limit. Efforts to obtain 
knowledge unconditioned by the categories of the understanding - 
as with traditional metaphysics - are to be rejected as dogmatic 
and self-contradictory. We cannot get at the "pure" world and 
grasp things as they are in themselves apart from the categories 
of the mind, however, we are aware of the limiting character of 
these categories and so we can meaningfully conceive of concepts 
of reality and knowledge beyond human understanding. What is on 
the side made understandable through the categories Kant calls 
the "phenomenal" world, and what is on the other he calls the 
"noumenal". In this way Hume's empiricist outcome, whereby the 
concepts which provide epistemological bedrock ultimately derive 
from the custom of repeated association in experience, is trans­
formed into a solid objectivity providing legitimate foundation. 
But in so doing the world divides up into that about which we can 
have knowledge and that about which we can never have knowledge.
Furthermore, beyond the limits of science, there can be another 
use of reason. As Kant puts it: "I have therefore found it
necessary, to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith". 
A "faith" which serves to preserve morality in the face of 
science and one which demands the pursuit and application of 
wisdom.
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IV
The Question of Kantian tffaith" .
What is the realm of this faith? And how can we use it, or, to 
ask the question in another fashion, in what way are we led to 
it in the study of man?
Kant asks us to use the language of our experience as a guide and 
to attempt to comprehend those aspects of our understanding that 
are fundamentally involved and demonstrated in our language use. 
Thus we pursue the reflexive turning and seek to understand the 
actual process of understanding which is involved when we ask: 
What is an individual human being? A section of reality; but by 
which perspective and what are the limits to the identification 
of reality that any concept used about him attains? Do certain 
starting points, such as the supposition of an absolute 
individuality, demand infinitude, freedom, and a self-contained 
nature? We are forced to recognise that there are many concepts 
which we appear to use in practical life that seem to carry that 
implication. Is to call a human being an individual to speak 
metaphysics, and in so doing to deny his links to physical 
reality, and thus to already assert an 'a priori1 to which we 
have no right? Or, is there a necessity in such treatment, for 
if we abandon this 1 a priori* and see the 1 human-being- 
(non) individual * in the "reality" of an integration of system and 
impersonal causality, then what possibility is there of a speech- 
act that refers to, or is conforming to, or allows a demand for, 
treating human beings as "individuals"?
Kant regarded Humean style empiricism as being correct in many 
aspects, and thus it was correct and proper to think of a human 
being as a finite, contingent, complex mind-body actually of 
physical substance, hemmed in on all sides, and interacting with 
other objective particulars of reality which were observable and 
acted in obedience of the principle of causality and thus 
necessity. Nevertheless, for Kant this was in a sense an abstract 
view of the individual. A view of him particular and singular, 
only correct to its perspective and one which also, paradoxi­
cally, denied the universality necessarily existent as the ob­
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verse of the notion (used in practical speech) of man as an in­
dividual .
On the question of human action, and the types of causality that 
we could use to explain this, Kant's answer was similar to Hume's 
in one respect. When the actions and choices of men are regarded 
as events in the spacial-temporal world then they must be subject 
to the laws of empirical necessity. When we begin as independent 
observers to explain men's actions, we may trace the commission 
of crime to factors such as heredity, education and environment. 
These are, however, so effective in our explanatory scheme as to 
have made it impossible for him not to have acted in this way, 
for we realise that the flip side of a law of nature is the
obverse of physical necessity, which is the physical impos­
sibility to do other - an inevitability of action. This 
realization demonstrates that our ascription of a range of 
freedom to his actions is only the result of a lack of 
information as to all the conditions, circumstances, factors and 
degrees of influence that prevent us from a total knowledge of 
his action - and hence from predicting exactly what he would do 
in the circumstances.
However, Kant notes that even in the light of this potentiality 
we persist in holding man responsible for his actions and we join 
in the general social practice of attaching an appropriate blame 
or reward. In our usage of theoretical reason we adopt a stance
which has developed into the various roles of criminologist,
sociologist, psychologist and so forth, whilst in our role in 
civil society where we attribute praise and blame, we consider 
the situation in the light of "practical reason". It is in the 
light of practical reason that we hold moral feelings and 
legislate laws which have as their presupposition that people 
need not breach them. In fact, we are saying that a person should 
not do certain things, and if he should not have done an action 
but actually did, then we are saying that it must have been pos­
sible for him not to have done it. But we as psychologists etc., 
have the potentiality to offer a complete explanation in such a
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way for there to be simply nothing visible to us that could have 
enabled the person to have refrained from the action. It is in 
this quandary that Kant introduces a strange concept peculiar to 
human action. He calls this "another causality", that of 
"freedom".
This is one example of what Kant termed "transcendental objects".
These are objects that transcend experience and sensation based
systems of description. The criminologist who bases his approach
upon the foundations of empiricism will never be able to consider
the operation of this "causality". However, by the use of
transcendental objects we may regard the offence in question (he
uses an example of lying) as completely undermined in relation
to the man's previous condition. It is "as if the offender
started off a series of effects completely by himself". Kant
goes on to say that when we are faced with a situation where our
theoretical reason tells us empirical conditions have determined
a persons actions we may still legitimately hold that person
responsible and blame him. Thus we are justified in holding a man
responsible for his actions, even as we as (future)
criminologists can also say that "before ever they have happened,
they are one and all predetermined in the empirical character".
But how are we justified in this? Kant states:
"this blame is founded on a law of reason by which we regard 
the reason as the cause which, independently of all the 
above mentioned empirical conditions, could and should have 
determined the man's actions in another way. We do not 
indeed regard the causality of reason as something that 
merely accompanies the action, but as something complete in 
itself, even if the sensible motives do not favour but even 
oppose the action; the action is imputed to the man's 
intelligible character and he is wholly guilty now, in the 
very moment when he lies; therefore the reason was wholly 
free, notwithstanding all the empirical conditions of the 
act, and the deed has to be wholly imputed to this failure 
of reason."11
As well as the closed and determined grip that the empirical 
observer can hope to identify there is always "another causality" 
operative which can ensure a different action, and this "another" 
is of its nature not able to be located in any spacial-temporal 
causal series. The ability to partake of this other realm of
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causalities is, moreover, that aspect of man which makes him the 
fit subject for moral praise and condemnation which accompany 
participation in the linguistic and practical arrangements of our 
world. Furthermore, it is upon the supposition of the operation 
of man's "will", and the concepts associated with it, that prac­
tical, free and rational life is possible. This rational, free 
life comes from the interaction of the will with an 'a priori1 
law essential to the operation of morality. Kant held:
"These categories of freedom - for we wish to call them this 
in contrast to the theoretical concepts which are categories 
of nature - have a manifest advantage over the latter. The 
latter categories are only forms of thought, which through 
universal concepts designate, in an indefinite manner, 
objects in general for every intuition possible to us. The 
categories of freedom, on the other hand, are elementary 
practical concepts which determine the free faculty of 
choice. Though no intuition exactly corresponding to this 
determination can be given to us, the free faculty of choice 
has as its foundation a pure practical law a priori, and 
this cannot be said for any of the concepts of the 
theoretical use of our cognitive faculty."12
These concepts, which Kant holds as the foundation of practical 
life, however, present a terrible morass, for they are "beyond 
the limits" of scientific reason.
In the structure of the Kantian project they constitute Kant's 
"third antinomy". An antinomy is a pair of contradictory 
statements both of which may be validly proved, and both of which 
represent a crucial and essential interest of reason. They are 
enabled by the possibility of making "synthetic a priori" 
judgments (statements in which the predicate is not logically in­
cluded in the concept of the subject, i.e. this man is a thief - 
an assertion the truth of which is only establishable in ex­
perience is an example of a synthetic judgement. Kant holds that 
there are some synthetic judgements that are logically true, a 
crucial one is "every event has a cause".) . In the third antimony 
conflict arises out of the concept of causality. The statement 
that everything has a cause serves to bring the elements of 
causality within time and under the laws of nature: but if every­
thing must have a cause then there must be a cause that is not 
an event in time under the law of nature. Further, both of these
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considerations are necessary to give absolute validity to the 
principle of causality; but both cannot, it appears, be true. The 
resolution of this antinomy relies, to use the title of 
Strawson's book on Kant, on a division of the bounds of sense.13 
The thesis, which asserts the reality of cause not contained 
within the limits of the laws of nature, and the antithesis, 
which asserts that all causation lies within the limits of the 
laws of nature either now known or potentially to be uncovered, 
may both be true if their respective areas are distinguished. The 
areas of each are confined to their specific realms and cannot 
validly cross the limits or boundaries of their domain. Thus the 
thesis is applied to the relationship between noumena (being 
"things-in-themselves", and here containing the idea of a suffi­
cient cause) and phenomena, whilst the antithesis is restricted 
to relations among phenomena. Thus separate and distinct applica­
tions of human understanding which are compatible in existence 
are legitimated; the legitimation of this state of affairs is oc­
casioned by the distinction between the world of appearance and 
the noumenal world. This dualism limits science and re­
establishes mystery, but this is not a superstitious or dogmatic 
mystery but a mystery based on rationally argued grounds.
A boundary is drawn beyond which scientific knowledge cannot 
aspire, and we are free to argue that laws of nature are not the 
only formula of causality and that there is another approach to 
understanding what it means to be human that is based on this 
'rational faith'; a 'faith' which preserves morals against the 
dictates of scientific knowledge claims. There can be no 
knowledge of this other causality, although, we are told, the 
general concepts relating to these aspects beyond the bounds of 
knowledge are meaningful. Indeed theoretical reason needs the ex­
istence of this other realm for its own completion but can never 
establish the nature of it. However, without it the very being 
of theoretical reason is endangered and if we attempt to do 
without the realm of the 'other', we "plunge it [theoretical 
reason] into an abyss of scepticism".
For its part, the operation of freedom is subject to the rules
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of the intelligibles. Remembering that Kant held that "the true 
method of metaphysics is fundamentally the same as that which 
Newton has introduced into natural sciences and which has there 
yielded such fruitful results", a statement such as 
"psychological causality subjects man to natural necessity as 
much as 'mechanical causality' does" reflects Kant's desire to 
assert the law abiding operation of the realm of the 
intelligibles. Interestingly, in the chronology of Kant's output 
the earlier Critique of Theoretical Reason is often read as 
leaving an unrestricted freedom to this other realm, whereas in 
the Critique of Practical Reason this other realm is held subject 
to its own species of causality. The operation of this realm is 
devoid of spacial-temporal matrices, and thus is outside of time, 
which means that in a crucial sense morality is also timeless. 
We see, therefore, that, in the totality of Kant's 
reconciliation, contingency and eternity co-exist.
When an offence is committed in this Kantian-reconciled world, 
what is actually having the linguistic utterance of condemnation 
attached to it is not the immanent phenomenal bound character of 
the activity, but the intelligible. Here guilt is complete when 
the person commits the crime, and nothing that went before can 
alter his guilt. Whatever the life-form patterns of the 
phenomenal world, which constitute a person's sociological or 
psychological (in the behaviourist as opposed to the looser Kan­
tian sense) position, these do not affect the evil of his deed, 
an evil which is his evil, introduced into the world by him in 
his exercise of freedom. A wrong is not converted into a non­
wrong on account of the activities which preceded it, nor can it 
be dissolved by what comes afterwards.
Kant holds that we demonstrate our recognition of this in our 
experiencing of remorse. Remorse, he declares, even when it takes 
the form of labelling an event an accident or mistake, by its 
nature can only have one true cause. Remorse, as opposed to 
regret (which is the simple reflection on outcome), is reflection 
on the evil brought into the world. Remorse is not atonement, it
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cannot achieve the undoing of what has been done, but is simply 
the painful recognition that we, in our freedom, did wrong.14
But, it can be argued that this act of self-reflection need not 
always have Kant's result, i.e. the recognition of the pure 'a 
priori1 "moral law". For if this causality is indeed outside the 
boundaries of science how exactly is it known to the "I". Kant's 
answer is that in the categories of practical reason, and in the 
operation of the moral law there exists a mechanism which 
stabilises the operation of this "I" that is truly "my-self". 
This is, however, a difficult task and Kant places the nature of 
the "Will" as central to its resolution. Here he distinguishes 
between desire in the animal, Humean form which subjects reason 
to the passions, and the higher form of desire that not only sub­
jects the passions to reason but is itself subjected to the power 
of reason. Here Kant asserts the necessary belonging of the 
individual to a universality; a universality which we realise in 
reflection upon the notions of practical reason, and the speech- 
acts of that practical reason. Individual man is necessarily a 
particular, but the recognition of his particularity neces­
sitates its existence as a perspective of something, and hence 
it is also partaking of a universality. Whereas integration of 
the unity of the physical for Kant meant subjection to Newtonian 
physics, integration on the noumenal led to the metaphysics of 
the 'will'. The integration of the individual will came out of 
reason itself. But here we have a fundamental problem - that of 
the relation of the will to the world of appearances. How does 
the moral decision, the activity of the will, moral thought, in­
teract with the phenomenal world? How in effect is it to control, 
or even to be relevant?
The moral law results from a crucial distinction which Kant is 
making, for the existence of the moral law asserts that we can 
rank our capacity of reflective evaluation of possible actions. 
Kant's two fold categorising of 'desire', so different from the 
empiricist reading of Hume, entails our ability to evaluate our 
desires, to regard some as qualitatively "desirable" and others
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as qualitatively "undesirable": action upon some "acceptable", 
others not, and this is to acknowledge that the crucial 
difference between man and sentient animal is the moral law 
within.
Action under the moral law is linked to our capacity for self- 
evaluation and the distinguishing feature between the Kantian 
agency and Humean lies not in that we are conscious of our 
capacity for making decisions about desired actions but on two 
differing kinds of evaluations of this consciousness. The Humean 
is subject to a realm where evaluation is, and cannot fail to be, 
a mode of quantitative analysis. The individual is linked to 
feelings as to the most desirable upon a plane of sentience and 
eventual satisfaction. In the act of deciding between two pos­
sible courses of action the Humean is attempting to make dif­
ferent desires commensurable under instrumentality, under the 
functionality of systematisation. By contrast the Kantian holds 
to the transcendence of quantitative weighing by the imposition 
of qualitative evaluation. Action under the moral law is action 
under the categorization of a style and quality of motivation in 
freedom from the phenomenal. The moral law is contingent upon the 
ability to rank, classify and categorise which noumenal man can 
engage in. The Kantian evaluation is concerned with the 
qualitative worth of different desires as they are judged by 
moral principle and it is noumenal man who judges.
The ambition of the empiricist construction of knowledges was to 
turn practical reason as much as possible into calculation, an 
ambition whose major expression has been in the doctrine of 
utilitarianism. But in this position the rightness or wrongness 
of an action becomes 'emotive1, assessed according to the actor’s 
eagerness to perform it, and in light of the reaction of the 
members of the populace which favour it - who approve of it, who 
take pleasure at the sight of its action. Kant moves against this 
and declares that to engage in qualitative evaluation of our 
desires is to engage in a qualitatively different mode of life - 
one he calls truly free - expressive of the distinctive quality
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of being human. The domain of this judgement, the domain of the 
ought, cannot exist in purely material nature, it is dependant 
upon beings who are apart from material nature.15
The Kantian transcendence of the cave, and the visualising of the
true nexus of humanity, comes from facilities inherent in man
himself - in his reason which gives the ideal of humanity. The
moral law, which corresponds not to any particular regime of
morality (which although customary may be regarded as unjust or
tyrannical) but the constraint of morality itself, is ingrained
in the person because of his humanity; it is not a mere calculus
of self interest, but lies in the obedience to that which is a
part of oneself - not to an external force.16 Man as subject
draws the precepts of action out of his own will and not from any
external empirical source: man in empirical circumstances may
feel passions and desires inclining him to act in a certain way -
but he has the capacity of will to substitute these desires for
will to do other than the desired activity. On reflection
"he must unhesitatingly admit that it is possible for him. 
He judges, therefore, that he can do a thing because he is 
conscious that he ought to do it, and he recognises in 
himself the freedom which, but for the moral law, would have 
remained unknown to him."17
However, on a related theme St. Paul in his seventh letter to the
Romans expressed his self reflection thus:
"My own behaviour baffles me. For I find myself not doing 
what I want to do but doing what I really loathe. Yet surely 
if I do things that I really don't want to do, it cannot be 
said that 'I' am doing them at all - it must be sin that has 
made its home in my nature."
R. Holland, explaining his vision of the growth in violence,
vandalism and mugging in Western Societies as an increasing
resort to "violence "as "a means of relief" held that it is a
"fact of nature that those who are tormented lash out and if 
they cannot hurt the source of torment in return, either 
because it is too strong or they cannot identify it, they 
hurt someone else instead..spirits are being wounded today 
in a way that does not put them in a state of conscious 
torment - so that they do not know what is happening to them
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- but which greatly worsens them and stimulates the reaction 
just mentioned. Being unable to pass the evil back they pass 
it on, only in a different form. The non-physical violence 
done to them is converted into the physical violence they 
do."
It is a similar argument to that of St. Paul, but in the 
intervening period sin has become a social-psychological entity. 
The Kantian point remains visible as Holland holds, "the 
perpetrators are not exculpated by the [above] general 
explanation" as the individual "became an evil person and bore 
the responsibility for it because as he knew in his heart, he 
could have forgone the relief." And thus he is responsible for 
this act of "relief".18
Acton reads Kant thus:
"a man who tries to excuse a wrong act by reference to his 
heredity and circumstances is, so to say, rationally 
abandoning his rationality....[and in this] to argue that 
one could not help it is to say that one is a passive 
subject of external stimuli in the very breath in which one 
shows that one is not. . .If we recognise the obligations that 
morality places upon us we ipso facto regard ourselves as 
free, for we accept the moral law as consonant with our 
practical reason, and we presuppose our ability to conform 
to it."19
V
What to Kant is the ontology of the rational agent?
The answer is provided by the interface of pure epistemological 
structure - the categories - and the synthetic knowledge 
generated. Man is constituted both in the phemonenological realm 
and in the transcendence of this, the noumenal; thus the absolute 
truth of man - man's 'essence' is beyond the trap of empirical 
contingency, beyond time, beyond temporal expression. Man 
straddles and is truthfully apart from the natural empirical 
world of appearances or the political world dealing with the 
material desires of humankind. He is of two domains - the 
empirical and the moral/ethical.
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Man's reflection upon the forces he mediates takes him both to 
"the starry heavens above...[and] to the moral law within." Man, 
in practical action, continually synthesises the 'a priori' and 
universalistic concepts of the moral law with his active in­
terpretation of social existence. The application of the 
transcendental principles is the active task of the moral life.
But what is success? What outcome legitimates the correct from 
the incorrect judgement? If we adopt a secular reading of Kant 
then the Kantian actor is one freed from a cosmos of set meaning, 
confronting the world instead on his or her own terms - a moral 
freedom to act which is governed transcendentally .20 The actor 
having confronted the dehumanised natural world, operates in a 
denaturalized social-moral world governed through the principles 
of the transcendental 'other'. The operations of man in society 
are dictated by the primacy of practical reason over the 
theoretical - practical reason exists two fold: both in the
publicly created and open political-social situation and in a 
private yet universal grounding.
Yet how is Kant so certain that man can actually do this? To the 
pragmatist the confidence which Kant holds is historical; in 
particular it takes confidence from a strong acceptance as to 
what man's actual duties are. A confidence found in a 
rationalised 'common sense'. This is neither the empiricist 
reading of the passions, nor the modern resources of "common 
sense", since the meaning we give common sense at present is very 
much that of a form of 'unsophisticated' practical reasoning 
centred on the 'opinion' of a 'universal' populace mediated and 
guided by utilitarianism. Kant's confidence is looked back upon 
by Hans-Georg Gadamer throughout his Truth and Method: namely, 
the revitalization of the Viconian meaning given to "sensus 
communis", the degradation of which he sees as one of the forces 
contributing to the modernist loss of social cohesion and con­
tinuous tradition. For Gadamer, the modern variant, "common 
sense", is a poor substitute for an earlier and stronger meaning
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of a sense, or meaning, commonly held or determined. Fro Gadamer:
"sensus communis here [in Vico] obviously does not mean only 
that general faculty in all men, but the sense that founds 
community... the sensus communis is the sense of the right
and the general good that is to be found in all men,
moreover, a sense that is acquired through living in the 
community and is determined by its structures and aims."21
We have implied that the Humean confidence in the operation of 
sympathy, the common feelings that found the natural reactions 
of empirical man, is only fully understood within a life that 
assumes sets of understandable and predictable social reactions, 
similarly Kant's confidence can be seen as seeking the 'rational' 
internal structure of such social phenomena. The central
doctrines of Kant's later work on Law and Punishment: The
Metaphysics of Morals (which contains The Metaphysical Elements 
of Justice.22^ appears to seek the security of a strict notion 
of a sensus communis at the same time as it gives a
universalization which draws the sensus communis away from its 
location in any particular community but presents itself as 
universal to all men (rational beings). The Metaphysics is 
proceeded by a work entitled Foundations of the Metaphysics of 
Morals,23 a work Kant directs at the general reader who possess 
"common rational knowledge of morality". It is to operate "within 
the moral knowledge of common human reason", and to unpack the 
essential conditions of the commonly held ideals of the time, the 
rational constitution of the sensus communis. The essential 
precondition is that there is the situation where people do know 
full well in practice right from wrong, good and evil, obligation 
and response, and our task is to discover the rational basis of 
this configuration.24
Kant's work can be seen as concerned to destroy the limited 
substantive conceptions of the sensus communis for the rhetorical 
force of the move to the universal rationality of man, for Kant 
is not concerned to unpack the beliefs of any one particular 
area, of one community, but to formulate for all and any "man" 
via the supposition of a universal foundation of reason. For Kant 
"Metaphysics is the science which exhibits in systematic
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connection the whole body (true as well as illusionary) of 
philosophical knowledge arising out of pure reason."25 This 
covers man, as persons, i.e. rational beings, share a rational 
nature: "rational nature is distinguished from others in that it 
proposes an end in itself."26 The central feature of man, social 
man, is that he involves himself with a "realm of ends", in which 
"everything has either a price or a dignity. Whatever has a price 
can be replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other 
hand, whatever is above all price, and therefore admits no equiv­
alent, has a dignity.
That which is related to general human inclinations and 
needs has a market price. That which, without presupposing any 
need, accords with a. certain taste, i.e. with pleasure in the 
mere purposeless play of our facilities, has an affective price. 
But that which constitutes the condition under which alone some­
thing can be an end in itself does not have mere relative worth, 
i.e. a price, but an intrinsic worth, i.e. dignity. To Kant
"morality is the condition under which alone a rational 
being can be an end in itself, because only through it is it 
possible to be a legislative member of the realm of ends. 
Thus morality and humanity, so far as it is capable of 
morality, alone have dignity. Skill and diligence in work 
have a market value...but fidelity in promises and 
benevolence on principle (not from instinct) have intrinsic 
worth."
Moral "actions need no recommendation from any subjective 
disposition or taste in order that they may be looked upon 
with immediate favour and satisfaction, nor do they have 
need of any immediate propensity or feeling directed to 
them. They exhibit the will which performs them as the
object of an immediate respect, since nothing but reason is 
required in order to impose them on the will."27
Society must never fall into "market" mentality in questions of 
punishment - dignity, does not allow the calculations and
administrative ethos of "prices", but the absolute bindings of
deontological reasoning - market mentality is anti-theoretical 
to the sensus communis.28
What is ultimately at stake is overcoming the spectra of the void 
of nihilism. For if there was no absolute grounding then
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everything was to be a matter of price and everything was 
permitted according to the price recognised. If mere empirical 
man, and empirical man in groupings, i.e. the voting public, were 
to determine value, it could not be freed from the subjectivity 
of desire. Accepting Kant's demarcation the subjectivity of 
desire could found politics but not morals. Desire could not 
determine the morally right, instead the morally right was free 
to judge, to label, desire. Moral subjectivity is in turn denied 
in the grounding which the universal categories of reason 
provide. The grounding of the egoistical demands of natural 
desire was, conversely, the limited creations of politics, e.g. 
the social contract.
Kant surrounds his various discussions on morality and political
philosophy with a particular vision of the nature of progress and
the role of man. Progress for man is movement towards the highest
good. Man in society considered phenomenally is subject to the
laws of nature, and in his rational existence in the social body
he is subject to laws which apply both externally and internally
(ourselves considered both phenomenally and noumenally). The laws
of our free state
"insofar as they are only directed at external actions are 
called judicial, but when they also demand that they (the 
laws) should themselves be the determining grounds of the 
action then they are ethical".
The orientative capacity of reason enables man to use the 
structures of human cognition, the structure of humanities 
linkage to reason, to open up the task of social life to reason. 
Mankind
"cannot do without associating peacefully and yet cannot 
avoid constantly offending one another. Hence they feel 
destined by nature to create through mutual compulsion under 
laws which proceed from themselves, a coalition which, 
though constantly threatened by dissension, makes progress 
on the whole."29
Conflict is an instrument of development insofar as it is located 
and mediated in the social creation of the structure of reason, 
thus:
"the greatest problem of the human race, to the situation of
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which Nature drives man, is the achievement of a universal 
civic society which administers law among men."30 
Kant states that if a man acts in accordance with the law out of
terror or coercion it is a mere hypothetical motive, but when he 
is motivated by an acceptance of the law itself it is an act in 
line with the categorical maxim. Freedom exists only in the 
second case and comes from "the autonomy of the will", as opposed 
to the "heteronomy" of the agent who acts in obedience not to the 
commands of his rational reflection but out of passion, fear or 
hope of reward. The heteronomous agent is truly the "slave" agent 
and although in his lack of strength he performs the observable 
actions of morality, he has taken refuge in this subjection to 
"nature" and/or to "superior force". He may disguise his slave 
mentality, his amorality, in a confusion of discourse, but this 
needs to be subjected to critical examination and this critical 
orientation is necessary to achieve the autonomy which will 
enable him to act as rationally autonomous and in so doing com­
mand the respect of other rational beings.
In What is Orientation in Thinking31 Kant appears to argue that 
the guarantee of progress is reason's own ability to point itself 
in the proper direction, to determine itself the correct use of 
the transcendental procedure. This is the full confidence of the 
rationalist imagination - the true metaphysical faith. Seen in 
this way the progress of man is in effect part of the journey of 
reason: one which is also an historical journey in which are tied 
together the diverse strands of man's existence. The backdrop of 
man's phenomenal positioning is the metaphysical aspects of 
practical reason in the suppositions of God, immortality, 
freedom, and their interactions within the life of rational co­
existence and co-operation with fellow rational human beings. Man 
considers himself first, and insofar as he belongs to the 
sensible world, to be under the laws of nature (heteronomy), and 
secondly, in so far as belongs to the intelligible world, to be 
under laws, which being independent of nature, are not em­
pirical but have their ground in reason alone. Out of this inter­
face frames of reference for social life develop, and thus the 
limited potentiality of the sentient life of the cave, or alter­
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natively as Plato also put it, the life of the city of pigs, is 
enabled to be transcended and guided by the transcendental proce­
dure . In this "man as a rational being" can never exist in a sys­
tem governed by the operation of his will except under the idea 
of freedom, attached to which is the concept of "Autonomy", and 
it is from this that "the universal principle of morality" the 
"categorical imperative" issues.
What is this freedom to consist of? Freedom is not lack of 
constraint, but is a particular form of constraint. The true 
state of freedom for man lies in his subjection to the moral law 
of which man himself is the giver to man, and is at its highest 
when man recognises the necessity of that law and its absolute 
authority over the actions of the rational agent. Social 
progress, what appears as the teleological realization of social 
man, is effected through the mediation of judgement as it trans­
forms people from pre-rational to rational beings. Man is to be 
the creator of the progressive social, and of his individual 
character "insofar as he is capable of perfecting himself accord­
ing to ends he himself adopts". The construction of the social 
is a distinctly moral-ethical problematic and is the true 
activity of the "human" enterprise.32
The progress of the social can only be structured by the
declaration of regulative ethical norms - in the acceptance and
communal articulation of these norms the rational guidance of man
as social being is effected and the resulting expression conveys
the expressive realization of the dignity of man. The laws man
forms in social life are to
"proceed from themselves, a coalition which, though
constantly threatened by dissension, makes progress on the 
whole."33
The political-ethical life of the modern state is to be
constitutional, bound by those public laws created under the
guidance of
"an idea of reason, which nevertheless has undoubted 
practical value; for it can oblige every legislator to frame 
his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by
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the united will of the whole nation, and to regard each 
subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had 
been represented within the general will. This is the test 
of rightfulness of every public law.1’34
VI
The international and universal totality of social progression 
involves a concept of the interaction of national states and the 
hope of an international moral world. Individual men, viewed as 
particulars of an international object are part of a journey to 
the constitution of a total ethical commonwealth.
In the movement towards the ethical commonwealth the political
commonwealth is the first step. Two different conceptions of this
are utilised. An external progress is visible in politics and in
the external legal system; progress in the second in ethics and
in the correspondence of the internal (ethical) lawmaking to the
external. Two stages of association are operative.
"A judicio-civil (political) condition is the relation of 
men to each other in which they are all alike stand socially 
under public juridical laws (which are as a whole coercive 
laws). An ethico-civil condition is that in which they are 
united under non-coercive laws, i.e. laws of virtue alone.1'35
The juridicio-civil condition presents an external framework, 
creating assurances demonstrated in the formal coercive 
instruments of the state that individuals will act in a lawful 
way. Kant sees this society as, however, a rather fragile 
structure and one that is dependent upon this 1 artificial' law 
to unite the various pulses, desires, and projects which 
otherwise threatened to tear it apart. The operation of law at 
this stage was to hold together a socially disunited group of 
people through moderating and controlling individual claims. The 
otherwise rampant subjectivism of man's contingent and historical 
attitudes needed to be brought under a system of state laws, and 
the operation of these coercive laws was based upon the principle 
of strict reciprocity in the treatment of others since no
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individual is prepared to give to others any more than the
freedom which he enjoys. The divisions of man so evident in this
form of association will not be truly examinable until the
perfect ethical community comes about. In our present political
condition (judicio-civil) we are internally in a state of nature,
for no one accepts the public, general authority as having the
power to judge "what is each man's duty in every situation." The
state cannot tell man how he ought to live, it can only tell him
how he can and must live. Civil society is the product of the
'political1 dimension of man, and the realm of civil society is
divided into two realms, the public and the private, the
demarcation of liberalism. The private domain of liberal virtue,
and the public domain of political, lawful "Right". The
legitimation of the inner continues directly the tradition of the
religious, the outer becomes the institutionalised order
legitimated through the political constitution and the formal
laws of the state. The ethical community, which will in time come
to replace the political, cannot be based upon coercive laws such
as those of the political situation since with the ethical
community "the very concept involves freedom from coercion." 36
Man progresses by leaving the ethical state of nature and thus
frees the state from the existence of coercive laws in the
adoption of virtuous motives and the performance of action under
the idea of achieving the highest social good, which is the
ultimate social goal.
"Here we have a duty which is sui generis, not of men 
towards men, but of the human race towards itself. For the 
species of rational beings is objectively in the idea of 
reason, destined for a social good, namely, the promotion of 
the highest good as a social goal."37
This concept, although central, is ambiguous. As Beck identifies 
it, the concept of the highest good is also described variously 
as the Kingdom of God, the intelligible world, the existence of 
moral beings under the moral law, the moral vocation of man, the 
regulative "Ideal of reason" (with an Ideal being "the concept 
of an individual object completely determined through the mere 
idea"), and also as the greatest happiness combined in the most 
perfect proportion with the highest degree of moral perfection,
237
and the statement of the Groundwork that "two things constitute 
the summum —  the moral perfection of the person and the physical 
perfection of his state". It is one of the most obscure parts yet 
Kant appears conscious of the need of some form of grand 
connecting mechanism with both the power to combine, and the will 
necessary to achieve the state of highest good and its 
correspondence between virtue and individual happiness - and 
whatever the mechanics of that mechanism, the irreducible Kantian 
core is that it is to be linked to the path of reason.
It is also held up as ideal for man to achieve, it is thus an 
example of "the sublime, yet never wholly attainable" idea of an 
ethical commonwealth,38 one which Kant states we must treat as 
attainable when ecclesiastical faith is gradually transformed 
into "the universal religion of reason"39 and so to Ma (divine) 
ethical state on earth". Thus finally the moral law of reason is 
"erecting for itself...a power and kingdom which sustains the 
victory over evil and under its own dominion, assures the world 
of an eternal peace."40 It is pure reason's path of 'problem': 
the realization of this methodology will escape the dehumanising 
state of the political commonwealth, transform the epoch, and 
overcome the political for the space of the ethical. The spirit 
and constitution of modernity will be transformed into the 
'peace' of the ethical spirit by our partaking in the universal 
structure of reason.
In the end politics surrenders its domain to a revamped religious 
orientation - rational (post)modernity.
This links to that peculiar Kantian vision of the good man - an 
ambiguous vision which is of.great power and yet barren solitude. 
The good man to Kant has the power of being ruled only by the 
strength deriving from his inner conscience, a strength located 
transcendentally. The man is in solitude, because, if he exists 
in the present world, the world of the ethico-political realm of 
justice, he is, in sense, not present. The 'justice' of the good 
man is not located by reference to the knowledge (which as soon
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as it becomes known as knowledge takes empirical shape and thus 
becomes policy) of the highest good, but in the reflexivity of 
pure human intentionality (moral reason). The morality of any 
action is not determined by any relation to a state of knowledge, 
the moral law cannot come from nature, but itself is the only 
grounding for the morality of nature. The solution to the need 
to ground morality, and yet avoid empiricist foundationalism, is 
to allow the reflexive movement of the moral law itself to give 
grounding - that we ought to act such that the maxim of our 
action could become the universal prescription, i.e. it must test 
itself. Similarly, the bearer, the subject of the imperative, 
posits the moral, not in his capacity as an individual 
personality, but as a person stripped of his individual 
personality (feelings, 'animal1 desires, instincts) existing only 
as pure human personality (rational mankind).
The result, however, is to become lost in transcendence from the 
imperfect 'legal- civil1 society of (all and any) present. The 
inhabitants who are the good men of Kant's 'invisible church’ in 
the realm of freedom (i.e. the formalist judge) are the saintly 
images of 'perfectible1 man. Being saintly images they correspond 
to no images our knowledges can give - they are the inconceivable 
personality of rational man.
VII
The outcome follows from the terms of the Kantian narrative which 
holds politics as a contingent to be overcome in the trans­
formation out of the 'ethical state of nature1. The immediacy of 
Gesellaschaft life, the dissatisfaction with modernity, the 
corruption of the impure and 'pragmatic1 operation of 'moral 
claims', finds its solace in the new ascription of it as ante 
chamber to modernity's overcoming - to the kingdom of ends in the 
Ethical Commonwealth.
We are, however, left with an impasse. For we have a defence of
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man's special dignity and freedom in the cosmos, and yet iran is 
estranged from participation in the causal chains which con­
stitute nature. Whenever we seek to construct comprehensive so­
cial theory, and thus to seek to understand ourselves 
'theoretically' as part of the cosmos, causal chains appear 
deterministically to bind our interaction with nature and each 
other; when we declare the special freedom of our purposeful, in­
telligible and autonomous reason, we are divorced - alone - ex­
isting in a society which is not part of the current of nature - 
but yet is the 'political' which our own true nature, the ethi­
cal, disdains.
The Kantian dichotomy is taken up by a variety of positions and 
we do well to remember Hegel and Nietzsche as in many respects 
"left Kantians".41 But if the impasse Kant leaves us with has 
been taken to give drive to the political imagination of others, 
his own displays the weakness of rationalism when it returns to 
'earth' from the realm of the 'other' . As Gay notes Kant is also 
well aware of the need for social control of 'the mob*. The 
optimism of reason's self-correcting and guiding properties finds 
its phemonomenal partner in the social distrust and pessimism of 
the lower social orders who do not respect self tutelage to 
reason: the "Volk" consists of "idiots".42 The constitution of 
the political public is limited; moreover, this is a limitation 
exposed as truly rational by the transcendental procedure.
The "matter" of the world, the a posteriori material, is provided 
by the actuality of society, and the true understanding of it is 
supplied by the transcendental principles. Political 
participation and relationship to law is thus called to be 
understood through the regulative idea of autonomy (independence) 
and freedom:
"the independence of a member of a commonwealth as a citizen 
i.e. as a co-legislator, may be defined as follows. In the 
question of actual legislation, all who are free and equal 
under existing public laws may be considered equal, but not 
as regards the right to make the laws."43
We know that the law pertains to all, but not all enjoin in the
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creation of the law - this is rational; moreover, it is the ra­
tional justification of empirical reality. To truly understand 
the rationality of the world we must discern the operation of the 
categories in the constitution of the world - thus the principle 
of freedom and autonomy specifies that only he who is free and
autonomous will actually be a participator in the right to vote.
'Rationally',
"he must be his own master and must have some property 
(which can include any skill, trade, fine art or science) to 
support himself. In the case where he must earn his living 
from others, he must earn it only by selling that which is 
his, and not allowing others to make use of him."44
We thus move to understand reality and are strengthened in our
rational approach to society, we realise that
"the domestic servant, the shop assistant, the labourer or 
even the barber, are merely labourers, not artists or 
members of the state, and are thus unqualified to be 
citizens".
The operation of the present has responded to the dictates of
reason; it has recognised the distinction between the free man
and those such as the artisan who
"in pursuing his trade, exchanges his property with someone 
else, while the labourer allows someone else to make use of 
him" .
The purity of the rationalist imagination can here appear as an 
illusion actually linked to the social metaphysics of the times - 
a relationship to constitute the 'what is' as the rational, to 
defend its historicism against reflexivity,45 and its claims 
against any radical pragmatism.
Take Kant's position on punishment. Kant's theory on punishment 
is a rationalist argument and has come to be known as a natural 
rights theory. In The Metaphysical Elements of Justice Kant 
rejects the utilitarian arguments of Beccaria while strengthening 
his 'rights' approach into the absolute binds of deontological 
reasoning. Thus we cannot look to calculations as to the effects 
of punishment, or non-punishment, upon the sum of goodness in the 
world (whether we define that goodness as pleasure, satisfaction
241
of desire etc.)/ but relate punishment to the test of whether it 
satisfies the persons capacity for autonomy. Thus individuals are 
assumed to have the capacity to determine their own ends as free 
and rational creatures and to live their life acknowledging this 
capacity in all the others of their society of mankind. 
Punishment is thus done to an individual for his intrusion into 
the autonomy of the other, and that punishment is to be related 
to the degree and quality of that disrespect and intrusion. 
Punishment is then to be strictly limited in kind and duration 
to the moral gravity of the actions which the offender has 
preformed; the purity of this linkage, however, is such that it 
must not only be limited in extent and duration and hence to 
over-punish is wrong, but that punishment must always be 
undertaken, for to not to punish is wrong (it does not respect 
the autonomy of the offender).
This is, however, abstract reasoning and when Kant brings it to 
earth he is dogmatic in his idea of 'practice', seeing it as 
fixed and absolute, rather than as a pragmatic expression. Thus 
Kant is open to the empiricist retort, namely that his thesis of 
radical freedom of the offender from the realm of empirical 
deterministic chains is wrong; to historicism in that he 
categorises various activities as absolute attacks by the 
offender on his own autonomy which appear to be actually defences 
of the Christian conceptions of sexual morality of the time 
(Lectures on Ethics, pp. 162-171); and to the charge of dogmatic 
interpretation in his proportionality requirement. On the latter 
Kant demands strict equivalence and absolute enforcement 
irrespective of questions of utilitarian deterrence. Thus the 
murderer must himself or herself be killed, the rapist castrated 
(Metaphysical Elements of Justice, pp. 100-107). One common 
argument against this line is that it denies any role for a 
lesser or greater sentence on deterrence grounds, but this 
argument falls short of the radical pragmatic retort of asking 
what sort of equivalence is this on Kant's own terms? For in what 
way is the taking of the life of the murder actually equivalent 
to the prior taking of the life of the other by the offender? On
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a one-to-one basis the action looks acceptable to common sense, 
the lex talionis, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life 
for a life; but what happens in the cases when it is one life, 
that of the offender, for the lives of several others, as in the 
hanging of the commander of the death camp of Mydeck in Poland, 
for instance, where some 360,000 prisoners had been exterminated? 
In what way is the death of one man actually qualitively exactly 
proportional to the deaths of 360,000? Is not it an insult to the 
360,000 to say that they each are actually only worth one 
360,000th of an individual, the individual who commanded their 
deaths?
Further, what actually is it to take the life on an individual, 
for is not any stage in a person's life a certain distance from 
birth and a certain distance from death. So instead about talking 
about 'life' one could talk about 'distance to death' etc. Thus 
in what way is the taking of the 'distance to death' of a 58 year 
old child murderer, who perhaps is suffering from cancer and will 
die within four years, equivalent to the 'distance to death' of 
a healthy four year old girl who has some seventy years to go 
before death? Or the person who is tired of life for the one who 
is optimistic and joyful, and so forth?
The only way out of this is to say that we are talking of 
'expressions' and 'symbolisms' of equivalence, but then once that 
is agreed it is open to accept various other activities of 
practice as viable expressions or symbolisms (which is a theme 
of the writings of the Norwegian Nils Christie for example). 
Again in what way is castration equivalent to rape? Some may 
argue it prevents abnormal sexual impulse but that is a 
consequentalist argument, and what if, as it is empirically 
argued, most rape has to do with desires of power and domination 
rather than sex? Are we to say then that the act of castration 
must be done as an equivalent act of domination and power? Is 
that not to go against the autonomy thesis? Again some of Kant's 
examples appear to be simply making 'rational sense1 of the 
practices of his time; when new forms of punishment enter, prison
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for example, equivalence becomes even more problematic.46
IX
Aspects of the Kantian Legacy.
The issues delineated by the terms freedom and determinism have
been central to the history of speculation and do not originate
with the Enlightenment, however, their modern critical use,
linked to the de-marcation of reason and desire, of modes of
judgement, is crucial to modernity's creation of differentiated
spheres of discourse and judgement. The resulting division in the
criminological arena, of law linked to justice obeying one regime
of 'truth' with social science linked to justice obeying another
is one result. The problems of reconciling this division, either
through a battle of perspectives (relying upon a confidence that
one actually highlights a superior 'truth' and thus can
successfully dominate the other), the search for a meta-theory
which can establish a Taskian corrective for subsidiary truths,
or a commensurability methodology which guarantees acceptable
levels of performance, are present problems which defy
resolution. The defence of the autonomy of law is primarily
Kantian. Daniel Roberts, for example, putting forward radical
determinism, soft determinism, and 'chance, change, and
probability in the affairs of men and atoms' as possible
reconciliations which have at one time been proposed concludes,
"only one view is coherent and plausible at the level of a 
civilized social life: if there is to be law at all, the 
presumption of human autonomy is inescapable. To write a law 
that proscribes actions of a certain sort is, among other 
considerations, to acknowledge that such actions are 
possible. It is to acknowledge further that they are not the 
inevitable consequence of the sort of causal series we take 
to be behind events of a purely physical nature."47
For Robinson man's occupation of dual realms means that "our 
'moral science' must be incomplete and perhaps forever arguable".
The fact - value distinction is central to the motif of freedom 
in those combinations of positions loosely known as Liberalism.
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One aspect is Hobbesian: social freedom and material freedom, i.e 
the possibility of choice over material goods, the enjoyment of 
property and free access of goods and services, is dependent upon 
the resolution to subject ourselves to legal rules, to state 
power; the product of that freedom is the assurance of the 
continued enjoyment of material goods (The Hume, Smith legacy); 
yet that state power is to be limited in its role by that 
criterion; the commodity materialist image of the social 
contract. Another is Kantian and stresses moral autonomy, wherein 
the activity of free choice is the resolution to subject 
ourselves to moral maxims, to the power of morality. It is an 
image wherein universalist self-criticism replaces specific 
communal criticism and control; the product of that freedom is 
the massaging of the intellectual, the primacy of the cultural 
seen as an autonomous sphere answering to its own claims of 
rationality. The third, which runs throughout the modern, is the 
concept of tolerance. Because no overreaching system of 
commensurability is possible we compromise and allow others 
various choices in specie of social heteronomy on certain 
conditions: namely, that they do not threaten social freedom nor 
the operation of tolerance itself (the master prescription) . Thus 
the characteristic of modernity can be gauged as a process of 
societal and cultural differentiation and pluralization, the 
changing and development of which is the result of the 
interactional dynamics concomitant from the impacting of the 
inner coherence of each sphere.
Morality is central - yet the empiricist asks that deon- 
tological moral concepts not stand in the way of maximising 
'progressive* social power and judgement under social law (the 
question of separate realms), and raises the question - does not 
such morality come always from a simpler time when the world did 
not know as much; therefore, must not it always lag behind as 
ideology of a past? Again is it not simply mistaken and ought 
to be disregarded in the name of progressive consciousness? 
Additionally, it is not possible to line up those who make such 
a claim upon the 'conservative-liberal-socialist1 continuum as
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paradigm positions often are in criminological literature.
Harold Pepinsky, who can be placed as a socialist (and self­
consciously utopian), says of the central moral claims of 
criminal justice: "to be convicted a person must be inferred to 
have chosen by exercise of free will to have committed the actus 
reus." But, he says, what this results in socially is an 
abstracted universalism that a person acted so as to earn 
criminal status as an individual achievement.
"Just as the class hierarchy is built on the foundation of 
individuals being considered to have earned their positions 
in it, the application of the criminal law against persons 
is built on the foundation of the persons1 having earned 
offender status. Correlatively, the message communicated by 
the concept of criminal responsibility is that no other 
collectively imposed obligation stands in the way of 
individualism. By circumscribing the substantive requirement
for the attachment of social responsibility......formal
support is lent to the popular notion that obligations to 
interpersonal cooperation are few and far between...Whether 
one goes to prison or becomes wealthy is a matter of 
individual responsibility; dependence on others for support 
is no defence to a charge of crime and no right or socially 
prominent guarantee. The law thus encourages the kind of 
injurious behaviour it is formally supposed to restrict."48
The Kantian legacy is thus held liable for the misuse of the 
power to punish due to its being closed to any pragmatic 
critique.
Conversely, the Soviet criminologist Alexandra Yakovlev, having
seen the notions of 1 social responsibility' and legality
outflanked by psychiatry, turns to Kant as his guide in order
"to substitute the ethically orientated interaction between 
the state and the responsible individual for the utilitarian 
action on man as an object serving various purposes. In 
doing justice, the punishment in this case does not 
interfere with his inner world, recognises the rights of the 
personality of the criminal as a reasonable and responsible 
subject and, thereby, does justice to his human dignity."
He concludes declaring:
"I don't say back to Kant! I say forward to Kant!49
The two legacies thus have historically lined up as rhetorical 
opponents, portrayed by their followers as totally
246
incommensurable positions, of which one only must be right.
Expositions expressly take the Kantian distinction of pure and
practical reason. As Jerome Hall put the differing positions of
law and psychiatry:
"the most important fact in the current polemics regarding 
psychiatry and criminal responsibility is the clash of 
elementary philosophical perspectives. Every science rests 
upon distinctive axioms or postulates that are accepted by 
the scientists as 'given1, while philosopher remain curious 
about them. Without describing the postulates of current 
psychiatry, we can perceive the general perspective that it 
draws. It purports to be rigorously scientific and therefore 
takes a deterministic position. Its view of human nature is 
expressed in terms of drives and dispositions which, like 
mechanical forces, operate in accordance with universal laws 
of causation.
On the other hand, criminal law, while it is also a science 
in a wide sense of the term, is not a theoretical science 
whose sole concern is to understand and describe what goes 
on. It is, instead, a practical normative science which, 
while it draws upon the empirical sciences, is also 
concerned to pass judgement on human conduct, entailing 
serious consequences for both individuals and the community. 
Its view of human nature asserts the reality of a 
'significant' degree of free choice, and that it is 
incompatible with the thesis that the conduct of normal 
adults is merely the manifestation of imperious
psychological necessity. Given the scientific purpose to 
understand conduct, determinism is a necessary, although by 
no means the only helpful, postulate. Given the additional 
purpose to evaluate conduct, some degree of autonomy is a 
necessary postulate."50
In the above passage science is expressly linked to the postulate 
of determinism, law to autonomy, science to explanation, 
description and understanding, law to normative pursuit (a
practical normative science). Law becomes the science of 
practical reason, while science proper is the result of the 
theoretical approach purely applied. A working reconciliation in 
the literature considers the respective purposes of the domains, 
science to understand conduct, law to evaluate conduct, and thus 
law can act as a secondary level which draws upon certain
knowledges from sciences which it may incorporate into the
evaluation procedure - so long, that is, as the fundamental 
postulate of autonomy remains undisturbed. Conversely, the 
rhetorical battle can be portrayed as 'dignity' against 
'scientific progress'. The spread of the scientific ideal,
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required by the narrative of modernisation, when linked to the 
apparent requirement of determinism for science to begin, 
requires the sublimation of those human forms of self-description 
into the universal discourse of impartial science. The 
deontological retort is simple: to question the supreme place of 
'morality' and 'rational autonomy1 is to destroy the very 'idea' 
of humanity. In line with the differentiation and plurality which 
so characterises modernity 'the moral' has become viewed as a 
separate sphere answering to the cannons of its self­
constitution. In its intrusions into the common life the dominant 
use of 'morality' has been narrow and confined to the 'normative' 
regulation of practical everyday affairs. In social control of 
the common life, the Kantian core of modern morality can be 
interpreted that morality is exactly what people can be blamed 
for ignoring or violating - Don't steal, don't lie, can be argued 
as belonging to a counter-preference and blame-generating moral 
code. Allied to this is the widespread view that the criminal law 
is based upon the standards of public morality (roughly the view 
of the 'consensus' school of criminal law, although shared in 
essence by the 'conflict' school which sees the criminal law as 
the reflection of the morality imposed by the 'ideological' 
mechanisms of the society), and that criminal sanctions operate 
so as to identify and stigmatise certain moral wrongs, which 
society as a whole condemns.51 Movements which looked to the 
going beyond of modernity (for example the post-modern promise 
of a communist society after the revolution from capitalist 
modernity52) seek to go beyond law and require us also to 'go 
beyond' the moral. Morality is not of great importance (it is 
argued), for morality, like civil order which (it is held) it 
seeks to constitute, is merely a background condition for the 
flourishing of anything really important or intrinsically 
valuable. (And this can be seen as so even when it is an appeal 
to morality, moral normative order, which creates the social 
order for such internal state of satisfaction or existence. This 
is so because the fact that the activity may be important does 
not mean that the conditions which created it are also. This is 
demonstrated through the non-necessity of transference: if we
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accept the supposition of universal causal connection, then if
importance transferred along lines of conditionality, everything
would be important and everything would lose its essentially
discriminatory import - there would be no difference.) Another
argument is that morality is no more than a set of marginal
constraints on behaviour serving an agenda set by life's
intrinsically attractive, effort-inspiring, eros-magnetic goals .
After all will not true life for humankind be "post-moral/post-
justice/post-law"?53 Karol Soltan argues that the state of love
is higher than the state of rational justifications:
"the morality of love [is] the highest moral aspiration of 
humanity... it is developed more through the appreciation of 
literature than through abstract moral and political theory. 
Where men and women have the appropriate intellectual and 
moral capacities, they do not need moral and political 
theory, and they do not need objective moral tests."54
Can one imagine morality in Heaven? Or in Hell?55
The anthropology behind this approach is the Kantian division,
the modern resolution to the mind body distinction. As Robinson
put it concerning the ontological status of the 'moral sciences',
which we can put Law as the supreme example:
"What the nineteenth century happily and aptly called moral 
science is, as Locke recognised, an axiomatic science akin 
to geometry. It proceeds from first principle (major 
premises), which are the necessary starting point for moral 
discourse of any kind. The major premises of moral discourse 
are always subject to dispute and disagreement and, as 
universal propositions can never be conformed 
experientially... Such rights as persons have are bought 
into being by these premises and have no existence apart 
from them. Such rights are, then, the most unnatural 
entities in the universe, existing as they do only in the 
realm of moral reasoning and never in the realm of space and 
time." (Emphasis added)
These arguments, however, from a post-positivist notion of 
science, unduly constrict the role and identification of the 
normative/moral function in social change and order. For, to the 
post-positivist approach, science itself is heavily normative. 
In post-positivist approaches it becomes not an independent 
external reality which impartially corrects scientific diversity 
into a progressive development but normative interpretations of
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proper scientific methodology, interpretation of results, and 
correlation with 'other1 work. Both this appreciation of science, 
and aspects of the 'narrative' readings of modernity as a 
construction project, emphasise the inescapable normative element 
which provides a foundational entity being one important pole of 
social change.
To the pragmatist the normative results in effects which actually 
can become the subject matter of the sciences. The normative 
'materialises1. For example a normative aspect of the Kantian 
scheme is that freedom is realised through history; that history 
is one of struggle and conflict in which man's natural instincts 
ensure antagonism. The compromise and progressive solution for 
human society is that of the law-governed social order, but this 
stage, the stage of the present, was imperfect because the force 
of that stage was not ideal, it was for the most not self
determination but determination by the external threat of law. 
The law should, ideally, in a republican state, obey the
reference idea of autonomy, the realization of that ideal will 
mean that law in the future will dissolve. This line of thought 
has been picked up by Nietzsche, Freud and Weber as referring to 
that process of internalisation of morality which leads to the 
Western phenomena of guilt. For Freud this guilt is linked to 
instinctual renunciation, neurosis, repression of desire, and, 
the mutilation of the 'self'.57 Here a 'social scientific' 
account of the phenomena of guilt, this process of internalising 
the moral prescription, this 'progress', is seen in this reading 
to be the subordination of humanity to 'reason' which produces 
as a direct consequence unhappiness and joylessness. Thus this 
'reason' of modernity is ultimately repressive, the opposite of 
joy, happiness and freedom; hence the instruments of this reason, 
the moral strictures of modernity and the subordination to law 
(the criminal law) must themselves be repressive. Hence the final 
state, the end of man, will be post-moral, post-law (justice), 
post-repression. This social scientific account not only
incorporates the normative entities but creates itself a
regulatory and normative outcome - it not only describes it
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prescribes (which may be why those examples where social sciences 
obviously do this are regarded as 'pseudo-sciences' by analysists 
such as Karl Popper).58
X
It follows from the above that the dual anthropology cannot be 
a dualism of two separate realms but a de-marcation of what must 
be one realm. It is not that the discourse of 'justice' and 
evaluative connotations inhabits one realm and social science and 
the descriptive another. After all what actually happens when 
citizens of a state define as just or unjust institutions of 
their state? Their discourse is both factual and evaluative, both 
placing a particular interpretation on observable practices and 
arguing for certain norms. Kantian notions of ideas operate as 
controlling mechanisms because of their openness to reflexivity 
and the pragmatic tactics of immanent critique, and the
identification by individuals of practice as being either a
correspondence to (reflective of) the normative ontology of the
idea. But the movement of this recognition cannot be a movement 
out of the internality of one realm into the internality of 
another since then a total relativism of realms would follow and 
such an outcome does not happen because of the jointness in the 
meta-reality of life itself. Both anthropologies are part of 
nature - such is the pragmatic message. It is only under this 
realisation that the act of contrasting the performance of
present activities and institutions to the supposed ideals which 
the structure of articulations and justifications hold it to be 
about.59
XI
Excursus on Power.
The Kantian directive for the role of the 'moral' can be seen to 
constitute one 'type' in the triads of modern social order in the 
'Liberal state'; one pole of the conceptional identification and 
positioning which mediate around the dilemma of power, order,
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performance and dignity. In his application of social theory to 
the organizational formations of modernity Etzioni interprets the 
pure noumenal power of morality as normative or identitive power. 
The Kantian rhetoric of the 'dignity of man* becomes an 
allocation of symbolism, a discursive currency of human 
motivation and compliance stratagem which becomes implicated in 
the constitution and control of a social order utilizing the 
rhetoric of understanding love, affection, and prestige. The 
purity of the rational sensus communis is now but one pole, to 
be played off against the phenomenal compliance stratagems of 
coercive power with its constraints of the physical, and 
remunerative or utilitarian power, with its constraints of 
accepting the market for growth (successive success and growth 
in material desire).60
In this analysis three types of power underlie organizational 
modernity which situate men in three types of involvement - 
alienative, calculative, and moral. Alienative involvement is the 
forced involvement of dissociation. Calculative involvement is 
changeable in its substantive identification, flexible, and 
instrumental in its legality. Moral involvement, conversely, is 
an intense positive identification with the organization (social 
identification). Etzioni holds that a particular kind of power 
and a particular kind of involvement empirically mesh together. 
Coercive power produces alienative involvement, remunerative 
power goes with calculative involvement, and normative power and 
moral involvement are congruent.61
The destruction of any fixed notion of the sensus communis 
develops modernity into a complex differentiation, a social 
market, where remunerative, rather than the coercive or the 
symbolism of the moral, stands as the basis of social control. 
Developing a system whose 'health' is a subject of a certain ease 
of measurement, and clearly related to performance 
(electionability, opinion, economic performance, etc,). Coercion 
resides in an hierarchal state apparatus which monopolises the 
use of force - at the expense of producing alienation - normative 
control (the appeal to the moral framework) is used in reserve. 
Too much normative identification reduces flexibility, and thus 
it is reflectively reduced to the status of an instrument to be 
produced when . the ability of the social order to produce 
calculative satisfaction is failing and some fixed appeal is seen 
as required.
Yet what is termed morality in post-christian western societies 
cannot claim the overreaching bind in a coherent scheme of 
reflected value - apart from the over-reach of the objective rule 
of tolerance there is no set of 'absolute principles1 that every 
individual holds in an obvious and 'objective1 sense which Kant 
assumed in his Foundations.62 One cannot simply claim, however, 
that there is no sensus communis in modernity - social order does 
exist, social grouping is the context of individuality; what is 
the case is that this grouping may obey no master prescription 
which traditionally could have been called truly 'communal'.6
If commentators like Gadamer and MacIntyre are correct, then a
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coherent reverential structure of an overreaching "tradition" is 
not a resource for the operation of the 'common life1. Instead 
the subjectivity of the free will of the individual is as a 
cipher inside a multiplicity of narratives as to the nature of 
the social body and the purposes of the self; a multiplicity of 
positions for the self constituted at the intersections of these 
narratives amidst a privatized notion of the 'good life'.64 
Without some form of transcendental motif, some vision of 
grounded tradition, the vision of mankind, our history and 
prospects becomes divorced from the "in common" and suffers the 
lack of any unifying moral-political intentionality. The media­
tion of the social still occurs, however, for as Gadamer states: 
"the displacement of human reality never goes so far that no 
forms of solidarity exist any longer."65
The cost, as MacIntyre puts it, is that when "in any society 
government does not express or represent the moral community of 
the citizens, but is instead a set of institutional arrangements 
for imposing a bureaucratised unity on a society which lacks 
genuine moral consensus, the nature of political obligation be­
comes systematically unclear."66
The pluralism of modernity is not, however, confined to within 
the 'liberal' nation state since the nation state exists within 
a pluralist globe. The state is the grounding to contain the 
particularity of its inhabitants yet it is a grounding which 
cannot be universal. Ultimately, divorced from a Helegian 
progressive narrative (where the rationality of states are coming 
together in a dialectical sublimation in the growth of reason), 
obedience to the law of the state implies relativism, for the 
state is only one of a multiple of states. The strength of the 
nation state as the grounding of obligation in modernity pushes 
obligation in modernity into an awareness of its own relativity 
and non-universality.
For Habermas this situation has no simple set of consequences for 
'late modern' society. The area of 'practical reason' concerning 
social action Habermas equates to the validity claim of 
legitimacy and Habermas earlier in Legitimation Crises relied 
heavily upon the Marxist concept of ideology to group together 
the various manifestations of the social consciousness of modern 
capitalist society. Thus in Legitimation Crises a central theme 
was the identification of an irreversible process of 
disintegration of classical bourgeois ideology. Morality, 
political economic theory, the drive for 'democratic rights', 
were disintegrating and loosing any ability to coherently hang 
together or to gloss over inherent contradictions.
Furthermore, no new comprehensive bourgeois ideology could simply 
be manufactured as if administratively ordered for system 
continuation, and this led Habermas to give the familiar mar- 
xist narrative of the inevitable approach of capitalism to a time 
where the conflict between class structure, the reality of anomie 
and alienation, and the espousal of universalistic democratic 
values would be apparent to vast sections of the populace, and 
as an emerging critical consciousness replaces bourgeois ideology
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resulting social unrest and transformation needed only to be 
hinted at.
However, by the time of Communication and the Evolution of 
Society Habermas has developed a new awareness on this question. 
What he now realises is that a fragmented social consciousness 
does not necessarily lead to a loosening of instrumental 
rationality or bourgeois individualism but may actually maximise 
systematic reliance upon it. Administrative activity appears in 
a time of confused moral prescriptives as a rational objectivity. 
Habermas understood that the reification and fragmentation 
process of modern society [even if analyzed in terms of ideology] 
decreased the need for the state to rely upon a basis of norma- 
tively secured and communicatively (i.e. two way dialogue obeying 
critical reason) achieved agreement. Instead "the scope for 
tolerance for merely instrumental attitudes, indifference and 
cynicism is expanded."67 In a complex and confused set of moral 
perscriptives the traditional pattern of legitimation may no 
longer be appropriate. The traditional pattern for social theory, 
the Weberian typologies, required a pattern of justification for 
the imperatives and commands of the rulers which ties in with 
sets of obligations and shared expectations. In Legitimation 
Crises the capitalistic state appeared headed for disintegration 
since it had to implement class-based economic imperatives and 
yet secure normative acceptance in terms of universalistic 
criteria. This led to the generation of "contradictions" even 
with the state's recently created compromise, namely the 'welfare 
state' which now found itself analyzed as an economic cost 
increasingly hard to sustain68 at the same time as it appeared 
unable to eradicate or even substantially reduce poverty, crime 
and social inequality, even being itself increasingly blamed for 
creating either 'dependency' or Foucaultean 'normalization' . Thus 
capitalism was on the path to self destruction due to its 
self-violation of the conditions of legitimacy which it itself 
posited and inculcated.
But what many of the writers who analyzed the coming 'crises of 
the state' mistakenly adopted was a form of neo-Hegelian 
conception of the reason of the state and the reason of the 
people being intermeshing and continuous. The disintegration of 
the collective identity which it thought bourgeois civil society 
had provided could thus cause a loss of meaning in the everyday 
life world, in turn reconceptualised into a critical 
consciousness and thence action. Habermas's later change is 
important not only theoretically, where it stands as Habermas's 
recognition that the Marxist camp had always over-stated the 
strength of the 'dominant ideology thesis', but also practically 
in the questioning it raises for the diverse related proposals 
for practical change in a 'post-bourgeois' era. Post- bourgeois 
may not mean 'post-individualist', nor lead to 'a developing 
social ethic1 as many have confidently predicted. Much of the 
work done to test the 'dominant ideology thesis', for example 
Michael Mann's 1970 work,69 has demonstrated the instrumental 
and individually possessive attitudes of the populace which, com­
bining the phenomena of possessive individualism and a growing 
indifference as to whether a political order is legitimate or not
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in the Weberian sense, appears to be the basis for an attitude 
becoming reflected in the criminological literature of the 
1980's. Namely, those writers who have been concerned with the 
emergence of a super-class under-class divide and who have sought 
to demonstrate a growing authoritarian response of the state 
towards the bottom segment of society.
The division can in turn be seen as acceptable to the degree to 
which the super-class simply suspends its commitment to the basic 
norm that democratic values must be universalised. Moreover, 
people with such attitudes are unlikely to get particularly upset 
with the judicious use of repression against the under-class 
elements.7 If this sort of analysis is correct, the state in 
advanced capitalism is actually gaining room to manoeuvre and 
assert control.
Habermas has his own project to counter this - it lies in the 
development of "communicative ethics and politics" and is 
premised upon the movement to a "post-conventional" era for 
political and ethical theory. It is a project which states its 
concern as the demonstrating and bringing to conscious existence 
the rationality inherent in "modernity". Thus it gives itself the 
status of a "scientific enterprise" divorced from rhetorical 
modality or moral persuasion. It is, however, on its own 
definition of rhetoric (the capacity for creating states of 
consciousness which act as world opening ideology etc), highly 
rhetorical and, indeed, moralistic in the sense of deeply 
committed to a particular interpretation of the concept of 'being 
human1 and Kantian in its vision of progress for mankind.
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Chapter Seven: Reflections on Wittgenstein and the ' style* of the 
pragmatic imagination.
Part A.
I
"The later Wittgenstein certainly was a pragmatist: the
meaning of a proposition (or rather a 'speech act1), and 
hence its truth value, is given by the social context of the 
'language game' it is a part of."1
The concept of a language game is, however, more than simply a 
conceptual scheme, and it is of importance to see how 
Wittgenstein arrived at this notion.
He begins his best known latter work, Philosophical 
Investigations. with an attack upon the designative theory of 
language - a paragraph from Augustine concerning the process of 
learning to speak a language is held out by Wittgenstein as an 
example of learning dependent upon the picture theory of meaning. 
For Augustine:
"the essence of human language...[is that] the individual 
words in language name objects - sentences are combinations
of such names - in this picture of language we find the
roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This 
meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for 
which the word stands"2
For the later Wittgenstein, this view, which he had based the 
Tractatus upon, is seriously defective in ignoring the context 
of the activities in which words are embedded. He now holds that 
words do not have an independent meaning apart from activity, and 
the combination of activity and language he calls a "language 
game". It is the operation of the language game which actually 
provides the bedrock, or limits, of human thought. The notion of
an essential meaning of "words" is replaced by the notion of
"meaning-in-use". It is this "meaning-in-use" which fulfils for 
Wittgenstein the function which foundationalism (or as 
Wittgenstein put it, the notion of a secure bedrock) provides for 
empiricism and rationalism.
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Hume had begun his search explicitly directed at uncovering the 
basic bedrock for knowledge: and it is as well to recap upon the 
empiricist version of his findings and Kant's interpretation of 
them. Hume approaches the matter in rationalist fashion: a
rational justification must be given for every stage in the 
process of gaining knowledge and the fundamental foundation must 
be shown. In this search we may rely upon the universal notion 
of causality (otherwise expressed as "necessary connection" or 
"constant conjunction") which we observe pervades the empirical 
world.
But when we turn to examine the very concept of causality we 
become immersed in the paradox of reflexivity. All that is found 
behind the concept of necessary connection are (causal) judgments 
of "contiguity and succession" and it is "in vain to rack 
ourselves with further thought and reflexion upon this subject". 
When we seek to propose another concept to explain causation we 
either analyze it in turn and reduce it to a further, deeper 
concept and so on, or, if man seeks to avoid such a continuing 
regress, "he [then] runs in a circle, and gives a synonymous term 
instead of a definition." (T. p.77)
We cannot demonstrate a foundation in our reason for our belief 
in the uniformity of nature, nor can "probability" arguments be 
conclusively relied upon as they rest upon the belief in this 
regularity itself. Thus we can, at least, know a form of negative 
knowledge:
"Reason can never shew us the connexion of one object with 
another, tho1 aided by experience, and the observation of 
their constant conjunction in all past instances. When the 
mind, therefore, passes from the idea or impression of one 
object to the idea or belief of another, it is not 
determin'd by reason..." (T.p.92)
Part of the empirical foundation for knowledge, such as causal 
belief, is found in the operation of the psychological relation 
of association - the basic level of empirical epistemology is 
thus found linked to "custom" or "sentiment".
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Hume makes a further move into what seems the most irrational and
arbitrary pragmatism possible wherein he claims
lf/Tis not solely in poetry and music, we must follow our 
taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am 
convinc'd of any principle, 'tis only an idea, which strikes 
more strongly upon me. When I give the preference to one 
set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from 
my feeling concerning the superiority of their influence. 
Objects have no discoverable connexion together; nor is it 
from any principle but custom operating on the imagination, 
that we can draw any inference from the appearance of one to 
the existence of another." (T.p.103)
Here we are plunged into the abyss, the hermeneutical void where 
all discourse is uncontrollably irrational, all is "without a 
meaning" (T.p.267). Out of the void we are plucked, not by our 
own endeavour, but by the "current of nature" which directs the 
basis of our psychological associations. The reality of external 
nature provides for us and saves us from "the necessity of 
Pragmatism".3
Kant acknowledges the rationalism implicit in Hume's original
drive, analyses Hume's difficulty and provides his own corrective
in his process of critique, distancing and alternative provision
of foundationalism. Thus Kant states:
"Hume recognised that... it was necessary that these 
concepts should have an 'a priori' origin. But since he 
could not explain how it can be possible that the 
understanding must think concepts, which are not in 
themselves connected in the understanding, as being 
necessarily connected in the object, and since it never 
occurred to him that the understanding might itself, 
perhaps, through these concepts, be the author of the 
experience in which its objects are found, he was 
constrained to derive them from experience, namely, from a 
subjective necessity (that is, from 'custom'), which arises 
from repeated association in experience, and which 
mistakenly can be regarded as objective"4
Kant draws a distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal 
worlds, and the possibility of true knowledge of the noumenal is 
guaranteed by the transcendental categories of the human mind. 
But Kant was not as aware as Hume of the bind of reflexivity and 
when future commentators explicitly apply the reflexive 
treatment, as with P.F.Strawson, Strawson is led to conclude:
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"Kant's arguments for these limiting conclusions are 
developed within the framework of a set of doctrines which 
themselves appear to violate his own critical principles. 
He seeks to draw the bounds of sense from a point outside 
them, a point which, if they are rightly drawn, cannot 
exist." 5
Against Hume, Wittgenstein did not expect there to be a rational
justification for every level of knowledge - no "explanations"
can be given for bottom level features of understanding, only
"descriptions". Moreover, these descriptions are not known from
outside of language games, but only from inside one or other such
game. It is not possible to stand on a position outside of
language games and judge the relationships between the words,
sets, propositions, and an objective "reality", and thus judge
whether language is correctly picturing, or correlating with, or
representing, reality. We are permanently within some or other
language game, and there can be no transcendental appreciation
of the adequacy of the language game. He draws thus upon his
feeling of unease where in the Tractatus he had followed the
Kantian path and drawn a boundary between the sayable/knowable,
and the unsayable/unknowable. Such a drawing of the bounds of
sense led Wittgenstein to conclude:
"anyone who understands me eventually recognises them [these 
boundaries] as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps 
- to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away 
the ladder after he has climbed up it.)6
Now in On Certainty Wittgenstein held that thought always existed
in a context of life; further, this was not an arbitrary
irrationalism, or a void as Hume had feared, but the actual human
rationality of our life forms themselves:
"All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a
hypothesis takes place already within a system. And this 
system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of 
departure for all our arguments: no, it belongs to the
essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so
much the point of departure, as the element in which 
arguments have their life."7
When we refer to objects in the world and suggest correlations, 
and so forth, we are operating within a language game, and how 
the world divides up to us is conditioned by the structure of 
that language game.
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The task of the inquirer is to draw out the intricate workings 
of the various language games - of the rationality of our ways 
of life. By this procedure we consciously strive to avoid our 
desire for a transcendental standing point creating a ' false1 
reductionism by denying the necessity of Explaining1 the 
operation of "foundationalism" - instead we attempt to 
demonstrate the processes wherein the limits of actual thought 
and experienced 'reality1 become evident, or attested to, from 
within the living structures of language games.
Wittgenstein called his approach therapeutic, and claimed that
he was proposing something quite different from the traditional
approach to explanation. His version of philosophy was to be
open-ended and non-authoritative:
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither 
explains nor deduces anything - Since everything lies open 
to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, 
for example, is of no great interest to us."
But he went on to say in the same paragraph:
"The work of the philosopher consists in assembling 
reminders for a particular purpose."
Philosophy was to be of practical use in the process of people's 
projects, purposes, and life forms. To say that we always operate 
within a language game is to accept a radical understanding of 
the contingency of social practices as defining what we are, and 
our human inter-relations as constituting the social - to say, 
however, that these are contingent does not mean that they are 
arbitrary, if that means that we are entirely free to leap 
totally out of one historical situation and simply choose to 
create ones position in some other set of contingent social 
practices; but neither does it mean that we are to accept the 
warm "organic" cradle of the fundamental "current of nature". We 
can instead look at the substance of our language games as 
constituting the material expression of our lives, and seek to 
appreciate the rational traditions within them, while, 
alternatively, always posing the question of transformation: we 
seek to be concerned with our "series of reminders" only because
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it is these which offer some real hope of solutions to cope with 
the concrete "problems" of mankind in their various socio­
economic-political positions.
The supposition that we can find some item absolutely independent 
of already operating language games upon which to base the 
construction of a new system is mistaken - instead of being 
concerned with the notion of some fundamental foundation to the 
bottom level features of language games we should get on with the 
business of identifying how we actually use and live inside our 
existing ones and what are the implications of their use in 
social life. Reflexivity and epistemological reflection leads us 
to realise the general need to base our actions upon some 
foundation, but this is embedded not in a universal scheme of 
pure reason, nor the constraints of a depth empirical framework 
conditioning existence, nor arbitrary desire, but in the 
operative forms of life we inhabit. Foundationalism is addressed 
thus:
"How am I able to obey a rule? - if this is not a question
about causes, then it is about the justification for my
following the rule in the way I do. If I have exhausted the 
justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is 
turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I
do'."8
At first sight this appears even more irrational than Hume's
conditioned sentience, the irrational nature of the foundation
of epistemology which this appears to offer is, however,
addressed further:
"' So you are saying that human agreement decides what is
true and what is false?' - It is what human beings say that
is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. 
That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."9
Pragmatic agreement is not an agreement of definition, but an
agreement in words and (i.e. linked to) activity. Danford
summarises the general emphasis of Wittgenstein's comments on
language as follows:
"The point of these remarks is that the notion that language 
is no more than a communications code by means of which we
make statements to or ask questions of each other makes us
look elsewhere for the thoughts or ideas, or 'meanings'
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conveyed by language. On this understanding we have a
tendency to overlook the fundamental fact that using
language, or speaking, is a human activity."10
Our attention is turned back by the pragmatic imagination to the
conduct of life and the formations which human sociality
develops. Specifically Wittgenstein calls us to investigate the 
operation of "language games", the words and the actions in which 
they are woven, "in the practice of use", as when "one party 
calls out the words, the other acts upon them".11 Learning our 
language means learning how to exist inside differing language 
games, in which words are used in differing ways. These language 
games are forms of human action, of activity; they are something 
humans do, and are not just instruments in the process of 
attaining something else, of reaching another place.
II
Language games are human activities - thus the meaning of words 
is internally connected to the part the words play in the various 
language games in which they occur. As Danford interprets 
Wittgenstein, understanding a word is like understanding the part 
a particular operation plays in the function of a complete 
activity, like understanding a lever in the cab of a locomotive: 
fully understanding it requires an understanding of the whole 
mechanism, that is what the whole mechanism is for. Understanding 
the part requires some grasp of the whole of which it is a part. 
In the case of a language game, this entails understanding what 
the human activity is, what it is for, why it is played. Words, 
or at least many words, are used in many different activities. 
To understand the full meaning of a word requires some grasp of 
all the activities, the social wholes, in which the word plays 
a part. Thus the meaning of words can only be understood if we 
understand the purpose or ends of the human activities of which 
the words are part. Ignoring the different language games and 
their ends or purposes when seeking the meaning of a word is like 
trying to understand the brake lever in a locomotive without
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understanding what a locomotive does, or what it is for.12
Reflexively, we are here in some difficulty - for there is the
danger that this approach merely temporarily submerges the
necessity for the external reference point which will re-emerge
at a later stage - the stage requiring Objective knowledge1 of
the operation of the whole: the teleos of language games similar
to the purpose of the locomotive. To the extent that such
knowledge is ever claimed to exist in a closed and certain form,
pragmatism breaks down; what is important is the recreation of
the speculative grasp of wisdom, which Apollonius referred to as
'a speculative grasp based on inference from "some understanding"
[which] we can wrest to deny the void', for as Dewey once said:
"Inference is the advance into the unknown, the use of the 
established to win new worlds from the void".13
Wittgenstein uses two tactics to determine the purpose of a
language game. One is when the game seeks to reflect what he
calls the ' laws of nature1, the other is when it consists of
learning the meaning inscribed in the living, traditional,
practices of man, i.e. life forms.
"To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for 
a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or 
consistent with them); but it also has the other sense, 
analogous #to that in which we speak1 of the invention of a 
game." (P.I. para 492).
Obedience to the purpose of the language game Wittgenstein calls
"Grammar". Grammar is revealed by the process which we call in
ordinary language, 'obeying a rule1:
"to obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play
a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions.). To 
understand a sentence means to understand a language. To 
understand a language means to be master of a technique." 
(P.I. para 199) .
Grammar is the living social procedure through which language 
evolves and meaning is guaranteed. To obey a grammatical 'rule' 
is to continue to practice the customs moulded by the community 
of man - this is the faithfulness of the present to the
traditions of the past - the inheritance of the meaning
271
continually worked out by communal man in his life practices. But 
there is another function which language serves; this is the 
disciplinary language which seeks to represent the laws of 
nature. Grammar avoids arbitrariness by the regulative criteria 
of being faithful to the material it seeks to describe, and the 
purposes for which it describes it; loyalty and consistency to 
the laws of nature work themselves into grammar through man 
seeking 'reliability' in what he says, and in his practices. 
Furthermore language is alive - we invent new games, new 
practices, give rise to new interactions or moves between 
participants which create new purposes for the life of man. In 
the process of growing we intermix rules, customs and conditions 
of use, under the influence of our inventiveness. Wittgenstein 
continued his paragraph (497) by stating that the very grammar 
of the word language was connected to the grammar of the word 
"invent" - The laws of nature are linguistic conventions for 
creating an orderly complement out of the vast quantities of 
observations and experimental happenings.
The Wittgenstein turn reinterprets the history of science as the 
rise and decline of various "absolute" laws of nature - the 
meaning of each successive scientific fashion becomes apparent 
when it seeks to expand its own game - what corrects the 
assertions of each attempt is that men are in some way linked to 
the observed "facts" of nature in attempting communication - the 
inner monologue of one specific scientific game may be self- 
sustaining - but the criteria of meaning-in-use leads us to 
consider the actual effects of the game in practice. From 
communication comes pragmatism - we shall examine this with 
relation to criminological theories in part three but here we 
shall be concerned to note our distance from Lakatos' claim that 
the grammar of each language game is so deterministic that each 
game is incapable of change and development. The charge is 
important as the criteria of meaning-in-use makes the pragmatic 
claim of direct embodiment and transformation of social reality. 
As Lakatos put it the image of the Wittgenstein imagination is
"that of a society without radical alternatives, where one
can only 'improve' but not replace 'the current repertory of
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concepts', a society whose membership depends on oaths of 
loyalty to specific doctrines ('commitment to collective 
ideals') and where only 'professional forums' can judge the 
implications of these doctrines for specific cases. In this 
closed society critical reappraisal and modification are 
allowed only if done by 'qualified judges'. The layman is 
powerless, the elite self-perpetuating."14
The elitism Lakatos sees as associated with pragmatism originates
in the move "from the classical conception of truth - a
proposition is true if it corresponds to the facts, to a belief
is 'true' if it gives rise to useful of effective action" for now
the "third world" of absolute epistemological purification is
"redundant". Further, pragmatism cannot give a "universal
criterion of progress", which Lakatos takes to imply
"that any change in science means by a Hegelian Cunning of 
Reason, progress in science... selective survival is the 
criterion of progress."15
But pragmatism should not be viewed as failed rationalism for it 
is the very persistence of "facts" under the regulative ideal of 
'inarticulable reality' which feeds into pragmatic 'progress' in 
science. Progress is achieved by various scientists inevitably 
forced into attempted communication and constituting new language 
games by the dictates of meaning-in-use. The elite cannot 
determine the activities of the game as the game must be 
actualised, and this actualization involves various games without 
a single plane of foundationalism. The focus is not on the 
rationalists' abstract movement of pure reason but is centred 
around a basically "human" focus in which ultimately it is man 
via the gathering of information and adopting modes of shared 
"use" which creates progress. There is no template of absolute 
progress; no deterministic foundational pattern to be discovered 
- only traditions to be lived within - but traditions that are 
living. Thus they must be open to projects of immanent critique 
and reflexivity when problems of communication arise. A fully 
pragmatic tradition is one which is self conscious of its own 
pragmatism, of its own human creation.
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Ill
The critical empiricism of Popper is at points similar to some
pragmatic themes. In Objective Knowledge Popper held:
"from Plato until today, most philosophers have either been 
nominalists or else what I have called essentialists. They 
are more interested in the (essential) meaning of words than 
in the truth and falsity of theories." 16
Pragmatism can be seen as most concerned with the adequacy and 
quality of theories, or adequacy of suggested language games, 
than in seeking essential concepts, laid down once and for all, 
or allowing the anarchistic play of labels to hold sway. Instead 
it seeks to draw out distinctions operative within theories and 
the flow of words, demonstrate their effectiveness and efficacy 
as they recount the diverse strands of the human narrative(s).
A central move of Wittgenstein was to place the question of 
'essence' or 'meaning' as a subject to be investigated in the 
context of humble life - in a sense we side a little with Hume 
as we read:
"we are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, 
essential in our investigation, resides in its trying to 
grasp the incomprehensible essence of language. That is, the 
order existing between the concepts of proposition, order, 
proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order is a SUPER- 
order between --so to speak --SUPER-concepts. Whereas, of 
course, if the words 'language', 'world', have a use, it 
must be as humble a one as that of the words 'table', 
'lamp', 'door'. (P.I.,p.97.)
When we recognise that in the life forms in which we exist 
"grammar tells us what kind of object anything is," (P.I.,para 
373) we are also, in a sense, with Hume, for, although this is 
a highly contested part of Wittgensteinian scholarship it is 
apparent that Wittgenstein holds the view that to be able to tell 
what kind of object anything is it must already be fulfilling a 
function. That is to say, the identification and 'knowing' of an 
object is contemporaneous with the positioning of that object in 
the life practices we inhabit. In other words; accepting that an 
object can be defined as X, means we must live our practices with 
it as X, or in terms more familiar to a lawyer; the formal 
identification of a thing (concept, right, duty. ) must always be
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accompanied by the substantive meaning-in-use of that thing 
(user, redress, access etc.)- To do otherwise would mean we had 
not been faithful in identifying this entity, or had really 
identified another. The extent to which this is similar to Hume 
is in the sense in which to be able to receive an object in use 
(grammar) precedes what we call the object (language) - that is, 
we cannot identify an object as such until the life conditions 
make possible the linguistic conditions. But we depart from the 
empiricist reading of Hume in that man is creative in this 
activity: nor does this development of grammar tell us what a 
thing is, other than what it is now within contingent practice - 
there is no meta-grammar to be found which ties language to one 
form as the rationalist may lead us to believe; grammar is the 
living instrument which serves to "show the post where this new 
word is to be stationed" (P.I.para 257), but this is always to 
express the rules of the game, rules which may develop and whose 
breach may give wrong meanings, but there are no 'rules' of the 
rules able to be objectively established.
As grammar is the life forms we inhabit, one word may have a 
position in different language games - the meaning is its 
meaning-in-use or the conditions which sustain its actual use 
within these practices - and these practices are a complex of 
many influences together constituting the process of human 
activity and communication. Any given word varies according to 
the context and use within which it exists - under different 
systems of language games varied uses make sense, and are 
rational, while at the same time the common use of the word 
provides a valid linguistic basis for such variety. Understanding 
the word adequately demands that we sift through the uses of the 
word to determine the character of the language game in which it 
is deployed and, thereby, indicate the grammar of that language 
game; for the grammar of that language game determines its being 
posted as it is. This can be both critical and conservative to 
someone desiring to state that a given word actually 'meant' 
something contrary to that which the meaning-in-use of a game 
appears to have developed it into.
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Take as an example the creating of the terminology of 'prisoners'
rights'. Let us suppose that some discourse has uttered a
statement which we want to take as substance for this concept,
say, a legislative act containing certain (supposed) directives
as to the conditions in prison. Given that the interpretation
which the prison authorities have accepted appears to our
critical inquirer to be contrary to the 1 spirit' of the
legislation, what does Wittgenstein suggest as a remedy? In
Philosophical Investigations he states:
"Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are 
trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. 
But what if one person reacts in one way and another in 
another to the order and the training? Which one is right? 
Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with 
a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would 
you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, 
obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on?
The common behaviour of mankind is the system of 
reference by means of which we interpret an unknown 
language." (P.I., para. 206).
Yet recourse to the common behaviour of mankind is ambiguous: 
Wittgenstein has also given the pragmatic advice to "look at the 
sentence as an instrument, and at its sense as the employment" 
(P.I.para 421), but instruments do not have a single employment, 
and there can be no single practice of using instruments. Yet our 
common language tells us that 'Legislation can be an instrument 
of reform' and this is to give it a role in one vision of the 
language games of penal reform where legislation is not an idle 
exercise but is undertaken for particular purposes. Enactment of 
rules, descriptions and like forms are typically addressed to an 
audience for the purpose of bring about or modifying patterns of 
behaviour; of elucidating responses. But use and application are 
variable in scope, the essential view of language at least gave 
the assumption that there was some ideal form of explanation 
which will not only be definite, but also bridge the gap between 
meaning and application - agreement, albeit imposed, as to this 
ideal essence could be enforced - but what of the variability of 
use? Recourse can only be made to the living conditions or 
background of the legislation - in a sense to the interpretative
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emphasis of Gadamer which appears to stress the possibility of 
achieving a privileged vocabulary, or conceptual scheme, for 
interpretating, at this historical moment, the correct meaning 
of the enactment. However, Wittgenstein is not primarily 
concerned with the truth of the code of the enactment but he is 
concerned with the link as it comes in use-in-practice. The claim 
of our critical interpreter to uncover the code of the text is 
only effectual if it is itself an active game - perhaps the game 
of critical penal interpretation of state practice. Our inquirer 
may well scrutinise the various purposes he discerns in the 
actual moves which led to the legislation, the speeches of its 
framers and so forth; more than this he may look to the various 
considerations which gave rise to this legislative activity and 
consider these as guides to proper practice - for although 
Wittgenstein counters the notion that there is an essential 
determinacy to the sense of words, there is no such thing as the 
absence of sense - there is always a sense to be constructed, 
ideally that 'sense' is created in the operative grammar which 
processes the new word's introduction - but this is also 'open' 
to participation in such practices. Thus, because there is no 
absolute determinate essential sense the task of grammar and the 
shaping of the techniques of applying any expression is a task 
open and demanding of participation. In the end the actual 
meaning of the 'rights' of the enactment will be those brought 
out in its meaning-in-use, and this will be a matter of the 
pragmatic construction of life practices.
This appears to many to be where pragmatism breaks down. Lakatos, 
in the review already cited, holds that pragmatism thus ascribes 
the proper meaning of an entity to the actual practices which 
result, but as he rightly says, these practices may be relativist 
and subject to the outcome of sheer power (coercion). Thus 
pragmatism, it is said, loses any critical edge and appears to 
accept a background notion of some cunning of history as its 
metaphysical guarantee. In Wittgenstein's teaching his concerns 
largely focused on bring notions down to their use in life - the 
point being that when we speak we speak always against the
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backdrop of particular circumstances, as individuals rooted in 
particularised socio-temporal, historical, cultural, political 
and economic contexts. In such contexts we do have the tools of 
criticism and desire, tools to use to transcend the flow of 
coercion by breaking its immanence. In a social context where 
some measure is being pushed through, the use-in-practice may, 
temporarily be the subject of 'Might' (coercion) but power is 
multi faceted, multi layered,and the various traditions of 
grammar (and the rhetorical demand of our faithfulness to 
accepted methodology of grammar - the strength of the tradition) 
can interpret and reinterpret the ploy of coercion and so 
obstruct it.
This methodology is represented or constituted as our historical 
ways of life - those forms of grammar .which we have fought over 
and brought about in the complexity of historical struggle. As 
opposed to the elitist fear of Lakatos the very point of the 
'grammar as technique1 argument is in the sharing of the language 
game - for the language formally lives in the shared techniques 
of all - we cannot have the imposition of an essence created once 
and for all and which is designative of supra-realitv. The 
reliability of the grammar comes form the collective permission 
that each can afford to give to all and which all can afford to 
give to each to use. This language is a chief indicator of what 
society can say - and the reality of social practice is the 
process of grammar.
IV
The real fear of those like Lakatos is that pragmatism is 
actually not pragmatic: that is, that it has nothing to with 
practice and with the conscious and rational guidance of the 
transformative desire. This centres on the question of how we are 
to understand dicta such as "philosophy may in no way interfere 
with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe 
it."(P.I. para 124) The dilemma is actually about foundations,
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for Wittgenstein continues the paragraph: "for we cannot give it 
any foundation either". Philosophy in the pragmatic mould cannot 
give it a foundation because there is no universal plane of 
sense, instead the practice must be understood on its own terms, 
thus non-foundational philosophy must "leave everything as it
is". But Wittgenstein states that his concern is with real life:
the next paragraph states the project of recovering the
tradition: we cannot "resolve a contradiction by means of a
mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery", but we aim to 
"get a clear view of the state. . .which troubles us: the state of 
affairs before the contradiction is resolved". Wittgenstein 
states:
"this does not mean that one is side-stepping a difficulty. 
The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a 
technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the 
rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are 
therefore as it were entangled in our own rules. This
entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand 
(i.e. get a clear view of). It throws light on our concept 
of meaning something. For in those cases things turn out 
otherwise than we had meant or foreseen. That is just what 
we say when, for example, a contradiction appears: 'I didn't 
mean it like that.1
 the civil status of a contradiction, or its status in
civil life: there is the philosophical problem." (P.I.para 
125)
Our practical concern includes the concern to actualise 
intentions, to demonstrate the immanent critique, and to 
investigate the constraints in the social body which create the 
gap between theory and practice, the entanglement of the language 
games.17
V
We could speak of the coming of pragmatism using the supreme 
rationalist narrative form of the Hegelian path of the objective 
spirit which, caught in the post-modern realisation of 
reflexivity, brings us, post-history i.e. post the looking 
forward to the future of the grand-narrative, to the present, a 
#pragmatisation' of belonging.18 The objective-subjectivism of
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meaning in the latter Wittgenstein is the subjectivism of a 
location in forms of life - it is non-Kantian although there is 
some similarity in the themes of categories, logic, grammars, and 
language games being related to the interaction of social man and 
material environment as opposed to the recognition of the 
structure of the world - yet whereas for Kant the structure of 
the world was ultimately knowable and we had the unchanging 
categories of the understanding with which to project the tool 
of universal syntax, and whereas for the early Wittgenstein the 
purpose of that syntax was to picture, via experience, the 
knowable structure of the world, for the latter Wittgenstein the 
categories of the understanding, the visionary games of language, 
were in constant flux. The self both belongs to the flux of 
multiple language games and is constituted in the experience of 
being a player in such games. Its nature is its agnostic 
expression - the language games it helps to develop and in which 
it continues to participate grant an openness of expressive 
conceptions rather than the closure of the designative.
To appreciate this, let us place it in contrast with one other
recent perspective on human nature at odds with rationalism and
empiricism. In response to the deterministic flow of empiricism
and categorizations of rationalization "Existentialism"
postulated the total openness of human nature. Thus for Sartre:
"If man, as the existentialist conceives of him, is 
indefinable, it is because at first he is nothing. Only 
afterwards will he be something, and he himself will have 
made what he will be. Thus, there is no human nature, since 
there is no God to conceive it. Not only is man what he 
conceives himself to be, but he is also what he wills 
himself to be after this thrust toward existence."19
In "existentialism's first move" man is to be made aware that for 
"what he is...the full responsibility of his existence rest[s] 
on him.." Man has no essence except the radical freedom of choice 
- he is not linked to the power of reason, to any intuition of 
'right' and thus there is no necessity to chose the rational, 
such an expression is meaningless but neither is he determined - 
he bears the full weight of his fate and actions. Pragmatic man 
is, alternatively, social man, he has no existence apart from
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human interaction and it is that human interaction which provides 
the tools, primarily language, by which he articulates the 
unnatural, acts upon it and thereafter treats that articulation 
as an expression of his constituted nature. The comparison with 
the existentialist position is revealing. Sartre says of talk of 
cowardice:
Mwhen the existentialist writes about a coward, he says that 
this coward is responsible for his cowardice. He's not like 
that because he has a cowardly heart or lung or brain; he's 
not like that on account of his physiological make-up; but 
he's like that because he made himself a coward by his 
acts. "20
Sartre places responsibility completely on the individual - the 
freedom of the existentialist is a freedom of anguish and despair 
as the individual shorn of 'illusion1 feels the loneliness of his 
sole responsibility - yet cowardice needs the 'other' to exist. 
It needs the other, the judgement of the other, even if that 
other is only the intrasubjective 'other' of inferiority. It 
needs the other to utter the language, to narrate the story of 
what cowardice is, to tell in what parallel situations particular 
actions amounted to cowardice. It needs the other to keep the 
articulations going - it needs the other to provide new units of 
discourse, new moves in the games of life forms, new rights, new 
allocations of gender role. It needs the other to 'game' with, 
and thus the other is not itself to be self-sufficient, for then 
the other could not be human, only God (the God that was man), 
or nothing (the absence of man). For Sartre "L'enfer, c'est les 
autres" (hell is the others), but equally he would be forced to 
utter in pragmatics, so too is heaven, but neither state can 
exist without'interaction, without involvement.
Part B
Pragmatism inherent in modern moves.
I
Rawls' restatement of his theory of justice in "Justice as
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fairness: Political not Metaphysical" develops his epistemic
modesty into a full pragmatic defence of his theory.21 The theory 
now is one of limited applicability (it is a theory for a 
particular society in a particular time: it applies to the basic 
structure of a modern constitutional democracy); it has shallow 
foundations (the foundations are assumptions and conclusions 
about the nature of those societies, assumptions which can be 
revised and must continually be examined for their adequacy and 
fit to conditions - the bedrock is their life in the here and 
now); it is autonomous (that is it does not require a grand moral 
theory or social theory as to the nature of man for its 
applicability - it is not based upon absolute moral truths but 
certain features of our understanding as we have thrown these 
up over time); it is based upon epistemic modesty or abstinence 
(Rawls does not claim that his theory is 'true1 in the empiricist 
or rationalist sense since if this claim was to be upheld it must 
flow from some comprehensive moral doctrine or ontological 
universals for man and social life) . The opponents to his theory, 
for example, Joseph Raz, are quick to use the reflexive paradox 
for either Rawls is being nihilist about truth, they say, or he 
is claiming his theory is true. "There is no room for epistemic 
distance" says Raz.22 But this is to ignore the type of 
epistemology Rawls is using which is very similar to that we have 
seen Rorty identify. Simply put, to the pragmatic imagination 
there is no possibility of getting to a position outside of our 
various intellectual systems to demonstrate comprehensive, 
universal foundations. All tactics of transcendence of 
intellectual systems are that, tactics of transcendence, which 
must draw upon a stance internal to one or other system - the 
transcendence of one system to create a new game is always within 
a game, even if it is a new one.
Arguments to transcend self-enclosed discursive fields, of 
philosophy, or of science, to disrupt their self-confidence and 
image of autonomous development and to demonstrate their linkage 
to forms of life are part of the pragmatic imagination. This is 
not, however, a tactic specific to the pragmatic label. One such
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enterprise is mounted by Ted Honderich in Punishment: The
Supposed Justifications. Honderich adopts in the course of this 
work a rather Humean way with retribution which ties punishment 
to satisfaction of emotional states. He provides, in other words, 
a 'natural history1 of retributive thinking.
Honderich attempts to give us a Kant that makes [empiricist] 
sense. His style of empiricism takes us from the recognition that 
for Kant "the point is that [the offender] has acted wrongly or 
immorally as distinct from only illegally" to a notion that 
desert is centrally connected to "satisfying the desires of the 
person or persons he has offended against".23 Proportionality 
comes about as
"penalties may be regarded as equivalent to grievances in 
the sense that they precisely satisfy them". And "as for 
judgments about responsibility, they may be described as 
factual...a considerable range of conditions may reduce a 
man's responsibility for a particular action." (P.p.31)
For Honderich the rise of retributionist thought in the 1980's
must be analyzed to ascertain the empirical "reason for action,
[the] one which moves ordinary men, men with an ordinary lack of
what can be called moral sensitivity" . The reactive attitudes are
implicitly seen as the key to the continuing existence of the
retributive tradition, and this gives us an "axiom of inquiry"
that the history of "the retributionist practice of punishment
has sense, clear sense, at bottom" (P.p.215). Honderich contends
that we will not find a rational justification for retribution
in the texts of retributionist moralists, in other words that
retributive practices are not legitimated or directed by
(abstract) moral reasoning but that this does not mean that the
practices are not founded on something. For Honderich the
"truth of the retributionist tradition...[is]..that it seeks 
to justify punishment partly or wholly by the clear reason 
that it satisfies the grievances created by offences, 
through causing distress to offenders, and that it takes 
penalties to be unsatisfactory if they do less than satisfy 
grievances or do more than that, and satisfactory if they 
just satisfy it. Here, the sense of saying that penalty P is 
deserved for A's offence 0 is that P will iust satisfy the 
grievance to which A has given rise by 0.
The requirement of an equivalent penalty, in this sense, is
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a direct consequence of the fundamental contention: that
punishment is justified partly or wholly by 
grievance-satisfaction. To do less than satisfy it would 
simply conflict with the fundamental contention. To do more 
would be to cause distress which would fail to have the 
given justification".
In adopting this approach we deny "respect for what most 
apologists for the tradition, notably moral philosophers and 
jurisprudents, have said for it". Honderich clearly recognises 
that the moral claims of retributionism are put forward by those 
who do not talk the language of sentient desire, effects and 
satisfactions, but he denies that there is any "sense" to their 
methodology; "there would be more call for respect if they were 
successful in providing the supposed reason" (P.p.234).
Ultimately Honderich also recognises the necessity for 
transcendence. Since any system of legitimation for punishment 
based upon the satisfaction of grievance-desires in any society 
must consider how it is possible to rank grievances and desires: 
"clearly they cannot be taken just as they are, unreflectively, 
as automatic justifiers, or automatic part-justifiers."
How to judge them? Where is the place to stand which will allow 
contrast? Honderich draws upon the tactic of seeking a con­
ception of the good or the fair or the right society.
"We shall necessarily regard the satisfaction of 
grievance-desires from the point of view of what we take to 
be the fundamental moral principle for the ordering of our 
lives together in society".
Why is this necessary? To save ourselves from the pure 
empiricist grip of a Hobbesian scenario.24
Honderich clearly finds it unacceptable to "embrace" the view of 
punishment he proposes if it "unreflectively takes grievance- 
desires as given." What is a valid desire? What are the 
categories of desire? The response is that whatever the total 
'truth' of punishment is it "is necessarily bound up with 
political philosophy" and ultimately "with the question of the 
fundamental principle or principles for the judgement and
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guidance of societies". Again we read that "philosophical and
jurisprudential reflection on punishment has in fact led a life
of its own, for whatever reasons, and continues to do so. It
cannot properly do so." (P.p.238) On the contrary,
"there is not the slightest possibility of dealing 
adequately or even pertinently with the question of its 
justification by attending only to the supposed intrinsic 
good of the suffering of the guilty, without reference to 
the rest of their lives and the lives around them".25
This essential interconnectedness of concerns calls for linked 
solutions and the self awareness that the conclusion to which we 
have come is not that "the problem of the justification of 
punishment is something which, although it presupposes or depends 
on something else, can be considered independently." This is a 
highly endorsable position; it is strange, therefore, that 
Honderich did not keep to his own dicta when he examined the work 
of others in his earlier text. Kant, after all, only warranted 
three passages picked from a small section of the Philosophy of 
Law which were not linked to any discussion of Kant's Political 
Philosophy or a proper examination of Kant's metaphysics. Hegel 
is dismissed even quicker: he is held as a paper target of
"another retribution theory of very secondary interest", and is 
equated with "‘annulment', a cancellation or a return to a 
previous state of affairs. This alone is what justifies us." 
(P.p. 45) But this is to deny Hegel's logic of Science, his 
progressive dialectic, his theory that punishment is necessary 
to aufheben or dialectically bring to light the "right" contained 
in the law offended against (literally, to resolve in a higher 
unity). To Hegel punishment is no synonym for vengeance, it is 
part of the process of the continual coming of age of "Reason". 
Honderich was content to dress his quote from Hegel with the 
trappings that "all this, of course, is obscure. It is by Hegel", 
as if the two sentences were equivalent and later states that "to 
reproduce this doctrine more faithfully and intelligibly would 
require a considerable and tedious excursus into the philosophy 
of absolute Idealism", equating the doctrine of Hegel with the 
"ratification" of James Fitzjames Stephen and the denunciation 
theory of Lord Denning. It is clear that Honderich is actually
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making an implicit summary of his Hegel when he states "this is 
nonsense" (P.p. 46), but how can he do so consistently with his 
later conclusion without a discussion of the political and social 
philosophies of these writers? Why, if his conclusion is that the 
problem of the justification of punishment cannot be considered 
independently, did he have such a narrow reading in these cases? 
Perhaps the answer is that he cannot allow for alternative 
"senses"; the table of de-marcation must be preserved and only 
his version of "sense" engaged.
II
The Norwegian Nils Christie is one contemporary writer who has 
attempted to provide a reconstitution of a feeling of sensus 
communis and a notion of a humanist penology. To Christie "the 
outcome of an epoch of rational useful thought", and that game 
of discourse "soundly embedded in science"26 guiding the 
practices of the modern state ensures that "we end up in a system 
of enforced consumption where one of the commodities becomes 
social control, - served by a comrade-functionary close to that 
type of personnel we otherwise meet in totalitarian 
societies".(LP. p.69) Behind the discourse of objectivity "crime 
control has become a clean, hygienic operation", whereby, "pain 
and suffering have vanished from the text-books and from the 
applied'labels."(LP. p.16) Christie's attack is not that of the 
formalist Kantian, but a softer, localised humanism. Christie 
does, however, make full use of the rhetoric of deontological 
reasoning. He pulls on the "objectivist" clothing of a "moral 
imperialist", stating that his bedrock is "that it is right to 
strive for a reduction of man-inflicted pain on earth", and that 
"there is no other defensible position than the struggle to 
reduce pain". A rationalist binding is apparent in that even 
though Christie criticises present argument for the bind of 
abstraction, his own movement relies upon that tactic - i.e. 
because punishment is defined as pain to reduce pain is to reduce 
the amount of punishment, and vice versa.
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Central to Christie's argument is the idea that 'problem' has
undone itself, and demonstrated its inconsistency - for although
"we have abolished hell, and have pain-reduction on earth as one
of our major goals", we construct a discourse which allows the
practice of applying pain, which* although
"in dissonance with some major ideals [can] be carried out 
in an innocent, somnambulistic insulation from the value 
conflict. The pains of punishment are left to the receivers. 
Through the choice of words, working routines, division of 
labour and repetition, the whole thing has become the 
delivery of a commodity."(LP. p-19)
Essential features of the human condition are being overlooked 
in the removal of the reactive attitudes from the legitimacy of 
social functioning - The "abstracted" concepts of "Crime and 
punishment" exist "on the same level of abstraction" where they 
demand and create an abstract logical structure that is then 
reapplied to society through the mediation of power by impersonal 
role incumbents. Conflicts have become ignored as property and 
are taken away from the social humanity of the original parties27 
- theories of punishment are primarily utilitarian in their 
legitimation, since "absolute" theories of punishment would not 
be commensurable to the framework of our societies.
This terminology of the "absolute" is recognizable as the
reactive attitude in Christie's definition:
"absolute, because no reasons are given. You punish because 
you punish just as you are sad because you are sad".(LP.
p.100)
By contrast utilitarian theories appear
"a true reflection of our societies as often presented to 
us: Societies of calculating individuals, deeply embedded in 
the exchange of commodities to maximise individual benefit. 
We have distant democracy, well suited to a distant 
penocracy, well suited to serve a large scale society using 
taximeters to control the price of all acts."(LP. p.101)
This distance distorts and in reality Christie contends
"it is absolute theories of punishment disguised as 
utilitarian which in a society of representatives create the 
strong incentives toward using pain".(LP. p.105)
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Alternatively he argues that if the activity of punishment was 
"seen as absolute, and executed by those close to the scene of 
misbehaviour....applied between equals standing close to each 
other", a situation would exist that would "pay tribute to local 
values", and our view of the large nation states "seen as natural 
solutions" changed to "problem-creating ones".
Christie recognises communication and the analogy with language 
as the key to the operational constitution of 'justice', 
contending that "through interaction we build up a sense of what 
is right language, as well as the right answer to deviance. Sense 
of language as well as sense of justice are thus social 
products". Such contextualism leads him to define modern criminal 
justice in terms of state domination, thus at present, "state law 
is the grammar. The ideal type of participatory justice would be 
one based upon the participant's own sense of justice - their 
legal local dialect".(LP. p.114)
Christie displays a pragmatic awareness of the link between 
language and modes of life - whereby actions, concepts and 
motivations are open to metamophorsis only by and in the 
articulation of language games, changing shape to shape, being 
to being, consciousness to consciousness: but importantly, it is 
hot language that determines justice, and thus we can not join 
any hope that there is a Justice as in any belief that language 
contains in itself the notion of consensus, both as to 
substantive cognition as well as reciprocity, but the 
Wittgenstein pragmatic concern that things are done through 
living out language and pluralistically shaped in the doing, and 
that the form of language game gives rise to the form of justice. 
Christie's attack upon the authority of the state to construct 
the 'grammar' is as an expose of the deceptive tactics of 
monopolistic notions of authority and the constraining, 
entrapping and deceptive linguistic ties of any functional super­
language, and is in line with the desire to open up the various 
texts and language games of modernity for greater participation 
and wider role playing.
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Christie's primary hope is that for the individuals of our
societies participatory justice would restore "participation in
his own conflict". Crime is not simply a problem, it does not
inhabit the terrain of 1problem1 solely, indeed
"it is important not to presume that conflict ought to be 
solved. The quest for solution is a puritan, ethnocentric 
conception".(LP. p.92)
Neither is the form of participation Christie espouses related 
to administration, for that "again is a narrow ethnocentrically 
determined choice".
Christie points us to the belief that a community, as a mode of 
life for humanity, is not something that can be produced or 
engineered by some form of technical administration or by the 
technique of utilitarianism. This domination of the concern with 
outcome in the practice of social life is to Christie a 
reductivist and destructive feature of modernity - it is a 
domination which furthers the breakdown of proper discursive 
communities. In the game prefaced upon "state grammar" central 
features of humanity have been systematically excluded and 
prevented from participating in actual participatory dialogical 
communities. In opposing this Christie's sense of participation 
"does not direct attention to the outcome, but to the act"; the 
centrality of participation in life as action, a theme he pursues 
in "punishment as mourning".
The central features of the conditions in which Christie sees 
participatory penology are "small scale-societies with lots of 
mutual dependence and where the participants cannot be replaced" 
(LP. p.89) It is crucially one in which there is a great deal of 
shared knowledge about participants, their roles and histories, 
a factor which Christie sees as more important than any question 
of the equality of power. In this type of society a version of 
the Durkheimean thesis on the minimalisation of penal pain would 
follow, and this would be a society where the application of pain 
(punishment) would not be laid down by any formula of dosage,
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either retributionist or utilitarian, but would be up to the 
participants, through their reactive attitudes, to impose.28
It is a problem with a simple reactive approach to punishment, 
however, that there is nothing in the concept of personal reac­
tion, or its emotional underpinnings (or indeed their possible 
genetic basis), to suggest any limitation or correspondence con­
cerning the magnitude of reaction - retaliation or forgiveness. 
Even in a society of common knowledges, when an individual is in­
jured and experiences a desire to retaliate, why should he want 
to inflict any particular level of injury on the aggressor? It 
must be quite rational to assume that there would be many cases 
in which the simplest and easiest response would be to remove, 
i.e., kill or exile, a wrongdoer rather than to undertake a 
process of accommodation. If Christie's response is to rely upon 
his criteria within organic solidarity of 'non-replaceability', 
then this is to slide into functionalism and the utilitarian jus­
tification he attacked. Without the indicators which embedment 
in some form of general functional-structural social theory, as 
Durkheim's thesis on the diminution of penal levels relied upon, 
there can be no assurance that any localised grouping of reactive 
occasions would result in the production of any optimal 
'penalising' or natural level of pain infliction. Christie 
recognises that
"to control such cases, we need large systems with 
independent non-vulnerable state power - in other words 
exactly the social conditions that..create possibilities of 
using [high amounts of] pain in social relations. To control 
cruelty, we might need more state power. But creating State 
power might lead to more use of pain.
I see no way out of the dilemma in principle... [only] to 
say: so little State as we dare". (LP. p.115)
In some versions of social change it is in this situation that 
the historical development of retribution takes over with its 
demands for proportionality and responsibility. In presenting an 
"economic" approach Posner suggested that in small-scale 
societies there is little need for a utilitarian calculation of 
reductionism, as the knowledge base of such societies ensures 
that the probability of apprehension and punishment is almost
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complete. In such a situation and when coupled with the private 
reaction of individuals or kin groupings etc., it is 
understandable that the discourse of punishment may refer to 
punishment as the paying of a debt, and that doctrinal texts (the 
Koran, the Old Testament) ensure retribution as an equality 
between offence and penalty. In conditions where reaction is 
private, and the probability of detecting and punishing offenders 
is high the range of considerations is lessened. Retributive 
principles result in both limiting and regulating the desire for 
vengeance, and also safe guarding against the arbitrary use of 
power (in doing so a side effect is to protect society from 
measures designed to combat crime at any cost - and thus ensure 
the continuance of a certain amount of crime: a society which 
allowed absolute repression or vengeance may have no crime).29
From such a perspective the demands of social organization of the 
modern nation state ensure that neither simple reactive response 
nor the qualifications of retributionary justice are functional 
when the conditions of Christie's localizations are not fulfilled 
i.e. when enforcement is not private and where the 
probabilities of detection and punishment are not high - and this 
reflects in the lack of interest in retribution for most of 
modernity by modern governments with the increased concealability 
of offending resulting from social complexity, mobility, and 
privacy.
In arguing for the destruction of the mediating techniques of the 
modern state and the utilitarianism which accompanies it, 
Christie has a problem, for in also rejecting the "hold of 
abstraction" and the conceptual retributionism which accompanies 
that, he has reduced the legitimacy of punishment to personal in­
teraction. Christie is relying partly on those rather 'romantic' 
analyses which seek to recreate the position where
"small democracies make it easier for citizens to 
internalise norms and values, hence to increase voluntary 
compliance and reduce coercion. Alienation and anomie - loss 
of community - are much more likely in larger democracies".30
Similarly, to a 'liberal' reading, MacIntyre in After Virtue is
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demonstrative of the occasion where people toward the end of an 
era lose their faith in their institutions; and finally abandoned 
their belief that these institutions might still be reformed from 
within.31
MacIntyre's disbelief is two fold - it concerns the operation of 
the actual institutions of the modern ' liberal-democratic1 nation 
state, and, the institution of moral language. The 
political/moral language of modernity still contains a vast array 
of terminology but this vocabulary simply does not add up to a 
coherent discourse any more. The 'solution1 he appears to offer 
is to reconstitute such a sense of coherence by a contained 
moral-political language game set in the utopian community, the 
motif of which he takes as a developed communal mode or 
monastery. The Benedictine Rule is offered as a model for 
administrating this kind of equalitarian order, small enough, 
personal enough, to create a mediating and reflexive language 
game incapable of overwhelming and extinguishing normal diversity 
of talents and individual personality.
The danger with the Christie move is that we may give up 
conceptual mediation and achieve a position where the only objec­
tivity may be that of an arbitrary personalization - paradoxi­
cally individualism could indeed be "absolute", and emotivism 
reign. The suspicion of ahistoricism can also be levelled on this 
talk, for are these localizations to forget the airs of enligh­
tenment penology? Is there to be a mass amnesia to conjure 
purity? Another criticism of Christie is that this talk is simply 
irrelevant to the increasing wider social concerns of 
Criminology. This is a criticism that he has in effect been 
concerned only to counter the modern conservative monopoly on 
'effective discourse' concerning street crime or interpersonal 
conflict. In this area we should also be aware that although 
proximate interaction (informal, implicit, customary forms of 
social control) may be engaged not only as a softer and more 
humane mechanism (that can be questioned) of control, that such 
proximate control tends to cover a much wider range of behaviour
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than does the remote form (formal, explicit, legal). Much of the 
social control bonds of those societies which appear reliant upon 
strong informal control - i.e. 'traditional1 societies and in 
certain modern societies as in Japan - are given up in systems 
which have more reliance upon formal - i.e. as in the 'West' - 
which is why, from the perspective of autonomy daily life in the 
West appears (subject to the critical revisions of those like 
Foucault) freer than Asia.
Furthermore, even if a Christie type arrangement comes about this 
does not mean a settled system; for proximate interaction is not 
necessarily more effective or humane (etc.), being only possibly 
more effective (etc.), for behaviour accepted proximately, but 
not elsewhere, for sanctioning [as the mediation schemes have 
discovered, i.e., a vast range of mediation on 'conflicts' which 
would not have been dealt with by the more formal agencies 
(police, social services) are now the subject of these mediation 
schemes]. Also, proximate interaction simply is irrelevant to 
many of the concerns at a higher level; for instance, corporate 
crime, environmental danger, which can only be tackled by a 
higher degree of articulation in the rhetorical battle over the 
value ranking discourses of modernity.
I l l
Stanley Cohen grasps the pragmatist mantle in the name of 
defending the gains that "morality" has achieved in criminal jus­
tice. Cohen cannot share the Christie faith in the miminization 
of the state - hence utilitarianism can be attacked but never 
overcome since crime control systems are simply what criminal 
justice is about in modernity. "Moral pragmatism" is required as 
the necessary tactic of our age. This states that the language 
game of utilitarianism and the goal of reducing crime must be 
disrupted at the point where it implies the destruction of 
"cherished values" such as "doing good" (in "the sense of the 
rightness and fairness of punishment for the collective good"),
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and the defence of "values in themselves". Thus,
"while strategic goals are certainly justifiable, for 
example using the struggle for justice as a way of exposing 
injustice and using benevolence as a way of exposing 
inhumanity, these goals should not override immediate human 
needs".32
The Cohen of Visions of Social Control is right, in this respect, 
to call himself a pragmatist and his elucidation of what 
pragmatic implies is directly in line with part of that tradi­
tion .
"The 'pragmatic' element stands against all forms of prema­
ture theoretical and political closure, all quests for 
cognitive certainty which rule out certain solutions as 
being conceptually impure or politically inadmissible. 
[Thus] If the guiding values of social intervention are made 
clear (justice, good or whatever else might be offered) then 
the only question is: what difference does this particular 
policy make? Each proffered solution must thus be weighed up 
in terms of its consistency or inconsistency with preferred 
values, the alternative solutions realistically available at 
the moment of choice, and the likelihood of the programme 
being able to realise (intentionally or otherwise) the 
desired goals with the minimum cost".3
However, Cohen states that
"utilitarian considerations should, where possible, be 
secondary to attaining these values for there own sake and 
whatever their other results, [his preference] is to be 
pragmatic about short term possibilities but to be genuinely 
utopian about constructing long-term alternatives".34
His pragmatism then is a defensive response - Cohen embraces
pragmatism because it is tactful to do so at present; it is as
a consequence of the fact that
"alongside an analytical view of current social- control 
systems, can be placed a more pragmatic sense about pos­
sibilities for realising preferred values".35
In other words, for utilitarian reasons. His own bottom line is 
apparent in his conclusion that there is only one political 
philosophy "consistent with sociology, namely anarchism." But 
anarchism has traditionally rested upon a 'faith* in man to find 
the true 'natural law* of sociality through the minimisation of 
organization, through the maximization of voluntary co-operative 
enterprises, and the denial of politics. Anarchism, after all,
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can be read as not merely the de-statisation of the social, but 
the total de-politicisation and can be seen to rest in the same 
'unpragmatic’ faith Christie shared - in the end Cohen appears 
to seek for pragmatism only to save himself from despair at the 
power of utilitarianism and the collapse of a secure foun- 
dationalism upon which to situate reference points.36
IV
Christie's analysis equates in spirit to Habermas's "colonization 
of the lifeworld". This notion of Habermas is not, we should 
note, the earlier marxist concern to locate in the 
rationalization of the life world expanding capitalist interests 
(i.e. the 'market' mentality of social control and system 
behaviour with a conformity compensated by rewards dependent upon 
the role of private consumer and public client of the welfare 
state) but more a juridical conception of Weberian 
rationalization; a notion which has led to the concept of the 
"juridification" of social existence.37
For Christie the role of the state has been to appropriate social 
conflict from the possibility of being something in which 
individuals were fully participants and where individuals - 
offender(s), victim(s), witnesses and other interested parties 
- have the power, opportunity and right to work through. Instead 
the legal regulations of the modern state ensures that the 
citizens are but clients of the processes and products of such 
regulations. There is thus a strong relationship of dependency 
between such individuals and the system of administration; this 
analysis is similar to Donzelot’s "tutelary complex".38 The very 
structure of such administration leads to bureaucratic 
implementation of the social guarantees of the modern state, 
which as Habermas states causes "pressure towards the 
redefinition of everyday life situations". The individual citizen 
is thus primarily regularised into defining his public social 
existence in terms of strategic-rational, acquisitive
295
relationships to bureaucracies.
For Habermas this subjective redefinition of public life in terms 
of strategic rationality may have deleterious effects over time 
on the propensity of citizens to engage in various forms of 
cooperative social and political action.
This reflects in two primary ways.
First, a redefinition of the client's lifeworld arising from 
the fact that juridification requires an incessant process of 
"compulsory abstraction" of everyday life situations. This is 
twofold in its effects: a) it is a cognitive necessity for
everyday life situations to be subsumable into legal categories 
(i.e. not only rights/obligations but offence/non-offence; 
reportable/non-reportable; specifically the categories of theft, 
rape, fraud (etc,)); b) it is a practical necessity for 
administrative control to be exercised. The deleterious effect 
is the creation of a reifying influence upon the nature of 
interpersonal social relationships, the destruction of any shared 
'common sense' in interpersonal activity which facilitates 
harmonious understanding other than this juridification. When 
combined with the enhanced claims to expertise of social workers, 
police, law-officers, and other administrators concerned with the 
juridified categories of life this produces an insidiously 
expanding domain of dependency.
Second, man's relationship to reason becomes primarily a 
living notion of strategic rationality. This becomes the dominant 
criteria of rationality in socio- political life, dominating 
questions which could alternatively demonstrate that they have 
both normative and explanatory significance. This is reflected 
in criminology, for example, in Matza's revolt against 
'correctionalism' in the name of 'appreciation' which opened up 
inquiry into alternative directions.39 In the 1970's 'radical' 
criminologists called into question the legal definition of crime 
and hoped to open up the very subject matter of criminology to 
alternative issues. In doing so, however, they often demonstrated 
the very hold of 'juridification'. The Schwendinger's, for
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instance, argued that to restrict criminological concern to 
violations of state-made law was to accept the definitions of 
harm and wrongfulness that the state asserted and they argued for 
a redefinition of crime as a violation of human rights; in this 
way they hoped to include as crimes activities of the powerful.40 
In calling for the redefinition of crime as violations of human 
rights these radicals relied upon a product of previous 
'juridification1, i.e. the concept of human rights themselves, 
and thus the actual argument was over the control of 
juridification (the power to utilise it) and not the process 
itself. Louk Hulsman, conversely, refuses to offer an alternative 
set of conceptions arguing the abolitionist perspective that the 
terminology of 'crime' should be extinguished without anything 
being put in its place.41
Some recent approaches on interpreting criminal statistics 
implicitly use a recognition of juridification. For instance, 
research undertaken from the perspective of strategic rationality 
has freed criminology from the assumption guiding the early 
positivist approach to criminal statistics that crime, of its 
nature, is something which is reported to the relevant 
administrative authorities, i.e. the police. This assumption can 
now be seen as a form of juridification, i.e. that crimes of 
their living conceptual nature are naturally "things" that are 
necessarily reported and handed over to the expertise of the 
police. We now hold that the social reality of crime (a 'highly 
contestable' term which is here used in the sense of the 
subjective definition of the common sense of the participant 
observing that the 'event' is 'reportable') is something that may 
or may not be reported depending on the subjects subjective 
conception of the coefficients in a strategic rational 
calculation (i.e. in this case an effective translation of 
strategic rationality into contextual rationality). The British 
Crime Survey can thus provide certain information as to the 
offence type reported and various reasons for non-reporting.42 
However, the question is still framed in terms of why the victim 
did not report the offence rather than a questioning of why was
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it thought that this event should be reported? In related 
criminological literature Pepinsky points out one effect that the 
realization of the 'unreality' of official criminal statistics 
has had. Previously the ability to define the crime rate of a 
society resided in the methodology of official processes - the 
resulting compilation was the amount of crime a society had. The 
supplementation of the official statistics by self report and 
victim studies in search for a calculable 'dark figure1 and 
knowledge by which the official statistics could be extrapolated 
into the 'real' gives a non-participatory influence to in­
dividuals to increase information demands for greater administra­
tive control (since the 'real' crime is so much higher). For 
Pepinsky this 'rationalization' of statistics on crime gives the 
basis for the rational response of more intensive policing since
"the American response to the perception that the crime 
problem is growing has been one of increased reliance on a 
growing criminal justice bureaucracy to arbitrate
conflict.... furthermore, Americans have proved unable or 
unwilling to manage their day-to-day interpersonal affairs 
without official criminal justice intervention. If the 
defining principle of democracy is that citizens shall 
govern their own affairs, this trend in response to crime 
literally represents a kind of decline in the level of 
democracy.."
We should note that Habermas stresses, in effect, that
juridification is linked to a dependency in imagination as to how 
we think, define and norm areas of life such as micro politics, 
family relations, welfare provisions, education, old age, as well 
as physical and mental health and well being. The corrective to 
juridification which Habermas offers is implicitly the liberating 
power of social theory, the provision of alternative modes of 
understanding to the juridic, to accomplish a wholesale
modernisation of modernity. The pragmatic interpretation sees 
progress via the seizing from groups of games in the activity of 
creating new games; that is, to engage in a conscious metaphysics 
of 'constructivist social reality1. To the pragmatic imagination 
this is the methodology of social evolution, an understanding 
that denies to the rationalist the timeless essences of non­
human moral ontologies and to the empiricist the deconstruction 
of rationalist categories into mere materialism. Looking again
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at the comments of Robinson referred to in our last chapter his 
dual ontology becomes untenable. In his understanding the 
entities of 'moral science' flow from the geometrical structures 
built upon foundational premises and these entities, for example 
rights, "are the most unnatural entities in the universe, 
existing as they do only in the realm of moral reasoning and 
never in the realm of space and time". Their historical or social 
origins are entirely beside the point, the entities of 
moral/rational discourse "do not occur in nature and are thus not 
natural; they are sublime, and it is the task of civilization to 
keep them so."44 But to the pragmatic imagination it is not the 
case that "no description of the bare facts of the material 
world, no matter how complete or precise, can address these moral 
entities which arise from rational discourse on subjects of moral 
consequence" for the existence of rights is their very operation 
within the language games of the social body. And that is an 
operation which is observable and whose experiencing determines 
what the 'meaning-in-use' of the regulatory idea actually is.
V
Excursus on an example of Language Games in Criminal Justice. 
The significance of language games can be further gathered by 
focusing onto a specific area of current Criminal Justice 
practice: the question of the exclusion of evidence obtained from 
the accused. This may also serve to focus elements of 
contemporary epistemological conflict at a clearly visible level 
contrasting two prominent continental figures: the German neo­
rationalist Jurgen Habermas and the French pragmatist Jean- 
Francois Lyotard.
Habermas declares that the 'telos' of our discursive engagements,
i.e. the intermixing of language games, is to reach 'truth'. 
Habermas reaches this position through what he calls a programme 
of "universal pragmatics" and there is no doubt that he derives 
much from the Wittgenstein understanding that language is 
embedded in life - so much so that Habermas sees language so 
interconstituted with social practices and not solely linguistic 
in nature that language (in the sense close to language games) 
is "a medium of domination and social force" as well as of 
communication. Many commentators have remarked that Habermas sees 
as our goal a utopia of a 'noiseless reconciled community'45 
which is to be achieved by stripping the barriers away from pure 
communication.
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His analysis was first situated in the narrow critique of 
science: in Knowledge and Human Interests he saw the 1problem' 
focused drive of modern science linking the production of 
knowledge with certain interest structures which shaped and 
contained the objects of analysis and structured their range of 
possible meanings. He thus presented a typological Interest- 
Knowledge structure of domination and the hope of an emerging 
emancipatory counter-interest. However, in his 1973 'Postscript' 
Habermas revises the determinism of his typology as a consequence 
of his desire to save both (1) the fruits of science and (2) the 
development of a notion of the social evolution of reason (the 
drive of the Enlightenment) from the charges of anthropological 
irrationalism his notion of strict interest creation appeared to 
present.46 He introduces a division between 'Action' and 
'Discourse' where 'action' refers to the interactional coarse 
process where information is gathered through sensory experience 
and exchanged through ordinary language; 'discourse' refers to 
the realm of communication which is abstracted from the context 
of everyday life. We move away from the ordinary language and 
'humble' concern of Wittgenstein to reincorporate the process of 
epistemological purification.47 The participants in a 'discourse' 
have primarily epistemological motives; they are not concerned 
to perform actions or share experiences, but rather to search for 
arguments and justifications - the only motivation allowed in 
this search is the co-operative drive to arrive at an 
understanding. From this division Habermas holds that while the 
object domains of the sciences are differentially constituted by 
the interests which operate at the level of action, the validity- 
claims which these sciences raise are subject to the unitary 
conditions of discursive argumentation - this is so as the 
'objectivity' attainable by science is based upon a suspension 
of 'action' constraints, and this alone "permits a discursive 
testing of hypothetical claims to validity and thus the 
generation of rationally grounded knowledge".4
Habermas' criticism of the Wittgenstein notion of language games 
was that "in Wittgenstein and his disciples, the logical analysis 
of the use of language always remained particularistic; they 
failed to develop it into a theory of language games."49 By the 
time he arrives at The Theory of Communicative Action it is clear 
that Habermas is concerned to postulate a universal 'grammar' - 
the existence, or at least the notion of which, is presupposed 
by the very notion of the 'grammar' of individual games; this he 
calls the 'ideal-speech-situatipn'.50 Our ability to communicate 
has a universal core, basic structures and fundamental rules that 
we implicitly master and recognise when we learn to speak a 
language. This notion of language is also a radical social 
critique, a radicalised, pragmatised social epistemology - 
pragmatised because we are totally concerned with the 
transformation of critique into life practices flowing out of our 
recognition of the primacy of epistemology to action and our 
nature as active. True human interaction will be guided by the 
notion of this pure grammar - our Kantian faith now rests in the 
notion of the ideal-speech-situation. "On this unavoidable 
fiction rests the humanity of relations among men who are still
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men".51 Truth is a validity-claim redeemable in an ideally 
structured theoretical discourse which relies upon the 
possibility of using reasons or grounds to gain intersubjective 
recognition for validity claims able to be subjected to rational 
criticism.
Habermas specifies that an important effect of this methodology 
and scheme for reaching truth is to preserve consensus against 
force - what is proposed is an appropriate 'reflective mechanism' 
for dealing with problematic validity-claims - that is, modes of 
abstracted pure argumentation. We, in turn, are bound to the 
ultimate goal of truth (in its definition by consensus) by our 
entry into language and communication, further as "the conditions 
for the truth of statements is the potential consent of all 
others....Truth means the promise to attain a rational 
consensus." We are bound by this prescriptively and under the 
rule of the 'rational1 the substantive truth of the assertion of 
the statement becomes something pertaining to statements which 
can be either true or false (not sentences or simple 
utterances).52 Truth is a validity-claim connected with 
constantive speech acts; to say that a statement is true is 
equivalent to saying that the assertion of the statement is 
warranted, and the assertion of the statement is warranted if and 
only if that statement would command a rational consensus among 
all who enter into a discussion with the speaker. A rational 
consensus is a consensus which is argumentatively obtained under 
the conditions of an ideal-speech-situation - the pragmatic drive 
of this is to face up to the socio-cultural matrix of individual 
action situations and transform them in the effort to create 
conditions as close as possible to the ideal-speech-situation.53
Habermas states that he is defending the enlightenment commitment 
to reason; to the pragmatist he is defending specifically the 
constructionist project with a vision of the speculative unity 
of all knowledge, and the linkage of man to such knowledge; a 
"meta-narrative" which the pragmatist Lyotard is at pains to say 
is vanquished. For Lyotard we must face up to the 'fact' that we 
have arrived at 'post-modernity' and recognise that the image of 
the ideal-speech-situation is simply another narrative entity 
which fits as a regulative device onto one of the discredited 
notions of progress, namely pure emancipation.
To Lyotard the emphasis upon consensus is indicative of the 
desire for a stable 'order of reason1, and he holds that instead 
of it being possible to envisage an ideal of a core set of rules 
governing all language games "it is clear that language games are 
heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic 
rules".54 Consensus cannot be the goal of dialogue as "consensus 
is only a particular state of discussion, not its end. Its end, 
on the contrary, is paralogy".55 Instead of 'discourse1 linked 
to obtaining consensus Lyotard declares we turn to the notion of 
"justice as a value neither outmoded nor suspect. We must thus 
arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to 
that of consensus".56 Instead of consensus we are presented with 
the concept of the 'temporary contract' about which the
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consequences are "ambiguous"; this is an ambiguity which 
preserves the openness of the concept and allows the notion of 
the temporary contract to be related to another notion: 
"knowledge of language games as such and the decision to assume 
responsibility for their rules and effects."57 That is to say, 
reflexive pragmatism.
With this epistemological framework in mind the language game of 
police power in producing evidence for the criminal trial 
demonstrates differing interpretations mirroring the division 
between Habermas and Lyotard.
Let us take the American discussion first. The President's Task 
Force on Violent Crime presented this picture:
"the citizen wants safety and expects justice, but too often 
he or she gets neither. Trials and the subsequent appeals 
that seem to go on without end have been turned into a 
search for error rather than a quest for truth (which was 
the original purpose of the trial and advocacy system in 
this country).. After a trial in which all kinds of 
technicalities are introduced, there are the endless 
appeals, in which the conduct of all the actors protecting
society are examined through a microscope to see if somehow
the appellate court can't find some basis on which to 
overturn the conviction and either throw it out entirely or 
send it back for more and more trials."58
The charge is simple: the American court system presently
operates in a way contrary to the Habermas scheme and our critics 
desire it to become more attuned to the search for truth. At 
present the higher, 'discursive engagement1 of the appellant
courts, operate a 'reflective mechanism' which seeks not to 
purify the epistemology of the contents of the statements and 
thus obtain a rational consensus over the ontological content of 
the statement, i.e., the 'truth' (the question did he do the 
offence?, the truth of the contested evidence), but the deviant 
moves (faulty behaviour outside the sphere of reason) of the 
actors in the sphere of action (did anyone breach constitutional 
protections and 'rules' of obtaining information) concerning the 
set mode of the game at present. We do not redeem the 
information/knowledge claims of the statements in the light of 
the ideal-speech-situation (what would the pure access to 
information decide), but search out the breaches in action of 
instrumental information gathering.
To the critics' call for change the response of the Civil 
Liberties movement is similar to the Lyotard dicta: "knowledge 
of language games as such and the decision to assume 
responsibility for their rules and effects". The rules and 
effects relate to rights and liberties of the subject vis a vis 
the State. But Lyotard would have us believe that this is a 
dichotomy which is in continual tension and wherein any 
'consensus', i.e. stabilised game, is only temporary, and will 
surrender in time to "the heterogeneities of desire".
The Scottish Judge, Lord McCluskey, in his 1986 Reith Lectures
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appears to come down in favour of Lyotard:
"it is, of course, extremely important to strike a just 
balance between the freedom of law-enforcement agencies to 
investigate crime effectively and the necessary liberties of 
the subject. But this balance is not, I believe, a balance 
that can be struck once and for all time, and for all 
cases.1159
He went on to talk in terms very close to the temporary contract 
of Lyotard specifying that restrictions on civil liberties may be 
freely accepted by most citizens "when they see their society 
threatened by some great and imminent danger, for example, in time 
of war, or when terrorists are perpetrating outrages, or if the 
country is facing a great and growing problem of hard-drug abuse 
or organised crime". One wonders quite how the contract is to be 
arrived at - McCluskey's answer is through politics, the decisions 
of elected bodies and not the courts.
To the pragmatist this is a narrow conception of politics since, 
accepting that the decision of the elected body, for example 
parliament, offering a linguistic statement is politics, the 
placement of that statement into other language games outside of 
the parliament, the performance of the living language, is 
political in the sense of giving coherence to that statement - 
giving a living meaning to that statement is surely as political 
as its first utterance. How can it be that the argument which sets 
out in some statue an arrangement which offers us, or a particular 
party, a set of 'rights', is political while the activity which 
makes that set into a grammar of life is not? How can politics be 
merely 'parliamentary activity' and everything else be 'social 
organization' - a matter of sociology and technocratic 
managerialness?
The pragmatic imagination affirms the role of practice, of praxis, 
of society as construction rather than society as a given. Thus all 
forms of social knowledge, and the entities of that knowledge, for 
example 'rights', have both explanatory and normative aspects which 
are always present (even though in any analysis one or the other 
may be emphasised or neglected). Thus rights, including human 
rights, are not discovered in the Eighteenth century when mankind's 
enlightened Reason breaks free of darkness and discovers the 
structure of rationality which demonstrates the essential link of 
humans and rights, they are instead actively constructed, and their 
continuation is not given. Their continuation, and their embodiment 
in the grammar of life requires effort, vigilance, and various 
states of mind, one of which following Dworkin with respect to 
present liberal-constitutional states (in Law's Empire) we may call 
integrity, but which in their operation are an exercise in 
participation in the political play of that society and are hence 
political in the original sense of the word (As brought out in the 
writings of Hannah Arendt, for example). To the pragmatist civil 
society is not merely a reflection of the political creation but 
the meaning of the created entity is only 'truly' knowable in civil 
society - hence the state civil society division is overplayed. It 
is not, as a crude pragmatist once put it, that statue does not 
become law until it has been interpretated and applied by the
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courts, but that the effective meaning of that statue is its 
placement in the various grammars of the language games of that 
society - the differences between the desire of the legislative as 
to what the play may be, and the placement of the court, and 
thereafter the placement of the courts ruling by relevant parties 
and other authorities may be great.
Human rights, to the pragmatist, can be acknowledged as a corollary 
of the Kantian imperative to treat humans as individuals by virtue 
of their autonomy - this abstract conception (autonomy) is not 
related to any particular conception of the common good or ranking 
of goods60, instead it allows a constructivist perspective devoid 
of intensive knowledge as the necessary presupposition. There is 
some combination of ‘ideas' which allow this constructivist process 
to be effected, namely the Kantian belief in the rational human 
capacity for autonomy, a requirement for the linkage to reason and 
the developing critical rationality which will subject desires to 
personal ordering coherently, and certain concepts of the empirical 
conditions of life, but these are open to variation in the vision 
of the good life which any individual may hold, dislocates the 
grammar of the games of the time, creating a space which allows 
conditions, plays, and movements through which individuals may 
partly design their lives.
The allocation of rights, secured as acceptable entities in the 
games (trumps in mainly utilitarian games as Dworkin put it in 
Taking Rights Seriously^, allows individuals to use these as tools 
to make their own projects in life. In the acceptance of this, what 
once was disruptive, revolutionary, a false move, becomes natural. 
Autonomy, for example, becomes seen as the natural capacity of 
mankind - the rationalist finds reinforcement in the way of the 
world for what he postulated as man's natural facility oblivious 
to the fact that it was his supposition which created the idea 
which, when placed in practice as varieties of grammar, constituted 
and determined the natural.
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Part Three:
Developing Terrain: 
towards Reflexive Pragmatism in Criminal Justice.
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Chapter Eight: The 1 truth' of Criminal Justice: The Domain of
Criminological Knowledge and Modernity.1
I
Criminology is a blanket term for our understanding of crime and 
of the state's handling of crime and related matters. The central 
feature of criminology is thus 'criminal justice' (and this is 
so whether or not we consider this a matter for sociology) . 
Whatever the socio-cultural context there are at least two 
intersecting areas or conceptual terrains. Namely the question 
of crime (here we may include deviance, as well as the criminal 
or the deviant) and the notion of justice. In this chapter our 
concern is with models or forms of epistemological structuring 
focusing around the question of what the just judgement would be 
in criminal justice.1
In the current interest in revisionism the ideas of "the Greeks" 
provide a common narrative beginning. The use made of this period 
varies: some ascribe to the idea of Plato the role of the father 
of rehabilitative philosophy.2 Michael Moore, for instance, in 
the midst of his comprehensive Law and Psychiatry: rethinking the 
relationship refers to the Platonic view as "the medicalization 
of morals" but such an ascription, at least when clearly drawn, 
obscures. Moore turns to the Republic noting that Plato held 
there that justice and injustice "are in the soul what the 
healthful and the diseaseful are in the body" and that 
"virtue... would be a kind of health and beauty and good 
condition of the soul, and vice would be disease, ugliness and 
weakness".3 Moore associates the Platonic conception with firm 
lines and confident marcation which are in turn to be rejected 
by us in our general perception of the "oddness of platonic
xWe are here talking about 'criminal justice' not dispute 
resolution nor general instruments of social control; as
S.Roberts points out on Order and Dispute, to assume that dispute 
resolution takes place everywhere within essentially legalistic 
categories is to observe the world through Western (eurocentric) 
lenses and not to let the world speak on its own terms. We, 
however, are concerned with the Eurocentric traditions for that 
is where 'we' are.
315
ontology...[and] his kind of objectivist ethics”.
This traditional and still dominant view of Platonic justice sees 
its essential methodology as first producing a 'true' theoretical 
discourse of the ontology of the cosmos, i.e. a theoretical 
description of the 'true' being of the world and society, and 
that in turn society will be just if it can be brought into 
conformity with this true being. It is an interpretation of Plato 
which also forms the essential straw man which Jean-Francois 
Lyotard's enterprise of a 'post-modern' judging is to be ranged 
against.4 Instead of this Platonic model Moore sees the 
"naturalist tradition", of which Aristotle is placed as the
originator, as more in line with our current empiricist frame of 
thinking.
The contrast with Aristotle is also pursued by Lyotard but for 
a different reason - Aristotle is seen as beginning a politics 
of judging. A mode of judging which takes place in the midst of 
opinions rather than in the grip of a comprehensive episteme. In 
such a way the central problem of the Platonic - how to create 
the transference of drawing a just prescription from a 
description which is 'true' - that is the problem of how we go
from "from the true to the just", is avoided. (Note the
'Platonic' conception of justice has existed for most
commentators as a generalization that there must always exist a 
theoretical solution to the problem of the 'just'. The just is 
definable 'a priori' for what is just will necessarily be 
dictated by the 'true' state of being for any entity and we start 
from the presumption that any entity has one true state of being, 
one true 'nature'.) Such a conception for justice, which appears 
to place the possibility of justice dependent upon the 
specification of the ontological structure of the cosmos, has 
always aroused the ires of those who have denied either the 
primacy of the ontological thesis, or the possibility of man to 
know it.5
The 'Platonic' image is attacked for two main reasons: one is a
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general suspicion of any thesis of an absolute framework of a 
steady ontological structure which may become depicted in 
theoretical discourse (as with the thesis of the intelligibles 
which lie behind the confusing array of the sensual); a second 
is the question of quite how is it that any particular judge, or 
engager in practical reason, is ever supposed to become familiar 
with this ontology.
This second criticism is presumed to dispose also of the 
Aristotelian tradition of teleological ontology. This is not a 
simple disagreement about the ontological thesis but a criticism 
which seeks to demonstrate the circularity and denial of 
reflexivity within which the epistemological methodology of the 
idealised 'greek' judge is seen to exist.
The circularity argument holds that both the Platonic and the 
Aristotelian create a circle to avoid the problem of an infinite 
regress in the creative movement of coming to know the just. The 
circle is seen in these terms: moral, including judicial,
understanding depends on vision; the virtue of appreciating 
vision depends on character, yet character can be properly shaped 
only in accord with a prior vision, which has created the 
structural conditions for proper character to be instilled in the 
person. With Aristotle this is seen in the necessary relationship 
he postulated between ethics and politics: the Nicomachean Ethics 
concludes by pointing to the Politics suggesting that the 
problems of ethics and justice are a subsumed part of the general 
problem of how best to constitute the political community. To act 
justly is a virtue and for this "the soul. . . must first have been 
conditioned by habits to the right kind of likes and dislikes..." 
But the character with the right kind of likes and dislikes can 
be fashioned only in a properly ordered, virtuous community. Good 
ethics requires good politics - but good politics requires good 
ethics. For the practices of the good society depend themselves 
on moral understanding, and practical actions within depend on 
vision - vision depends on character; character must be shaped 
by those who came before us.... We then must ask: 'Who comes
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first the just man or the just society?' Is society able to 
become just and to be recognised as just because of the actions 
of individual just men who create that set of conditions, or, is 
the individual only able to act justly and to recognise justice 
within the practices of the just society and the concepts and 
tools of articulation which such a society provides for the 
individuals within, but not outside, it.6 The problem of the 
infinite regress is seen in the question of what justifies the 
wise or virtuous man's claim to a vision of moral truth? By whom 
was their character originally shaped - this regress can only, 
it is thought, be cured by Aristotle postulating a good lawgiver, 
and Plato a philosopher-king.
To MacIntyre this line of criticism rests upon a fundamental 
misunderstanding of both Plato and Aristotle. For MacIntyre the 
distinction traditionally drawn . between Plato and Aristotle 
neglects the extent to which Aristotle can be seen "as Plato's 
heir" and whose explicit account of a structured community, the 
polis, is the necessary context for understanding the 
'foundational status' of the just.
Although it does appear that for Aristotle justice is implicated 
in the teleological account of the cosmos, in the operation of 
finding a common measure for judgement the action boundaries of 
the frame of reference are drawn much closer to individual man. 
The account of the justice of any act, any decision, cannot be 
seen as free standing only answerable to theoretical accounts of 
the totality of the cosmos, but is part of the living practices 
of the polis. All practices are, however, interrelated and guided 
by the existence of a common standard; it is the choice of, and 
in turn the respect for, a common measure which makes the polity 
survive.
The common life of a society was to be a life beholding a shared 
purpose and commitment, and within this context it is the rule 
of justice linked to that purpose which makes possible the 
exchange of things and which allows the establishment by men of
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their self-identities (i.e. their narrative role and character). 
The character of individual men is a reflection of their respect 
and practice of the virtues, and yet virtue requires the 
existence of what is agreed as a vision of the just society to 
flourish. Virtues take their strength from their practice in an 
ordered hierarchy in which activities are purposeful in their 
contribution to those sets of relations which lead to the 
furtherance of the good for society.
Which in turn means that society needs a highly articulated
conception of the common good and of the hierarchy of goods which
orders social relationships from the defence of the polis to the
duties of the household. Each conception of a good has its own
account, but this is always an account which can never be
presented in theoretical insularity since it is a question of the
practices of the polis. The question of what is just can never
be answered by a theoretical system (a theoretical solution)
centred around a theoretical definition of what is just but must
be uncovered in a dialectic of practice and the theoretical which
practice embodies and in turn places under stress. The question
of 'Justice' can never be given a theoretical solution but only
a practical one within the social context of the polis. As
MacIntyre summarises:
"Aristotle's accounts of practical reasoning and of justice 
require one specific type of context, that of a society 
structured in terms of systematic forms of activity, within 
each of which specific goods are acknowledged and pursued, 
while within the overall social order the activity of 
politics provides for the inhabitants of the polis ways of 
understanding and pursing those goods in an integrated way, 
so that the good and the best may be achieved".7
Aristotle's presupposed social context is one in which evaluation 
is primarily in terms of the achievement of the ends of activity, 
and the individual envisaged by Aristotle engages in practical 
reasoning not just qua individual, but qua citizen of a polis. 
In such a context the epistemological grasp of the basic goods 
of human flourishing can be ascertained by a reflective grasp of 
what appears self-evidently good for men. It is not derived from 
observation of some profile of nature from the outside; but it
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is rather a process of non referential understanding from the 
inside. Such a process is therefore heavily context dependant and 
with the breakdown of these forms of life, or the acknowledgement 
that social reality does not provide such a context, this mode 
of epistemological reasoning is unable to be accomplished.
It is a commonplace to acknowledge how in an expanding world the 
reconciliation between the Aristotelian science of the 
teleological conception of ontology and a growing rational 
theology which reduced 'mystery' into the Being of a personalised 
God gave irrational theology a power base to legitimate a 
political domination of church and sovereign through Christendom 
- a domination torn asunder in the changes of the Enlightenment.
II
The post-Enlightenment period produces essentially three 
Epistemological models for criminal justice. Two models which 
dominate any historical survey of criminology, namely the 
classicists and the positivists, and the present, the 
'post-positivist' or, alternatively, to treat it by the most 
visually dominant trend, the 'neo-classical' . The usual histories 
of criminology stress the thematic division between the 
classicists represented by names such as Beccaria, Blackstone and 
much of Bentham, who to varying degrees intermixed ideas of 
choice, free will and rational calculation, and the positivists, 
represented by Lombrosso and Ferri who, with their modern 
adherents like Skinner or Eysenck, accepted the idea that human 
behaviour is determined by forces over which the individual had 
little or no control.
Historically, most accounts dictate, in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries the positivists defeated the classicists and 
elevated the intellectual disciplines associated with criminal 
justice to a form of scientific status concentrating upon the 
study of the offender and his circumstances. The modern,
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'post-positivist' situation is ushered in when David Matza's 1964 
Delinquency and Drift is seen as taking criminology to task for 
holding to an 'old fashioned' belief in 'hard' determinism; 
criminology it seemed had not kept pace with developments in the 
philosophy of science which had displaced this notion by 'softer' 
versions. The 70's and 80's then abound with a grand expansion 
of 'paradigms' and 'conceptual schemes' concerning crime and 
deviance. Criminology is held to be freed from the ideological 
shackles of a false positivism, and a whole range of theorizing 
is announced which either emphasises 'praxis' or declares its 
role as actually 'giving the deviant a voice'. Then comes the 
cold reality of 'just desserts'! An expression of criminal 
justice focused on both deterrence and retributive ideology - the 
individualistic motif for practice which positivism espoused 
becomes out of step.
The conventional accounts of criminological development, i.e. 
Void (1958 and 1978), Radzinowicz (19668), The New Criminology 
(1974), see criminal justice as reflecting the Weberian 
discussion of the development of criminal law as surmounting its 
'irrational' roots and its development and differentiation in 
terms of the process of the rationalization of societies in 
general and of the law in particular. Weber's typology of legal 
conflict is carried out in the dimensions of rationality versus 
irrationality and formal versus substantive.
Void, for example, starts his narrative with the freeing of 
intellectual thought on crime from the domination of 
semi-religious Demonological explanations. Demonological 
explanations make use of the principle of other-worldly power to 
account for events, the rejection of demonism turns man's 
attention on to this world and the inherent structures of the 
world. The Humean attitude is openly scathing of popular 
fallacies and is also a criticism of the current legitimative 
conceptions for authority. These popular beliefs tied to the 
practices of wergild, a contest of sin and crime, trial by 
battle, trial by ordeal, compurgation, and the use of miraculous
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signs or omens to indicate guilt or innocence, in a ritualization 
of life. Behind such popular attitudes were also, however, 
sophisticated intellectual systems which drew out the remaining 
traits of what is sometimes referred to as "classical realism".9
What is characteristic of these systems is the interdependence 
of each part in an overall conception; an interdependence which 
borders on the aesthetic. In the scholastic system of Thomas 
Aquinas, for instance, the emphasis is on a synthesis of 
classical philosophy, Christian theology, and the concerns of 
politics. The duty of civil participation, natural political 
action, must be viewed in relation to citizenship in the kingdom 
of God. The synthesis requires a duality of movement - philosophy 
begins with the immediate objects of sense experience and reasons 
upward to more general conceptions, until, in neo-Aristotlean 
schemes, the mind fastens upon highest principles or first causes 
of being, ending in the conception of God. With theology the 
movement begins with the idea of God, the revealed concept, and 
moves downward seeing objects in the light of that relation. The 
movement of philosophy begins with diversity and chaotic 
impressions linking and classifying in search for a coherent set 
of final positions, or truths - the movement of theology begins 
from such a conception. Within such a synthesis elements have 
both a natural situation and a relation to supernatural ends. 
Loose ends are linked together - any semblance of 'mystery’ 
assuaged. The state is a natural institution, deriving from the 
nature of man, and is orientated towards satisfying and 
encouraging man's natural potentiality. It cannot, however, 
direct man to his supernatural end, that is the province of the 
church. The two cannot, however, be separate as both are within 
the scheme of creation and the power of creation is, ultimately, 
responsible for the whole of the cosmos. Guidance by Natural law 
is, thus, ultimately derived from guidance by Divine law - those 
who seek knowledge of their good will, ideally, find direction 
in the Natural law and, subsequently, the Divine law.10
The entire scheme of society and its laws are evaluated by a
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notion of the whole. A notion which in its heritage draws upon
a sympathetic dialectic with the legacy of Aristotle where the
choice of, and respect for, a common measure is what allows the
polity survive in the face of the disruptions pluralism would
give. The identity of the elements of justice, and what
designates their place in the right order of that society, the
rule of justice at the foundation of the socio-political
association, is the centrality of the common good. The common
good allows the positioning of individuals since
"the goodness of any part is considered in comparison with 
the whole... Since then any man is a part of the state, it 
is impossible that a man be good unless he be well 
proportioned to the common good."
Law is "a rational ordering of things which concern the 
common good, promulgated by whoever is charged with the care 
of the community".
Penal activity is not merely to reflect the power and authority
of the sovereign but to be aligned by reason and aimed at
benefiting the common good. The penal practices of the body share
both in the rationality of obvious power but also intellectual
acknowledgement for the defilement which sin brings is close to
the symbolism of the physical. Aquinas states
"now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a 
kind of contact in the soul; and when man sins, he cleaves 
to certain things against the light of reason and of the 
divine law.... the loss of splendour, occasioned by this 
contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul."12
It is a touching, a diseasing and contagion of the social world 
which demands a cleansing. This is a cleansing for which soap and 
water will not suffice but demands a ritual purification, a 
prescribed and sanctioned ceremony. Intercession by the power of 
God is required in the satisfaction of evil since the 
disobedience of the dictates of true law represents the absence 
or privation of something which is itself good. A privation which 
comes about by a deterioration or misuse of man's reason by 
deference to the force of passion, or a training in vice not 
virtue. Evil is the possibility of wrong choice which accompanies 
man's freedom, but choice is not something radically free 
springing out of an existential void but part of the practice of
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life - the development of man's practical rationality. [Or in the 
language which MacIntyre earlier identified with the virtues, the 
development of Character1, see After Virtue.1 Moral evil is the 
product of the will, whereby the essentially good element in the 
willed act lacks its true end. The privation may be righted by 
Divine grace; the human condition is incapable in itself, it 
simply does not possess powers of governing itself - it is 
created and ultimately dependant.13
IV
In Foucault's analysis of "governmentality" the practical 
politics of ruling which lies embedded in the intellectual 
legitimation of ruling pre-Enlightenment Europe, and which is 
displayed in the advice Machiavelli gives to the Prince, "posited 
the Prince in a relation of externality and singularity and 
consequently of transcendence to his principality."14 The ruler 
becomes ruler by inheritance or violent conquest, he is a product 
of the past or by an act of the present in which he imposes 
himself from outside, in either case he is not essentially part 
of the terrain of the ruled but remains external to it. The link 
he maintains with the territory of the ruled is synthetic and 
"there is no fundamental, essential, natural and juridical 
connection between the prince and his principality". There is a 
division, a dual anthropology of existence and of power. The will 
of the prince is not a product of the will of the ruled, the 
interests of his rule are not inherently their interests. This 
leads to a conclusion, "deduced as an imperative: that the object 
of the exercise of power is to reinforce, strengthen and protect 
his principality which is not meant in his object sense as the 
entity constituted by the subject and the territory, but rather 
in terms of the Prince's relation with what he owns, with the 
territory he has inherited or acquired, and with his subjects. 
This fragile link is what the art of government .. is to take as 
its object." The source of the power which is peculiar to the 
Prince is outside of the territory, the source of other powers
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internal to the operation of that territory which means that:
"while the doctrine of the Prince, as well as the juridical 
theory of sovereignty, are constantly attempting to draw the 
line between the power of the prince and any other form of 
power, because its task is to explain and justify this 
essential discontinuity between them, on the other hand in 
the art of government the task is to identify the 
continuity, both upwards and downwards."15
The displacement of this motif occurs around the Enlightenment 
when the modern concept of economy comes to designate "a certain 
level of reality, a field of intervention, through a series of 
complex processes" and where, moreover, the central focus of the 
'common good' becomes replaced by "an end which is 'convenient' 
for each of the things that are to be governed". Which in turn 
implies that the social body requires not the touch point of a 
common good but "a plurality of specific aims". The area now 
revealed Foucault places as an intersection of "security, 
territory and population"; an area where the finality of 
government resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit 
of the perfection and intensification of the processes which it 
directs and the instruments of government, instead of being laws, 
now come to be a range of multiform tactics. Legality is crucial 
to sovereignty but is only one aspect of governmentality. The 
concept of population allows sciences of government to isolate 
the reality to be governed as one reflective in rates of death, 
cycles of scarcity, levels of morality and mortality, in other 
words the development of statistics, the quantification of 
phenomena specific to population.
Thus for Hume dominant social institutions arise not so much from 
natural inclinations and knowledge of the good but from the fear 
of natural inclinations and the path to institutional reform is 
via knowledge of the facts of the human condition. But these are 
isolated facts - it is no longer for Hume possible for one man 
ever to claim that he can know 'the human condition' in its 
entirety, all he can know is some or other facts 'of' the human 
condition. This change is slowly apparent in the projects of 
writers who change both the nature of their concerns (their 
ambitions as to their coverage of humanity) and the 'facts' they
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report.16
What is apparent is an intermingling, a variety of claims and 
tactics. Defences of present structure, as in the writing of 
Blackstone for example, must in the concerns of criminal justice, 
be placed alongside the many reforms proposed (under the 
influence of Beccaria), and inside particular visions of 
progress. Whilst sceptical of grand claims law is slowly becoming 
adjusted to a conception of engineering social benefit on a scale 
which goes beyond the local and is not sovereign focused. In 
Lockean fashion Blackstone, for instance, sees the object of law 
to secure fundamental rights which "consist, primarily, in the 
free enjoyment of personal security, of personal liberty, and of 
private property".17 The role of law is not to lead people in 
the exercise of their virtue or to encourage behaviour conducive 
to developing a notion of an overriding telos of individual and 
common good, but to discourage (through penalising) conduct 
harmful to the fabric of social organization (organization that 
is in line with the new non-teleological notions of social 
welfare). More and more the 'justice' of the structure of the law 
is a vision of adequacy to various implicit and explicit social- 
political goals rather than that the law supposedly represents 
and structures a system of 'natural' status and teleos.
Sovereignty coexists; the image of law Austin gave was of "the 
command of the sovereign backed by threats and habitually 
obeyed".18 But this concept of Law is based on an empirical 
reflection of the fact of hierarchial social power which the 
ethos of crimio-administrative writing in its "liberal" clothing 
moved to contain in a 'legal-rational' framework - it has lost 
its normative dimension in a new claim to be a product of 
epistemological empiricism, to be a reflection of empirical 
reality, the way things really 'are'. The status of law is 
problematic; it becomes part of the tensions of modernity. One 
strand is the criminological 'liberal'19 criticism appeared 
necessary to apply 'reason' to a harsh social order in which 
recourse to power was often arbitrary; criticism which must play
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a game of satisfying the allure of sovereignty while capturing
its power in the confines of a reason which claims to represent
the social. The period 1688 to 1820 saw a rise in capital
statutes from 50 to 200 and the spread of the criminal law
attracted an ambiguous response. As the 'thought' of the social
came, it appeared, to exist freed from the confines of tradition
and religious hierarchy potential anarchy was avoided by
conceptual boundaries and balancing of decision making in formal
frameworks which structured decision possibilities. The growth
of the criminal law as a principal method of formal social
control and the strict operation of the law with the methodology
of crime control of the time having its crux in the symbolic
execution of the law through its capital aspects was also a
centralization of the power and 'will' of control.20 A
centralization of. power to punish wherein, as a later marxist
commentator put it, even the aristocracy of the eighteenth
century might agree that,
"the ideology of the ruling oligarchy, which places a 
supreme value on property, finds its visible and material 
embodiment above all in the ideology and practice of the 
law. Tyburn Tree, as William Blake well understood, stood at 
the heart of this ideology; and its ceremonies were at the 
heart of popular culture also".21
This marxist interpretation is, however, a product of a later 
period of intellectual reason. Hegel, flushed with the 
imagination of rationalism, gave the driving force to modernity 
as the coexistence of law and morality.22 Social progress moved 
via the determination of the Concept and the Concept delivered 
freedom in the development of individual and institutional 
rights, articulated in social contracts constituting and 
formalising property rights as personal and alienable. Via 
property, via the relations which law allowed, the individual 
reflected his worth and expressed his personality. Via 
institutions, via the relationships of the state which public law 
allowed, modern society set itself apart from the pre-modern as 
the expression of the free and rational and reached for the epoch 
of the absolute. Marx's inversion placed this expression of legal 
rationality, appreciated primarily by the new 'professional', as
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the ideology of class and social structure; as the appearance 
obscuring the reality of class interest. Weber, appreciating the 
distance modern rationality achieved from community and previous 
'objective1 moral systems, saw the rationality of law (developing 
legal norms) as differing in kind from that of religious or moral 
norms - thus distance existed between law and ethics. The law 
became a self-contained set of rational procedures whose 
knowledge base and interpretive methodologies were the property 
of, and existentially required, a body of professionals and 
technical expertise.23
Law's development in social control we may classify in Weberian 
terms as 'social rationalization' although there appeared 
different visions of what such rationalization entailed, as 
indeed were various analyses offered as to the dangers present 
in society; but progress in rationalization could be sought not 
only by those who protested the arbitrary power of the rulers but 
by those who saw the Poor Laws as "a corrupting benevolence", and 
from those who feared violent unrest, as well as those who 
assembled humanitarian reasons. The complex of determinants, some 
of which can be classified as class, religion, and rationality 
itself, may be as vast as the analyses of interpretators. To deny 
reducing this production to a master prescription does not mean 
that certain lengths of chains of determinants, certain "local" 
determinants, are not at work. Undoubtably, concomitant and 
interlocking processes are at work - macro structural-functional 
processes which contain processes of state formation, of 
capitalist formation, of legal-rational legitimacy formation, and 
the impact of legality itself (including the behavioral desires 
of the professions involved, for example, lawyers, and judges).
An example is the persecution of witches which became a matter 
of legal activity in the middle ages and was repealed in the 
course of the Enlightenment. The traditional criminological 
approach, as in Void for example, places belief in possession by 
the devil and associated evils such as witches as products of 
demonism - an epoch which saw witch trials is superseded by a
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different specie of social epistemology, namely naturalism. But
how does naturalism come about in criminal justice and how does
it affect witch hunts and trials? The assumption may be that
increasing education defeated the belief in witches but most of
the educated peoples of the middle ages appear to have believed
in witches, as Trevor-Roper put it:
"the more learned a man was in the traditional scholarship 
of the time, the more likely he was to support the witch 
doctors. The most ferocious witch-burning princes, we often 
find, are also the most cultured patrons of contemporary 
learning.1,24
Trevor-Roper does, however, place the image of epistemological 
transformation as ultimately determinate, giving credit to the 
writings of Descartes for having
"dealt the final blow to the witch craze in Western Europe. 
[What] ultimately destroyed the witch craze, on an 
intellectual level...[was] a philosophical revolution which 
changed the whole concept of nature and its operations".25
Jerome Hall identifies the factors of change as a complex 
interaction of truth, religious toleration and the rising active 
role of the professions, namely the lawyers and judges who were 
called upon to conduct the witch trials. The labelling 
perspective would remind us that the witches were actually weak 
and mostly old women who posed little threat to the 
concentrations of power in the social order and provided little 
resistance to their use as "outsiders" in a process of labelling 
which served to maintain boundaries and reinforce dominant 
conceptions of truth and authority in these societies. As Hall 
points out the actual decline of witch trials cannot be simply 
attributed to the philosophical systems of Descartes since the 
dissemination of his thesis occurred after the trials became 
obsolete. A range of social processes were at work: the impact 
of a scepticism concerning absolute claims of truth based on the 
old metaphysics, the impact of religious toleration, and the 
changing rise of the professionals. Thus: "The chief cause of the 
sharp decline in prosecution for witchcraft was the influence of 
lawyers and judges". The repeal of specific acts, such as the 
Witchcraft act of 1736, can be attributed to a changed attitude
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particularly of "the judges, lawyers, grand Jurymen and petty 
Jurymen whose collective resistance effectively brought the 
trials to an end." The attitude of the professional was a 
reflection of a different truth and of rising toleration. 
Toleration was a matter of compromise and the inability to 
conclusively demonstrate the singularity of truth's 
manifestation.26 The rise of toleration entailed the decline of 
persecution as a technique (that is to say belief in the 
effectiveness of that style of enforcement of control); the rise 
of scepticism reflected in the changing attitude of the lawyer 
to the questions of evidence and acceptance of external authority 
within the confines of legal judgement.27
V
The decline of the persecution of witches was a subset of a later 
movement of what scholars as far apart as Radzinowicz and 
Foucault have catalogued and offered interpretations of as "the 
end of the spectacle" wherein the power which displayed itself 
via the ceremony of public punishment was replaced by the 
prison,28 although it appears safer to accept a thesis of gradual 
development rather than a sudden transformation.29 This change 
undermined "theatrical" penality which had "echoed a long 
tradition of public punishment", and which Bentham described as 
"an imposing commentary - a sensible and speaking image of the 
law" (emphasis added), wherein the power of the sovereign was 
expressly tied to the truth of law and the truth behind law (the 
right to rule).30 In the context of this methodology of 
connection, of power wherein the rationality of law is open in 
its message of subjection, of an ownership of the seat of power, 
the Classical school of criminology, as exemplified in the work 
of Casame Bonesana, Marchuse de Beccaria ['dei Delitti e delle 
Pene1 (On Crimes and Punishment) published in 1764]31, takes its 
life.
Void characterises the Classical school as "administrative and
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legal criminology, concerned with setting out a scheme easy to
administer”,32 and Beccaria as
’’protesting against the many vagaries and inconsistencies in 
government and the management of public affairs.... He 
proposed reforms to make practice more logical and 
rational" .33
The criticisms of classicism which commentators concentrate upon 
are well known and Void implicitly uses Weber's 
formal/substantive topology in echoing the positivist response, 
wherein the epistemological growth of legality ignored social 
reality:
"puzzling questions about the reasons for or causes of 
behaviour, the uncertainties of motives and intentions... 
were ignored for the sake of administrative uniformity. This 
was the classical conception of justice - an exact scale of 
punishments for equal acts without reference to the
individual involved or the special circumstances in which 
the crime was committed."34
Radzinowicz, aligns himself with a sophisticated version of the
narrative of humanitarian progress:
"the rigidity of the classical school on the Continent of 
Europe made it almost impossible to develop constructive and 
imaginative penal measures.... because they would have 
conflicted with the principle that punishment must be
clearly defined in advance and strictly proportionate to the 
offence."35
By contrast the authors of The New Criminology adopt the
methodology of immanent critique. Within Beccaria's work is a
contradictory tension in both proposing the notion of equality
and also defending the possession of property. The democratic
stress of early utilitarianism is seen as nothing more than the
ideology of the rising bourgeoisie and social contract theory as
ideologically part of their protection against feudal
interference; ideology which bore little relation to middle class
practice. For the authors of The New Criminology uncovering such
contradictions reveals that
"a system of classical justice of this order could only 
operate in a society where property was distributed 
equally... Such distribution was never contemplated."36
Yet what is the context for this change? Punishment in feudal
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society can be seen as reinforcing a particular form of social 
relations - a set of relations in which law, religion, politics, 
and economics were involved - in sum the whole set of 
socio-political relations were intertwined and co-determinate. 
The transformation of Christendom from a condition of numerous 
small divided feudal societies to one of a few large and 
absolutist states concentrated social power in the personalised 
will of the ruler who often side stepped feudal institutions in 
a general appeal to individuals as subjects (universalised 
appeal). Rule, however, is suffused with personal use of power.
Beccaria, on the other hand, appears as part of an emerging 
defining process whereby the growing civil society is placed as 
the sphere of private interests and the state, the region of 
public authority, is divorced from it; the process of definition 
concerns the mediation of power which is invested in the 
sovereign as supreme superordinate, namely upon what conditions 
is the exercise of this power to be just? The situation of 
"corruption and excesses of existing institutions" wherein 
"punishment was arbitrary and barbarous, 'due process' of law 
being absent or ignored and crime itself being ill-defined and 
extensive"37, was one where what passed for the institutions of 
state and society was barely distinguishable from particular 
holders of uses and loyalties over property and services. The 
move to 'rights' and 'due process', the move to the 
rationalization of state and society, is a move to divorce the 
reason of the state from the actual empirical self-interest of 
concerned individuality. The actual, immediate will of the 
present always seemed the will of self-interest - the will of the 
state, conversely, could be freed from such and invested with a 
new legitimacy by becoming identifiable through the notion of the 
'general will'. This new creation, the general will, is not the 
will of egotistical individuals in present situation but their 
abstract consciousness as rational human beings and citizens of 
the state.38 Beccaria is the central pivot for criminology in 
such a move. A move which those who came after, even when as with 
criminological positivism they offer a critique and a
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transposition, find themselves trapped within its framework.
Essentially Beccaria determines his text as the rhetorical break 
between theology, politics, and the application of punishment - 
a move from practical action as political service to 
administrative action as obedience to rational performance.39
The text is built upon the work of others; its methodology is to 
grasp the narratives already accepted as images of the human 
condition and to inter-play them to create the new social space 
of a 'rational penology1 . Specifically, Beccaria placed the birth 
of criminology in a narrative tradition containing a past grand 
event of political activity (the transformation of the state of 
nature to civil society existing within the abstract framework 
of law), which set out a context for what could then be seen as 
essentially social, as opposed to political action (i.e the act 
of penal judgement).40 The 'political' is placed into a 
differentiated sphere through the assumption that administration 
can benefit from 'cognitive transparency1 and the clear 
identification of objects which this allows us in the problem 
field before us; but the truth of these objects is the creation 
of philosophical mediation which guarantees successful behaviour 
because of a perfected theory of behaviour which the individual 
recognises by his self-conscious participation in this 
philosophical insight into the nature of reality. The result in 
the classical reforms was the creation of a 'tariff system' where 
a table of sentences matched to offenses by length and severity 
were in turn linked to the gravity of the offence. Logically this 
also required a defining and ranking of offenses in strict order, 
and this, preferably, required the creation of a comprehensive 
criminal code. Criminological positivism, in turn, turns to an 
alternative imagination which, however, keeps the notion of 
security for judgement under the guidance of those who know the 
terms of the scientifically discoverable Newtonian flows and 
interactions of the world. The identity of the prince of law 
(i.e. the applier of law) changes in a declaration that 
responsibility can legitimately be handed over for large sections
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of the organization and administration of our various societies 
to the expertise of the scientist and the technician, supposedly 
creating 'value free' expert spheres of decision making. A 
situation which the Portuguese scholar, Boaventura de Santos, 
refers to as the hold of "cognitive domination".41
VI
How was the epistemological framework for justice in classicism 
constructed? Essentially it was a philosophical justice. A 
justice whose truth was necessarily constructed amidst the 
destruction of the Neo-Aristotelian synthesis which had 
underpinned the grand schemes of Natural Law of Aquinas and 
others. Devoid of such a cosmos as background stability the 
ontology, the physics, and the theology, which combined to allow 
the postulation of a common good, and the geometrical proportions 
(i.e. the 'mean') necessary for positioning and which guided 
prudential reasoning were cast adrift. In a world whose physics 
came to be thought of as 'Newtonian' man can no longer think of 
looking to the idea of natural form of entities as the guide for 
decision - the idea of living in accordance with the rhythms of 
the cosmos no longer has meaning.
In such a time there is a dual need: firstly a need to quieten 
scepticism and fill the epistemological confusion which borders 
upon being a void; second, the social need to constrain and 
position power within a legitimative strategy no longer able to 
be fixed into notions of a stable and unchanging cosmos or a 
teleological one. Moreover, whatever the answer was to be, its 
social context was to be set amidst the demands of the socially 
progressive class of the time, i.e. the bourgeoisie, for a 
legitimation which went against any notion of the wise in favour 
of the universal and the openly visible; that is to say that the 
epistemological strategy should be congruent to the environment 
in which it has to play its part in evolution.42
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The philosophical construction of modernity provided an answer. 
Modern man would create his own beginning, out of his own 
endeavour - his reasoning and his philosophical reflection upon 
his experiencing. The question of criminal law and justice - of 
prudential reasoning and the disposition of offenders - of the 
compatibility of man, sovereign and society - required thinking 
upon a new foundation. As Evald stresses it was no longer 
possible to start from the conception of a natural whole with 
which to dialectic the particular - it was no longer possible to 
create a central referendal point in the concept of a common 
good. The socio-political argumentation of society could in no 
way look to a system of shared expectations, as with the model 
of the polis, since society no longer could have the supposition 
of a common good as measurement, for the polis - regarded as the 
natural site for the idealised political animal that was the 
#greek' man - was no longer able to be thought of as a natural 
entity.43
In many ways the distinguishing feature of modernity is that it 
has always thought of itself as "unnatural11, as alienated from, 
or a distortion of, the natural.44 In the context set for 
Beccaria the question of the nature of society, was revisualised 
as the question of what the nature of society was to be, i.e. it 
was now reposed as a problem to be resolved. Beccaria as the 
originator of a Criminological rationality fit for modernity 
faces the reflexivity of a thinker who must propose, and yet 
explain, the epistemic capacities of the human thinker towards 
the world. The presuppositions of the Aristotelian formation, 
that man's pretensions to knowledge could be fulfilled, that one 
could affirm that knowledge of the world could be achieved as 
something finite and definitively complete, were based on the 
implicit premise "that the human capacity for knowledge is in 
principle equal and adequate to its natural object"45. Beccaria, 
however, in facing a world becoming modern, cannot propose a 
reason which in any form can claim to penetrate (because it is 
essentially part of) the thoughts of the hidden God and bring out 
the divine conception of the world. Linguistically the absolute
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cognitive pretension of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge - 
the natural coordination of subject and object - had to be 
surrendered. Joining himself to the cognitive efforts of others 
Beccaria's tactics were:
1) to provide a narrative history to position the present.
Here Beccaria is at odds with Humean legitimation in that he
utilises the 'fiction' of the social contract as the past reality 
of an historical act (whereby independent and isolated men, weary 
of living in a continual state of war, sacrificed a part of their 
liberty so they might enjoy the rest of it in peace and safety).
This is in turn linked to an ontological doctrine (namely that
man's rampant individualist nature ensured that every man was 
willing to put in the public fund only the least possible 
proportion, "no more than suffices to induce the others to defend 
it. The aggregate of these least possible portions constitutes 
the right to punish; all that exceeds this is abuse and not 
justice; it is fact but by no means right".). The necessity of 
punishment is presented as empirically based on the nature of 
man's position and governed by man's reason for its legitimation. 
Punishment was in the class of "tangible motives" required "to 
prevent the despotic spirit, which is in every man, from plunging 
the laws of society into its original chaos".(B. pp.11-13) In a 
universe which was not moral neither could the multitude be 
naturally moral. Men could not be left to their own devices to 
socially co-exist.46 The paradox of crime was that it was both 
rational and irrational. It was rational for an individual to 
choose to commit a crime - he may well have his reasons which 
Beccaria acknowledged were possibly political - and yet crime was 
a social irrationality. The irrationality of crime stems from its 
contravening the rationality of the social contract. Man's 
selfish rationality has identified subjection to the power which 
the social contract grants as the most beneficial mode of social 
existence and the rational choice of an individual to choose 
criminal behaviour, i.e. behaviour outside the terms of the 
contract, is to choose the irrationality of behaviour beyond the 
social contract. It is an irrationality to be constrained by a
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fully rational crime control mechanism.47
2) To ensure a separation of functions where the 
administration of law is separate from the political question of 
the content or style of law. The narrative participation of 
individuals in an ongoing social contract united men under the 
authority of the sovereign. In the substantive institutions which 
took the name of justice, neither the people nor the judges were 
empowered to interfere by continually making, or altering law, 
or have discretionary power to choose penal measures. Judges were 
not to be allowed discretion: Only the sovereign was so entitled 
as he was "the legitimate depository of the actual wills of all" .
3) To subject empirical diversity to a conceptual
objectivism. Beccaria holds
"there is nothing more dangerous than the popular axiom that 
it is necessary to consult the spirit of the laws... Our 
understandings and all our ideas have a reciprocal 
connection; the more complicated they are, the more numerous 
must be the ways that lead to them, and depart from them. 
Each man has his own point of view, and, at each different 
time, a different one. Thus the 'spirit1 of the law would be 
the product of a judge's good or bad logic, of his good or 
bad digestion; it would depend on the violence of his 
passions, on the weakness of the accused, on the judge's 
connections with him, and on all those minute factors that 
alter the appearances of an object in the fluctuating mind 
of man."(B. pp.14-16)
Subjectivism is acknowledged and constrained; it is not possible 
for the knowledge of the individual to be knowledge of the 
'truth' which the individual can himself grasp the totality of, 
instead he shall be introduced to 'truths' which need to be 
positioned by co-operation with others. No possible embracing, 
objective viewpoint of society in itself can be presented48 - 
there is but individual, localised, situated and therefore 
limited, viewpoints of the whole - the linkage of each to the 
whole is but the empirical bonding of personal need and 
satisfaction.
Beccaria follows the lead of Hobbes and places (exposes?) 
individual men in the state of nature in a chaotic state - the
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need for self grounding creates a solipsist bedrock. The need for 
a commonalty for judgement cannot be satisfied in the absence of 
a reference to any natural objectivity, man can have no other 
measure than himself, a situation, a "state", in which no common 
measure for the multiplicity of judgments that each makes of 
himself and others can be provided.49
There is, however, need - dire need. Need articulated by the 
empirical knowledge which demonstrates the natural limitation of 
death, the ultimate limit of hope. To avoid death (of 
individuals, of society) is the potentiality of the 'social'.50 
A potentiality made possible through the grand act of politics, 
the central focus of which is a common act of judgement which 
gives the maxim: 'Give up to others the minimum necessary to
avoid death1. The state of war, the empirical bedrock of man's 
basic nature, can be broken only by the transcendence of this 
natural location. The referent which objectivizes the status of 
man must come from the impasse of the empirical natural condition 
- the solution of which must come out of empirical knowledge but 
be able to be set against the scene made visible by that 
knowledge. The need of man demands a breaking with nature, the 
setting up of a counter-power to nature - the political 
Leviathan.51 The naked irrational flow of power is incorporated 
and rationalised in the creation of a nexus of political power, 
sovereign power - the overcoming of natural terror by submission 
to legitimate power.52 A power which contrasts to nature its own 
sovereign - Law.53
4) The realization of these background conditions (or 
assumptions) concerning key 'facts' of social existence 
demonstrates the need and right of a mechanism of control. The 
operation of the mechanism can become an organizational concern 
taking a set of operative conditions and debates as its own.
The social is safe within the confines of that regime of law, 
safe within a containment, a subjection to that political 
creation.54 Beccaria holds that man does not need to come out of
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himself and participate substantively in a common realm. He may 
rest in essentially solitary existence - but if imposed upon he 
can impose back. Paradoxically, although the sovereign is to 
embody the "common will" the principle does not draw the 
substantive thoughts of the individual will into the common - on 
the contrary it specifies that man will regard himself as the 
stranger to/of all others and they of him. And in such 
strangeness all are equal. Each is thus the abstract equal of all 
others, and in that abstraction equality reigns over any "fact" 
of their difference.
The legitimacy of the rule of Law is posited as the necessary
creation or rational reflection on the empirical operation of the
world.55 Empirically, Hobbes states, all men are equal in the
face of death, and the power of any is not sufficient to disallow
the potentiality of death at the hands of any other.
Additionally, the empirical result of individualism is that men
must judge themselves as equal, not because of a natural ordering
of telos made visible to all, but because in the absence of such,
none will accept being unequal to others. Hobbes declares that
even if there were a difference in natural power it would never
be so great to make all men agree as to
"who has the superiority of power over the others, and who 
is so stupid that he cannot rule himself? In fact, everyone 
naturally considers that he is at least as capable of ruling 
another as the other is of ruling him."56
Thus, because of the absence of a common reference an equality 
(abstract) in law must be accepted;57 moreover, it is known that 
it must be contrary to the facts but the facts also determine 
that we must act as if it is not!58
5) Beccaria's thesis, finally, is a rhetorical testament to
progress. Progress which comes about as an event which breaks
upon history: part of a progress of epochs wherein the first was
the formation of the great societies of men organised around the
"false divinities" of "primitive errors". Now is the second epoch
"where truth, after progressing slowly at first and then 
rapidly, sits at last as a companion to monarchs on their
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thrones and enjoys a cult and alter in the parliaments of 
republics". (B. p. 96-7 )59
Under the influence of Beccaria's pen we shall move beyond those 
present laws which contain "the dregs of utterly barbarous 
centuries", we "directors of the public welfare", and we shall 
create a sight that will lie before our eyes illuminated in the 
peaceful splendour of progress. This transfer of a whole 
structural scheme of aesthetic, theoretical, technical, and moral 
progress within a collective idea of unified history presupposes 
that man sets himself as the only one in charge of this totality, 
that he takes himself to be the one that 'makes history1, but he 
makes history progressively under the guidance of 'proper 
knowledges'. It is then that he can hold it possible to deduce 
the movement of history from the proper self understanding of the 
rational subject. The future can become the consequence of our 
actions in this present, and these are moved by our present 
understanding of reality.60 Thus the 'plea' of Beccaria, a 
discourse aimed "not to demonstrate what the law is, but rather 
to incite men to make it what the author thinks it ought to 
be",(B.xviii) has its own philosophical consciousness.
VII
Both Hobbes and Beccaria avoid, however, the question of what is 
going to be the actual substantive content to this notion of 
equality in the social sphere. It is an issue which surfaces 
later in critiques of the liberal equality of modernity and takes 
a particular critical conception with Marx and his own modern 
measure of commonalty, namely, "a comprehensive social theory" 
which fully explains the reality of human nature. But in Hobbes 
and Beccaria it is the absence of any reference except the 
philosophic "experience" of the state of nature which drives us 
to set posited law as "the order of things" and to achieve a new 
regime of 'objectivity1. Equality (of Being, of Rights), is thus 
posited as an unreflexive axiom of judgement.
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This amounts to a substitution, a reintroduction into legal and 
political judgement, of an objectivity which the void of the 
natural state had done away with; the reintroduction of that 
notion once linked to the consideration of nature, now linked to 
the idea of equality, the clarity of philosophic-legal form. 
Moreover, it is the arrival of a complete cognitive transparency 
for our act of judgement which will allow the tribunal of power 
to compare terms, crime-punishment, without the need to 
investigate the value of each other than as it relates to law.61 
Once the movement is complete a form of empirical objectivity can 
rule in the social since the act of judgement concerning the 
entities of criminal justice (i.e. law, offender, guilt, 
punishment) appears as if it only combined the unproblematic 
experience of the world which has successfully informed itself 
of its nature. Paradoxically, although the issue of the classical 
school concerns the power of the state to punish, ' Justice' is 
de-politicised in its judgments and the acts of justice in the 
social is synonymous with the empirical existence of a legal 
order. True law cannot now appear as a structure of Reason built 
deductively from the axioms of a foundational common good, it is 
now the empirical existence of law itself built upon the 
egoistical experience of the state of nature and our overcoming 
of that state through the creation of conventions.62
Let us be clear about the complexity of the 'functions1 achieved 
by this part of the philosophical birth of modernity. The 
emphasis upon control, explicit in classical criminology, should 
not blind us to the obverse functionality of this methodology of 
'problem' in the life of modernity, that is that it entails that 
'crime' is a central foundational conception for that modernity. 
Crime, as a concept and the implicit range of responses of 
dealing with crime, for example, 'philosophies of punishment', 
are then notions to be utilised in the constructionist project 
of modernity. One hidden curriculum of classicism is not so much 
to devise a mechanism to control and in time eradicate crime, but 
to assert that 'crime' and its associated conceptual apparatus 
are central for modernity. The implications of this are clear:
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Firstly, crime overwhelms 'non-crime'. As modernity spreads 
aspects of social interaction which involve 'harm' become 
questioned in the form - 'can this be fitted into the rational 
scheme of criminal jurisprudence?'
Secondly, crime becomes the technique of 'formal social 
control', displacing alternative mechanisms53 - the result is 
a concentration of functional power in the hands of professional 
criminal justice personnel. A power which is legitimated 
according to conceptions of specific role performance. Modern 
criminal justice organisations are, thus, not only a technique 
of ensuring formal social control but are also products of the 
type of social control being aimed at in modernity.
Thirdly, the 'freedom' of crime, i.e. the metaphysics of 
rational choice, and the imposition of key elements of social 
judgement as to the constitution of the social self of 
individuals after the act (and thus the encouragement to think 
deviance) spreads. When modernity declares its 'right' to 
autonomy, to the 'liberal' freedom of individualism it declares 
its right to crime, and also that its citizens have a 'right' to 
be criminal and thus a 'right' to be punished.64
Fourthly, to ensure the freedom of crime as a concept, 
punishments are required to become 'modern' - too harsh a 
punishment interferes with the acceptability of 'crime' as the 
natural form of modernity. That is to say that as well as any 
'functional' fit between the demands of social structure and the 
type of penality experienced in punishment (see Rusche and 
Kirchheimer, etc) the practical experiencing of the pragmata of 
social thought must not be incongruous with the narrative forms 
of that social structure.
Part B.
I
Positivism.
In contrast to the 'moralist' freedom associated with the notion 
of crime another line of dealing with the 'social' was already
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becoming apparent and was in part a reflection of 'problem'. Even 
in the idea of creating a rationalised instrument of social 
control, 'proper1 social engineering required a 'proper'
understanding of human motives. Helvetius, one of the
inspirations for Beccaria, stated his concern that to construct 
good laws it was "necessary to know the human heart".65 Both 
penology and criminology partly defended the regime of law with 
a "psychological theory of culture" or, as more usually referred 
to, "associational psychology". With Beccaria: "Pain and
pleasure are the only springs of action in beings endowed with 
sensibility". But what was meant by these words "pain" and 
"pleasure" which now defined the grounds for human action?
It involved the denial that there was a particular category of 
things that was fit to be human pleasures; that is the
traditional search for those things qualitatively fit to give
human pleasure and thus achieve the end of 'happiness', for so 
long seen as the true end of human existence, and a category of 
things which of their essence constituted pain for humanity gave 
way. Instead the use of these words of pain and pleasure now 
demonstrated the freeing power of nominalism. A power which 
destroyed the Aristotelian dogmas and opened a new interest in 
nature. It was the ontological replacement of the category of 
substance, that certain things were of their essential nature to 
be classified as belonging to a category (i.e. pleasure or pain), 
by a loose and always transient category of quantity which in 
turn established the idea of handling all possible problems by 
calculation. The route was, moreover, set for a concentration 
upon penalty as the motif of social control rather than the 
'informal' operation of family, peer group and interpersonal 
shame.
II
The general justification of the practice of punishment was 
utilitarian. The problem of the individual, orientated by his
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nature to his own ends, and the question of achieving social 
order, was resolved in utilitarian punishment which gave the 
legislator a mechanism to control the social, with the social 
being seen as a mass of individual pursuits of ends. Talcott 
Parsons has observed that a division occurred at this time 
concerning the rationality linked to social engineering between 
those who held a free will approach, and those who accepted 
determinism.66 Utilitarianism developed a thesis of economic 
style motive as a casual version of free will, and positivism, 
developing in the influence of St Simon and Comte, accepted total 
external determinism as the consequence of a wholesale 
associationism as per Hume. Punishment for the utilitarian 
becomes a social activity much like economics - individual man 
is governed by the "hedonic calculus" (the calculus of pleasure), 
and man's mind can calculate the visible factors rationally 
perceived in the pursuit of his ends. The publication of the 
consequences of offending, punishment, will induce rational 
people not to undertake actions resulting in the imposition on 
themselves of pain, and so not offend. As for the individual 
offender, he shall so learn from his experiencing of pain, that 
he will never again commit the offence giving rise to that pain. 
Implicitly, as with economics, the proper management of the 
hedonic calculus in the service of the sovereign's utility, 
required a collection, categorization and transference of 
information about the state of offending, and the relative 
strengths of preferences by individuals. If possible, and 
implicitly this is possible, preference should be influenced - 
this we can call education, ideological stimulation, or market 
development.
The division which Parsons identifies is of importance to the 
application of 'problem' and solution: the pure thesis that the 
application of scientific knowledge, praxically reflected, would 
eliminate crime as an entity, appears not to be central to the 
utilitarian, but only to the positivist. The utilitarian takes 
on a concept of 'problem' that is related to how best to manage, 
to direct and control; and this is essentially a superstructure 
that can be superimposed over ends. Under Bentham's pen, society
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is a mass of physical sentience, an anti-intellectual vision, but
which in Bentham's vision reduces the range of emotions and
desires of individuals to a commensurable and universal form
which gives confidence for the notion of 1 problem1 to achieve the
"greatest happiness of the greatest number". The ritualist
elements, the unpredictable nature of human emotionality, the
contingent possibilities of desire, all these are denied in this
empiricist foundation. The empiricist imagination had earlier
revealed the social-material structure of the world as simply a
'trampling march of unconscious power', an attitude where on its
extreme views, life itself came to be seen as almost an
accidental by-product of a mechanical process. Into this Bentham
counters the Aristotelian lineage with a move to methodological
individualism. Acknowledging that the phraseology of the common
good, or as he puts it, the interests of the community, is
central to moral-political discourse, Bentham reinterprets it:
"the community is a fictitious body, composed of the
individual persons who are constituting as it were its
members. The interest of the community then is, what? - the 
sum of the interests of the several members who compose 
it."67
In this each person is to count as one and all pleasure is
regarded as commensurable and able to be included in the
calculation unless good reason condemns it. Empirical fact, not
tradition or reference to authoritative books, is to be the
guide, and its elements lies below the nominalism of words:
"politics not less than physics is an experimental science: 
feelings not words are the elements that comprise it".68
The empirical reality of the desires and feelings of the social 
are the material of this science. The liberation of the social 
from the bounds of traditional authority and false metaphysics 
releases the potential power of its parts.
A central focus of this time is the handling and praxical 
recognition of power - the rhetoric of the power to punish is to 
be made expressly instrumental and consequentalist. The England 
of the late Eighteenth Century found itself attacked not simply 
for the excessive nature of the punishments but, to repeat how
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Foucault put it in Weberian terms in Discipline and Punish, "for 
an excess that was bound up with an irregularity even more than 
with an abuse of the power to punish". Reinforcing the practical 
reforms of those who "integrated prison reform into a general 
attack on the administration and political structure of the 
ancien regime" was an epistemological basis which Ignatieff 
identifies as "English materialism derived largely from the work 
of David Hartly and John Locke".69 The "positivist revolution" 
took up the broad themes of Comte's placement of Law as but an 
emanation of the metaphysical spirit which would be overcome with 
the advent of a purely scientific or positive age where judgments 
based on the visibility of scientific facticity would be engaged 
in.
The challenge to the dominance of legal categories was, in the 
rhetoric of the 'positive' approach complete, in its purity it 
was no fusion that was espoused but a complete substitution of 
legality for 'social science'. Lombroso, for instance, contended 
that progress lay in the application of science to the 
administration of criminal law "to emphasise the importance of 
apportioning penalties, not according to the offence, but 
according to the offender.." Offenders could not be equal; not 
equal in possession of stigmata, nor equal in the various 
measurements of positivism's specifications; they must be unequal 
in possession of the characteristics of biology, anatomy, 
psychology, and in time the imprints (deposits) of socialization.
Lombroso represents, perhaps, the most Humean of the early 
criminological positivists. His dicta of what constituted proper 
theory echoed Hume's distinction between true and false 
philosophy:
"nothing is more imprudent than to try to maintain theories 
. . if they are going to upset the order of society. The 
sociologist must observe still greater circumspection, for 
if he puts into operation innovations of an upsetting nature 
he will simply succeed in demonstrating the uselessness and 
inefficiency of his science."70
The point here concerns what MacIntyre terms in Whose Justice?
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Which rationality? the "translaterability of traditions"; as we 
saw in the chapter on Kant the later bearers of the rationalist 
and Empiricist imaginations rhetorically identified themselves 
as belonging to two opposing camps only one of which was right. 
The cause of positivism, some of its finest adherents held, was 
to destroy the old illusions. Lombroso's tactics, however, are 
to demonstrate, in direct Humean terms, how even the 'distorted 
truth1 of the other is contained in the truth of wider natural 
functioning. This progressive epistemological advance preserves 
the latent rationality of the earlier system. Thus 
commensurability is established which converts the items of 
common sense and legality into facets of a common natural flow 
which lies beneath the variance of language; the criminal law 
thus drew from natural process and so the categories of the 
criminal law, the "juridical figures", actually could stand in 
close connection to the categories of scientific positivism.71 
Thus: "to the juridical figure of incendiarism, of homicide, can 
be opposed the psychiatric figure of pyromania, homicidal 
monomania, paradoxical sexuality, etc.". Similarly the juridical 
figure of theft is opposed to the psychiatric figure of 
kleptomania; habitual drunkenness to dipsomania; rape and 
pederasty to sexual inversion; crimes of lust to satyriasis and 
nymphomania; idleness and vagabondage to neurasthenia. It is a 
specific view of law and the structure of the world which 
reproduces Hume's earlier discussion of the creation of law.
The constitution of 'reality' changes. As the Soviet 
criminologist Yakovlev put it classical legality "considered that 
the personality of the criminal does not exist prior to, and 
apart from, the commission of crime".72 However, if science is 
to constitute the categories for use in judgement then the 
natural physical/psychological must always exist prior to the 
commission of the offence. This cannot by definition be the same 
as the earlier personality, there is no legalistic 'criminal's 
personality1 , as a crime is yet to be committed, it is instead 
the personality of the delinquent, the deviant, or the anti­
social individual. The epistemological basis of this, the 'social
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justice1 of modernity, provides not only grounds for the 
transference to the therapeutic resolution of crime, but alsc to 
the constitutional and informed measures by socialist states to 
base social defence on the concept of the social dangerousness 
of the personality.
The central figure of the Judge is called upon to change: the
representative of the sovereign should, it followed, be replaced
by the person who commanded the facts. As H.D.Lasswell put it:
"Must the psychiatrist, then, unseat the king and actualise 
in the world of fact the philosopher-king of Plato's 
imagination....? . . If sufficiently secure of himself and of 
his field, he may dare where others dared and lost before."73
In Lombroso's texts this linkage between epistemology, the 
categories of judgement, the act of policy and solution of 
problem, was possible since all nature partook of one essential 
connectedness "where the most striking phenomena are in 
continuity with a series of analogous phenomena less 
accentuated", which observation of nature, and careful 
measurement of the facts displayed, could lay open.
However, positivism implied as well that the resulting conditions 
of these knowledges, the delinquent, has his characteristics 
valid only under such and such conditions - that the empirical 
forms of man were relative to social conditions. "Society" being 
thus both the foundation and the structure of its own being - the 
criminal milieu being the foundation for the structure of 
criminality. What this in turn means is that the criminal posited 
in Northern Italy is only the criminal posited in Northern Italy 
- he does not travel (i.e. universalise from this particularity) 
well when subjected to critical scrutiny. The criminal which 
Goring contemplates in the prisons of England behaves, exhibits, 
differently to the interrogator.74 Already the suspicion looms 
that the positivist criminal may well be the product of his 
empirical 'interrogation' - the terror of a different penal 
arrives - the suffocation of penal empiricism.75
The hopes for the total solution to the crime problem ring
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through the texts of positivistic criminology and do not need 
repeating. Their claims range from the totally confident through 
to lesser optimists such as Ferri.75 For Ferri the creation of 
a more advanced society came about through "penal substitutes" 
which replace retributive concepts based upon "the abstract idea 
of law". Criminology contributed to social development through 
exposing the social injustice of the classical criminal law's 
preservation of its "theoretical method, the 'a priori' study of 
crime as an abstract juridical being" and yet it also adopts some 
of the underpinnings of the classical school, namely "the 
practical object, the diminution of punishment and to a large 
extent [crimes] suppression", changes which, led to a shift of 
approach to the amelioration of the conditions of human 
existence. Primarily, although Ferri was often indecisive as to 
the extent that economic distribution would suffice, through a 
more satisfactory economic organization of society. (CS.p.181) 
"Science must control" the responsive actions of those 
organizations that operate in the name of society. (CS. Chapter 
VI, quote p.120) Judicial procedure must be transformed, for 
example, the requirement to tell the truth under oath should be 
replaced by the use of technical and experimental tests of human 
psychology and psycho-pathology, the jury system abolished, truth 
determined clinically.
The rhetoric of the texts proclaim that what is at stake is the 
placement of criminal justice "in an entirely different moral 
world". A moral world, which is to some, no longer moral, but 
part of the movement "beyond good and evil", a movement that does 
not mean, however, "beyond good and bad", substituting 
'naturalistic' ethics and a table of natural valuation as exposed 
by science instead of the abstractions of law and of the 
transcendental. The conception of individuals is in a sense non­
individualist, since they partake of cultural and biological 
continuities rather than the status of self-determining beings. 
Scientific reason reveals the natural laws of the physical and 
material composition of our world, and it is our task to locate 
and re-adjust society in the light of these. Our task is
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optimistic, for even as we face the spectre of social
dissatisfaction, unrest, and crime, better things are possible
through the power of scientific vision uncovering the root
mechanisms; the basis of this optimism lies in the self-
conception of such social theory. New social theories are not
ideological constructions but the uncovering of truths of man and
his conditions. "The old anthropomorphic illusions" are being
destroyed and replaced with a vital vision stemming from "the new
experimental knowledge" . Positivism teaches intellectual "modesty
by teaching us to seek the complex causes of each fact", but "the
constantly increasing expansion of this study" is due
"to the correspondence which exists between our ideas and 
the manifest realities of daily life. It is this 
correspondence which gives a promise of future triumphs, 
which we await without too much impatience, with the 
security of the strong with no intolerance, and with the 
calmness of the soul which trusts to the labour and justice 
of the future." (CS. p. 567)77
The epistemology of these claims is secure in its correspondence
to the external world and our usage is secured by faith in the
socialist value of labour and deliverance of the future. The
rhetoric of this vision is both "modest" for the contents of
contemporary theory, and "stirring" for its acceptance of the
path of justice. Further,
"penal justice as an establishment of violent repression and 
class domination is destined to disappear, and to exist only 
as a clinical function.... the development of penal justice 
has always been, and will always continue to be, in inverse 
ratio with the development of social justice. As ordinary 
justice develops and organises, the importance of penal 
justice will diminish, and as justice ceases to be a 
coercive external and material mechanism, it will become 
more and more an intimate general organic sentiment, the 
product of a social environment which will ensure to every 
man the material and moral conditions of everyday existence. 
This means that the disappearance of penal justice as a 
political institution will coincide naturally and 
necessarily with the universal predominance of justice as a 
specific sentiment and force in social life." (CS.p.568-569)
What then will happen to criminology? The criminology Ferri has 
envisaged has an expressly political and practical role - it is 
an instrument which takes its nature from the inter-connection 
of theory and practice - a political role which dissolves its
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politics into a judgement which seeks to achieve the 
correspondence of social activity to the laws of the lived world, 
and as that task becomes achieved, for which criminology has been 
an instrument its purpose is achieved and the very project of 
knowledge growth becomes obsolete. Since its main function is to 
demonstrate the structure of laws and the underlying operation 
of observed reality, and so inter-relate to the readjusting 
ideals, it in turn becomes realised in practice. By its very role 
as the bearer of the truths of man's situation, the practical 
result of the acceptance of these truths will sound the death 
knell of criminology.
Ill
What is central with this usage of Ferri, who was the most 
articulate in elucidating the 'point' of positivism , is 
positivist criminology's ideal of definitiveness. A notion that 
man can actually look at the reality of the world's processes. 
The world and the position of man in it can be captured as an
object of the scientific gaze and 'Reason' will lead man in the
light of that gaze - ideally no exercise of judgement free from 
this gaze or politics of social being is then required since this 
reason can encompass all.
It is an ideal which stipulates total truth as a given quality 
of existence - but this ideal, which must owe its existence to 
a continuing legacy of the ancient concept of reality, actually 
has a faith which is at odds with the practical reality of 
positivism's reach. What the hopes and faith of this discourse 
denies is reflexivity since the 'essence' of positivism is its
denial of 'essence'; the actual status of positivism is as the
pick and shovel of a co-operative enterprise to understand the 
workings of a world whose reality always moves beneath the skin 
of the observed appearances which positivism works upon. It is 
this reflexive understanding, the self-awareness that positivism
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only works on the surface of the world, the acknowledgement that 
the great volume of reality is at any time out of reach, that 
gives to the actual task and situation of positivism the 
reflexive necessity to acknowledge its moral dimension - a 
necessity which ensures positivism's bondage to metaphysics.78 
But criminological positivism forgot such awareness, instead it 
spoke as if nature held out itself to criminological positivism 
as the uncomplaining subject for the most profound 
investigation. 79/80 Ultimately, however, the dilemmas of 
classicism, aroused in the Kantian position of 'other 
causalities' unbeknown to empirical analysis, and the 
superficiality of positivism, result in unpredictability.81 Both 
undercut the universal and comprehensive pretensions of 
theoretical reason and place us again at the bequest of practical 
reason, which, undeveloped in the pure drive for true knowledge, 
lurches into an underdeveloped pragmatic politics of life and 
which demands newer forms of rationality.
IV
End-state: The poverty of linear progressive accounts of change 
realised.
One underlying argument of this work has been that the 
traditional intellectual narrative of work in criminal justice 
has seen itself ideally as a process of progression via 
epistemological purification, and is simplistic and limiting. Its 
collateral that practical matters are, ideally, part of a 
rational reflection of increasing knowledge of nature attained 
via the application of newer and better epistemological methods 
to a universal reality is likewise afflicted.
The first step in redevelopment is to acknowledge the failure of 
the philosophy of knowledge to solve the problem of purifying 
itself in the manner demanded by empiricism and rationalism. The 
solution to reflexivity is to acknowledge the pragmatic 
condition.
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Within criminology the knowledge of empiricism, via positivism, 
becomes pragmatic under the reflexive turn which dooms both the 
deviant and the knowledge of deviancy to be the product of 
society. The epistemological production of positivism, linked to 
a rational reconstruction via a publicly specifiable and 
repeatable methodology, implies that the resulting products of 
these conditions, the knowledge of the delinquent, the deviant, 
has its characteristics valid only under particular conditions - 
that the empirical forms of man are relative to the social 
conditions via which knowledge is produced. Positivism's claim 
to reality can only be an allusion to a reality which remains 
always a 'mystery' . The pragmatic conception of the reality which 
knowledge seeks, on the other hand, announces the redundancy of 
the ancient concept of reality changing it to a 'reality 
concept'. An 'idea' which, in its very presentation as a concept 
of reality, anticipates reality as the always incomplete result 
of a realization, as dependability constituting itself 
successively but as never definitive or demonstrating an absolute 
consistency. This actively pragmatic concept of reality, 
legitimates the desire of knowledge, or curiosity, as a 
discovering of the quality of the new, of the surprising and the 
unfamiliar element, as both a theoretical and aesthetic quality, 
rather than a curiosity which seeks to look out onto the 'what 
is'. That is to say it allows and perpetrates the post-modern 
pragmatic preference or desire for the new [parology] over the 
positivistic conception of curiosity as the desire for knowledge 
of that which must be the given.82
That particular outcome, one possible direction for endeavour, 
is itself indicative of the fact that the endstate of criminology
is not restricted to the problem of knowledge alone, which would
still hold out the hope that refined epistemological techniques 
would 'discipline' criminological confusion83, but is indeed 
wider. We may give this at least four headings, namely:
1) the problem of knowledge;
2) the problem of the intellectual;
3) the problem of the enterprise;
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4) the problem of justice;
all of which would be viewed as interrelated. As Maxwell put it
the philosophy of knowledge undercuts itself since in attempting
to solve its fundamental problem, that is
"the various aspects of the problem of knowledge.... it is 
essential to construe the pursuit of knowledge as an aspect 
of life, an aspect of the pursuit of wisdom in life. It is 
essential to give intellectual priority to action, to life, 
and to the capacity to act more or less successfully in the 
world."84
But while wisdom is the cognate of pragmatism it is not the 
inevitable outcome - others are Just Deserts and the plays of a 
minimalist post-modern.
Regarding the problem of knowledge, critical thought in 
criminology arrived at the necessity for epistemological 
pragmatism, albeit unarticulated as such, not so much through the 
deconstruction of the models of classicism and positivism but 
through a realization and interpretation of criminological 
'truth' as an internal feature of multiple paradigmatical 
configurations, the considerations of which are not 
commensurable. The development of multiple paradigms became 
articulated from the mid 1960's onwards and each constitute their 
own theoretical object. Jock Young analyses what he calls the six 
major criminological paradigms85 considering each in relation to 
various dichotomies (structured around theories of human nature, 
social order,' definition of crime, the extent of crime, policy 
and causation) drawing out various ideal typologies which 
demonstrate internal coherence at the cost of independence. 
Although accepting that any individual criminologist, at any 
given time, may well be in a movement between paradigms, for 
example from positivist to marxist, Young is implicitly critical 
of the isolationism which appears essential to the development 
of each paradigm. Using rather crass rhetorical devices, such as 
the 'myth of the new theory' and the belief that each paradigm 
"developed in a series of discrete historical stages, each 
representing a step in the rational progress towards the solution 
of the crime problem", to inhabit each paradigm the theorist
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appears forced to believe in separate theoretical development as 
the most viable strategy for progressive intellectual 
development. Success is thus dependent upon the paradigm 
remaining true to itself to avoid co-option, emasculation, and 
corruption of coherence. The result is a "perennial tendency to 
one sided interpretations of social reality". And, although Young 
states:
"the problem facing the theorist is to transcend such 
dichotomies, yet the tendency in terms of the fashionable 
theory of the moment is to swing backwards and forwards, to 
bob from one position to the other",
he offers no vision as to how this is to be achieved. His
conclusion, instead, refers to the actual "relationship of
academic criminology and the real world" and is an inversion of
the Karl Manheimn stipulation of the "classless intellectual",
namely that the ideas of criminology "often have an only too real
institutional basis",86 the consequences of which he does not
draw out.
Thus the problem of the intellectual is drawn in rather 
unarticulated form to resolve the problem of knowledge. Placing 
the institutional basis of criminologists as essentially 
determinate of the production of the knowledge of criminology 
underpins the 1988 edition of Downes and Rock's Understanding 
Deviance.87 Arguing, in a text true, perhaps, to the symbolic 
interactionist perspective, that "criminology is still so 
indeterminate that its authors can always hope to make a mark on 
it", criminology is seen as a loose mass of 'ideas' which 
individuals and teams draw upon, or add to on their way to 
broader concerns, in the pursuit of quite specific institutional 
purposes (for example, particular research, preparing a text). 
Downes and Rock's text itself evidences an unarticulated tension 
in allocating productive force to 'disciplines' or 'individuals' . 
By comparison to the implicit alternative that such 'disciplines' 
could and do operate as semi-autonomous epistemic subjects (which 
create perhaps a social reality of their own in their 
relationship to investigation), Downes and Rock's text veers 
towards the view that it is individual actors who by their
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intentional actions in the pursuit of diverse ends in varying 
institutional settings, create disciplines whose existence lacks 
any inherent coherence other than that which is constructed by 
the text book writer in the course of his own project of situated 
practical reason (i.e. the act of text book creation). The danger 
then surfaces that the legacy of the criminological enterprise, 
having given up its comfortable motifs of functional evolutionary 
progress, becomes lost in a dissipated sociology of knowledge 
which, forgetting its own reflexivity, has no time for vision of 
any form except an impotent shadow of pragmatism where all are 
free to enjoy the unconnected relativistic nihilism of their 
'explained thought1 now devoid of the narrative connection of the 
'project1 of modernity.
A pragmatic resolution of the explanatory dualism of the first 
and second problems is to see the development of frames of 
inquiry in terms similar to that of Imre Lakatos* notion of a 
"research programme1'. A research programme is neither owned by 
the individual researcher but nor is it at the behest of the 
'discourse of the discipline1. Knowledge, is however, at any one 
time the product of some or other research programme. 
Furthermore, 'progress* is not some notion of coming closer to 
'undistorted reality* but a notion that the conceptual framework 
must be judged by how progressive that research programme is over 
a period of time.88
However, what it means for a research programme in the social 
sciences to be progressive is not something clearly agreed upon. 
The 'progressive* element relates not only to the idea of 
generating cogent interpretations and explanations, for the 
prediction of novel 'facts* not otherwise uncovered, as do 
research programmes in the natural sciences, but success for a 
social science research programme also depends on the practical, 
normative insight it generates. In this case the question becomes 
one of the 'moral self-assurance' or, alternatively, the 
'critical awareness' criminology can give to societal action and 
social self-conceptions.
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Such a conception for progress can be fitted only very poorly, 
if at all, into frameworks of progressive epistemological 
purification since it brings in the dimension of an implicit 
agenda of critical problematics of a particular field of 
endeavour. A field of endeavour is wider than a discipline and 
is in part touched upon by MacIntyre when he stresses its
importance for any tradition-constituted inquiry which wishes to 
rationally evaluate both its forwards and the backwards-pointing 
developmental aspects. At issue is the "agenda of unsolved 
problems and unresolved issues by reference to which [the 
tradition's] success or lack of it in making rational progress 
toward some future stage of development will be evaluated.1,89 
How may success be guaged? It is central to the pragmatic concern 
that having a better theory is being able to more effectively 
cope with the world. We can intervene successfully to effect our 
purposes in a way that we were not able to before. The
technological or manipulative aspect is that we can apply our
knowledge of what we take to be the underlying mechanisms in
order to manipulate more effectively the features of our 
environment. Developing the aim orientated perspective 
necessarily requires a wider range of considerations to be 
introduced than the criteria of the philosophy of knowledge 
requires, reflexivity asks to acknowledge the presuppositions of 
the programme. The first aspect acknowledges that one basic 
question of all scientific inquiry is linked to a descriptive 
methodology. The aim is to be able to offer a fundamental 
description or account of the orderly processes and mechanisms 
of society. This search, the 'what is really going on?1 question 
is necessary to transcend the common sense conceptions of the 
time. It aims to guarantee a pole for action which is independent 
of the subjective desires and feelings of man. Certainly whatever 
desire for change or project is to be accomplished, knowledge of 
the terrain for action, of the processes to be intervened in is 
required but Science, proper knowledge, operating under the 
philosophy of knowledge criteria aims to correct and replace 
common sense as a foundation for action. But, as has been 
stressed, on its own terms this quality control of the philosophy
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of knowledge undercuts itself. Social science cannot neglect 
either the assumptions of common sense nor the grand narratives. 
The assumptions of common sense provide the self-descriptions and 
internal 'sense* which the life practices of the members of the 
various societies use to perform their social activities; those 
of the grand narratives tie together the practices of 
intellectuals. The defence of common sense serves, in the Humean 
style of the philosophy of knowledge, to protect the common life 
from grand theory, from 'false philosophy*, for if social science 
replaces these common sense descriptions by a set of transcending 
conceptual and theoretical terms linked in flows of determinism 
then theory takes over completely from the internal sets of 
self-understandings of which the institutions and practices of 
the social world are comprised. The traditional conception of 
social science, naturalism, however, claims that only the model 
of the natural sciences is appropriate and that the rejection of 
the self-understandings and internal 'meanings* which the 
practices of the social world are comprised of is done at the 
gain of truth and the loss of illusion and mysticism - but such 
a claim appears barren when we recognise that these very 
practices are inescapably linked with such sets of 
self-understandings and internal meanings.90 Thus is defused the 
traditional dilemma between the scientific, or positivist 
understanding of man and the moralist. The positivist, which 
claims dominance in explaining society and human 'behaviour' runs 
counter to those human self-conceptions and romantic ethics which 
correspond to our human self-vision of moral agency, thus telling 
us nothing about our selves that we can relate to. The romantic 
discourse draws upon our insights into moral agency but which 
lacks empirical vigour. A pragmatic scientific sociology is 
instead revealed to be an interpretive enterprise always based 
on assumptions and premises - its scientificity lies in its 
adherence to methodology. Its reflexivity lies in the fact that 
the self-consciousness of its methodology is also a self- 
consciousness as to our methods of understanding ourselves and 
the methodology of constituting our own insights into life.
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Developing self-consciousness is always a practical activity both 
on the personal and social level. The two are intertwined. 
Moreover, changing conceptions about ourselves and our society 
impacts upon social and individual development. Changing accepted 
self-understandings and internal meanings of practices directly 
impacts upon social change - as Max Weber told us behaviour 
outside the realms of shared significance is not truly social 
action. The hounding of 'witches', the execution of the 
'parricide', the rehabilitation of the delinquent, the 
imprisoning of the 'typical offender' in penal warehouses, all 
take place in a setting of understandings, partly inherited 
'common sense', partly contemporarily achieved and packaged 
theoretical understandings. Social theory serves to upset settled 
sets of shared significance when it claims to tell us what is 
really going on in society and offers us some perspective at odds 
with our own accepted images or one that is simply 'new/novel*. 
Such new perspectives may provide the desire for social 
transformation with articulated weapons. Theory may set out 
unperceived lineages and causal contexts, or clarify and codify 
significances implicit in the self-understandings and practices 
of the times. Such theories can play both a challenging and 
sustaining role - upsetting legitimacy or reinforcing prior 
legitimation. They can aid regimes of power and domination, or 
they can attack such regimes giving direction and impetus to 
other activities. Theories of the 'divine right to rule* are 
criminological to the extent that, when faced with a query on the 
medieval execution, they provide an answer to the question of 
what is really going on and so point to a 'true' set of 
descriptive propositions and legitimate interpretative 
strategies. That situation is analogous to the theories of the 
natural sciences but the particularity of social theory is that 
a challenging social theory can directly serve to undermine a 
practice. Setting up an articulated social theory in place of 
'common sense' understandings, or of previous theory, can show 
that the claims and foundations for practice in the previous 
understandings are wrong, mistaken or have a quite different 
meaning. In Beccaria*s criticism, for example, a practice is
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shown to need rational legitimation, and for which, by neglecting 
the 'theological', Beccaria demands secular theory; the prior is 
shown up for a sham and in need of change. People will treat this 
practice very differently if they can be convinced of the 
adequacy (truth?) of a challenging theory. Thus, mindful of the 
political ties of the transformative desire Beccaria frames his 
social theory with the rhetoric of rational accommodation and 
progress rather than revolution. Similarly people will look on 
the practice of criminal justice very differently if they are 
convinced of the adequacy of the theory of the delinquent and the 
causal links to 'crime/deviance* - the practical drive of 
positivism. Again, the commonsense 'liberal' or 'humanitarian' 
scene of criminal justice looks very different if one adopts a 
Marxist of a Foucaultean set of theoretical spectacles.
Yet for modern criminological positivism, labouring under the 
philosophy of knowledge, all concern with change is treated as 
faults of writing,91 as evidence of a dangerous concern with 
effect and with practice as opposed to the purity of theory. But 
the connection between social theory and change is more than some 
consequence of an interaction with psychological concerns, for 
the potential for change in social theory flows for the nature 
of social life, of social practices and the nature of those 
practices when one of their constitutive elements has been 
removed or changed. Practice needs certain descriptions and 
internal understandings to make sense and to operate in such a 
way as to constitute a practice, and it is these that social 
theory may undermine - or strengthen. But there is no movement 
beyond, no safe 'extra thought1 action.
What is the technique of validation/marcation for social theory? 
Social theory simply cannot be held accountable in the fashion 
that it is right when it corresponds to the pure and objective 
'set of facts' that it is supposed, naturalistically, to be 
about, since inescapably social theory is about our social 
practices and their creation and acceptance can alter those 
practices - they are not about some external domain of
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'facticity' unresponsive to the development of theory but are 
themselves connected to the sets of earlier understandings. The 
simple claim of the pragmatic enterprise is that social theories 
are validated in practice. Pragmatism has, however, been 
condemned for this notion. To link the validation of theory to 
practice leads to the caricature of pragmatism as the stance that 
'what works is right1. But this is one sided. It is one sided 
since it neglects any consideration • of 'quality'. It is also 
logically incorrect - for how is it possible to understand 'what 
works* unless there is some set of expectations governing the 
sets of desired outcomes. Social theories are, moreover, 
inescapably linked to practice in a fashion which goes beyond 
anything the natural sciences claim for themselves. The label 
'what works is right1 can be better seen as actually 'what works 
[to achieve the kinds of goods that I/we desire] is right* and 
this is always an effect which is embedded in life games, taking 
force within and upon the foundations of the practices of life 
and their central assumptions.
The pragmatic point is that a form of aimlessness occurs when the 
premises remain unarticulated. If theory is to be validated in 
practice then it is to be tested by the quality of the practices 
that it informs; but quality is a valuative notion. It requires 
a theory of context and of humanity that is truly metaphysical, 
it requires the co-penetration of forms of social articulation, 
it denies reductionism. As Unger put it in Law in Modern Society 
the labelling of 'quality* is a dialectical issue. A methodology 
of human striving for ideals and of an inevitable clash between 
the ideal and the actual. It is also an issue that the pragmatic 
imagination asserts has to be faced in a situation without 
metaphysical guarantees. No transhistorical, transcultural, 
absolute structure can be demonstrated as the actual structure 
of reason or the natural development of the empirical social 
world. Thus the answer is a living answer found in the context 
of further articulations of social theory, social philosophy and 
reflection on the modes of life they give issue to, that is it 
is a concern with the connection of life, practice and
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humanity.92
V
Justice in the endstate: Is there an image of justice internal 
to Pragmatism?
We have defined modernity in terms of a grand constructivist 
process part of which was to construct the just society - a 
society fit for human habitation where criminology*s role was to 
provide the knowledge of crime and its containment and/or 
eradication. The minor role traditional criminology played in 
this project is complemented by the wider dreams of naturalist 
social theory which gave the possibility of a grand co-operative 
project which worked on the foundational basis of social change 
and development. In this chapter, however, we have stressed that 
the question of justice is an issue of judgement, justice is thus 
an epistemological product. In this pragmatic approach, the just 
state is not a state of natural flow which may be discovered by 
man*s coming across it, nor is justice a particular activity of 
humanity which carries within its structures its latent 
perfection. Instead for the pragmatic imagination to see the just 
society as the end-state of mankind, as the grand prize of 
modernity's perfectibility is to live in the illusion of an un­
reflexive modernity. What must here be stressed is that giving 
up the end-state conception of the just society is not a result 
of lack of knowledge, not a contemporary position to be remedied 
by better knowledge of the structure of rationality or of the 
human condition, not a position of scepticism, but a position of 
the awareness of modernity itself.
Two projects redescribing the progress of justice in modernity 
which have informed this chapter and which serve as a recapping 
are those of Ewald and MacIntyre.
In "Justice, Equality, Judgment: On 'Social Justice1"93 Ewald
captures 'the problem of justice1 as "an issue of judgement" 
concerned
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"not in the determination of a good, but in the gaining of 
that objectivity of judgment about oneself (and about
others) which is the true political good Objectivity is
the condition of the justice of the judgment, of the 
existence of a just judgment, and therefore of a right, of 
a practice of judgment whose constraint will not be merely 
undergone, but demanded, as making peaceful collective life 
possible. "(J. p.97)94
Thus we are told that:
"Justice has more to do with a science of being than of 
duty. The search for it has not in the first instance to do 
with the faculty of desiring, but with the faculty of 
knowing. The realm of justice is at bottom subordinate to 
the possibility of a true knowledge of men and of things. 
Laying down the law is always dependent on a type of telling 
the truth. The problem of justice comes down to an 
epistemology. So much so that one may make the assumption 
that there were historically as many ways of conceiving the 
problem of justice as there were different epistemological 
configurations. And ipso facto that there could be no new 
way of conceiving of justice except in correlation with the 
emergence of a new configuration of knowledge. Thus, the 
problem we set ourselves concerning "social justice" would 
come down to determining what might be the epistemological 
configuration behind it." (J. p.97)
Ewald presents a three-fold periodisation of justice and 
epistemology: namely 1) classical natural law, 2) modern natural 
law, and 3) social justice. It is a semi-structuralist analysis 
(in the sense in holding to the sanctity of the new 'episteme') 
which grants a total involvement in one of other epistemes of 
justice; the final image is of 'social justice1, the act of 
judging internal to social theory with no conception proposed of 
what is the next episteme. In 'social justice1 the category of 
legal reason is replaced, in Foucaultean style, by 'the norm1 and 
the just judgement is therefore the judgement which respects the 
'norm1, using this as the frame to decide on corresponding 
practice.
In After Virtue95 MacIntyre complements Ewald. MacIntyre's 
analysis strives to reassert the primacy of Aristotelian, as 
opposed to what MacIntyre sees as our empty, modern (quasi- 
'liberal'), conceptions of justice. For MacIntyre modernity 
resounds with appeals to justice - linguistic utterances devoid,
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however, of any patterned references which can give these appeals 
or purported resorts to 'justice' sense. That is to say that 
there is no scheme of commensurability or coherent 
translatability which can assert the dissimilar and similar in 
these appeals such that they may be ranked. MacIntyre's reading 
of Aristotle places justice as the first virtue of political life 
and a community which lacks practical agreement on a conception 
of justice necessarily, on this reading, lacks the foundational 
basis for a proper political community. Virtue is understood as 
a disposition or sentiment which will produce in us obedience to 
certain rules, or modes of acting. Thus agreement as to what the 
relevant rules are to be is always a prerequisite for agreement 
upon the nature and content of a particular virtue.
The position of genuine consensus as to the moral framework of
action, presupposed in the Aristotelian notions of the polis and
its central measure of the common good is, however, antithetic
to the individualist politics of modernity. Instead:
"government does not express or represent the moral 
community of the citizens, but is instead a set of 
institutional arrangements for imposing a bureaucratized 
unity on a society which lacks genuine moral consensus....
 the nature of political obligation becomes
systematically unclear".(A.V. p.254)
In this image of modernity the virtue of justice has become the 
virtue of bureaucratic managerialism with its own claims to 
objectivity and authority.
When modern social science moved against the pious claims 
advanced for reason it showed that the claims of reason were 
simply founded upon the constructions of reason - abstracted, 
divorced from any substantive reality the universality claimed 
by reason was the universality of 'fictions'. Thus for MacIntyre 
notions such as 'rights' (in the sense of 'the rights of men’ or 
'human rights' as things alleged to belong to human beings as 
such) or conversely, utility, are fictions - but fictions with 
highly specific properties and effects when embedded as poles for 
language games. Rights, for instance, served as part of the
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social invention of the autonomous moral agent. The 
characteristic of such fictions is clear: "They purport to
provide us with an objective and impersonal criteria, but they 
do not".
The claims of managerial effectiveness came from a different set
of purposes and aspirations. These are the 17th and 18th century
hopes for social control and social progress via the application
of the ethos of science.
"when in the 17th and 18th centuries the Aristotelian 
understanding of nature was repudiated... the Aristotelian 
accounts of action were also rejected. 'Man* ceased, to be 
a functional concept. The explanation of action is 
increasingly held to be a matter of laying bare the 
physiological and physical mechanisms which underlie 
action". (A.V. p.82)
Judgment by the qualities of action, finds itself at odds with 
the scientific vision. The governing metaphors deriving from the 
cyclic nature of human life and the teleonic conception of 
natural growth gave way to the metaphor of mechanism. The 'facts' 
of human nature derive from the modern attempt "to understand 
human nature in mechanical terms, in terms that is of antecedent 
conditions understood as efficient causes". The modern drive 
latches on universal foundations, thus human activity is reduced 
to a series
"of invariences specified by law-like generalizations. To 
cite a cause is to cite a necessary condition or a 
sufficient condition or a necessary and sufficient condition 
as the antecedent of whatever behaviour is to be explained. 
So every mechanical causal sequence exemplifies some 
universal generalization and that generalization has a 
precisely specifiable scope. Newton's laws of motion which 
purport to be universal in scope provide the paradigm case 
of such a set of generalizations".(A.V. p.82-83)
The legitimative appeal of the bureaucratic is the ability
"to deploy a body of scientific and above all social 
scientific knowledge, organised in terms of and understood 
as comprising a set of universal law-like
generalizations....
....we can see a progress first from the Enlightenment's 
ideal for a social science to the aspirations of social 
reformers, next from the aspirations of social reformers to 
the ideals of practice and justification to the theoretical 
codification of these practices and of the norms governing
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them by sociologists and organization theorists and finally 
from the employment of the textbooks written by those 
theorists in schools of management and business schools to 
the theoretically informed managerial practice of the 
contemporary technocratic expert".(A.V. p.86)96
Such runs the analysis - the question then becomes what is one
to do with this?
First we must be aware that if there was indeed, ideally, 
an image of justice internal to social theory, and if that is 
capable of being seen as the last of an historical succession of 
images of justice, then this image no longer has the legitimation 
that its adherents once stressed. What is then at stake is the 
question of achieving an image of justice for the indeterminate 
concept of pragmatic epistemological foundationalism.97
Second, the creation of that image of justice must have some
self-referral nature about it. That is to say that if it is truly
pragmatic it must be aware that its bedrock is its own
reflexivity.98 To deny the fixture of meaning takes us into
questions of power and social practice.99 Which can be read as
meaning we give up on the tradition of 'being bound by truth*
altogether in the pursuit of contingent practices and the solace
of 'commitment*. Some readings of, for example, Lyotard*s Just
Gaming appear to support this as the only thing that can be done.
Rorty's response is the conversation of mankind motif which
functions as a 'regulatory idea' where all are, ideally,
inhabitants in a grand conversation bringing with good faith our
narratives, self-images, where justice will be a living voyage
of discovery or social widening of vocabulary achievable when
"readers, or society as a whole, break free of outworn 
vocabularies and attitudes, rather than [concentrate upon] 
providing 'grounding' for the intuitions and customs of the 
present".100
Conversely Santos's hope is that the 'crisis of epistemology' may
allow a shift from
"scientific to nonscientific knowledge and thus from 
scientific legal knowledge to nonscientific legal knowledge 
which will not be captured by the polarity of truth and 
falsity, which has been the basic matrix of the scientific 
paradigm, but will rather point (like utopia) toward a 
polarity of liberation and oppression."101
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But what in Santos' scheme is there then to actually specify 
what is domination/oppression and what is liberation? Or to put 
it another way, using the language of Lyotard in Just Gaming, if 
"human beings are never the authors of what they tell, that is, 
of what they do"102, how is the prospect of liberation possible 
for "the one who speaks"103. For Foucault it was impossible to 
visualise 'liberation' and the various claims made in its name 
were merely new forms of domination.104 The pragmatic answer must 
be that the human subject is always constituted in the various 
language games he is a part of, the various narratives he becomes 
the articulator of and of which he himself is articulated through 
his actions.
This opens up for Lyotard the realization that the power
relations between "the pragmatic relation of discourses" is to
be seen in terms of boundaries not borders. Discursive
interrelation is thus not to
"obey a pragmatics of border to border, between the two 
perfectly defined blocks or two armies, or two verbal sets, 
confronting each other. On the contrary, it is a place of 
ceaseless negotiations and ruses."105
Thus for Lyotard neither the sociologist, the psychiatrist nor 
the criminal lawyer are "gods", neither can speak the language 
of the "all knowing". Instead the sociologists have stories which 
the lawyer does not know, and the lawyers have their own stories. 
"And these two sets of stories are, if you will, not two blocks 
but two centres that send out their elements to negotiate, if one 
can call it that, on the boundaries. This is paganism."(i.e. 
speech beyond the throne of 1 truth'). The consequence is that 
"one does not know whom one is speaking to; one must be very 
prudent; one must negotiate; one must ruse; and one must be on 
the lookout when one has won". One must be on the lookout because 
there is no way that one can judge the whole thing; there is no 
outside and thus no certainty about the course of outcomes and 
of the true nature of the undertaking. Thus the being of the 
narrator is necessarily implied in the constitution of the 
outcomes of negotiations and of the narratives themselves. The 
constitution of the society, and of the actions of that society
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cannot ever be judged "just" or "unjust" except from the internal 
negotiations and ruses of the operatives who arrange themselves 
around the various centres. It will be a matter of a point of 
view, and of the victory of certain points of view, but no point 
of view will ever be total, nor final.106
The statement that there can be no just society may therefore 
stand qualified.107 For although, there cannot be a just society 
in the sense of one whose social arrangements are static, whose 
being has reached the state of unchanging arrangements, whose 
ontology corresponds to that of the 'truly just', there may well 
be a society that behaves 'justly*. From The Post Modern 
Condition and Just Gaming it is apparent that Lyotard would hold 
that society as one which recognised the heterogeneity of 
language games, which accepted that consensus (which "does 
violence to the heterogeneity of language games"108) is not the 
goal of society. He would therefore conclude that society is to 
be guided by "an idea and practice of justice that is not linked 
to that of consensus".109 Such an idea is found in the 
acknowledgement that "every one of us belongs to several 
minorities, and what is very important, none of them prevails. 
It is only then that we can say that society is just".110
This notion of Lyotard has consciously the status of 'an idea*,
not descriptive sociology. Lyotard ends the essay "What is
postmodernism"111 with a warning:
11 it is not our business to supply reality but to invent 
allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented. And 
it is not to be expected that this task will effect the last 
reconciliation between language games (which, under the name 
of faculties Kant knew to be separated by a chasm), and that 
only the transcendental illusion (that of Hegel) can hope to 
totalize them into a real unity. But Kant also knew that the 
price to pay for such an illusion is terror".112
The role of the idea in Just Gaming cannot force the terror of 
a reconciliation between "the concept and the sensible" - the 
idea must involve the non-resolution of desire and knowledge.113 
The development for the image of justice then mirrors the 
narrative image 'truths*' journey into pragmatism, for as Ewald
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described it the image of justice was an image internal to the 
history of epistemology. To avoid what is seen as the weak 
nihilism of pragmatism the tactics appear to be as follows. To 
attempt integration via commensurability - but integration is the 
attempt to overcome the gaps between structures of knowledge into 
some formal network - its goal, implicitly at least, to achieve 
absolute consensus. Such an idea carries the solace (the desire) 
that the synthesis will absolve us from the bewildering array of 
conflicting vocabularies and perspectives available in the social 
world, it will reduce the plurality of language games to a 
managerial core so that control shall be re-established over the 
totality. However, this is an intellectual solution to the 
perpetual strife of the social world which in praxis dissolves 
into what Lyotard calls the terror and what we shall describe as 
another option - imperialism. The imperialist strategy is to 
identify and elaborate the key discourse which recognises the 
'organising principles' which inhere in the wider social body and 
through aligning itself with it criminal justice can become a 
tool in the proper management of that society. But then criminal 
justice loses any claim to any separate status or separate 
identity or purpose or self-doubt and is simply geared into 
maintaining the historical transformations in institutional 
structures and is theoretically impotent as a site of activity. 
In its positivist sense criminal justice becomes a terrain 
awaiting the intrusion and subjection to the progress of 
positivist science (social justice). The reaction of Just Deserts 
may be temporary under this scenario for what it proposals is 
that the contending perspectives within criminology, the social 
sciences, and criminal law are to be superseded by a more 
encompassing framework. To a limited extent Just Deserts can be 
seen as a practical example of a second alternative, namely 
recourse to procedure without requiring a idea of ultimate 
grounding. What is provided by Just Deserts is a methodological 
framework which has the capabilities to define reality for the 
administrator and to disallow any reflexivity between 
administrator, theoretician, and the connection of social theory 
to the constitution of social movements of all kinds. What its
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claimants specify in its defence is that it will clarify and 
force into articulation the choice of the judgmental subject (the 
judge on punishment) and actually allow this subject more choice 
- this is a choice which, however, is ideally only at the surface 
level of social practice and action, it is conditioned by rules 
specifying the selection of penal outcomes for observable 
conditions. Just deserts ultimately claims its provides a 
procedural truth beyond which its users need not search for 
ultimate grounding.
The third choice is the Rorty style ideal of pluralism, 
communication, and dialogue - a choice which does not have 
consensus as the goal, although that may occur in the course of 
operation. In the pluralist scheme social interaction is the 
primary concept and it maintains that the inherent complexity and 
diversity of the structuring of the social world demands the 
development of a sufficient range of approaches that will allow 
the subtlety and paradoxes of the social world to emerge. True 
pluralism is not Millsean tolerance where tolerance is espoused 
as the methodologically most efficient way to ensure true or most 
natural forms of social life are engaged in, but is the province 
of the pragmatists theoretical desire for the new, for paralogy - 
for creation rather than discovery.
But in everyday language game paralogy is deviance, and to allow 
the deviant is, on the terms of the modernist notions of 
development through social control, possible only in the shadow 
of practical terror. This terror, the visage of penalty, is a 
presence utilised for social control. Yet the terror which the 
post-modern analysis also concerns itself with and which the 
penal system exists in the shadow of, is not the direct terror 
of obvious penalty. Penalty is terror but is limited terror, the 
post-modern concern also rises to prominence the terror visited 
on the losers, on the underclass, on the unwanted minorities - 
on the excluded from the dominant narrative forms of 
inclusion.114 But there is another terror that the macro­
sociology implicit in some images of the post-modern understands.
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This terror is the ending of the restraint of the state, the 
narrowing of that space which allows the differentiation of the 
plays, by the imposition of imperialist community, the 
overproduction of its monopoly on violence (including that of 
definition). So the pluralism which criminal justice could allow 
must be a controlled dialogue - control of some form, some 
regulation is unavoidable. Even post-modernism requires the 
'regulatory idea1 to preserve dialogue from nihilism.
A current favourite idea in criminal justice is that of the
'community' and the late modern or post-modern reception of
pluralism into criminology, under this idea, would be a dialogue
in which one pole represents the speaker of the community.115
This is why the philosopher who seeks the "reconstruction of our
arguments about punishment", as Lacey does, must return to "the
ideal of community",116 to ask: "how would common decision-making
be accomplished in an ideal community?" (p.174) There the
criminal law would be
"a set of public norms generally backed up by the threat of 
punishment for breach...employed primarily to preserve the 
framework of values perceived to be necessary to the 
maintenance, stability and peaceful development of the 
community...[where] the central commitment to community 
would inform a commitment to preserving the necessary 
framework of values in the most effective way possible 
(whilst accepting, of course, the possibility of changes in 
those values through political decision)."(p.176)
The outcome is ambiguous. The ideal of the community here can 
also be required to deny the activation of difference, to create 
the overview that the different is the same; that the deviant is 
the same because he is a member of the same community and in the 
spread of that community the foundational status for the 
reference point is secured. The deviant is different, but not in 
essence, in the essence he is part of the 'commun-1, the common. 
The suspicion looms, however,' that the philosopher must call it 
an ideal because, reflexively, he 'knows' that the community does 
not exist, he thus makes his allusion to the non-existent in the 
hope that the rhetoric of the allusion may be the move to create 
the constitution of the better. Not only to control the
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dissipation of the modern but because he understands it is 
better, not because of his faith in the essential rationality of 
man, nor in the current of nature, but in man's unity through the 
duality of mind and body, through the blood of time and in the 
irreconcilable movements between the memory of the blood and the 
hope of the future, between the immanence of the games and the 
possibility of transcendence. In the normative demand for 
community. Moreover, the community must govern itself - that also 
is the pragmatic imperative, it cannot look to the security of 
some template of rationalism, nor to finding the laws of 
movement, for its members are the active points for 
correspondence; the social is contingent. Remembering this takes 
the question back into the construction of the social making 
directed and aware human action the central focus. Ultimately the 
postmodern end-state of criminal justice turns from the narrative 
of goals, of accomplishment, of awaiting the creation of the 
grand society, and into the condition of doing, of journeying. 
The aim of pragmatic justice is still the good society, but now 
it is wrapped in circles of interpretation and practice, 
methodologically participative, procedurally expressive, rather 
than crimeless. In such a complex the imagery of justice is an 
instrument of imaginative conception. A tool which aims to make 
societies more responsive to the desires and hopes of mankind's 
diversity, and which rejects the static arrangements of time as 
anything other than limited experiments, temporary shelters for 
the human spirit, and says 'we' can do better.
NOTES.
l.In this chapter our concern is to offer a reading of aspects 
of criminological history with the epistemological concern as our 
guide.
This reading is done in the light of the work of Alisdair 
MacIntyre (After Virtue. Whose Justice? Which Rationality?), and 
Francois Ewald (His article "Justice, Equality, Judgement: On 
'Social Justice1, in Juridification of Social Spheres: a
comparative analysis in the areas of Labour. Corporate. Antitrust
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and Social Welfare Lawr Gunther Teubner (ed.), Walter de Gruyter, 
Berlin/New York, 1987).
2 .Mary Mackenzie, for example, in Plato on Punishment, University 
of California Press, Berkeley/London, presents a complex, 
although primarily a reformist and humanist, Platonic conception.
3.Both quotes from Plato, The Republic, quoted in Michael S. 
Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the relationship. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge/London/New York, 1984, p.116. This 
is a simplistic reading. R.A.Duff, accepts "that some, like 
Plato, talk of punishment as an attempt to cure the criminal's 
soul of its spiritual disorder: but talk of a person's soul is 
not to be confused with talk of her psychological states; and the 
cure of souls is not to be confused with the cure or treatment 
of psychiatric disorders. To say that a criminal is spiritually 
sick or disordered is to offer a moral comment on the values 
which do, as contrasted with those that should, inform her life 
and her relationships with others, not an empirical diagnosis of 
some impairment in her rational capacities." Trials and 
Punishments f Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/London, 1986,
p. 261.
4."Plato believes that if one has a 'just' (that is, true) view 
of being then one can retranscribe this view into social 
organization, with intermediate instances, to be sure (such as 
the psyche), but nevertheless the model remains that of the very 
distribution of being. Society ought to repeat for itself this 
distribution, which will include also the distribution of 
assignments, responsibilities, values, goods, women, and so 
forth." Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, Just Gaming. 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, p.23.
5.For example Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies.
6.Cf. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. p. 96.
7.Ibid.. p.298.
8.Leon Radzinowicz, Ideology and Crime. Columbia University 
Press, New York, 1966.
9.As in David Jones' selective overview of criminology, History 
of Criminology: a philosophical perspective. Greenwood Press, New 
York/London, 1986.
10.There is, however, an openness to potentiality. The issue of 
predestination has within it the reality of choice. Within the 
unified system of the good man ideally chooses his good - that 
ideal is made into reality via education and the performance of 
practice, the development of a natural aptitude for virtue which 
needs considerate training.
The offices of the state, in particular the sovereign, are 
entrusted with authority and power - a power for which an 
attitude of care, an exercise in virtue, a training in the 
practice of government is required. Monarchy appears as the best
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form of government but in the absence of the proper exercise of 
propriety, in the freedom of government action rule may become 
tyranny.[See "On Princely Government", in Aquinas: Selected
Political Writingsr A.P.D1Entreves (ed.),J.G.Dawson Trans., 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1959, pp 2-42.]
Tyranny gives an order conducive not to virtue but to vice. 
[For Aquinas on the State, Laws and Justice, see A.MacIntyre, 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? . Duckworth,
London, 1988, pp 198-208.]
Government was just in its rule for "the common good". 
[Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, p.5.]
The state was an instrument existing for "the good of the 
community", fIbid. . p.4.] and power was to be exercised "for the 
common welfare of the citizens".fIbid.. p.8.] Thus the Monarch 
"must be concerned, by laws and by advice, by penalties and by 
rewards, to dissuade men from evil-doing and to induce them to 
do good; following thus, the example of God, who gave to men a 
law, and- rewards those who observe it but punishes those who 
transgress". f Ibid. . p.42.] The concern of such rule is the 
"development" of society and in all things the ruler should be 
conscious that "human law has the quality of law only so far as 
it proceeds from right reason; and in this respect it is clear 
it derives from the Eternal law. In so far as it deviates from 
reason it is called an unjust law, and has the quality not of law 
but of violence".TIbid.r p.61.]
Although the ultimate foundation of law, the bedrock of 
reason, lay with the giver of the law, the being of God, the 
observable reality of power although causally part of God's
creation may not be as the scheme of Justice desires (that scheme 
lies in the thought of God - pure reason), for all is subject to 
the corruption of man.fIbid.. p.61.]
The exercise of power is to be a moral exercise; the
political sovereign has his authority, ultimately, from God, the 
central referent of the Cosmos, and the purpose of this authority 
is to provide for the common good. Authority is not to be used
as an end in itself or for selfish ends. Nor must the common good
be interpreted so as to totally submerge the individual in the 
collective whole, but must have respect for the good of 
individual persons. Thus "the proper effect of law is to lead its 
subjects to their proper virtue... to make those to whom it is 
given good".fIbid.f pp.59-60.] The "true ground" of the authority 
of the lawgiver is his intention to secure "the common good 
regulated according to divine justice" (i.e. the justice of the 
cosmos - the teleological state of both physical substance and 
reason).
11.Aquinas: Selected Political Writings, p.57.
12.Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoloqica. Part 2, Part 1, Q.86, Art.l. 
Quoted in Merold Westphal, God. Guilt, and Death: an existential 
phenomenology of religionr Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 
1984, pp. 115-6.
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13.See MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp 181-2.
14.Michel Foucault, "Governmentality", Ideology and
Consciousness f No. 6, pp. 5-21, at p.7.
15.Ibid.. p .9.
16.Thirteen years after Hume's Treatise with Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England direct reliance upon 
traditional natural law is mainly confined to the introduction: 
reference to the desire (the will) of God is now not the dominant 
presence but replaced by concern with the institutions of the 
society (parliament, the common law).
English local municipal law was "a rule of civil conduct" 
- as distinguished from a rule of morals or of faith. "Municipal 
law regards man also as a citizen, and as being bound towards his 
neighbour in other duties than those of mere nature and 
religion." [Commentaries. p.45.]
The Commentaries, Humean style, link change to the notion 
of gradual reform, a mechanism of reform legitimated by the 
facility of new knowledge and a certain degree of faith in the 
quality of past performance. The texts blend the rhetoric of 
intellectualism with the defence of the existing 'pragma' of 
law's operation in the institutions of the time, thus the true 
nature of understanding laws is "not only as a matter of 
principle but as a rational science".[Commentaries. Vol. II, 
p. 2.] but true law reflected the underlying "essence" of social 
being and law was no simple plaything of the central power. Law's 
defence, the rationalization of the English common law, appears 
as an implicit development of traditionalist essentialism, in 
which the common law is held to express and captivate the 
"essentialness" of the living categories of what was previously 
articulated as natural or divinely inspired law as it works 
through the minds of men in local, particular situations.
This defence declares that the world has reason in its 
fabric. A reason which is slow and fragile in its development; 
liable to destruction by unfettered power. [In touching on 
Blackstone MacIntyre holds that Blackstone gives that God has so 
constituted human being that the natural passions and the 
operation of past practice in English society are our proper 
guides. See Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp.228-30.]
The true nature of the "judges... are [as] the depositories of 
the laws, the living oracles"; fCommentaries. Vol.1 p.69.] judges 
do not interpret but transmit concepts of the essence of legal 
foundationalism. This mediates between the living conditions of 
law, the locality, direct, the apprehended and the centralization 
of a power which flows from the state. Blackstone lays down 
certain conditions concerning the central institutions of the 
increasingly powerful state assuming the sole power over 
defining, creating and enforcing law. First, the actual operation 
of the criminal justice process would effectually undermine any 
'unnatural' capital penalties which the legislative might create 
as the sense of justice of individuals would subvert their 
application. Second, power only from the centre and the 
resistance of the local will disrupt the orderly operation of
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what should be a fully rational process, specifically leading to 
a confused image as to the likelihood of punishment for the 
rational criminal. Third, the motor drive of positive change came 
from below and not from the commands above. Blackstone, it is 
said, provides "an account of the dominant English social 
structure according to which the justification of those 
structures is internal to them. The standards by which 
established practice is to be judged are, with minimal 
qualification, the standards already embodied in established 
practice", an interpretation which MacIntyre places Blackstone 
as "the legal counterpart of Burke".TWhose Justice? Which 
rationality?. p.229.]
17.Commentaries. Vol. 1, p.140.
18.John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence.
19.My use of the term 'liberal' in these sections is both in the 
sense used to ascribe a philosophic tradition (as in MacIntyre) 
and in the sense Radzinowicz uses it in his chapter 1, "The 
Liberal Position", of Ideology and Crime.
20.Blackstone does comment on the birth of the "discretionary 
imprisonment" beginning to replace transportation. Commentaries. 
Vol. IV, pp. 371-372 (called "penitentiary houses" in the Edward 
Christian edition of 1830).
21.See E.P.Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class. 
Pelican, London, 1968, particularly p.64 ff for a radical 
sociological interpretation of the strength of Humean Justice as 
the defence of property. The above quote is from D.Hay et al. , 
Albion's Fatal Tree. Allen Lane, London, 1975, p.13.
22.F.W.Hegel, The Philosophy of Right.
23.M. Weber, Economy and Society.
24.H.Trevor-Roper, Religion. Reformation, and Social Change, p. 
172, quoted in J. Hall, Law. Social Science and Criminal 
Theory,Fred B. Rothman & Co., Littleton, Colorado, 1982, p.60.
25.Ibid.. p.64.
26.Let us be clear about the concept of toleration: historically 
it was a forced position, an uneasy compromise, which T.S. Eliot 
recognised well when he said the Christian did not want 
tolerance, he wanted acceptance.
27. If social life is to be subjected to a 'rationalised' legality 
then the question of who shared power (albeit of another form, 
the power of enforcement and of dispersal of the reach of law) 
with the king of law (the maker), was a matter of contestation 
(particularly if the politics of interpretation of the will of
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law and of the delineation of role was not absolutely pre­
given) . Modern legality, in the sense of enlightenment positivism 
(e.g. Hobbes, Locke, Austin, Bentham), entails a notion that the 
truth which law contains is only legal truth, it is only the 
truth of the law itself which is involved - the truth of law does 
not partake necessarily in the truth of the cosmos (although the 
necessity for law may, see H.L.A. Hart) but only in the will of 
its makers and servants, i.e. the subjectivism of man (hence the 
route to Dworkin's 'integrity1 which attempts to rescue a 
rationalist structure from positivism) .
28.M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, and Leon Radzinowicz and 
Roger Hood, A history. . . . Vol 4, "Grappling for Control", pp 
343-353 .
29.Cf. Pieter Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Suffering: Executions 
and the evolution of repression: from a preindustrial metropolis 
to the european experience. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1984. Spierenburg sets out to demonstrate that 
"Foucault's picture of one system quickly replacing another is 
actually far from historical reality. The infliction of pain and 
the public character of punishments did not disappear overnight. 
Both elements slowly retreated in a long, drawn-out process over 
several centuries." p.viii.
30.Quoted in Radzinowicz, A History.... Vol. 4, p. 353. 
Radzinowicz also quotes Gibbon Wakefield in indirect support of 
the Foucault position that the continuing spectacle was causing 
public sympathy for the accused and leading to an irrational use 
of the power to punish.
31.C.Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments. Henry Paolucci Trans., 
The Library of Liberal Arts, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, [1764] 
1963. Other references in text annotated as (B. p....)
32.Ibid.. p .22.
33.Void, Theoretical Criminology, p.22.
34.Ibid.. p .26.
35.Ideology and Crime, p. 123.
36.The New Criminology, p.6.
37.Ibid.. p .1.
38.See Chapter One of Bob Fine's Democracy and The Rule of Law, 
for a general discussion of these issues in the context of 
"Classical Jurisprudence".
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39.My subsidiary thesis here is simple: Matza over states the 
case when he states that 'positive criminology achieved the 
almost impossible, the study of crime separate from the 
contemplation of the state1, and seeing the positive 
criminologist as the technician of the state (in Delinquency and 
Drift. and Becoming Deviant  ^ for the break is already in 
Beccaria. Henceforth the subject of criminal justice will be the 
objects of 'the legal system1 and discussion conducted within the 
boundary of 'legal doctrine’ and developments of that discourse. 
Second the general labelling of classical criminology as being 
about the mediation of power between the state and the individual 
criminal, while positive criminology neglects the question of 
power, overlooks the degree to which Beccaria consciously designs 
an instrument of crime control. Thus the distinction future 
analyzers draw, for example in Juvenile justice between welfare 
and justice or the use made of Packer's "Two models of criminal 
justice", the crime control and the due process, are overstated 
and misconceptions. A detailed reading of Beccaria, only done in 
outline here, leaves no doubt that "due process is part of crime 
control". The elements of 'due process' help to secure its 
legitimacy and authorityr which does not mean to say that they 
are created merely for crime control since they are themselves 
reflections of the wider social issues, but that their appearance 
in criminal justice is not contradictory. This has been recently 
argued quite convincingly by Doreen McBarnet in her sociological 
work on criminal justice process (Conviction. 1981). Weber's
analysis in Economy and Society created ideal types of 'formal 
rationality' (consisting of the absence of value judgments and 
furthering the greatest amount of freedom for economic, political 
and personal liberty) and 'substantive rationality' (consisting 
of the resolution of concrete problems and conflicts within the 
given social order). The liberty of formal rationality is the 
liberty of the bourgeois state, substantive rationality calls for 
a 'sociological liberty1, a 'factual1 liberty. Under legal 
formality the legal apparatus functions as a technically rational 
machine, but with a social terrain of unequal distribution of 
economic resources and power, it cannot achieve substantive 
ideals of justice. Thus the welfare state comes to oppose legal 
formalism - characterised by anti-formalism its development is 
closely aligned with increasing particularization of the state 
organization especially the legal apparatus and modes of 
adjudication. But in giving reasons for this development Weber 
also gives reasons why this need not be uniform and can be a 
mixed system in any one area. The forces driving legal 
particularization Weber identifies as twofold: first,
professional differentiation and the increasing visibility and 
potency of economic interests; and second, the desire to escape 
from formal legal procedures in favour of legal reasoning more 
suited to individual cases. The effect is to question the 
dominance of legal logic and categories, as well as the hegemony 
of legal doctrine. Thus sociological, ethical and economic 
reasoning increasingly comes to replace legal terms in the 
increasingly differentiated modern states. Importantly this 
movement is expressed by, and operates through, groups of 
professionals who wish to avoid becoming 'legal automats'. This 
role of the professional as the actor in the system is strong
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and, implicitly, different groups of actors may have different 
particular interests. Thus the legal apparatus can be seen as a 
site of continual interplay of 'rationalities' and professional 
interests which mean that any 'model' categorizations can only 
serve as ideal types.
40.1 am here influenced by the terminology Hanna Arendt uses in 
distinguishing the social and the political. Richard Bernstein 
summarises Arendt!s distinction as putting into "the public 
political sphere" only "those matters that can properly be 
debated; and about which we can form and test our opinions; 
matters that require judgement: and about which it is correct to 
cay that we seek to persuade each other through public 
argumentation" . We avoid the political by various suppositions, 
one important effect is that "we do not, for example, debate 
about matters where there are clear decision procedures for 
determining whether they are true or false, for example, 
mathematical truths or even empirical claims which can be settled 
by the appeal to facts." Richard J. Bernstein, "Rethinking the 
Social and the Political", in Philosophical profiles: Essays in 
a Pragmatic Mode, Polity Press/Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986. 
p.252. Accepting the distinction as usable does not mean that we 
accept Arendt's 'resolution' of that distinction.
41.Boaventura de Sousa Santos, "Law and Community", in The 
Politics of Informal Justice. Vol 1, The American Experience, 
Richard Abel (ed.), Academic Press, New York/London, 1982, p.264. 
Santos adopts a mixed Foucault plus Marxist approach in which 
political domination mirrors itself in cognitive domination and 
argues in post-modern fashion that the present crisis of the 
scientific paradigm destroys the overreach of this domination 
allowing other forms of 'knowledge' will point to 'liberation'.
42. In the work of Ewald, for instance, and for most 
criminological texts, this development is presented a complete 
sudden entity, as an event - 'actual' social history is much more 
confusing, however, Beccaria does present a unique juncture, a 
text in which many narratives interrelate to produce a 'classic' 
text.
43.Ewald, "Justice, Equality, Judgement: On 'Social Justice’".
44.See Bernard Yack, The longing for Total Revolution: 
philosophic sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx 
and Nietzsche. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986) for 
a development of this theme.
45.Hans Blumenburg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. Robert M. 
Wallace (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, 1985, p. 337.
46.A view which structures a whole field of criminal justice and 
in which law is a bulwark containing the unsociable nature of 
man; in presenting his 1976 proposals for Criminal Justice change 
Harold Pepinsky demonstrates the opposite view stating that his 
proposals "rest on a faith that people can be trusted to co­
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operate in interpersonal affairs". Harold E. Pepinsky, Crime and 
Conflict. Martin Robertson, London, 1976, p. 131.
47 .Beccaria1 s rationalization can be seen in such terms - it was 
to be an instrument, a mechanism, which would allow calculation 
pacifying the arbitrary and disruptive influences of social life, 
and which would give the social engineering required for 
progress. Beccaria's rationalization of penology was a steely 
affair. As Thorsten Sellin labels it, his replacement of capital 
punishment with penal servitude was a punishment worse than 
death, "a living death".[Thorsten Sellin, "Beccaria's Substitute 
for the Death Penalty", in S.F.Landau and L.Sebba (eds.), 
Criminology in Perspective. Lexington Books, Massachusetts, 
1977.] Penal servitude, and the associated repeated public 
sighting of the prisoner, is a rational advance since "it is not 
the intensity of punishment that has the greatest effect on the 
human spirit, but its duration, for our sensibility is more 
easily, and more permanently, affected by slight but repeated 
impressions than by a powerful, but momentary, action." The 
death penalty can only create an impression which, for all its 
immediate force, men soon forget, but "in a free and peaceful 
government the impressions should be frequent rather than 
strong. . . . The death penalty becomes for the majority a spectacle 
and for others an object of compassion mixed with disdain: these 
two sentiments rather than the salutary fear which the laws 
pretend to inspire occupy the spirits of the spectators." 
Furthermore, this right to control is fundamental to orderly 
political structure and its continuance is a crucial social task. 
It is, of course, a political task also - but we are not led to 
see it as such. Instead the operation of the penal machine is 
depicted as a technology of the social - something to be 
discussed as a matter of efficiency not of politics.
Beccaria espouses his version of the penal spectacle as 
able to deter any potential justifications the populace may have 
in breaking a law they consider creates or reinforces an 
unjustified situation. The penal equation reinforces the economic 
and social structure under which the majority live, and which the 
offender views as "fatal to the majority". Remembering the 
materialist use of 'motive' Beccaria considers the rationality 
of thieves or assassins as those individuals "who find no motive 
weighty enough to keep them from violating the laws, except the 
gallows or the wheel", although they cannot give a clear account 
of their motives this "does not make them any the less 
operative". Thus it is that the offender dares to think politics 
and considers: "'What are these laws that I am supposed to
respect, that place such a great distance between me and the rich 
man? He refuses me the penny I ask of him and, as an excuse, 
tells me to sweat at work he knows nothing about. Who made these 
laws? Rich and powerful men who have never deigned to visit the 
squalid huts of the poor, who have never had to share a crust of 
mouldy bread amid the innocent cries of hungry children and the 
tears of a wife. Let us break these bonds, fatal to the majority
and only useful to a few indolent tyrants; let us attack the
injustice at its source. I will return to my natural state of 
independence; I shall at least for a little time live free and
happy with the fruits of my courage and industry. The day will
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perhaps come for my sorrow and repentance, but it will be brief, 
and for a single day of suffering I shall have many years of 
liberty and of pleasures. As king over a few, I will correct the 
mistakes of fortune and will see these tyrants grow pale and 
tremble in the presence of one whom with an insulting flourish 
of pride they used to dismiss to a lower level than their horses 
and dogs'. Then religion presents itself to the mind of the 
abusive wretch and, promising him an easy repentance and an 
almost certain eternity of happiness, does much to diminish for 
him the horrors of the ultimate tragedy.
But he who foresees a great number of years, or even a whole 
lifetime to be spent in servitude and pain, in sight of his 
fellow citizens with whom he lives in freedom and friendship, 
slave of the laws which once afforded him protection, makes a 
useful comparison of all this with the uncertainty of the result 
of his crimes, and the brevity of the time in which he would 
enjoy their fruits. The perpetual example of those whom he 
actually sees the victims of their own carelessness makes a much 
stronger impression upon him than the spectacle of a punishment 
that hardens more than it corrects him."(B. pp. 49-50)
48.Although this can itself be open to the reflexive paradox, 
i.e. it is itself such a viewpoint, it differs in that it is a 
negative epistemological claim - the 'truth' is that no man can 
know totally the 'truth' but he can know that! It is the same 
epistemological structure as the argument for tolerance which 
specifies, because of lack of confidence in the 'truth' of any 
particular practice, multiple practices shall be allowed, so long 
as they do not impose themselves on the 'truth' of the master- 
practice, i.e. the 'truth' of the need for tolerance.
49. Cf. Ewald, prev. cit. . pp 101-104. No one can accept being 
subject to the judgement of another - such is only arbitrary 
imposition, the activity of the war of all upon all. Any movement 
to generalise or universalise the act of judgement of one to 
another is but an act of defiance and conflict. Without natural 
ordering there can be no law of judgement, no law of lawgivers, 
no grounding of valuation for principles transcendent of the 
self.
50.For Hobbes in the above paragraphs see Leviathan. Penguin 
Edition, Part 1, particularly Chapter 13. Certain qualities lead 
man to form society, namely: "The passions that incline men to 
Peace, are Feare [sic] of Death; Desire of such things as are 
necessary to commodious living; and a hope by their industry to 
obtain them", (p.188)
51. In this regard see chapter three of Norman Jacobson, Pride and 
Solace: The Functions and Limits of Political Theory. Menthuen, 
New York/London, 1986, entitled "Behold Leviathan!: the 
Systematic Solace of Thomas Hobbes".
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52."Where there is no common Power, there is no Law: where there 
is no Law there is no Injustice." Leviathan. p.188.
53.Hence, the rule of law not the rule of nature, but as this 
'naturally' comes about [cf., Hume earlier] this can be called, 
as Ewald does, 'modern natural law'. Such a body, law, takes on 
an identity of itself, 'Legal ideology' , the objects of its truth 
claims cannot be linked via some correspondence theory to 
'natural reality', but grow up in accordance with basic 
assumptions of developing legal doctrine as a self constituting 
epistemic body.
54.The principle which gives organization flows from empirical 
observation - No man will give other than what is the minimum to 
sustain co-existence. Hobbes sums his deductions of the laws of 
Nature into the maxim "do not do that to another, which thou 
wouldest not have done to thyself." Leviathan. p.214. There is 
a certainty of reciprocity although there is no substantive 
commitment to a content to social orginisation. There is no 
substantive content necessary to the social, only the stylised 
form of reciprocity which gives it stable expectations. Man does 
not need any idea of the "good" society to constitute civil 
society out of the state of nature.
55.Beccaria here is specific: it is both because "these problems 
deserve to be analyzed with that geometric precision which the 
mist of sophisms, seductive eloquence...cannot withstand.. " and 
that in "defending... unconquerable truth..." we turn to "consult 
the human heart, and find there the basic principles of the true 
right of the sovereign to punish crimes." (B. p.214) Beccaria's 
narrative calls upon the motif of mirroring nature (natural 
process), for "it is not only the arts of taste and pleasure that 
have as their universal principle the faithful imitation of 
nature, but politics itself, at least that which is true and 
lasting..."(B. p.55)
56.Quoted in Ewald, prev. cit.. p.104.
57.Leo Strauss in Natural Right and History. The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago/London,1953, analyses at length this 
transition. For Strauss the dilemma was clear: "Reason is 
impotent because reason or humanity have no cosmic support: the 
universe is unintelligible, and nature 'dissociates' men. But the 
very fact that the universe is unintelligible permits reason to 
rest satisfied with its free constructs, to establish through its 
constructs an Archimedean basis of operations, and to anticipate 
an unlimited progress in its conquest of nature." p.201.
58.Hobbes states that the contract by which men leave the state 
of nature and form civil society is an agreement between 
individuals "as if every man should say to every man, 'I 
authorise and give up my right of governing myself'.
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59.The importance of Becarria's placement of his message in a 
scheme of progress lies partly in what it tells us about desire. 
The progress of the modern age is unattainable without Christianity 
which went before it, but the progress of the modern cannot be 
achieved by a mere transposition of Christian motifs (eschatology, 
and so forth) for whereas Christian progress postulates the hand 
of the other-worldly (divine intervention, the occurrence of the 
grand event), the guarantee of progress of this modern era evolves 
from the power/knowledge equation and an adherence to an image of 
the structural visibility of truth continually organising the 
performance of activity. This idea of progress, in its reflexive 
understanding, recognises that the subjective desire of its will 
and practice resides in its own projection of history, a projection 
which was not possible at just any point of time but depended 
itself upon past progress (i.e. the fact of the the Enlightenment).
60.See Beccaria's "To the Reader" , pp. 3-7 of the Paolucci 
translation, being his response to the criticism of the first 
edition and where he distinguishes his thesis from the idea of 
Divine justice stating that he is concerned with "human, or 
rather political justice". This understanding may be expected to 
make judging part of the political process but remember for 
Beccaria judging is mere technical application, judges do not 
interpret; his is a positivist conception of law.
61.The reciprocity of Baccaria's formal rationalism is apparent 
in his concern to link punishments to a ranking concerning the 
deed. This is essentially a formalist conception, and one based 
upon a vision of the nature of the populace and an idealist 
conception of crime: "the measure of punishments is not the 
sensibility of the criminal, but the public injury... equality 
of punishments can only be extrinsic, since in reality the effect 
on each individual is diverse. . . And who does not know that 
external formalities take the place of reason for the credulous 
and admiring populace?" (B.p.70)
62.That is not to say that law does not retain the shape of 
reason - the law must be internally ordered by reason, since it 
is such reason and logical form which will ensure laws operation, 
its objectivity. Law is rational and formal, to be applied in the 
social, its policy aspects discussed and changed in the 
political. The role of the judge is but to reflect what the law 
is - "the interpretation of laws is an evil". (B.p.17) The 
inheritors of the criminal law can look back upon Beccaria, and 
the 'rights* approach which through its Kantian forms later 
develops into the 'due process' defence of the institutions of 
criminal justice, and thus blind themselves to what Beccaria 
achieved, an instrument designed for control, which legitimatises 
itself to mediate between the open power of the sovereign and the 
latent power of the subject.
63.For instance Donald Black outlines how much 'crime' is 
actually "quite the opposite. Far from being an intentional 
violation of a prohibition, much crime is moralistic and involves 
the pursuit of justice. It is a mode of conflict management, 
possibly a form of punishment, even capital punishment. Viewed
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in relation to law, it is self-help. To the degree that it 
defines or responds to the conduct of someone else - the victim - 
as deviant, crime is social control." "Crime as Social Control", 
in Toward a General Theory of Social Control: V01 2: Selects 
Problems, Donald Black, ed., Academic Press, INC. (London) LTD, 
London, 1984, p.l. The impact of state control over ' crime1 thus 
robs 'traditional self help1 of its meaning and makes problematic 
'modern self help1; the ability of individuals or groups to 
respond in certain ways is taken away by the state. Modern 
legality is "governmental social control". Black leads to the 
conclusion that the reality of much crime, for instance inner 
city 'drug wars1 and self help actions, is that "in modern 
society the state has only theoretically achieved a monopoly over 
the legitimate use of violence. In reality, violence flourishes 
(particularly in modern America), and most of it involves 
ordinary citizens who seemingly view their conduct as a perfectly 
legitimate exercise of social control." p. 13.
64.For a Marxist perspective on this see Drew Humphries and David 
F. Greenburg, "Social Control and Social Formation", in Toward 
A General Theory of Social Control: Vol 2: Selected Problems, 
p.171-208.
65.In De l1esprit II, 5, See discussion in George H. Sabine, A 
History of Political Theory, 4th ed. , Dryden Press, Hinsdale, 
Illinois, 1973, pp.519-20.
66.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, in 2 Vols., 
The Free Press, New York, 1968.
67.Bentham, quoted in James Steintrager, Bentham, Political 
Thinkers Series No. 5, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1977, p.30.
68.Ibid.. Quoted p.31.
69.M.Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the 
Industrial Revolution, Macmillan, London, 1978, p. 68. Materialism 
aided even the religious reformers "by collapsing the mind-body 
distinction, it seemed to offer a scientific explanation for 
Howard's claim that men's moral behaviour could be altered by 
disciplining their bodies. Materialist psychology implied that 
a regime applied to the body by the external force of authority 
would first become a habit and then gradually be transformed into 
a moral preference. Through rountinization and repetition, the 
regimes of discipline would be internalised as moral duties."
70.Quoted in D.Garland, "Politics and Policy in criminological 
discourse: a study in tendentious reasoning and rhetoric", 
International Journal of Sociology of Law. No.l, 1985, p.27.
71.The trustees of the Eastern penitentiary at Philadelphia were 
already in the 1850's and 60's linking the categories of the 
criminal law to the "scientifically" derived categories of 
Phrenology. See the table in Barns and Tweeters, Horizons of
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Criminologyf p. 160, for their vision of "passion", "vice" and
"offence" within the scheme of nature.
72.A. Yakovlev, "Criminal Law - Individualization of Punishment 
or Equality Before the Law", Papers on Criminal Policy, HEUNI 
PUBLICATIONS SERIES. No. 7, Helsinki, 1986, p.55.
73.H.D.Lasswell, "What psychiatrists and political scientists can 
learn from each other", Psychiatry. 1938, p. 39.
74. It is thus no coincidence that Goring's book is called The 
English Convict. Published 1913, see discussion in Void, 
Theoretical Criminology, p.92 f.
75.The constitution of the 'criminal' is located at the interface 
of the law, the 'social1, and the process of clarity.
Suicide has, post Durkheim, been the motif for the 
investigation of crime. Durkheim obtains a transition. A 
transition from 'traditional natural1 legal law - the law of God 
and Sovereign - to social law. As Foucault depicts it, the attack 
which suicide constituted under that legal law is an attack of 
will. Opposition to the will of God, opposition to the will of
the sovereign. A play of power which seeks to raise the will of
the subject above that of the sovereign. But with Durkheim that 
will is not now located as belonging to the subject, but is the 
temporal result of another set of laws which flow through him.
It is to the sociologist, not the theologian or the philosopher, 
for whom these "real laws are discoverable". The subject is 
constrained by "real, living, active forces which, because of the 
way they determine the individual, prove their independence of 
him." Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Routledge & Kegan Paul,
London, 1970. There is now the rescue of the term from legalist 
abstraction - a replacement by social types of suicide determined 
by their own configurations of 'social facts1 (e.g., the 
'egoistic1).
The subject of this suicide is essentially passive - the 
bearer of the impact of the social law(s). His is not the 
rebellion of the personal desire, the personal boundaries of 
suicide are penetrated and made non-existent before the social 
forces which are external to and act upon the individual - social 
forces which are the "real laws" which "are discoverable" by the 
observation of the sociologist. Subsequent criticism of Durkheim 
mirrors those which positivist approaches to crime suffered 
generally.
First, the positivist self-criticism: the data Durkheim
analyzed was official statistics from the 1840's to the 1870's 
and this information is subject to error. Errors of collection 
and reportage thus prejudice the analysis through data fault. 
Similarly much of subsequent criminological investigation can be 
seen as an attempt to explain the official crime statistics - if 
these are suspect then the whole analysis is also. The positivist 
response is to correct such errors and to provide real, actual 
data as 'true facts1 upon which to join correlations of 
'observable occurrences1.
Second, the phemenological criticism of such statistics is 
that they never are capable of conversion into 'real facts1 or
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'empirical positivistics' at all. The original or basic datum 
involve a process of interpretation and symbolic construction of 
meaning which is unable to be analyzed by positivist methodology 
other than spuriously.
The interactionist approach to suicide can be seen in 
Atkinson's concentration upon the "process" of categorizing 
deaths as "suicide". The 'objectivity' of a 'real' rate of 
suicide which would provide the material for analysis is 
rejected. Instead coroners interact with the situations their 
courts interpret producing suicide rates as a result of the 
interaction of their "common sense" theories of suicide with the 
material presented to them. Coroners bring sets of narrative 
expectations, or patterns of cultural history, and, under which, 
if the material fits, a suicide will most likely be registered.
If not further investigation or no suicide is found. 
[J.M.Atkinson, "Societal Reaction to Suicide", in S.Cohen (ed.), 
Images of Deviance f Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1971; and 
Discovering Suicide. MacMillian, London, 1978. The paradigm 
reflection in Criminological literature is Aron V. Cicourel, The 
Social Organization of Juvenile Justice. Heinemann, London, 1976. 
The categories of crime and criminal are not references to 
'objective facts', or mirror images of objective reality but are 
constructions of meanings which come out of the interaction of 
certain situations. Importantly, the question becomes 'how do 
such meanings become generated? How is the categorization 
manufactured?'
76.Ferri is specific: "the doctrine and proposals of the new 
criminal school. . . hold that crime is to be studied in its 
natural and social causes, because a crime is always the effect 
of an anomaly or of a pathological condition, permanent or 
transitory, in the individual and in the society itself. And, on 
this account penal justice, instead of having a mission of 
measuring the 'moral fault’ of the delinquent (a measure which 
is an unalterable impossibility), and of measuring a 
'proportionate punishment' (a proportion which is impossible), 
penal justice can only be a tactical defence against the danger 
and the injury represented by crime; a kind of hygiene and clinic 
against the disease of criminality..." Criminal Sociology. 
American Edition 1917, reprinted Agathan Press, New York, 1967, 
p.xi (references annotated in text as (C.S. p...)
77.Ferri is specific in his conception of the non-interactive role 
of theory, thus "It is we who, by changing our manner of conceiving 
and explaining the world, believe that the world is going to ruin. 
Natural laws, however, remain what they have always been, and the 
world keeps the even tenor of its way regardless." This version of 
naturalist theory denies the pragmatic dialectic of social 
theorizing. The world keeps the even tenor of its way regardless 
of the explanations of philosophers and of scientists, we are to 
be passively instructed as to the way of the world - to the 
pragmatic imagination this is not so. Social theory and philosophy 
interact with and change the very 'reality' they set out to mirror. 
We are not passively instructed by the world, we interact.
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78.Raffaele Garofalo locates the feeling of criminality in the 
concept of ’’natural crime" wherein crime is what offends the 
'norm' of the moral sense of the community: "Moreover, the injury 
must wound the sentiments not in their superior and finer 
degrees, but in the average measure in which they are possessed 
by a community - a measure which is indispensable for the 
adaption of the individual to society. Give such a violation of 
either of the sentiments, and we have what may properly be called 
a natural crime." Criminology. p.44. The moral sense of the 
community is guaranteed by its form of natural law, since Humean 
style, Garofalo finds two "elementary altruistic sentiments of 
pity and probity". The image Gabrielle Tarde has of this thesis 
was of a "desperate effort to attach himself at some point in 
this unfathomable flood of phenomena and cast an anchor exactly 
in what is the most fluid and evasive thing in the world, that 
is to say, feeling." Penal Philosophy, p.72. Both quotes in The 
New Criminology, pp. 16-17.
79.As Daniel Bell put it: "today we feel that there are no 
inherent secrets in the universe. . . and this is one of the 
significant changes in the modern moral temper", ("Twelve Modes 
of prediction - a preliminary Sorting of Approaches in the Social 
Sciences", Daedalus, Summer 1964, p. 845.) which appears to 
return the moral temper in its faith in knowledge to those 
'Platonic' theses which hold to the essential intelligibility of 
the universe, yet without the Greek emphasis upon combining 
truth, goodness and beauty.
80.It was inside these boundaries that "method" gained in 
importance magnifying the technical emphasis of action within and 
upon the observable entities of knowledges boundaries. The notion 
of the "defective delinquent" which positivism created was 
something that could be observed and the elevation of "social 
protection" as the central reason for punishment combined to 
raise both reformation, deterrence, and preventive measures of 
various kinds - the fashion may change, and as interest in "the 
science of the mind" replaced the "anthropological determinism" 
of Lombroso or the "sociological determinism" of Ferri, or the 
"biological determinism" of Garofalo, then some could say: "It 
is increasingly obvious that a majority of the persons whose 
lives are apparently abandoned to a career of crime are 
determined by a deviation from a normal mental condition. This 
fact can no longer be ignored either in our effort to correct 
offenders or to protect society". Law, state and society engaged 
in a field of discourse where, for example, assertions as to the 
social dangerousness of the offender were held to be an 
"objectively existing phenomenon", and we meet "traits" whereby 
one can judge the presence or absence of such phenomenon.
The dialectics of discourse were, for most of the twentieth 
century, predominately interdisciplinary. To those of the 
sociological school that claimed the determination of 
"environment" the proponents of "traits" could respond that "many 
boys and girls have worked themselves up against tremendous 
obstacles. This proves that persons with valuable personal traits 
will rarely yield to criminalistic tendencies." But positivism 
over-predicted crime when it assigned individuals into 'classes'
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or 'typologies' which flowed deterministically within grand mono 
theories. Instead an individualist orientation favouring eclectic 
data appeared preferable.
Crime was thus the product of a persons tendencies and the 
situation of the moment interacting with his mental resistance. 
Criminology could offer to the policy maker a diagrammatical 
representation explaining crime and the necessary action that 
would solve it. Thus letting C stand for crime, T for tendencies, 
S for the situation, and R for resistance:
T & S
C = ---------
R
"Penal Treatment" could change both the inputs of tendencies and 
of resistance. Deterrence would also back up resistance. 
Situational factors could be dealt with by suitable preventive 
measures. The underlying drive is individualist - the primary 
uses of the scheme were to give confidence to 'naturalistic' 
conceptions of man and the ability of 'expertise' to oversee the 
operation of this formula even as the scientific claims of any 
one discipline may be negated or cut across by those of another. 
Moreover the formula offered a rationalization for the past 
empiricism which had resulted in so many collections of "facts". 
For the formula offered a methodology to combine an array of 
information for the collection of which criminological 
eclecticism appeared the best guiding rationale for research. The 
widest multiple factor approaches could be legitimated under the 
desire for practical knowledge as providing some information for 
the formula.
81.See Hook, discussed in Matza, Delinquency and Drift, pp. 10- 
11.
82.See Lyotard, the conclusion to The Post-modern Condition, and 
Blumenberg, throughout The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, for the 
changing pattern of 'theoretical curiosity'.
83.The underlying theme of Nigel Walker's attempt in 1974
84.N. Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom, p.149.
85.Jock Young, "Thinking Seriously about crime: some models of 
criminology", in Crime and Society: readings in history and 
theory. Mike Fitzgerald et al, (The Open University Press) 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1981,
86.Ibid.. p. 307.
87.David Downes and Paul Rock, Understanding Deviance: a guide 
to the sociology of crime and rule breaking. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, (2nd ed.) 1988.
88.Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programs", in Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.) Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge, p. 133ff.
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89.A.MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. p.361.
90.Now, as Charles Taylor describes it quite a game goes on 
between social theory and the 'common sense' descriptions of the 
common life. The practices which make up society require certain 
self-descriptions on the part of the participants - these 
self-descriptions can be called constitutive. In a certain way 
social theory merely tries to make explicit what the participants 
of a social practice are doing, describing the activity central 
to the practice and articulating the norms central to it. Perhaps 
we can then describe the first set of understandings as 
'pre-theoretical1 but what then follows is that any subsequent 
set of understandings involving prior reflection upon practices 
is inescapably 'theoretical'. This is of course to simplify as 
any set of practices can be said to involve a set of 'theoretical 
understandings1 , but the original set of understandings can be 
called pre-theoretical in the sense that they do not rely upon 
a set of articulated theoretical positions for their legitimacy. 
There may not be any systematic formulation of the norms and the 
conception of man and society which underlies them. Social theory 
can be said to arise in our attempts to articulate what we are 
doing in the activities of life, formulate its 'practices’, 
routines and central features, and the regularities and 
understandings these rely upon (the norms). But once that is 
attempted choices are faced, for the construction of theory 
rarely if at all consists of the simple reportage of self evident 
practices or the raising to an explicit formulation of what 
before was only latent. Instead the articulations of theory often 
appear as an opposing force to our common sense thought - theory 
does not expressly articulate common sense but challenges, 
replaces or extends such understandings. The answer to the 
question: 'what is really going on?' is thus to demonstrate a
previously unthought of recounting of the activities. A 
recounting which to common sense may appear dangerous or simply 
mistaken. Alternatively, ways of perceiving what was previously 
taken for granted are provided which provide radically shocking 
ways of perceiving, offering, perhaps, the power to transform. 
This effect of theory cannot but place itself under the label of 
'political' in effect if not in its self-consciousness.
See "Social Theory as practice", in Philosophy and the Human 
Sciences: Philosophical Papers Vol 2.
91.See Positive Criminology, p.12.
92.Ironically, considering the terminology which he employs, the 
situation we depict here is presented by Ronald Dworkin in Law1 s 
Empire. Dworkin is referred to in our next chapter and this 
thesis is not the place here to fully deconstruct the rationalist 
rhetoric of Dworkin into pragmatism, however, the social theory 
of law he presents in Law's Empire, implicitly, only partially 
exists, it is as much a normative conception, a "noble dream" as 
a critic has called it, or as others have put it in opposition 
to empirical legal theory, an exercise in normative legal theory.
The cover to Law's Empire claims to provide "a masterful 
explanation of how the Anglo-American legal system works and on
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what principles it is grounded." Yet Dworkin’s thesis is full of 
phrases which identify his theory as "a conception" which 
"denies", "insists", "rejects", "suggests" and "instructs"; for 
example (at p.225): "the adjudicative principle of integrity
instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far as 
possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a 
single author - the community personified - expressing a coherent 
conception of justice and fairness." Law as integrity "insists 
that legal claims are interpretive judgments and therefore 
combine backward- and forward-looking elements; they interpret 
contemporary legal practice seen as an unfolding political 
narrative", again: "according to law as integrity, propositions 
of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles 
of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the 
best constructive interpretation of the community's legal 
practice."
Dworkin's project offers an interpretative explanation with 
persuasive force, it seeks to establish an interpretation of 
practice which has normative impact asking the reader to both 
understand contemporary practice differently and to change future 
practice as a result. The theory will be true if it can achieve 
that. Its rhetoric is that this will achieve the rationality 
inherent and latent in Law; "it reflects a discrimination already 
latent in the ideal of integrity itself" (at p.243). Dworkin fits 
into the rationalist tradition where the full grasp of the 
meaning of Law's Empire in thought carries with it a grasp of its 
inner necessity, of an understanding of its meaning which conveys 
a total clarity, however, this guarantee is reinforced by the 
persuasion that it is simple better to treat law as integrity 
than alternative, what he calls conventionalist and 'pragmatist', 
accounts; better in terms of more liberal practices which result.
Thus (at p.243) we read: "Law as integrity asks judges to 
assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is structured 
by a coherent set of principles about justice and fairness and 
procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these in the 
fresh cases that come before them, so that each person's 
situation is fair and just according to the same standards. That 
style of adjudication respects the ambition integrity assumes, 
the ambition to be a community of principle."
Further (at p.406): "Our root ambition of treating ourselves 
as a community of principle itself recommends a special role for 
justice. Citizens of such a community aim to be governed justly 
and fairly and with due process... So there is practical 
importance in isolating the question of what integrity both 
permits and requires seen from the standpoint of justice alone. 
For that question marks an agenda for the community as a whole, 
as prior to and shaping further questions about what 
institutional decisions would be necessary to achieve this."
Ultimately, however, (at p. 407) the theory is described 
largely as a story of law's growth whose "optimism may be 
misplaced. A sceptical story seems better to some critics of our 
law: they predict the triumph of entropy instead, of law losing 
its overall substantive coherence in the chaos produced by 
selfish and disparate concentrations of political power. Which 
attitude - pessimism or optimism - is wise and which foolish? 
That depends on energy and imagination as much as foresight, for
390
each attitude, if popular enough, contributes to its own 
vindication."
The impact of accepting this account of law and its practice 
may lead to a change of practice, a constructivist change 
inducing practice more easily covered by the description.
In Charles Taylor's definition the modern empiricist tradition 
"is a genuine attempt to go beyond the circle of our 
interpretations, to get beyond subjectivity. The attempt is to 
reconstruct knowledge in such a way that there is no need to make 
final appeal to readings or judgments which cannot be checked 
further., [to obtain] a unit of information which is not the 
deliverance of a judgement, which has by definition no element 
in it of reading or interpretation, which is a brute datum." He 
has no doubts that both rationalism and empiricism fail and that 
social theory is an endless series of interpretative structures 
(in "Interpretation and the sciences of man", Philosophical 
Papers. Vol II. See also "Self-interpreting Animals", in Vol I.
In this respect Ruth Benedict has earlier destroyed recourse to 
a settled naturalist foundation for modern empiricism in deviancy 
studies; in "Anthropology and the abnormal" she argued the 
relativity of our conceptions and the life grounding for the 
normal and abnormal. For Benedict "normality is culturally 
defined", the structure of humanity is open-ended but in all 
societies choice is required. "No one society can possibly 
utilize in its mores the whole potential range of human 
behaviour." The categories and marcations which social theory 
investigate are socially created: "The concept of the normal is 
properly a variant of the concept of the good. It is that which 
society has approved." Moving against the crass empiricist 
reading of Humean functionality Benedict states: "The small
proportion of the number of the deviants in any culture is not 
a function of the sure instinct with which that society has built 
itself upon the fundamental sanities, but of the universal fact 
that, happily, the majority of mankind quite readily take any 
shape that is presented to them." The result is that questions 
of social engineering become contingent: "Our picture of our own 
civilization is no longer in this generation in terms of a 
changeless and divinely set of categorical imperatives... we must 
face the fact that even our normality is man-made, and is of our 
own seeking." In the variability of time: "No society has yet 
achieved self-conscious and critical analysis of its own 
normalities and attempted rationally to deal with its own social 
process of creating new normalities within its next generation." 
Ruth Benedict, "Anthropology and the abnormal", The Journal of 
General Psychology. Vol. 10 (1934), pp.59-82.
93.In Juridification of Social Spheres, other references to this 
work are contained in the text annotated as (J. p...)
94. Ewald stressed the relationship between 1 justice' and 
epistemology by linking the idea of justice to the concept of 
equality; equality defined in terms of the granting of equality of 
consideration. This recognition of fairness or of appropriateness 
must always exist as a judgment, and, since judgment itself 
requires prior vision to enable the entities to be judged to become
391
1known to the judge, the emphasis can in this way be traced back 
upon the structuring or facilitating of this vision with the 
consequence that we are reminded that vision is allowed, and 
perhaps can only exist, as an internal aspect of an epistemological 
regime.
Ewald specifies that the term justice designates three different 
things: the first is to see justice as a virtue - a virtue to act 
according to the norms of judgment, norms, however, appropriate to 
the well ordered exercise of judgment. The virtue of justice can 
thus be equated to continually treating the beings of a category 
in the fashion that category requires. The exercise of this virtue, 
therefore, presupposes the existence of a common measure by which 
the apparently dissimilar can be compared and equated. This leads 
to the demand for the meta description - the language wherein is 
found "a principle that would allow the value of all values to be 
assessed". (J. p.95). Drawing upon Aristotle (the Politics) we 
understand that this meta or key principle for the rule of justice, 
on which one must agree in order for the polity to survive as an 
harmonious whole, is also the most problematic thing there is. It 
is the creation of a convention - an act of agrement upon a common 
rule of judgment that allows judgment about oneself and judgement 
about the others, to create via the process of reciprocity, into 
a judgment of the social whole. A process which suffuses throughout 
the social body an identity of objectivity.
95.After Virtue, further references contained in text annotated 
as (A.V. p...)
96.In criminology this central theme of managerial expertise with 
its stress upon "the aspiration to value neutrality and the claim 
to manipulative power", although stronger in America with the 
claims of corrections (i.e. rehabilitation) under the indeterminate 
sentence, is clearly visible in the training traditionally given 
to social workers and probation trainees. Central to that training 
was the necessity to adopt a "non-judgmental stance", but to 
respond to the object, i.e. the client, the offender, solely on the 
basis of the techniques inscribed during training (in their earlier 
forms a bowlderised Freudianism).
97.In this discussion 'social justice1 is viewed as that state 
of social organization which is regarded as just because it is 
revealed by social theory to be the grand product of modernity's 
progress. The decline of social justice in the context of the 
positive state taking on the role of organising society, the rise 
of neo-liberalism, the position of Just Deserts, is linked to the 
functional utility of a libertarian order. Libertarianism is to 
some extent reliant upon social theory, in Hayek's writing, for 
example, the market is held out as being undeniably proved to be 
the most efficient mechanism of modernity. Moreover Hayek claims 
that the market can satisfy all of man's wants:
"The economic efforts of ... individuals as well as the 
services which the market order renders to them consist in an 
allocation of means for the competing ultimate purposes which are 
always non-economic. The market order reconciles the claims of 
different non-economic ends by the only known process that
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benefits all - without, however, assuring that the more important 
comes before the less important, for the simple reason that there 
can exist in such a system no single ordering of needs. What it 
tends to bring about is merely a state of affairs in which no 
need is served at the cost of withdrawing a greater amount of 
means from the use of other needs than is necessary to satisfy 
it. The market is the only known method by which this can be 
achieved without an agreement on the relative importance of 
different ultimate ends. . .11 fLaw. Legislation and Liberty. Vol 
II, p.113]
The backup to the market is a set of universal rules, rules 
which are necessarily abstract, the observance of which is the 
virtue of justice (the allegiance to Hume is clear) - the spread 
of these rules constitutes the culmination of modernity:
"revolt against the abstractness of the rules we are 
required to obey in the great Society. . [is to demonstrate that] 
intellectually and morally we have not yet fully matured to the 
needs of the impersonal comprehensive order of mankind." fIbid.. 
p.149. ]
Nor do these rules have as their foundation the expectation 
that sets of human emotions, sympathy, will ensure that social 
relations actually contain instincts of co-operation and 
benefice, opposed to the assumptions of Hume, Hayek attacks 
ideals of socialism and social justice not only for their 
epistemological claims but because their ideals
"do not offer a new moral but merely appeal to instincts 
inherited from an earlier type of society. Similarly the people 
who are described as alienated or estranged from a society based 
on the market order are not the bearers of a new moral but the 
non-domesticated or un-civilized who never learnt the rules of 
conduct upon which the Open Society is based, but want to impose 
upon it their instinctive, 'natural' conceptions derived from 
tribal society." fIbid.. p.147.]
The market is thus the crowing achievement of modernity; but 
this is undercut by reflexivity.
First, the rule of law is not the impartial abstract mature 
order Hayek sees it since even if enforcement of the rules was 
able to be impartial and objective, and we shall see in the next 
chapter that this is not possible, the rules themselves lock 
everyone into an order not all have chosen and many do not want. 
In reality the rule of law makes sense as part of the narratives 
of progress and linked to desires, i.e. those sets of desires for 
liberty, equality and fraternity, which set in motion the force 
of political change in modernity. Thus the impartial, abstract, 
inhuman, rule of law depends upon very human, emotional concerns.
Second, to see the rule of law as a technical matter of 
reference to self-evident rules, where the application of rules 
is different from policy or interpretation is subject to all the 
criticism of legal positivism (see Dworkin, Law's Empire.).
Third, to see the tension between our 'natural emotions' and 
'the discipline of rules' imposed by the achievement of the Great 
Society as the source of the 'fragility of liberty1 is to cleanse 
humanity of what others have seen as humanity's greatest 
attributes - we may still feel, however, that the poet, the 
playwright and the musician cannot be so easily discarded.
393
Forth, his project is ambivalent to local values. In true 
Humean style he demands political decentralization with local 
accountability, which would give rise to the expression of 
localised, non-universalised values and emotions. However, there 
is to be no carry over of these values into the larger sphere 
since "all attempts to model the Great Society on the image of 
the familiar small group, or to turn it into a community by 
directing the individuals toward common visible purposes, must 
produce a totalitarian society". fLaw. Legislation and Liberty.
Vol II, p.147.] What is, however, to prevent the occurrence of 
these small groups, and their allegiances from spreading their 
value structures if there is to be no recognition of the 
legitimacy and incorporation of value discussion in the larger 
sphere and thus no institutionalised methodology of demarcation?
Fifth, to prevent the appearance of this totalitarian 
society Hayek sees the disciplining of individuals into a common 
acceptance of the necessity of the rules and informed public 
opinion as to duties, but how is this to be achieved unless by 
a powerful state or set of media monopolies which control 
communication and influence public expectations? In other words 
a totalitarian society? To think that a free and pluralist 
political and educative order would automatically produce the 
degree of discipline that sets of universal and abstract rules 
require without local influences would appear to hold to some 
common metaphysic of the structure of human nature and desires 
which he claims not to hold.
To the pragmatic imagination the image of Hayek's Great 
Society founders without a foundation on assumptions as to 
humanity which earlier writers such as Hume and Smith shared but 
Hayek attempts to cleanse in creating a bloodless Great Society.
98.The question can be put to Ewald as 'from what epistemological 
regime is your statement concerning the structures of the 
previous launched?1 There has been a tendency to launch critiques 
of the rationality of modernity from the weak position of 
"irrationalism". Sometimes this is confused with the tendency of 
certain writers, Foucault is an outstanding example, to engage 
in epistemological critique without any statement as to his own 
epistemological basis. However, as with the paradoxes of 
reflexivity, to deny truth is to bring into play some form of 
epistemology.
99.Peller, for instance writing about the collapse of modernity's 
confidence in epistemology adopts the de-constructive stance which 
soon reduces to plays of power:
"each move to fix meaning fails because no essential or necessary 
meaning adheres to either the expressions or the things they 
signify. . . The search for such meaning leads back to contingent 
social practices rather than to objective 'reality'. These social 
practices embody contingent choices concerning how to organise the 
thick texture of the world. . . What gets called knowledge is the 
effect of social power institutionalised in . . representational 
conventions". Gary Peller, "The Metaphysics of Law", 73 California 
Law Review, pp 1168-70.
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Chapter Nine: Problems of intellectual order for Criminal
Justice: notes on avoiding false objectivity.
I
In Explaining Criminal Justice David Duffee divided contemporary
criminal justice into two approaches, the Moralist and Welfare.
In this distinction (which roughly corresponds to the usual
Justice versus Welfare distinction used in Britain with
particular reference to Juvenile Justice) the moralist position
is identified as defending the morals or cultural fabric of the
society, whilst in the welfare position public organizations are
primarily concerned with improving social welfare. As well as
being expressions of themes dealt with in our last chapter both
are battles of personnel - the welfare perspective necessitates
a range of social work and interventionist agencies while the
moralist approach is linked to policing, prosecution, court
agencies and penal establishments. The moralist position
conflates two themes, first the Humean legacy of the criminal law
as a system of 'rules' and secondly that these rules reflect the
moral understanding of the society. As Hyman Gross puts it:
"The rules of the criminal law let us know that certain of 
these things that members of a community know to be against 
prevailing moral views are also against the law.
...With rules [of the criminal law] we have a common means 
of guiding ourselves and of judging objectively the acts of 
others. Through the institutions of a legal system that 
includes a legislature representing the people, rules have 
the further virtue of representing not a single person's 
judgement but the intelligence, will, and moral sense of the 
community at large."1
This picture of criminal justice gives
"prominence to rules of conduct whose violations the law 
makes punishable. Such rules are violated when a person acts 
contrary to the rule by engaging in conduct the rule 
prohibits or by failing to engage in conduct that the rule 
requires."2
These rules, although nominally the rules of a 'community', are 
the rules of the abstracted community - the nation. Indeed 
implicitly in Duffee's analysis both the moralist and welfare
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approaches are aspects of modernity's overcoming of 'community' 
in the task of organising 'society'. The welfare position, 
although mediated by knowledge, is an agency of social control 
which reflects activities of politically ordered society, and can 
be seen as a progressive growth in the functions of social 
control complementary to law since "the basis of the authority
of law is immediately the power of organised society....
Ultimately the law rests upon the basis of its accord with the 
conditions of life in civilized society."3 Welfare takes as its 
concern a concept of overall social welfare where the practical 
actions of the system are action for the good of the society. 
This welfare approach is currently subject to a neo-Weberian 
critique which develops Weber's idea that bureaucratic 
administration entailes that a few, and not necessarily an 
elected few, do the thinking and determine the socio-cultural 
forms that delineate the projects of modernity, while the rest 
of society is confined to a submissive conformity. The critique 
of treatment and intervention associated with the rise of Just 
Deserts can be seen as not only part of a return to doctrines 
associated with the perspective which underpinned the early 
modern nation-state with its stress upon sovereignty, individual 
freedom, responsibility and the rule of law, but also a reaction 
against certain of the institutional forms of organizational 
modernity; i.e. of the welfare state.
The tension Duffee portrays is mirrored in Unger's division of 
modem jurisprudence into two principles of justice; the 
principle of freedom of contract and the counter-principle of 
community. For Unger the two are dialectically connected, the 
first serves the money-making ethic of capitalism while the 
second heals or regulates the dehumanisation of life which the 
first leads to - late modernity lurches between the two. Unger's 
demand is for a responsive jurisprudence which reinstates the 
locality of humanity.4
Duffee sees criminology having brought criminal justice to a 
position where although research has not left us ignorant of
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crime it has stripped us of any confidence that the operation of
criminal justice is highly significant for anything that we may
wish to achieve under the label of 'social improvement1. This
understanding complicates the belief in the primary importance
of 'criminal-justice-as-social-control' which both welfare and
the moralist perspective gave themselves as a 'normative' self-
conception. This normative emphasis on what should happen
therefore confounds efforts at describing what in fact does
happen. Behind this normative approach Duffee sees three
overriding assumptions:
"(1) that there is a uniform conception of criminal justice 
applicable to any and every actual social setting; (2) that 
there is in fact a coherent criminal justice system in any 
particular social setting; and (3) that there is in fact a 
coherent, consensual version of American society and 
consequently a single version of social order that most, if 
not all, persons in the United States would accept, had they 
the opportunity."5
Central to the modernist perspectives of criminal justice is the 
state-wide unity of thought and action - a universal grounding 
which both the moralist and the welfare share and wherein 
decision making occurs on criteria which are the same throughout 
the area concerned. Decisions are thus an application of rules 
or, conversely, an application of the facts of judgement - 
decisions do not vary with locality. Against this the pragmatic 
element in the post-modernist critique of modernity concerns 
itself with the local dimension of thought and action. Foucault's 
argument for local discourses, Lyotard's local narratives and 
just gaming, Rorty's situated dialogues, Unger's responsive 
jurisprudence, share a pragmatic retort to the centralised, 
dominating and exclusive operation of modernity's structures. The 
extensionality and similarity which empiricism and rationalism 
designate as the bedrock of modernity's imaginative 
epistemological structuring pragmatism fractures into claims for 
disassociation and multifaced creativity.
Normative assumptions appear to guide the self-conception of 
criminal justice. Opposed to these so called empirical or 
'sociological' studies of actual criminal justice functioning
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stress, in equivalent fashion to the work on 'living law', that 
the criminal justice system is a network of agencies and 
groupings that on a local level seek to achieve their own goals, 
not some abstract 'will of the society/people1 or 'the aim of the 
state*. Although the 'policy' of criminal justice may be 
determined by factors at the level of state politics and demands 
for social change at the level of the nation state, the 
grassroots operation of criminal justice is necessarily mediated 
by factors internal to the bureaucracies themselves and the 
social characteristics of the officials subject to local 
contextualisation.
This understanding is not simply to take the stance of, say, 
'legal realism' against 'legal formalism', but to deny the 
commonality of grounding which either rationalism or empiricism 
normatively assume for understanding. Instead under the pragmatic 
imagination the forms of punishment found in societies come to 
be seen as creations; as social artifacts necessarily historical 
and contingent.6 As a social artifact the operation of criminal 
justice is multi-layered and multifaced, able to be expressed in 
terms of an overriding universalist function only at the cost of 
reducing complexity.
This complexity is felt inside the criminal justice system by the 
actors involved, felt as an enemy. The demarcation central to 
criminal justice decision making corresponds in large part to 
reasoning in binary oppositions rather than complexity and local 
determinism. Thus sets of alternatives such as crime/non-crime, 
guilty/not guilty, insane/normal predominate acting as if the 
particular was always a version of a universal. In sentencing, 
where more options are theoretically available, the tendency is 
to locate them in sets of oppositions such as discharge/punish, 
imprison/alternative, and the rhetoric of diversion presupposes 
a 'normal' in relation to which diversion is the 'other'. When 
this system of oppositions comes across either sets of beliefs 
which do not correspond, for example with the guilty/not guilty 
division, the difficulties of the Japanese in pleading at the
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Tokyo war trials, or the situation of socio-pathology or 
psychopathology which is not classified as true insanity but is 
not 'normal' , or an offender who does not fit the bill for prison 
or probation, then difficulty is experienced fitting the 
oppositional template onto life. Empirical research on decision 
making reveals the narrative methodology wherein the decision­
maker simplifies, labels and locates the entities so labeled as 
characteristics of other situations which are reflected in the 
situation under consideration, labelling into roles or images 
which fit into narrative renditions of thought and action. In 
this way both the widespread, in the offering of the discursive 
terms in the narrative, and the local, in the living interpretive 
activity of giving meaning, are combined.7
One of the features of Just Deserts is that it consciously sets
out to achieve a formal process of simplification and boundary
drawing which will control decision making on the local level.
Depending on the presence of certain features the sentencing
outcome will be found in various set situations in terms both of
imprisonment and the length of time to be spent. One reason for
this has been the fear of discretion and the arbitrariness which
it was felt the complexity of contrasting inputs into criminal
justice from law and the social sciences under local
considerations was achieving. Concern with the notion of fairness
and objectivity run through work which is related to this theme.
Thus in his survey of decisions in the penal process Keith
Bottomley highlighted the difficulties in applying the slogan
"equal justice under the law" as a point of reference which could
presently enable us to contrast our empirical reality with an
agreed ideal.8 He pointed out that this slogan was of limited use
if different conceptions of the overall goals of the criminal
justice system were in common usage. For if
"sentences reflect different goals they cannot easily be 
compared with another according to some supposed overriding 
criterion of 'equality' ; it is more a question of the 
injustice of sentences being passed with different 
objectives in mind than sentences being unequal according to 
the same criterion, and to that extent unjust."9
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The contrary presumption is that there is ascertainable some 
essential reason for the performance of punishment, and thus some 
essential goal for the social organization of punishment, by 
comparison with which any others are subsidiary. In other words, 
some one, dominant thing that is being done when punishment is 
performed. This notion runs counter to the idea of pluralism and 
highlights the notion at the back of rationalising 
punishment/penalty - which is that if we are to be able to judge 
the fairness or quality of a sentence then we require some 
settled criterion of equal treatment to begin with - and that the 
criterion of fairness in sentencing will become visible in our 
efforts to locate the central purpose of punishment. This is the 
traditional purpose for studying the philosophy of punishment. 
It still lurked beneath the sociological notion of 'penality' 
which Young and Garland used, as it was with Rusche and 
Kirchheimer where it was thought that if the essential purpose 
of punishment could be exposed then its essential non-fairness 
would be exposed also (i.e. negative critique). According to this 
view, locating the central purpose of punishment leads to no­
tions which give the criterion for allocation of 
punishment/sanction/treatment/deserts, or, alternatively, through 
the negative force of critically exposing the dialectical 
transposition of the 'unfair'. When the central notion of 
punishment was a mixed social defence and rehabilitative purpose, 
for instance, one institutional implication led to indeterminate 
sentences and the power of parole. The replacement of such a sen­
tencing system and its ideas of indeterminacy with one of Just 
Deserts is in turn indicated by changing prior notions about the 
central purpose of punishment. The defence of 'rehabilitation' 
in the face of Just Deserts easily lapses back into such 
essentialist thinking.10 In contrast, Wittgenstein put a 
pragmatic perspective thus:
"'Why do we punish criminals? Is it from a desire for 
revenge? Is it in order to prevent a repetition of the 
crime?' And so on. The truth is there is no one reason. 
There is the institution of punishing criminals. Different 
people support this for different reasons, and for different 
reasons in different cases and at different times....And so 
punishments are carried out."11
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It is important to note how widespread the reductive picture has 
been, however, with scholars as diverse as Durkheim and 
Pashukanis offering "sociologies of punishment" bound by its 
framework.12
Similarly Nietzsche attacked crass normativism as preventing 
sophisticated analysis.13 The mistake commonly made in ap­
proaching the subject of punishment was to
"seek out some 'purpose' in punishment, for example, revenge 
or deterrence, then place this purpose at the beginning as 
the cause of the origin of punishment.
. .. the cause of the origin of a thing and its eventual 
utility, its actual employment and place in a system of 
purposes, lie worlds apart; whatever exists...is again and 
again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, 
and redirected...
...one must distinguish, that in it which is relatively 
enduring, the custom, the act, the 'drama', a certain 
sequence of procedures; [from] that in it which is fluid, 
the meaning, the purpose, the expectation associated with 
the performance of such procedures...the concept possesses 
in fact not one meaning but a whole synthesis of meanings; 
[moreover] the previous history of punishment in general, 
the history of its employment for the most various purposes, 
finally crystallizes into a kind of unity that is hard to 
disentangle, hard to analyze and, as must be emphasised 
especially, totally indefinable."
In parenthesis Nietzsche adds:
"today it is impossible to say for certain why people are 
really punished: all concepts in which an entire process is 
semiotically concentrated elude definition; only that which 
has no history is definable."
He concludes that "the meaning" of punishment is "uncertain, 
supplemental and accidental" and that "the one procedure can be 
employed, interpreted, adapted to ends that differ 
fundamentally." One target is the rather comfortable translation 
of functionalism whereby social custom is seen as natural 
process. A mistake which occurs when people assume that "the eye 
is made for seeing, the hand for grasping", and go on to assert 
that "punishment" is simply a natural "invention for the purpose 
of punishing". Freed from reductive functionalism both the type, 
and amount of "punishment" are shown to be varying social 
creations, not a naturally occurring given.
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Yet our common ways of referring to criminal justice and penalty 
leads us to think of a highly rational and goal directed 
"Criminal Justice System" as being the natural and rational thing 
that we are to strive for and this is expressly so when the 
analysis finds that criminal justice is currently a "non­
system".14 Apart from the deviant 'abolitionist' perspective the 
terminology of present progressive discourse is full of implica­
tions of expertise, cohesiveness, and rational operationality. 
One result analytically is to see the practicality of criminal 
justice as purely the prerogative of the state and thus deny the 
variability of language games which may also be at play in 
creating the concrete "punishment" which an offender experiences. 
Punishment is thus considered as something abstract and 
independent of local human concerns, agency or processing. This 
latter characteristic is replicated in the second move to reduce 
the power of the criminal justice system to that range of 
'determinants' which are assumed to lie behind the state, i.e. 
'political economy'.15 Both appear to doom Criminal Justice to 
the status where inputs for change from individuals or weak 
groups are ineffective. But again there are grounds for seeing 
'the criminal justice system' as more open to intervention than 
is suggested.
Comparison of the stated criteria of system analysis to the 
operation of criminal justice reveals that criminal justice can 
only be called a system by a loose use of this terminology and 
many commentators prefer to use the term "process".16 Whether we 
are dealing with a "system" or not would be somewhat of an 
academic point if it were not for the battle of.semantics which 
lie beneath this issue. Namely, the impossibility of the tradi­
tional 'progressive' motif of rationality and systematization 
achieving a coherent series of "goals" and ranking of these other 
than in a system by contrast to the sets of opposing values 
implicit in the 'abolitionism' of those such as Christie or 
Hulsman.17 Such system thinking encourages functionalism, it also 
fits well with rather utilitarian theories of punishment such as 
social defence and reductionism, but it also has been seen by
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analysts to run counter to certain of the 'rights' approaches in 
legal theory and related modes of procedure. As apparent, for 
example, in Howard Packer's two models of criminal justice.18 But 
again to conceive of criminal justice in terms of these two 
models is to adopt an essentialising of punishment. Michael King 
adds Medical, Power, Bureaucratic and Status Passage, as other 
"models" we can use in conceptualising "The Framework of Criminal 
Justice".19 Is there a common referendal for this system? The 
question is especially crucial for if there is to be agreement 
and translatability of discourse for solution, for action, must 
there not be some form of agreement and common understanding of 
the position each one inhabits?20 But what sort of consensus is 
asked for in this language of 'the criminal justice system'? The 
traditional image attached to the modern theme of the democratic 
control of those modalities of social control lies in the notion 
of consensus - the legitimative authority of modernity achieved 
via cognition and a co-orientation to some form of meta-code 
(legal-rational forms of authority). Yet the consensus which 
Duffee finds in Criminal Justice is only to a vague notion of 
'social order' or 'protection of society1 which conceals a 
variety of suppositions as to what form of order is required. As 
Stanley Cohen describes it inside the criminal justice system 
these world views co-exist in complexes of interaction, conflict 
and mutual indifference, partly as symbolic modes by which "the 
professionals" exercise "deposits of power... inside the 
system".21 The paradox for the post-modern, however, who would 
welcome this 'de-construction1 is that without some notion of 
systematic contexuality the symbolisms and semantics which 
legitimate the present institutional arrangements need not be 
confronted with, or contradict, each other. Gidden's post­
consensus babel does not mean Rorty's 'conversation of mankind'! 
At least two paths could develop. One is a 'pragmatism without 
foundations1 which would link participation to a methodology 
rather than agreement on some objective categories of a meta­
language; the other is the imposition of some form of meta-code - 
some agreement upon a common form of definition to be imposed 
to achieve and control a common universe of discourse. The second
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line encourages the rhetoric of reflexive control over the 
participants and instruments of criminal justice and so Just 
Deserts, as an example, appears to achieve a mechanism of control 
without needing to argue the reflexivity of what sort of society 
is justly defended.
II
The cure of Sentencing disparity by Just Deserts is a 
subordination of plural discourse to central power.
One explanation for sentencing disparities is the conflicting 
pulls of differing conceptions of the aims and goals of criminal 
justice. These may be felt differently as between different 
judges and in the same judge on different occasions. Increasing 
the range of available dispositions, for long seen as a key 
element in producing a "progressive system", without working out 
a coherent and integrated philosophy underlying decisions, may 
only further enlarge disparities. Is this consequence to be 
feared? Or can a coherence which allows a degree of disparity be 
acceptable?22
The tradition of conceptualising the role of the judge has 
relied, in the main, upon universalising the conception and 
position of this 'semi-autonomous state functionary'. Work on 
disparities has been done with the presumption of the consensus 
model of the criminal law at the same time as lowering the effect 
of the diverse aims of criminal justice administration. The first 
presumption appears that similarity in outcomes of dispositions 
should occur naturally, as though the Humean legacy of an 
empiricist natural law carried over to 'natural sanctioning'. 
This is a move which H. Mannheim realised was crass and sought 
"significant factors" which would allow a justifiable 
universality. Conversely, Hood sought "considerations" that would 
account for differences. Mannheim's failure to identify 
consistency led to the explanation of disparities becoming the 
non-occurrence of objectivity, concluding that "the subjective
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or intuitive assessment of individual cases does in the main
prevail."23 The consensus model finds itself qualified by "the
human element in justice" to steal Everson's title.
"Justice is a very personal thing reflecting the 
temperament, the personality, the education, environment and
personal traits of the magistrate to a [great] extent
justice resolves itself into the personality of the judge."
As Bottomley points out, to many writers
"the introduction of concepts such as these into the 
analysis of the problem implies a retreat from systematic 
and objective investigation into the realms of subjectivity 
and irrationality; they seem to equate 'personality factors' 
with pure arbitrariness, inevitably resulting in 
injustice. "24
Gaudet's comment is to the point:
"if this personality of the judge element is present to a 
marked degree, we may assume that there are inequalities and 
even injustices in the administration of the criminal law."25
Bottomley's review of the literature leads him to side with the 
conclusions of Hogarth's study and hold that the most important 
influences upon sentencing are the penal philosophies and 
attitudes of individual judges, attitudes which act as a 
framework through which the other social and procedural 
constraints are filtered in a way broadly consistent with the 
magistrates' existing attitudes and objectives in sentencing. 
Bottomley presents a picture wherein sentencers selectively 
interpret and respond to their effective environments in sentenc­
ing and thus exhibit a large degree of self-consistency with the 
corollary being an equal or greater degree of inconsistency be­
tween different sentencers. Bottomley concludes:
"Such inconsistency must by definition, always contain an 
element of 'injustice' for convicted offenders appearing 
before different judges, but the degree to which particular 
sentences may also be considered 'unjustified' on their own 
terms, can only be assessed after a close examination of the 
validity not only of the individual sentencer's own penal 
objectives but also of the social and situational 
constraints to which the final sentencing decision is a 
response.1,26
The paragraph is remarkable for the pragmatic epistemological 
foundation it seeks to have accepted as the basis of a redefined
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"objectivity11. As Donald Black put it:
"In the traditional conception, law is fundamentally an 
affair of rules. The explanation of a legal decision 
normally lies with one or more rules by which the 
established facts are assessed. By contrast, the 
sociological model directs our focus to the social structure 
of a case - to who is involved in it - and this explains how 
it is handled. The rules provide the language of law, but 
the social structure of the case provides the grammar by 
which this language is expressed."
Basic to the pragmatic imagination is the contention that 
decisions and arguments are the arguments and decisions of men - 
the decisions, therefore of the criminal justice 'system', 
although functional, are not the decisions of the 'system' nor 
can they be reduced to coherent bodies of rules or principles, 
but they are of the individuals, contextually situated, who in 
the policy of criminal justice, preform the tasks of staffing and 
mediating between the abstraction of the state and the varying 
individuality of the subject.
Yet a great deal in what has been taken as the progress of 
criminal justice goes directly counter to this notion. Much of 
the development of decision making in Criminal Justice has been 
understood in terms of a 'rationalising of the moral aspect of 
life* in an overcoming of passion and the 'human element1 in the 
name of reason seen as the objective application of rules and 
knowledge.
The rationalization of 'justice', which the narratives of 
progressive epistemological development called for, expressly 
disrupted certain features in the notion of 'judgement'-.28 It was 
not simply that sentencing was called to undergo a revolution to 
a new 'model' (Classicism, Positivism, Just Deserts) but that the 
very acceptance of a concept of rational, 'professional', judging 
by any individual in modernity, and in particular the modern 
phenomena of the judge passing sentence within choice but with 
the use of reason and under the constraints of the new 
"knowledges" (as, for example, in the current American notion of 
'selective incapacitation1 which requires knowledges of
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dangerousness), rests on the presupposition that judgments in the 
formal sense of the outcome or product of the activities of 
deciding, arguing, justifying, and giving reasons, can be 
considered separately from those activities themselves. That is, 
from ' judging1 , 'deciding*, 'arguments' , in what can be described 
as an alternative, and at the risk of over-simplification, 
'human' sense. The success of the type of rational arguments to 
be engaged in is achieved in the distancing of the arguer from 
the argument - the argument is to take on the form of an 
algorithm. This is essential to distinguish knowledge from mere 
subjective belief or opinion - legitimate and rational action 
from arbitrariness. The discipline of the epistemologically 
secure 'reconstructions' of the expert stands contrasted to the 
free flowing poetic licence of the rhetorician.29
On the one side stands the purity of the 'objective' epis­
temological warrant, on the other, the arbitrary, impassioned 
movement of what may loosely be called humanism. The two sides 
appear disjointed and the distinction drawn in chapter one 
between the 'context of discovery* and the 'justification of 
belief' reinforces this. Epistemology, and thus the question of 
the legitimacy of thought, was assigned the task of the 
'justification of belief' while psychology was given the task of 
explaining how men came to hold the diversity of true and false 
beliefs that they did. Correct thought, a matter of 'justified 
true belief', is thus the province of epistemological 
purification stating why a belief is certain and justified and 
this process accounts for the belief in terms of the reasons or 
grounds which can logically reconstruct it, while psychology has 
an applied status accounting at most for methods of assent and 
denial.
In the pragmatic imagination, as we have seen, social human 
behaviour is placed at the foundation of judgement - questions 
of justification become 'beyond' epistemology in the empiricist 
and rationalist sense, and become a question of the constraints 
that shape our actions and allow the active sequence of social
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interaction and the expression of modes of life. The relationship 
between truth and human conviction and action are thus not that 
of the traditional distinction - they are reflexive and not a 
process of contrast in binary opposition. But this does not mean 
that reason is without a role, for the understanding that some 
beliefs are entrenched into our life forms and others are not, 
is not an arbitrary matter. We should not lose sight of what we 
have stressed continually, that the entrenchment of a position 
(and thus the acceptance of that position as a foundational basis 
of judgement and action) can be a matter of reasoned decision 
which does not need the foundational guarantee of its absolute 
truth or falsity.30
Ill
James presented the dicta of pragmatism as 'you can't weed out 
the human element' and sociological understanding shows that the 
legitimation of action in modern Criminal Justice is not a pure 
rationality but rests in a combination of pre-modern claims to 
authority in the Humean sense, claims to 'objective' truth 
statements in the criminological domain (the facts of judgement), 
the interactional mediation of moral rhetoric and the variable 
social structuring of the cases. Rational organization is always 
situated, and, as Richard Sennett points out for example, 
although the direct appeal to patriarchal authority is not made, 
many of the structures of modern authority are still vaguely 
aligned with one or other patriarchal model. In Juvenile Justice, 
for example, one strong image is 'paternalism', which seemingly 
appropriates the image of paternity yet constitutes a power rela­
tion that has few of the real elements of a family.31 The ancien 
regime's symbolism of sovereign authority implanted in the robes 
and formal language of the law courts still continues in at­
tenuated form - law and religion still stand central in their 
concern with manifesting themselves by the symbolic, at the same 
time as they themselves attempt to provide symbolic reference 
points for the modern state.32 Similarly, the neo-conservative
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demand, phrased in terms of a social anthropological conscious­
ness, states that symbols linking governmental action to a realm 
of certain values are as necessary today as in 'primitive1 pre­
enlightenment conditions. Sennett specifies the impossibility of 
a truly or wholly rational structure of authority, since for him 
the barriers of marcation between the ' irrational1 and the 
epistemological secured rational appear frequently of little 
effect. Thus in social life the distinction between the emotional 
and the rational is not firm. He holds that a political order 
cannot base itself solely upon one or the other.33 For his part 
Habermas, in dealing with the rationality of the discourses of 
modernity, gives rhetoric a bridging function between the 
specific "expert" cultural domains in modernity and the life 
world where rhetoric serves to
"feed the contents of expert culture, in which knowledge is 
accumulated under one aspect of validity at a time, into an 
everyday practice in which all linguistic functions and 
aspects of validity are intermeshed to form one syndrome."34
If criminal justice is about 'authority1 then the operation of 
criminal justice requires alliances with the common life. The 
survival of the legal framework over the positivistic, 
incorporating as it does its set of 'moral fictions’ and 
philosophical suppositions (as opposed to the scientific fictions 
of the sciences) aligned with those life-ideas which from the 
time of Kant onwards have articulated the "moral consciousness" 
of society as including the idea of a rational "moral reactive 
attitude"; an attitude which is opposed to many of the 
foundational claims of the "positive", and one which has resisted 
all attempts to subdue and replace it. The ability of legal 
notions to resist the alternative 'naturalistic' conceptions of 
social science can be seen in H.L.A. Hart and A. Honore's 
Causation in the Law which contrasted legal and scientific 
conceptions of causation.35 For the authors, law's use of the 
term was and, moreover, normatively should be taken from the 
common sense perceptions of the populace; the correct test for 
legal outcomes was their correspondence to the presuppositions 
and attributions of responsibility in the common life. Similarly 
the truth in sentencing which the rhetoric of Just Deserts offers
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is a correlation to the reactive attitudes of the common life, 
as, that is, in the American example of deciding sentencing 
lengths by public referendum the collection of preferences 
indicated in polls on the issue (See also the recent return to 
favour of the Death penalty in the U.S.).
IV
The moral reactive attitude and objectivity.
In Freedom and Resentment36 P.F. Strawson legitimates the 
reactive attitude in our experiencing "what it is actually like 
to be involved in ordinary interpersonal relationships ranging 
from the most intimate to the most casual". Reactive attitudes 
are central constitutive features of those relationships which 
draw upon such emotions as resentment, gratitude, forgiveness, 
rage or simply disappointment; emotions and relationships which 
give rise to attitudes which stand in contrast to those he terms 
"objective".
To Strawson attaining a total "objectivity", would necessitate 
a transformation to social attitudes fundamentally at odds with 
the social reality we experience and relate to as humans engaged 
in daily social interaction. In what could be discussions aimed 
specifically at those like Barbara Wootton37 or Eysenck, Strawson 
asks whether the acceptance of the principle of determinism, i.e. 
the acceptance of a particular 'truth' portrayed by social theory 
(i.e. theoretical reason) as the grounding of criminological 
judgement, could lead to the decay or repudiation of participant 
reactive attitudes. He considers this "practically 
inconceivable", as "the human commitment to participation in or­
dinary interpersonal relationships is too thoroughgoing and 
deeply rooted for... a general theoretical conviction [to] so 
change our world..." Strawson contends that "a sustained objec­
tivity of interpersonal attitudes and the human isolation which 
that would entail, does not seem to be something of which human 
beings would be capable, even if some general truth were a
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theoretical ground for it'1. Reactive attitudes are essentially 
"participant attitudes", and removal from general social par­
ticipation is only occasioned in cases of outstanding abnormality 
or immaturity, or when used as a resource and aid to policy, or 
when it provides a refuge from the strains of involvement, or 
simply out of intellectual curiosity. He rephrases the tension 
between the participant attitude and the objective attitude, 
although he also admits it is to somewhat distort both notions, 
as between "our humanity and our intelligence".38 For Strawson, 
the claims of the theoretician to bring objective knowledge 
necessitating such substantive change fails to adequately grasp
"the fact of our natural human commitment to ordinary 
interpersonal attitudes...
..this commitment is part of the general framework of human 
life, not something that can come up for review as 
particular cases can come up for review within this general 
framework.1139
Strawson rephrases the question in terms of a choice between 
continuing to regard the individual who has offended as a member 
of our general moral community, but one who has offended against 
its demands, or regarding him as somehow different and outside 
this community. If we consider him as part of the moral 
community, then, he implicitly claims, we must see the practice 
of punishment as of a piece with the whole range of attitudes 
constituting that community, including the self reactive 
attitude.
In contrast, Barbara Wootton openly espoused the path of 
'objectivity1 in order to realign the practice of sentencing so 
that its social practice was to rest upon calculated, objective 
consequences. "The frequency with which reconviction follows a 
sentence for a given offence is a fact", which could serve as "an 
objective criterion" to develop "the prevalent punitive system 
of sentencing into one the success of which is judged by its 
skill in preventing recidivism".40 The crucial element in this 
progress is the provision of "better information": both as to the 
outcome of the courts decisions and in the translation of this 
information into "statistical analysis" providing objective
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particulars of a "higher prognostic value" than "subjective
judgments of persons...in close touch with the subject of the
investigation."41 Criminology and penology are self sustaining
discursive instruments of the social and the question of
punishment Wootton presents does not contain any moral or social
ambiguity. Support will be granted to actual dispositions, or
not, on the basis of factual, 'hard', particulars. The
consequences are clearly recognised:
"decisions as to the treatment of offenders should become an 
administrative, instead of a judicial, matter....
...custodial sentences should be indeterminate...rigid 
divisions of institutions into the penal and the medical 
should be obliterated...
...regard should be paid to questions of guilt and 
responsibility only in so far as they are related to this 
aim".
It is the denial of any concept of the penal equation, and the 
sentencing function, other than as a particular unambiguous 
specie of scientific reasoning; morality as a specie of discourse 
is extraneous.
The overall position relies upon a specific notion of the role 
of objectivity - it clearly draws a distinction whereby the forms 
of psychological judgments that Strawson notes in the reactive 
attitudes stand outside science and logic. It grants a belief 
that science and logic are on one side, and on the other 
psychological factors masquerading in the terminology of the 
moral which are continually to be fought against in the name of 
a rational system, and are to be removed in the creation of that 
system. Woolly, "humanist" thinking, of whatever form, 
retributionist or the opposite, is not to be indulged in. This 
position is on a par with the infusion of related styles of 
"objective attitude" throughout general explanatory schemes of­
fered by empiricism: for, "if causal theories explain why a
criminal acts as he does, they also explain why he must act as 
he does".42 The foundations of discourse are confident, and, 
furthermore, this explanation promises to enable the holder the 
power to play with the strings that control the "must" by the 
creation of a scientific crime reducing 'treatment' system.43/44
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Wootton clearly indicates that her drive to attain "objectivity"
requires an instrumental machine-like approach stressing
'objective particulars1 which minimises subjective discursive
interaction. It is ideally a treatment machine where "the concept
of legal guilt" is "dissolved", replaced by a system where the
"significance of a conviction [is] reinterpreted merely as 
evidence that a prohibited act has been committed, questions 
of motivation being relevant only in so far as they bear 
upon the probability of such acts being repeated."45
Jurisprudential concern is transformed: for "the forward-looking 
aims of social protection might... have absolutely no connection 
with punishment", thus "there is little cause to be disturbed by 
the multiplication of offenses of strict liability",46 as these 
are mostly aimed at the task of reducing social harm, which is 
the same whatever the mental state of the actor.
Wootton’s own version whilst expressly stated as not requiring 
an "acceptance of a deterministic view of human behaviour" is 
ambiguous. For on the one hand she wishes to state that "it is 
not possible to get inside another man’s skin", yet that denial 
is made for the purpose of benefiting the contention that we 
simply "by systematic observation of experience" come to know 
what treatment is most effective with offenders, and that it is 
un-necessary to the operationality of this knowledge to ask 
whether the reason of man is subject to free-will or deter­
minism.
One of the Just Deserts arguments against the "scientific" 
approach is that its instrumentality would justify sentences 
which may amount to restrictions far out of proportion in 
severity to the seriousness of a committed offence; i.e. that it 
loses any thread of connection of the actuality of punishment to 
the a c t i v i t i e s  w h i c h  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  the 
punishment/treatment/measure/etc.
In fact this charge could be conceivably ignored, for if the 
scientific and "objective" game is internally consistent it has 
achieved the verbalization of a language game in which this as­
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sertion is incommensurable, and has no place within the framework 
of the game, belonging instead to an outmoded and separate game. 
There is no grounding for this complaint as there is no question 
of the retributive demand for proportionality in ranking severity 
of sentence to past offence. There can consistently be no limits 
upon efficiency, and Wootton recognises that "if an anti-social 
person can be changed by medical treatment into a well-conducted 
citizen, it is only common sense that he should be so treated.1'47 
On this there can logically be no constraints except utilitarian 
efficiency, however, Wootton emphasizes the existence of "moral 
limits" to the permissible types of treatment, and although she 
does not go into the question of how these could be formulated, 
or what they would look like she relies upon these moral factors 
to guide the range and imposition of treatment.48 This, however, 
from the point of view of a Strawson style argument, means that 
Wootton is being either inconsistent, or simply speaking non­
sense. Since, as Strawson emphasised it, the basis of the 
"objective" approach is the suspension of the notion of belonging 
to a moral community. To reintroduce "moral" arguments into the 
performance of tasks legitimated upon the premise of the inap­
plicability of the "moral" is to have ones cake and eat it to. 
As Wootton explicitly declared, the practice of each game is 
different; the empiricist, scientific game, and the rationalist, 
punishment as a game of the moralist, are incommensurable.49
Modern offenses of "no responsibility" have been called no­
morality offenses. Historically, modern moves to avoid 
jurisprudential subjectivism (i.e. the avoidance of needing to 
investigate the question of mens rea, for instance strict 
liability offenses), which provide a transition towards a 
technical objectivism, are clearly linked to utilitarianism.50 
The use of the criminal law as opposed to administrative control, 
in areas such as traffic, consumer protection, environmental 
concern, can be argued to lead to certain traditional features 
being relegated (such as the requirement of consciousness and 
mens rea). The arguments that such strict liability offenses were 
necessary to provide knowable potential costs to companies
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planning development, and thus increasing cost and efficiency 
analysis, places the criminal law as a "market consideration" in 
the Kantian sense. Such crimes do not become "crimes" in the Kan­
tian deontological sense but assume the characteristics of 
'regulatory violations*. Reaction to such activities is some­
thing which can be thrown open to administrative techniques with 
all the tactics of prosecutorial discretion, a range of penalties 
after the finding of occurrence and the emphasis upon out-of- 
court settlement rather than formal measures; the Kantian objec­
tion is that such methodologies cause one to punish the blameless 
and ignore moral condemnation when, conversely, it is due. The 
moral condemnation which the Kantian sees as essential and which 
focus upon a communicative process of demonstrating the normative 
aspects of the individual/community interface is transformed into 
a technical doctrine where the individual takes on the charac­
teristics of an object to be controlled on the basis of scien­
tific findings derived from the study of the external features 
of the object.51 In the resulting theoretical perceptions the in­
dividual tends to become a mere epiphenomenon, and the formula 
for society is that of an objectively organised society directed 
by state functionaries, with deontological morality subservient 
to administrative science. The legitimation of such Law and its 
enforcement is not confined to the delineation of abstract 
spheres of conceptual reasoning but such 'regulatory law* 
legitimates itself by the social process it achieves by 
regulation.
The strict purity of Kantian rationalist reasoning can be seen 
in contrast to a modern writer, Walter Berns, who has implicitly 
attempted to reconcile a notion of the sensus communis and moral 
reactive attitudes in a defence of retributionist activity within 
an empiricist imagination.
Although Berns does not talk in terms of the sensus communis he 
uses a notion of "the moral community" and society is con­
stituted as a moral community by the common experience of the 
moral reactive attitude. Within the commonality of this moral
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community certain acts appear as unjust and give rise to anger; 
this moral reactive attitude is the defining characteristic of 
the community. Specifically: "if men are not angry when someone 
else is robbed, raped or murdered, the implication is that no 
moral community exists, because those men do not care for anyone 
other than themselves. "52 In the moral community dominant beliefs 
as to the injustice of certain acts arouses anger at their 
occurrence; that anger is a justified reaction to those acts and 
this justification carries over to punishment. "Punishment arises 
out of the demand for justice, and justice is demanded by angry, 
morally indignant men; its purpose is to satisfy the moral 
indignation that, it is assumed, accompanies it."53 Berns would 
confine us entirely within a narrow empiricism, for "justice" is 
equated to the satisfaction of an empirical desire, one which 
Kant would call a lower desire - there is no transcendency 
possible, no prescription other than the purpose of satisfying 
moral indignation, i.e. the natural sentiment of anger. The 
Kantian position on the other hand necessarily relates the 
question of justice to the "higher desires"; the non-sentient, 
and in such a case justice may well be demanded by angry men but 
justice does not relate to their anger but to their use of 
reason.
Why too must the reactive attitudes be reduced to one facility, 
that of anger? The Christian response, which may just as well be 
feasible also relies upon a notion of a sensus communis - that 
of feeling a cosmic unity with God, but its response may well be 
different from anger; the Jewish response, taking as it does fhe 
completion .of a promise as its criterion of justice, is also 
different.
Berns1 position that anger can be seen as reasonable, and that 
to act out of anger is not a primitive throwback or irrational 
self-indulgence, defends the rationality of the Strawson style 
attack upon the objective attitude, and stands counter to the 
Kantian ideology that reason takes morality as its own and lines 
up against the emotions. Berns sets out to demolish the notion
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that punishment linked to anger is nothing other than a barbaric 
retaliation against the criminal which denies the criminals 
dignity. However, 'dignity' inhabits a variety of language games 
and Berns by no means succeeds in placing reference to anger as 
the legitimate reference for the games of punishment.54 Berns is 
with Strawson in stressing that anger is properly directed only 
at agents considered to be responsible and thereby possessed of 
the "dignity" of responsibility.55
Strawson's aim at 'the intelligence' on behalf of 'our humanity* 
sides with the pragmatic concern to put the human element as the 
centre of explanatory focus and action, and thus both the image 
of chains of determinism which enable the 'expert' to decide in 
the model of the diagnostic tribunal, and the pre-arranged 
categorizations of the rationalised mandatory tariff system which 
enable the neo-classical moralist to judge both stand condemned. 
But it may be a characteristic of modern life that the actuality 
of "what it is like to be involved in ordinary interpersonal 
relationships" is that the "committment to participation" and 
"communication" are actually features which central trends of 
modern life goes against: features we can label as those of 
'distance'. A central theme of scholars as far apart as Hume, 
Smith, Durkheim, Weber, and Marx is the effect of the growing 
division of labour and the necessary mediation of the social 
world upon the human experience of life in that world. That the 
individual's life in that world is mediated by the activities of 
others is obvious enough, what is not so obvious is that there 
is no escape from this mediation, since even the individual's 
understanding of himself is mediated by, and largely the product 
of, the images others have provided him and the necessary 
structuring of his attempt at understanding in language.56 There 
does, at least at first, seem to be something strange or wrong 
about the pragmatists notion that no one has unmeditated direct 
experience of his actions or of the structure of his thoughts 
(moral principles and so forth). It conjures up the puppet model 
or the image of a robot and we feel that we are clearly not 
either - but this is to confuse domination with mediation,
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passivity with dialectics, mindlessness with social 
responsibility. 'Social responsibility1 , for as with the other 
terms none makes sense without the social. In the pragmatic 
imagination it is impossible to escape the social; outside of the 
social the non-social mind or language does not exist. 
'Individual responsibility* is a 'social creation*.5? Without 
constant communication, without the constant interaction with the 
other (including the intrasubjective 'other*), the individual 
lives in a moral vacuum. The abstract recognition of the 
existence of 'good* or 'evil* is of little consequence, what 
counts is the ability to appropriate such concepts into the 
actions of ourselves and others. The failure to do this is the 
creation of extreme social- distance and the creation of acts 
which the individual refuses to appropriate. But under the theory 
of a Skinner,58 for instance, the individual cannot appropriate 
his action, similarly to all forms of formula decision making, 
the responsibility is there held to be the formula's.59
Accepting, however, that language and the constructions of 
language act as a medium connects the products of language, 
theories, philosophies, ideologies to human activity. All act as 
a medium and are themselves mediating forces. Reflection, 
expression, criticism, of the self and of the others in that 
social environment whether individually, in group, or 
institutionally, would be inconceivable otherwise. Mediation is 
required by the expansion in modernity of social consciousness 
out of the premodern spacial characteristics of the local and the 
simplicity of limited division of labour - the style of criminal 
justice which Christie espouses in-Limits to Pain does not need 
a developed 'philosophy of punishment* since its reactionary 
attitudes are mediated by the experience of close interpersonal 
contact and intimate knowledge of the 'other' .60 In the pre­
modern spectacles of medieval Christendom or the ancien regime 
a form of participation was granted to both the ruler and the 
ruled. Psychic distance was kept at a minimum - the public nature 
of the execution gives to each the experience of being a witness 
of the other. In the case of dealing with what is considered
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'evil*, all can say if was 'we' that rid the social body of that 
evil. In the case of the political offender, the visuality of the 
spectacle helps all to recognise and to respect his part in the 
order of things. His execution has a positive function 
reinforcing order by the visual display of the power to punish. 
In the developed modem state, however, punishment and the 
operation of the criminal law is carried out by the complex 
division of labour termed the criminal justice system, where the 
handling of the offender and the imposition of pain is hidden for 
the most part. The operation of the modem Criminal Justice 
system is the operation of a series of interactional sites in 
police stations, courtrooms, prisons behind walls, staffed by 
professionals, existing at an ambiguous distance within and yet 
not of the social body - officially aiming at the control of the 
social. The removal of the visibility which characterised the 
premodem with the witnessing of each act by substantial members 
of the populace (who would describe the event in graphic detail 
to those not there), eliminates participation and makes the role 
of penalty in the expression and continuity of the social bond 
harder (as well as depriving the public of a direct avenue of 
response). The act will still be social - but legitimacy may be 
suspect, penalty may no longer have such a direct and obvious fit 
with the social body, and come to play a more indirect role in 
reinforcing the social fabric. Conversely, however, the role of 
criminal justice ideology, i.e. philosophies of punishment, 
theories of criminology, theories of law and society, can be seen 
not only as instrumental creations of thought but instruments 
which grant vicarious participation in modern social processes. 
That is they serve as medium which effect the legitimacy of acts 
done in the name of 'us' and which are conducted under the 
rhetoric of the 'we'. Utilitarian theories roughly put, state 
that the act of punishment is done to maximise the social benefit 
of the majority, to give the greater social benefit, punishment 
is an 'evil' operating as an instrument on behalf of all the 
society - therefore vicariously it is carried out by officials 
for you and thus you and the offender who in sharing it 
understands that his suffering is the means to that end.
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Deontological theories of punishment give to the official the 
task of seeing that the proper deserts for wrongdoing (evil) are 
visited upon him. Therefore as the child molester sits in the 
prison his suffering, albeit witnessed only by his fellows 
(neither Beccaria nor Bentham had their wishes put fully into 
practice on this point), is offered as satisfaction to virtue and 
populace; understood and communicated by the understanding that 
his disappearance is proper 'deserts1, and, that he, the 
offender, understands and recognises the 'mediated' stare of the 
public. However, it is not put quite so clearly. Utilitarian 
theories are expressed as the tools of the rational organization 
of that abstract entity 'society' , deontological theories attempt 
to reconcile the patently different, and rights based theories 
lose themselves in the abstraction of the 'regime of rights' . The 
offender becomes the entity to be talked to, to be convicted, to 
be imprisoned, to be paroled, to have things done to him of which 
he is the recipient, and which go on largely irrespective of his 
participation or of any others. The instrumental function of 
language takes over, the raediative and expressional downplayed, 
possibly resulting in alienation.61
In the imaginative structuring of early modernity mediation was 
not seen as a problem. Both rationalism in its Kantian form, and 
empiricism in its Humean, specified constraints which would in 
the 'natural' course of events regulate the application of the 
power to punish. For the Kantian it is never right to use another 
person as a means, and for the Humean the inter-human capacity 
of sympathy would ensure a degree of reciprocity and humaneness 
in dealing with fellow human beings. The late modern public space 
is, however, a thoroughly mediated space. Mediation by theory, 
philosophy, and the institutional positioning of the individuals 
who exercise decision making capacity. Such mediation necessarily 
results in the creation of psychic distance between individuals 
who may already be the subjects of a large degree of social 
distancing.62
In the historical analysis of Spierenburg the 'disappearance of
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public executions' is linked 'to verifiable expressions of 
anxiety or repugnance' where "the death and suffering of fellow 
human beings were increasingly experienced as painful, just 
because other people were increasingly perceived as fellow human 
beings."63 In the developing modern society with the increasingly 
professed allegiance to the democratic ideal and the lowering of 
social suffering such visual suffering could not take place, it 
was a political liability. How then, if the literature which 
brings out the hidden pain of modern imprisonment is at all 
accurate, can the pain of the modern prisoner be legitimate and 
measured as desert? The 'unproductive' pain of a series of hidden 
processes full of unquantifiable variables?64 The pain is still 
productive because the populace still have to understand that 
punishment exists and that the power to punish is present, but 
the sensitivity, the acknowledgement that the criminal is 
actually a fellow human being, a central controlling factor over 
change, is blunted by the 'objectivity' of modern discourse, that 
is to say through the 'distancing' of modernity. However, it is 
as well to remember that this distancing is an achievement of 
modernity, an achievement which itself allows other achievements 
in social life to develop. The reactive attitudes of community 
life may well be structured along lines, for example those of 
race and of status, which the distancing of modernity overcomes 
in the name of social progress. The social structuring of real, 
human, communal judgement defends what we may call its 'inner 
territory', an inner territory consisting of others like the 
communal self, and defends this from the intrusion of others who 
do not share the features of that self. The weakness of the 
'return to community' models is their lack of appreciation of 
that real 'progress', of the types of interactive social 
relationships which modernity allows to a social life freed from 
the constraints of communal pressure - conversely the postmodern 
move in the pragmatic deconstruction of that distance, the move 
to 'humanise' language, is a move to bridge such social distance. 
Its terms, however, are not the return to premodern denials of 
mediation, but a postmodern conception of the reflexive 
conception of the richness of linguistic mediation and
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construction of social life. As Wittgenstein put it: "We are
struggling with language. We are engaged in a struggle with 
language."65 In such a process we may do well to be wary of false 
'objectivity'.
V
'Objectivity' and the Sentencer.
In the previous chapter we attempted to show that ref lexively all 
the central concepts of justice are open to varying interpreta­
tions. Justice and humaneness take historically different 
meanings and similarly with fairness. Fairness wears at least two 
faces. The first concerns the relationship between the individual 
(citizen, offender, victim) and the society/community. Rules of 
equality, subordination, duties or rights are historically 
situated and contextually laden within varying temporal 
configurations (epistemes). How society is to deal with its 
citizens and lawbreakers is in general terms indicated therein. 
The second concerns the specific treatment, allocation and 
distribution of resources within any particular configuration of 
relationships. This second consideration is an internal 
ascription process having to do with the operation of those 
criteria and proceedings which the general relationship chooses 
to adopt as its internal mechanism of performance. This sense of 
fairness appears thus as an internal question within any one 
episteme of Justice.
The pragmatist must appear as relativist as between systems of 
general relationships, since he holds that the claims of an 
individual to declare the fair and the unfair can be countered 
by a grand scepticism as to the his universal foundationism, a 
relativising of his foundational touchstone. Specifically, the 
pragmatist is sceptical of there being either an external empiri­
cally identifiable reality (such as absolute truths of human 
nature and the human condition which contains empirical 
substance) which can be used as the reference demonstrating the
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fair and the unfair. However, he is equally sceptical of any set 
of universal, reconciling principles whereby justice, fairness, 
politics and being flow into one; into the absolute. The 
pragmatist cannot, however, be a relativist internal to his 
living conceptual scheme or paradigm set; his epistemic 
abstinence or scepticism founds itself upon the living language 
games of his society and the macro-understanding of pragmatism 
itself. Internally, coherence and logic constantly reinforce a 
concern with the relationality of the internal factors 
constituting the points of the conceptual vision. Further, the 
pragmatist denies staticity, thus he may well wish to trade, 
renounce, disregard or develop one or more of the concepts or 
principles which comprise his paradigms and this must cause a 
necessary reorganization to retain coherence in the relations 
internal to his vision, among, for example, the concepts of 
justice, fairness, and equal consideration. Individual 
pragmatists may demonstrate different degrees of personal 
entrenchment or flexibility vis a vis elements of their scheme. 
The pragmatist is not a nihilist. Nihilism is as much the 
opponent of the pragmatist as it is the rationalist or the 
empiricist, but nihilism has less to grab onto in its struggle 
to drown reason since the pragmatist did not ever rejoice in the 
notion of the settled final scheme. The pragmatist always took 
his scheme to be a laical statement (in the sense of the language 
game) arising in a particular spacial-temporal moment, as well 
as an item in ongoing (and engaging) historical narratives - part 
of the process of historical journeying in the multiple unfolding 
language games of existence.
Since the pragmatist is devoid of the ease of reference to 
settled foundations the pragmatist has continual pressure placed 
upon his choices and the integrity of his vision. The temptation 
is to renounce pragmatism in a capitulation and forgetfulness of 
external relativism and accept the 'theory' as true. When called 
upon to act under the guidance of theory to accept the concepts 
of those theories as faithful representations of reality (as the 
crude empiricist seeks for him to do with the appearance of the
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world), or to the presented sets of rules as self-explanatory and 
completely posited. That is to conceive of the law as the written 
statement of an uninterepretative reference, or to be strictly 
bound to the implications of such theory as determining the only 
fruitful mode of dealing with the world. This would result in him 
adopting a forward goal pursuing projection with the entities of 
the world thus revealed, which the efficiency bound, utilitarian 
empiricist would wish him to do, or accept the rationalists* 
intuitive, dreamlike, propositions as bearers of true reality, 
i.e. to the 'true* law as the absolute moral determinant (as 
opposed to choice) of justice. All such alternatives would doom 
his pragmatism and renounce his integrity.
For the pragmatist, acceptance of theory and philosophy is to 
take a grounding and tools arising out of the suppositions and 
modes of life, rather than some complete 'truth' of such theory. 
The absence of self-directing knowledge necessarily determines 
that such theory and philosophy is 'moral* in the proper sense 
of 'the moral sciences'. The pragmatist cannot renounce the 
centrality of human judgement for the security which social 
theory appears to promise, for to him Wittgenstein's statement 
that 'knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgement' ensures 
the placement of humans at the centre of judgement, and it is 
thus up to humans themselves to continually acknowledge and to 
be constrained by the boundaries and complexities of their world 
views. To the pragmatist if the choice of judgement is taken from 
the person and given to the theory then there can be no claim to 
be a reasonable person. The pragmatist cannot renounce the burden 
he carries of the ideals , of his scheme for the empiricists 
'objectivity*, or non-human currency, that reflective social 
theory promises. For the pragmatist the tradition of his 
paradigm, and his attitudes to reason, his introduction into and 
furtherance of the narratives of the historical world demands 
respect as the heritage of reason.
Seeing intellectual models of socio-political obligation and 
distribution in these terms, i.e. at any one time as a system
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concerned with the activities of distribution, allocation, and 
restriction of people within what a commentator may see as a 
growing tradition but which may only be one of a multiplicity of 
possible traditions, directly structures modes of judging. It is 
easy to see how a reflexive pragmatic position for judging (i.e. 
internal to the formal social control mechanisms of these 
traditions) is radically incompatible with either a wholly 
backward looking, conventionalist empiricism which ties the 
concern of decision making only to the announcement and 
performance of the actual words expressed in statue or precedent 
devoid of tradition; or the radical utilitarian version with its 
practical mandate to place the power to punish at the service of 
empirical meta-theories as to the monolithic design of society 
and the normalcy of the unit.
A commitment to fairness and objectivity is thus a committment 
to forms of huam practice and interhuman development. When 
guidance for immediate action is sought within the demands of the 
present criminal justice system being conscious of the 
historically changing paradigm formulations of general fairness, 
of the general relationship between individual and society, 
reflects in his approach to the question of defending, or 
stipulating, the degree to which aspects of an internal method 
of distribution should be upheld. Moreover, he recognises that 
this is crucially a question of living interpretation - the prag­
matist does not have the solace of the externally provided em­
pirical or rationalist solution - his solutions cannot be 
provided from outside of man's activities but are an act of 
living interpretation between present purpose, past tradition, 
and living mode of life.
By contrast, the empiricist judge in a simple act of reflection 
(i.e. non-interpretatively) claims to find his solution in the 
statutes and legal decisions of the past. He is like Hume in his 
defence of conventions, albeit, he may hot share his stoic faith; 
his solace is found in his functional performance of objectivity. 
Alternatively, the forward looking empiricist who is bound by the
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dictates of his social theory must accept the consequentalist 
predictions which his social theory gives, and, mindful of his 
goals instrumentally choose and apply. In comparison, the 
rationalist holds himself bound by clarity of principle to 
decide, by allocation to absolute categories. It is the 
pragmatist, by contrast who has the rough passage for he raises 
the act of judgement into an act of affirmation of modes of 
social life and in this he cannot deny his self-consciousness, 
his reflexivity, and thus the pragmatist must keep interpreting 
the tradition of his conceptual scheme, which of course, already 
holds itself out, seductively, as the 'correct* scheme - the 
overcome of the other(s). But reflexively the pragmatist 'knows' 
that this very claim is undone, and, hence, he must interpret the 
very material which the alternative positions of the empiricist 
or the rationalist, hold out as post-interpretative. What this 
further entails is that at any time the application of internal 
fairness must be part of, and continuous with, the wider 
interpretation of the general relationship - there cannot be a 
paradigmatical breach and it is the role of immanent critique to 
locate any such incompatibility. That is to say, that the details 
of substantive fairness d£» stand in a continuous relation of 
interpretation to the episteme's interpreted principles of 
general fairness. But because this relationship is not absolute, 
nor grounded in an ahistorical, 'naturally' given universal 
'objective' foundationism, that interpretation is always a living 
process involving the integrity of the judge (and all 
functionnaires are judges in the performance of their tasks).
VII
We have noted that a prominent concern in criminal justice 
studies has been the issue of sentencing disparities; the working 
presumption evidenced in the literature was that disparity 
indicated a case of injustice - the blame was placed squarely 
upon the 'human factor' creeping into the judicial mind. As 
described in the criminological literature the epistemology of
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the judicial sentencer lines up with the division between 
empiricism and pragmatism as the following quotations of Hume and 
William James demonstrate.66
Hume held that "after every circumstance, every relation is 
known, the understanding has no room to operate, nor any object 
on which it could employ itself." Objectivity is thus something 
that can wield an impersonal control over beliefs and action. 
James1 reply is simple: "You can't weed out the human con­
tribution." He asks us to give up any notion of the mind of man 
as a responsive to entirely external procedures of evidence and 
justification.
James holds that a persons belief system grows and changes by a
process of accommodating fresh observations within a body of
existing opinion and in this "consistency between previous truth
and novel fact is always the most imperious claimant".67 New
facts may serve to drag aspects of the persons belief system to
a different formation, but the belief system may also prevent the
recognition of novel facts. Piecemeal change is the norm, and
this is governed by highly "subjective" considerations. The judge
which fits this picture is very much the judge revealed in the
conclusion of Hogarth whose "Sentencing is a human process" found
"that the attitudes, definitions of constraints, and 
sentencing behaviour of magistrates are organised in 
congruence with one another. A punitive sentencing policy is 
associated both with punitive attitudes and with a belief 
that the law and the social situation demands a punitive 
response from the magistrate. A lenient sentencing policy is 
associated both with lenient attitudes and beliefs that the 
situation calls for a more lenient policy... Certain reality 
aspects of the social environment do penetrate the 
consciousness of a judge resulting in a modification of his 
behaviour on the bench."68
The judge of the empiricist, on the other hand, appears as an 
ideal type and is the subject of a universal extensionality. He 
belongs to no particular location but is the incumbent of a 
universal but internally empty "role". He is a receiver and in­
terpreter of the social consensus and the 'truth' of presented 
law or theory; he has observed, apprehended, made sense of or
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directly intuited a continuum of experiencing. The individual is 
presented as a passive receptor of data and the relations between 
objects. The picture is that of a sensory, or sensory-cum- 
intellectual confrontation with the objective world as it reveals 
its reality structure.
The pragmatists' judge is an agent acting in the world and guided 
by belief, motive, desires and need, and the foundation of the 
epistemology of his ideas and positions will stem from his 
activities and practices.69 The emphasis is upon accepting that 
reasoning, observing, judging, and the quality of being objective 
are products of people's activities. Under the pen of the 
pragmatist the epistemological perspective changes from the image- 
of the subjective observer facing an objective external world to 
a conception of consciously active agents acting rationally 
against a background of acquired belief. The ethico- 
jurisprudential problem for this "humanist" conception is the 
necessity of constructing an arrangement where people are at the 
focus of the epistemology of criminal justice without sacrificing 
what is accepted as the virtues of objectivity, reasoning and the 
assigning of truth values by rational methods. To even consider 
this as a possibility, however, seems to run counter to the view 
that the subject related elements accruing from the "human 
contribution" undercut interpersonal neutral testing and permit 
the observer to project his own beliefs onto the world thus 
reintroducing the factors of arbitrariness and opinion the 
project of the enlightenment fought against. It appears to ignore 
the issue of rational control over the conclusions that people 
may reach and open further the field of criminal justice to chaos 
and division. A mature empiricism, on the other hand, takes us 
along the path of believing that a developed subject matter open 
to uniform testing can be achieved only if the road to 
objectivity coincides with the road to impersonality, and that 
a truly objective operation can only be achieved by progressively 
eliminating subject-related factors from the process of 
verification. In other words to screen out those personal factors 
of background, biography, values, attitude, ability, decision and
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judgement that are distinctive of "oneself". This version of 
"objectivity" seeks to remove such factors in the double demand 
for a generality of considerations and the process of neutral 
observation. Here the constitution of the 'social' is to be self 
defining. The requirement of this generality is, however, a form 
of essentialism, and the assumption of neutral observation 
effectually removes from the ongoing concern the legitimacy of 
the internal expressional of the judge, who is seen as a neutral 
functionary with only a role playing methodology instead of 
individual responsibility for decision.70
By contrast the pragmatist openly takes up the humanist mantle 
and denies the possibility of humans becoming operators of a 
decision making apparatus in which responsibility is taken out 
of their hands. The pragmatist denies that the 'social' exists 
other than as a result of the work of individuals and groups in 
history. The 'social' does not work upon itself other than by the 
work of humans, and it is the pragmatists cry that only restora­
tion of the creative human factor, and the requirement of human 
responsibility can generate epistemological success to the 
understanding of that social. Some, as James did, can take as 
their general opponent the resulting analytic-synthetic dichotomy 
of empiricist structure wherein each direction of discourse has 
its own mode of validation; dual mechanisms wherein humans but 
look on as spectators. The "democratic" theory of James is 
opposed to any such dichotomy in the interests of a uniform 
account of testing, and the rejection of the notion that the key 
to epistemological success lies in increasing impersonal 
judgement. With the empiricists' idea of objectivity two crucial 
assumptions are important for success - the maintenance of 
interpersonal commensurability of perceptions, meanings and 
beliefs, and the elimination of whatever might break down this 
commensurability. Commensurability is aided by the establishment 
of general criteria of identification to be shared across the 
board, which justify the ascription of predicates and serve to 
measure the verdicts of different individuals. Cohesion is 
achieved by attempts to eliminate divisive subjective elements
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from the decision making process. The path is to maximise unity 
and minimise fragmentation.71
In his analysis Newell sees a second role for objectivity which 
enables objective judgments to be contrasted with prejudiced, 
biased or dogmatic judgments where objectivity is associated with 
impartiality, detachment, disinterestedness and a willingness to 
submit to standards of evidence. It becomes a quality of persons 
through their actions. The objective judgement becomes so not 
because of the character of the external entities but because of 
the practices of the person judging. This understanding of 
objectivity turns the central focus of objectivity away from 
suppositions concerning the external world onto the practices and 
attitudes of man. Objectivity becomes a human conception in the 
radical sense that the objective person is a result of his ex­
ercise of a disposition to act within the constraints of a wider 
social practice. Just as, for example, integrity is associated 
with certain observable patterns of human behaviour, so does ob­
jectivity become identified by the practice of respecting certain 
norms (among which are standards of evidence and lines of 
argument regulating ways of resolving disputes). Objectivity 
becomes a practice, something we can take a moral stance about 
and praise a person for maintaining. Objectivity is something 
that the person can do something about -. he may choose to be 
objective or not in the same way he chooses to be honest or not, 
and -thus it becomes talked about as a virtue. Treating 
objectivity as a virtue similar to integrity breaks the force of 
the ontological argument as the dominant player in the game of 
social objectivity. It is no longer of primary concern to 
objectivity. The primacy of ontology depended upon the existence 
of impersonal entities existing independent of subject-related 
properties as opposed to the second role where it is dependent 
upon the performance of human actions and is linked to choices 
and decisions. But in effect 'objectivity' is redundant in the 
first role for it serves to add nothing; ontology does it all. 
If something is actually out there it is so, and the ascription 
of objectivity to a judgement adds nothing but is actually excess
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baggage. To explain things "as they really are" by calling them 
objective does nothing without a prior grasp of the difference 
between "real things" and representations, and, if we have that, 
then we already have a sense of the distinction and there is no 
need to use the notion of objectivity to supply it. To simply 
correlate the objective with the nature of the external world 
leaves objectivity with no job of its own, since we broadly 
identifying 'objective particulars' with the 'facts'. However, 
the idea that objectivity depends 'on the facts outside' makes 
the mistake of assimilating practices to particulars.
This pragmatic role for objectivity is not concerned with the 
ascription to external particulars beyond reach. It invites us 
to conceive of objectivity as a part of human activity and not 
as a property transcending activity and thus opens it up for par­
ticipation. The focus, therefore, shifts from the problem of
identifying what lies beyond us to become the problem of
identifying the human actions which ensure objectiveness. It 
brings objectivity back onto a human scale. However, this very 
accessibility causes conflict by threatening the subjective-
objective distinction as it is officially understood. If
objectivity is something like a visible disposition, then to be 
objective, or fail to be, is to conduct oneself in certain ways; 
the distinction between the objective and the non-objective would 
be drawn solely within the arena of action. But this will clash 
with the traditional idea that what is subjective is in the mind, 
and what is objective is 'outside' it. The distinction would 
simply be irrelevant.
Under the direction of this argument we are encouraged to drop 
the concern with outer ontology and concentrate upon our 
methodologies instead. If objectivity is actually the essential 
feature then it must be accessible - and thus one may talk of the 
objectivity of a practice but not of the objectivity of the par­
ticulars of the world beyond that practice.
The criminal becomes constituted in that practice, in the
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objectivity of the methodology enshrined and the outcome of those 
practices.72 The price of objectivity then becomes the demand for 
a proper method, not the actuality of some external "objective 
particulars", but in the practice of the process itself. A public 
practice, constituted upon a public methodology, and one open to 
the scrutiny of the possibility of independent and impartial 
criteria. Yet this seems to reconstitute the problem of the 
misuse of objectivity again, this time in the expectations of the 
"independent" and impartial.
The pragmatic retort is to again redefine the "independent" and 
impartial, this time in terms of agreement in participation. It 
can be no other, for the ambitions of the external "objectivity" 
which even MacIntyre looks back upon in his ambition to 
reconstitute morality (in After Virtue) still "harps" upon the 
Aristotelian desire to see the beauty of form. Wherein the objec­
tivity of values is linked to their validation by external items, 
existing "independent" of the products of the mind. But this is 
circular unless they can universally be picked out and identified 
by observation, and thus be a form of naturalism, or they are 
decided a priori, in which case we have no grounds except for as­
sumption for declaring their existence. This is only to fall into 
the mistake of holding that the more a practice becomes 
"impersonal" the more it is "objective" - the trick of a success­
ful reconciliation will be to achieve an objectivity which incor­
porates those things distinctive of individuals, and one which 
builds upon the opposite assumption to the modern claim that a 
judgement denies its discussability, rationality and 
justiciability in admitting that it is the judgement of a person 
and, communicatively, of a group.
Just Deserts restates the language of 'fairness' and 'justice' 
at the time of the onset of the 'post-modern' in the rhetoric of 
calling upon a progressive narrative of returning to the 
'tradition' of the Enlightenment. What we are offered is the 
"Struggle for Justice", "Towards a Just and Effective Sentencing 
System", "Fair and Certain Punishment", "Doing Justice: The
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Choice of Punishments". We are told that we have taken the wrong 
turning and forsaken the doing of justice for the illusion that 
the 'truth* of justice was upon us (Social Justice); the remedy, 
we are told, is to constitute a new formal structure of objective 
particulars, clearly visible and universally applicable across 
the relevant frame (the state) . Just Deserts is to be a new tool 
of government for the sovereign institution of the state, the 
repository of legitimate authority and power, overseeing citizens 
who stand aware of the price of infraction and are 
constitutionally clothed in rights of protection against both the 
actions of others and the arbitrary power to punish.
There is a motif which sits as the obverse to this spectra of an 
impersonal ordering mechanism and it is referred to by those who 
seek to use the motif of the polis - the motif that justice is 
implicated in the symbiotic and dialectical relationship of 
individual to the community and cannot be abstracted from it. For 
modernity, however, 'community' has been an overburdened concept. 
In marxism, although Marx recognised that existing forms of 
social communities, as in India, were sites of irrational 
discrimination, the idea of the socialist community performs the 
utopian role of the counter image to liberalism, the promise of 
a 'solution' to mankinds' alienated condition. In jurisprudence, 
community emphasises the primacy of the social over the
individual, the tension is between the concentration of 
liberalism upon the freedom of individual rights and community's 
emphasis upon collective welfare. In criminology, the
individualist presuppositions of Kantian liberalism are
apparently vacuous in light of the reality of communal social 
science - i.e. the impossibility of moral desert in a 
heteronomous world where crime is socially patterned and
conditioned. The dream of community is the dream of the 
overcoming of liberalism, the end of the state and the end of 
punishment. Conversely the achievement of community is seen as 
the only time when punishment would be justified.73 However, some 
critical commentators of liberalism have recognised that the 
ambivalence of modernity to community, the tension between
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furthering individual rights with the corresponding ability of 
the individual to pursue individual projects and the possible 
communal consequences of doing so, is not a tension between 
liberalism and the 'other* , i.e. community, but a tension within 
central projects of modernity which involve liberalism. Tim 
0*Hagan, for instance, has argued that instead of there being a 
necessary incompatibility between community and the idea of 
sovereign individuals as citizens of the state many writers have 
actually seen them as interconnected.74 In Unger's analysis the 
principle of individualist freedom of contract and that of 
community dialectically feed off each other.75 Out of Unger comes 
a less optimistic pragmatic notion of community. Community no 
longer is an end state to be achieved - community cannot be a 
solution to social life. Instead community is an intellectual 
sphere capable of energising language games interconnected in its 
name which must be actively and consciously created as a sphere 
continually vulnerable to colonization by the morality and 
mechanisms of the marketplace. The pay off in justice is the 
concern with locality, a concern with practical rationality 
within a semantic space, a community that is not the abstraction 
"community" but is the reality of "X community" - the 
'particular* community.
This image of community denies the possibility of overcoming 
tensions. For its community is 'mystery* and not 'problem'. It 
must be continually fought for, created and defended, not 
inherited and preserved. Neither can it be achieved through the 
embrace with the void, with the image of the sudden 
transformation, since to the pragmatist that is but a solace of 
the mind. Community must build on what is potential in the 
present, creating via paralogies on the active. What then are 
possible modalities of this reasoning?
One possible route in criminal justice judging lies in the 
combination of the normative conceptual positions and empirical 
sociology, between normative legal theory and empirical legal 
theory.76 Within normative legal theory the models that Dworkin
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uses in Law's Empire reflect the concerns of our discussion.
Dworkin builds on his earlier position in A Matter of
Principle.77 where he saw the role of the U.S. Supreme Court as
a forum of principle allowing a continuing public moral debate
within a particular socio-legal moral tradition. MacIntyre by
contrast expressly argued that the Supreme Court has
"the role of a peacemaking or trucekeeping body by 
negotiating its way through an impasse of conflict, not by 
invoking our shared moral first principles. For our society 
as a whole has none."78
In Law's Empire Dworkin places the judge as the most important
personage in Law's Empire (rather than the legislature) and saw
law as an expressive form of the will of the community (as will
made into legal language). The legal community is the inheritor
and safeguard of this expressive process protecting the just
society. The shared value system of the judges enables them to
advance the key rights and privileges which are central to the
particular community's tradition and minimise those which are
not. Dworkin puts up three models of judging, conventionalism,
pragmatism, and integrity. The conventionalist simply applies,
non reflexively, the law which is seen as unproblematic and
successfully pictured in statute and precedent. When he comes
across cases not actually covered by the past law he is radically
free to make new law. The pragmatist is a radical consequentalist
who feels free to ignore what the conventionalist sees as the
'law' and he judges solely on the basis of a utilitarian calculus
of the community interest, maximising future welfare and social
benefits and so forth. Dworkin's pragmatist is thus a development
of the empiricist imagination while his hero, Integrity, actually
derives from a rationalist version of pragmatism. Law as
Integrity consists of
"trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about 
people's rights and duties, the best constructive 
interpretation of the political structure and legal doctrine 
of their community."79
Law as Integrity sees contemporary legal practice "as an 
unfolding political narrative" and the judge takes his self- 
image as the latest participant in that community’s 'chain
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novel1. Underling the undoubted pragmatic epistemology of law as 
integrity however, is rationalist metaphysics. For Dworkin, law 
is a structure of reason, and this is so ultimately because the 
will of man and community is fully rational, that is to say its 
present imperfections are correctable in the latent perfection 
of law's image as the imperfect presentation of the pure law 
which is possible (which is the expression of the rational 
structure of the cosmos). Dworkin cannot acknowledge pragmatic 
contingency since ultimately 'consensus' is his goal, a consensus 
which resides completed in the future since "present law gropes 
towards pure law."80
What we can take from Dworkin is that all judgments of legality 
are necessarily defences and investigations into the entire 
socio-political structure of the society. The institutions of law 
are not sealed spheres of technical application of objective 
rules, instead the objectivity of law's institutions lies in the 
methodology by which it is faithful to a best reading of that 
society's socio-political principles.81
The arguments of Dworkin and Maclntrye are limited to normative 
conceptual analysis - why must the images of a MacIntyre or a 
Dworkin be expressed in terms of seeking the court as a forum of 
'principle' only? To Black such approaches show the hegemony of 
legal formalism and in Sociological Justice Black starts from the 
simple notion that "legal doctrine cannot adequately predict or 
explain how cases are handled."82 For Black "the social structure 
of the case" is crucial. That is, the social characteristics of 
who has a complaint against whom? Who handles it? Who else is 
involved? Who are the various supporters, witnesses etc.? What 
is the social standing of the participants? What are their social 
skills, ability to communicated, appearance in court etc? These 
are factors of empirical predictive power. Every case is thus a 
complex structure of social positions and relationships which 
determines the legal variation from one formally similar, 
technically identical case to another. The conception of legal 
formalism, that law is fundamentally an affair of rules, is
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replaced by the social structure of the case and this explains
how the language games of criminal justice locate and give actual
meaning to the various words of official discourse and sets of
rules (from Police and Criminal Procedure Acts, to Criminal
Codes, to Penal statutes). Legal Sociology "documents the
significance of social diversity and specifies its impact on the
handling of cases. Moreover... it demonstrates the social
relativity of law."83 These understandings imply to the formalist
"a gross violation of the rule of law", it provides the empirical
counterposition to normative legal conceptualisation:
Legal sociology therefore invites modern jurisprudence to 
face reality: Cases are not decided by rules alone...
A new sociological jurisprudence would critically examine 
each of the social factors associated with the handling of 
cases: the several kinds of social status, the involvement 
of organizations (including the state), the degree of 
relational distance between the parties, the availability of 
alternatives, and the like. Which of these, if any, should 
be legally endorsed? Which, if any, should be 
counteracted?1184
Thus "sociology changes our conception of judgement itself. . . it 
raises relational consciousness, and consciousness of everything 
social". Thus the objectivity of judging in normative legal 
theory needs to be complemented with the objectivity of empirical 
legal theory.
However, neither is the articulated form of the present 
organization of the trial process and sentencing. Present 
opportunities for any in depth articulation are mainly confined 
to appeal review, a process which is conducted on pleadings and 
judicial reflection and the very structure of the way criminal 
law is understood is abstracted methodological individualism. The 
opportunities for the trial to be a communicative mechanism and 
a continual reflection upon social relations, sociological 
knowledge and moral positioning within socio-political discourse 
appear limited. What sort of knowledge of the criminal would be 
allowed? The knowledge of traditional criminology has been a 
function of the sites and practices which were given to it by the 
criminal law and its administration.85 Indeed much of the focus 
of knowledge production in criminology has been concerned with
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the activity of control and the subject-object distancing which
'objectivity' is presumed to require. Our reading of social
theory in Chapter Eight has touched upon this and it is as well
to note that it is different from the objections which David
Matza gave to the "correctional" attitude he saw underpinning
criminological knowledge production. Matza asked for the
"appreciative" attitude to be developed, an attitude which would
produce a different form of knowledge and a different stance for
the user of that knowledge towards the activities being
discussed.86 We have previously stressed that the duality of
modern disciplinary knowledge is such that it can function as an
instrument of control, or subjugation of the individual, while
acting as an instrument of participation. Could not the
individual also use the resource of the disciplinary languages
to articulate his position and his point of view without being
caught in the power of the determining of the 'self' beyond the
participation of the active self?87 Such dialogicity may run
counter to the reductivist theme of contemporary trials and
sentencing since the dominant attitude towards the criminal trial
is instrumental, it is to see it as a part of 'problem1 aimed
towards crime control and crime reduction: "that the guilty
should be detected, convicted and duly sentenced".88 In Trials
and Punishments Duff sets out an alternative, openly moralistic
position concerned with the normative aspect of the
Kantian/Hegelian emphasis on autonomy and respect. This makes the
trial a moral confrontation:
"a communicative process of argument and justification which 
seeks the participation and assent of the defendant^ and 
which addresses him as a rational responsible agent."8
Duff is at pains to point out he is putting forward an 'ideal' 
and that actual criminal trials are far from' having this 
character, further: "the extent to which they lack it shows the 
extent to which our existing legal practices are radically 
imperfect."90 Penality has the purpose of confronting the 
offender:
"It serves in part to make our endeavour more effective, 
forcing the criminal's attention onto the implications of 
his crime; he cannot ignore it as easily as he can ignore or
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forget a conviction or a purely symbolic punishment. But it 
should serve too - if it is successful - as a penance which 
the criminal comes to will for himself; the pain or 
suffering which begins as a coercive attempt to attract and 
direct the unrepentant criminal's attention should become 
the penitential pain which the repentant criminal accepts 
for himself.1,91
Enlarging upon Duff, in such a communication process, 
disciplinary discourses of the self and sociology can have an 
expressive part to play - however, as we have stressed the 
dominance of the model of 'problem' and its presuppositions 
places manipulative potential at the heart of what is proper 
'modem' knowledge. The introduction of professional, therapeutic 
expertise and knowledge represents for MacIntyre "the 
obliteration of the distinction between manipulative and 
nonmanipulative social relations.. in the sphere of personal 
life".92 For Foucault, western mankind has become a confessing 
animal. Thus Duff's penitence in penology can be seen as the 
latest move in the procedures of individualisation which link 
together the desire for the truthful rendering of one's being 
into speech directed to one's parent, one's teachers, one's 
doctor, one's lover - a rendering which creates one's social 
individuality.93 But from this process there is no escape, for 
our subjective lives are the products of the language games we 
play, and our intimate feelings, desires and relationships are 
the objects of new forms of knowledge, the object-subjects of new 
forms of power.94
Thus we could have another ideal, that of the criminal trial as 
a communicative process utilising both the discourse of social 
science and of the moral presuppositions of law aimed at the 
maximization of the possibilities of articulation by the 
defendant using social sciences which have given up the 
metaphysical guarantee of total determinism. Paraphrasing Duff, 
the extent to which the trials of the present lack this, shows 
the extent to which both our existing legal practices and use of 
the 'human sciences' are radically imperfect. Which does not mean 
that a search for some way in which criminal justice could 
contribute to an increase of normative-cognitive self­
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understandings and information on offending, individuals, the law 
and society need be fruitless.
However, to jump ahead of our story a little, the differentiation 
of the social which characterises late modernity is also a 
differentiation in discourse. The rise of the pragmatic 
imagination and the testing of knowledge spheres by internal 
coherence and a lowering of the demands for commensurability 
means that we are presented with a confusing melange of 
'knowledges*, assertions, and 'opinions* which survive alongside 
the monopolistic tendencies of blocks such as criminal law 
doctrine and social science disciplines. For, having changed 
'truth* from an 'absolute1 to a 'conditional*, we arrive at the 
non-occurrence of revolutions - the destruction of a block 
becomes more difficult- and blocks become 'autopoietic*. The 
claims which positive criminology made concerning the 
disappearance of criminal law (i.e. claims for the superiority 
of social science as a 'system* which can understand law's 
weaknesses and correct its previous haphazard modes of dealing 
with social life) reflect Popper's argument against the old 
notion of truth in relation to system legitimacy: "Newton's
theory is a system. If we falsify it, we falsify the whole 
system".95 But as MacIntyre put it in his 'pragmatic' conclusion 
to Whose Justice? Which Rationality? the pragmatic imagination 
of modernity turns such 'systems of absolute truth1 into 
traditions which operate according to relatively self-sustaining 
processes.96
Yet interference from the outside is required for 'progress'; in 
Luhmann's analysis which we look at in the next chapter, the 
attempt at communication and the uncertainity over ontology 
raises tensions1 and creates a reflexivity practical action 
dialectic. The advent of reflexivity by actors situated in 
discourses and attempts at self appraisal occasions change and 
constitutive social development.97
There is a complex set of constraints on this process,
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constraints which hamper attempts at communication in criminal
justice and, among them is the question of the institutional
structure of producing knowledge inside the centres of discourse,
and the question of the degree of reflexivity or non-reflexivity
of these centres. That is their essential self-understanding or
non-pragmatism which makes them think of domination and
colonization rather than negotiation.98 In this respect, David
Nelken has recently addressed the position of criminal lawfs
ability to escape from talking to the social sciences in any real
form, first concentrating upon the tactics of teaching and
scholarship,99 and then the question of "the truth about law's
truth".100 For Nelken there is no simple commensurability of a
real differentiation between law and social science. Continually
"different elements of positivism and post-positivism or 
modernism or post-modernism, variations between explanatory 
and interpretive strategies or between a stress on cognitive 
adequacy or normative correctness all figure as 
argumentative moves and counter-moves within theoretical and 
practical controversies between law and science."101
In Nelken's conclusion is implicit that the advent of the
pragmatic imagination, which he identifies as 'post-positivism',
means that we are able to transcend the enclosed awareness of the
epistemic believing subject. We are
"not to treat law and science as monoliths.. .We need not 
take the self-conceptions of law and science as a 
justification for political choices towards the 
proceduralisation of law."102
The advent of Just Deserts can be seen, therefore, is these 
terms: a political choice concerning procedualisation of conflict 
between law and social scientific notions of offending and 
responsibility. The implications of the communicative approach 
Duff outlines are, however, diametrically opposed to the strict 
framework of Just Deserts where in its 'normal' form, as in 
American sentencing guidelines, much of the energy of the trial 
will, by implication, be directed at factual and labelling 
battles as to which 'Box' the event fits into (for example, 
disputes as to whether the housebreaking took place before dark 
or after). Just Deserts opposes pragmatic reflexivity by 
embracing the motif of the stable mechanism and the fully
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developed organizational form where fairness pertains to the 
operation of the algorithm and is the internal ordering of stress 
and energy to components in their respective positions according 
to whatever engineering application is being sought. Thus 
offenders must be treated according to the criteria of distribu­
tion which is being used - it does not matter what the substan­
tive outcome may be, that is open to another decision, what is 
important is the following of the principle that is in applica­
tion.
With 'democratic* versions of Just Deserts the communal and the 
mechanic ideas are fused into one by the concept that the 
community (democratically) decides upon the algorithm - the grand 
political statement of Just Deserts. Not as with Hobbes by one 
grand act, but by the continual (re)adjustment of politics 
(referendum and elected officials). But the question of fairness 
is located in the treatment of the offender within the existing 
penalty structure. The question of the composition of the penalty 
structure is thus always an issue ex parte - it is no longer 
regarded as 'essentially' fixed, but now admitted as fixed by 
acts of politics, but these are acts which are separate from the 
action of this new 'social* tariff. That application is an 
objectivity which resides in the 'facts* of the penalty 
discretion and guidelines. The fairness of the objectivity of the 
'fair' recognition (that is of the proper cognition) is the 
objectivity of the fair treatment - the objective retributive 
concept legitimated only by the tautological dance of modernity's 
distanced 'objectivity'.
Moreover, the internal coherence of the extrapolation from the 
algorithm will depend upon the selective ranking of the variety 
of the 'aims of the process'. The aims are to be ranked them­
selves according to a meta-algorithm. Thus the sentencer(s) 
cannot pursue a variety of goals in a 'subjective' manner but is 
now provided with an external framework by which to correctly 
structure his preferences. Again the meaning of this 'correction' 
of subjective narrative of criteria of meta-fairness is to be
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procedural and amounts to the empiricism of setting up an exter­
nal body constituting criteria know(able) in advance (temporal 
realism). Above all we have reversed the substantive questioning 
of the ' factual’ approach of empiricism and escaped reflexive 
pragmatism - for our narrative of Just Deserts is concerned with 
an equal treatment within a/the penalty system and is not 
concerned with the nature of the penalty system itself. 
Unfortunately, this is at least twofold, for not only is the 
sentencing process to be constrained in the amount of questioning 
and divergence it can undertake but the process of constructing 
the mechanism becomes concentrated only on the 'objective 
particulars' which the organising body, the Sentencing Commission 
or the like, is told are relevant. Thereby the central pivot of 
Criminal Justice turns away from partaking in any wider concerns 
of social theory and openly denies the need to be concerned with 
the messy facts of the world outside the de-contexualised 
operation of 'criminal justice’. In the central place of power 
marcation bites again denying reflexivity, denying the need to 
synthesis beyond the dominance of the 'knowledge led1 model of 
'problem' which refuses to locate crime and its administration 
into the moral, social, political and economic contexts which 
give it its grammar.
VIII
Excursus on the arrival of Just Deserts.
Instead of incorporating social science into questions of guilt 
and of sentencing, Just Deserts appears to turn away from the 
participatory element for perspectives which can be seen as a 
consequence of the tradition of the Enlightenment.
Partly this can be seen as a response to over confident claims 
by positivism under the model of 'problem'. The accepted formula 
for attaining knowledge did not give control of the social and 
the redefinition of punishment as a civilised element of rational 
society stripped the understanding of punishment of any 
justification other than functional rationality. Instead a public 
concern with social order, termed 'law and order', has arisen 
which has taken crime and punishment away from being seen as a 
question for "experts".103 The semi-acknowledged consensus, which 
existed in Britain at least, among the major political parties
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which saw criminal justice as increasingly a province of 
"expertise" has been undone. Now law and order has become a 
political issue, and one in which the "public" is involved and 
an appeal to common feelings as to desert is engaged in to 
legitimate this change.104
The issue of the "truth" of sentencing and penal practice is 
openly held to be at stake and new formal structures arise to 
counteract the doubts within criminal justice. To use the 
terminology of Lyotard, we appear to move from any self 
acknowledged episteme to that situation where in Just Gaming we 
are said to be
"in dialectics, and we are never in the episteme.... [Our 
intellectualism] is not a reason that states Being. It is a 
reason that is an understanding. . . In ever instance one must 
evaluate relations: of force, of values, of quantities, and 
of qualities, but to evaluate them there are no criteria, 
nothing but opinions".105
Against the idea that this leads on to a time of loss of power 
for central authority (the critical dream of 'de-construction') 
and a resurgence of pragmatic responsibility on local levels, 
Norbert Elias stated in his classic work:
"the hour of the strong central authority within a highly 
differentiated society strikes when the ambivalence of 
interests of the most important functional groups grows so 
large, and power is distributed so evenly between them, that 
there can be neither a decisive compromise nor a decisive 
conflict between them."106
At such a time the excuse of administrators may well be that they 
are hampered in their efforts by unnecessary restrictions on the 
exercise of their functions, and that the fight against crime 
requires greater powers for the elements involved. The limited 
role of the criminal justice system and sentencing process for 
the control of crime is an understanding of reflexivity. Keeping 
the image of the 'all functional' role for criminal justice, 
entails that when the 'problem' worsens the range of powers and 
interventionist tactics available to state functionnaires should 
be increased. To see this form of authoritarianism as a response 
to post-modern times is not an image only of the 'left'.10
The collapse of confidence in expertise, we have broadly placed 
in terms of a social history of the epistemological warrant for 
social affairs, and in the confines of penological discourse this 
movement also, at least in part, relates to and enables a rise 
in interest in certain philosophical arguments concerned with the 
'remoralising' of criminal justice, specifically identifiable in 
the United States in a report published by the American Society 
of Friends in 1971.108 Much of this was repeated in the book which 
Andrew von Hirsch based upon the work of a committee of scholars 
reporting on incarceration published in 1976.109 Out of these 
deliberations came the label of Just Deserts which claimed to 
present a "justice model for crime and punishment" having 
specific recourse to notions of equality and reciprocity.11
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The challenge to the idea of the clinical approach to dealing 
with offenders began much earlier in the work of research 
analysts. As early as the 1950's doubt was thrown upon the idea 
that the more effective the "treatment" of the offender, the less 
was the likelihood of recidivism.111 A summary of research into 
recidivism may by given thus: There is no evidence that any
identifiable disposition is superior to any other in terms of its 
impact upon the subsequent criminal activity of the person dealt 
with.112 As the authors of Justice for Children put it:
"Major reviews of research into the effectiveness of penal 
measures both in the USA and UK provide no ground for 
optimism. It is not at all clear that doing something is 
better than doing nothing, or that doing one thing is better 
than doing nothing, or that doing one thing is better than 
doing another. It is also now clear that intervention can 
harm as well as help, and that the actions of even the well- 
meaning do as much harm as good."113
These findings open new grounds for functional differentiation 
within the rationality of punishment - new forms of 'selective 
incapacitation1 for example. Some approaches tend to a crass 
pragmatism; for example what can be termed a pragmatic approach 
and free exchange of penal measures treating all as 
interchangeable on a simple "whatever works" principle (holding, 
however, to the instrumental 'crime reduction' perspective 
solely). The boundaries of the institution blur and the 
techniques of the institution - intensive control over time and 
spacial location - can be transferred into the community (via 
supervisory tracking, electronic tagging for example). An 
alternative desire in both the economic and 'humanitarian' 
quarters is to pose the praxial question as - 'how little is it 
possible to do to offenders and still retain respect for the law 
on the part of non-offenders?'114 In the absence of determinable 
criteria to guage progress there are arguments to regard 
punishment as a scarce and costly resource, an equivalent 
principle to economic accountability has been developed - the 
principle of parsimony - penology becomes economics.11
Some professionals, however, analyzing the co-option of 'back to 
justice' by law and order writers reaffirm rehabilitation as 
being the only defensible ideology for criminal justice.116 
However, as Stanley Cohen points out in discussing a prominent 
American argument:
"Not content to revive rehabilitation as a value in itself 
or as an ideology to use in the struggle against 
conservatism, Cullen and Gilbert have to make the very same 
essentialist claims against 'punishment' and about the 
'real' purposes of the criminal justice system which started 
the last round of reforms moving."117
Not all such moves are the claims of criminologists; in the 
institutions, fear is voiced by grass-roots personnel at the 
difficulty of life post-rehabilitation. The necessity to keep up 
what is seen as a humanistic core to the Enlightenment tradition 
of progress in criminology is asserted - to keep the humanism 
without the rigidity of the hold of theory. This humanitarian
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approach also perceives that it may well be a good thing that 
human individuals are highly resistant to being changed. If some 
people could change offenders into good citizens, it would be 
just as easy for other persons to change good citizens into 
offenders... or whatever socio-political animal they wished.118 
Alternatively theorists also claim that human resistance to 
change may well be functional for society; innovation and 
diversity result. Moral claims also intervene in that if it were 
possible by technical means to dramatically change human 
behaviour it appears that this would require methods so intrusive 
to the integrity of the offender’s 'human' personality that they 
should be rejected on moral grounds.119
According to some other lines of the Just Deserts or return to 
justice critique of correctionalism and welfare, the offender has 
a #right1 to the appropriate punishment: this is a "right” that 
appears to take much of its strength out of comparison to the 
alternative modes of dealing with him. The emphasis of this 
"right" is that he should not be treated according to anybody's 
opinion as to what he needs in order to lead a crime-free life 
but only in a system which takes seriously the possession of 
rights by individuals in society and the fact that in offending 
he has breached this regime.120 The Committee on Incarceration 
stated:
"The conventional wisdom has been that the sentence should 
be fashioned so as to rehabilitate the offender and isolate 
him if he is dangerous. To accomplish this, the sentencer 
was given the widest discretion to suit the disposition of 
the particular offender. We reject these notions as 
unworkable and unjust...and conclude that the severity of 
the sentence should depend upon what he did rather than on 
what the sentencer expects he will do if treated in a 
certain fashion".
The simplistic and common-sense notion of "what he did" is 
modified slightly in other places to accommodate the idea of 
culpability. Von Hirsch stating that "'seriousness' depends both 
on the harm done (or risked) by the act and on the degree of the 
actor's culpability" (on p.69), but the idea of culpability, and 
the seriousness of the crime, do not receive much critical 
attention in this work and are presumed to be those of the 
traditional confines of the notions of the criminal law (i.e.
' intentionality' ), not social theory.121
The Just Deserts concept is now hotly debated. On the one hand, 
criticism comes from those who wish to believe that case work and 
therapy really work. There is an unease on the part of those who 
think that if humanitarian dispositions cannot be seen to "pay 
off" in reduced recidivism, there will be a return to draconian 
punishments. Advocates of Just Deserts argue that it is the 
treatment approach which could result in draconian dispositions 
because it is indeterminate; in this area they ask for control 
of power by legal procedure and predictability. Others argue that 
Just Deserts does not face up to questions of social justice and 
the social factors surrounding the offender and the offence, but 
"abstracts" this from society. Some persons also want to find a
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middle ground between punishment and rehabilitation, to combine 
a little of each of the main philosophies currently in vogue, and 
to stress the offender's culpability and make the sentence 
commensurable to the odium of his criminal act, and yet, under 
the influence of parsimony and deinstitutionalisation, to use 
imprisonment "most efficiently" as a scarce resource aimed at 
those whom we recognise as "dangerous", or as bearing a strong 
propensity to develop into "career criminals". Some argue for the 
necessity to look forward at the same time as criminal justice 
looks back at the crime committed, stating that rehabilitation 
is the attempt to look forward while retribution is the backwards 
glance.122 This is problematic. Put another way, the retributive 
basis for a decision and the correctional/rehabilitative basis 
are polar opposites; they are from vastly different language 
games.123
What is apparent is a collapse, in criminological quarters at 
least, in reductionism as the rationale of sentencing. That is 
to say, the belief that the control effect of criminal justice 
through sentencing policy was the determinant factor in the level 
of crime in society. The labelling school actually asserts that 
official sanctioning creates more crime and some argue that a 
more sensible policy is "radical non-intervention".124 Even within 
the purely technical or 'problem' approach to punishment much of 
current research and thinking is as follows
(i) we cannot justify punishment of individuals solely in 
terms of any likelihood of reduced crime or recidivism;
(ii) scientific inquiry cannot indicate the 'right' amount 
of punishment for any crime, but this lack can suggest that we 
should not spend too much on punishments which do not work;
(iii) we have two problems rather than one; we have the 
problem of :-
(a) what to do with persons found guilty of crimes?
(b) what to do about crime itself?
That is to say, we can no longer simplify the problem of 
crime to the problem of the offender.125
In criminal justice the lack of attention to this distinction 
between persons and acts, between methodological individualism 
and methodological holism, means that when administrative 
attention is turned to crime frequently it becomes the 'criminal' 
who is seen as the problem rather than social conditions (for 
example, the Johnson Administration started what was called a War 
on Crime, but quickly it became a war on criminals. Which is 
simply not the same thing. The Nixon Administration sought to 
wage a war upon the problem of drugs, but soon reduced this to 
the problem of drug pushers and traffickers - the social problem 
of drugs gets ignored).
This chapter began identifying the assumptions of control and 
social order underlying the two distinctive approaches 
characterising criminal justice arguing that reductionism was a 
consideration shared by both classicism and positivism. In 
methodological individualism, the classical reduction through 
deterrence; in positivism a reduction through lowered recidivism 
by individualised treatment; in methodological holism a reduction
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of crime into a determinate of social structure. What this means, 
however, is that the 'justice' of criminal justice is a balance 
between social purpose, individual application, intellectual 
episteme and objectivity. In this way, inhabitants in the models 
of justice of modernity therefore see, as a crucial matter of 
epistemological foundationalism, that the rationality of 
decisions concerning the dispensation of justice is a question 
of methodology and a matter of selection of variables and 
information which is deemed correct for participation. Yet what 
is information: if a 'just' decision is 'one which is justified 
in the circumstances' then it follows that the 'justice' of a 
decision depends upon the relevant episteme which structures and 
guides the relevant historical 'sense', the methodology of 
collecting such information, the regime of fairness which lays 
down the appropriate presentation and rules of 'reading' 
information (i.e., general evidence), the resulting ranking of 
importance of such information, all of which may exist of a local 
- general tension.
Yet including the idea of uncertainty or local determinism is 
problematic to the normative assumptions of modernity. The 
statement whether a particular act is "right or wrong" is usually 
expected to give a certain answer; not one which says that it is 
probably right, but that it has a chance of being morally wrong 
or that it is only capable of being called "right" or "wrong" 
given our changeable social circumstances. Moreover, whatever the 
moral difficulties of dispensing justice, where we cannot claim 
complete assurance of accuracy in the availability of 
information, we are not justified in 'assuming' the data is 
always accurate or provides a picture of 'reality'.126 The 
categories of sentencing guidelines are man made selections - 
relativism is their bedrock. Judges, and others, who make 
decisions in criminal justice, must accept that, regardless of 
the criteria they accept, their decisions will not be guaranteed 
by extra human standards, and that the 'justice' of their sets 
is a matter of social creation and possible choice.
Thus Just Deserts appears apt when it claims that to avoid this 
there should be a public structure which specifies relevant 
information and the methodology by which factors are deemed 
relevant to decision making. It is not only from an 
instrumentalist perspective concerned with developing an 
'efficient system' that there appear to be good reasons why 
"Policy" should determine what items are to be considered, and 
as to whether these should be few in number or not. Since some 
form of inner relevance of the system must be in effect. Items 
which it is policy not to consider would then not be collected. 
As an example, if we decide that prior arrests (including, for 
example, cautions for juveniles) should not be considered but, 
regard should be paid only to convictions, then information on 
prior arrests should not be provided to the decision-maker 
concerned. The range and selection of information is linked to 
the policy considerations of punishment rationale and should be 
logically consistent for that structure.127 Thus it logically 
follows that if a fully developed 'rational' system for 
sentencing is created it requires decisions as to the information
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which constituts the relevant factors and, for example, if we 
decide the crime is the same whether the victim or offender is 
old or young, it should not be possible for any decision-maker 
to arbitrarily decide otherwise - the alternative also holds, but 
"alternatively" . That is the meaning of 'policy' . What that then 
leads us to ask is what sort of structure should it be which 
specifies the methodology of information collection and 
presentation - also what price discretion? And how open or closed 
should such a structure or methodology be? Must we in turning 
away from the over ambitious claimants of 'truth' in the modern 
state and succeed in recreating only another 'machine' which 
denies the desires which Ferri and other claimants for social 
theory in their varying ways expressed? A turning away from the 
tyranny of theory and the path of 'problem' only to be free from 
'problem' at the expense of denying individuals entrapment in 
socio-political problems.128
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extent to which their existence lends support to either the 
"consensus theory" or the "conflict theory" of criminal law. 
Consensus theory takes its modern expression from Durkheim and 
his contention that the criminal law is an expression of the 
collective conscience of society. Here "the nature of collective 
sentiments accounts for punishment.... the power of reaction 
which is given over to government functionaries is only an
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emanation of that which has been diffuse in society... there is 
a social cohesion whose cause lies in a certain conformity of all 
particular consciences to a common type which is none other than 
the psychic type of society."(pp.104-5) This image of the 
judicial functionary being necessarily coextensive with the 
collective consciousness is embedded in the dominant traditions 
of jurisprudence.[Friedmann held:"The state of the criminal law 
continues to be - as it should - a decisive reflection of the 
social consciousness of a society. What kind of conduct an 
organized community considers, at a given point in time, 
sufficiently condemnable to impose official sanctions... is a 
barometer of the moral and social thinking of a community." Law 
in a Changing Society. 1964.
The criminal laws and the sentencing carried out in their 
name "speak to members of the community, in other words, on the 
community's behalf, with all the power and prestige of the 
community behind them".(Henry Hart)
For the English Lord Devlin the task of the law is to 
strongly enforce shared morality, the sensus communis, of 
society. Without enforcement society would disintegrate; by fiat 
of pen and in a movement similar to Berns, a society without a 
strong shared morality cannot be a society. Devlin, The 
Enforcement of Morals r Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965. 
H.L.A. Hart's reply involved .the epistemological critique and 
offered Devlin "the alternative of supplementing his contentions 
with evidence, or accepting that his statements... were not 
empirical statements at all but were disguised typologies or 
necessary truths.." University of Chicago Law Review. Vol 34, 3.]
Moving beyond the rather sterile dichotomy of this opposition the 
existence of sentencing disparities may act as a reflection 
wherein the confused nature of sentencing aims is actually a 
reflection of the confused and incoherent nature of our society's 
"moral and social thinking", that is to say it reflects its 
location in the ethics, theologies and power plays of the 
ordinary life only too well and its local consistencies provide 
evidence of what we may call, following Lyotard, the ' local 
determinism' of language games.
23.Mannheimm et al, "Magisterial Policy in the London Juvenile 
Courts", British Journal of Delinquency. Vol 7 (1957), p. 136.
24.Decisions in the Penal Process, p.143.
25.Quoted in Ibid.. p.143.
26.Ibid.. p.170.
27.Donald Black, Sociological Justice. Oxford University Press, 
New York/Oxford, 1989, p.19
28.Jacobson reminds us of the terms that the bargain Hobbes drove 
were: we surrender to the Sovereign our power of opposing and he 
will protect us and brood for us the vicissitudes of existence, 
but at a price. "His price is that we henceforth agree to discuss 
the human condition in his terms, rather than ours; that we
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discuss it in terms of reason and science, rather than of the 
passions - what Hobbes calls superstition, myth, and theology.
To the sovereign we yield our judgement. To the scientist we 
surrender our understanding." Pride and Solace, p.61.
29.Foucault1s definition of modernity in relation to rhetoric is 
illustrative. Thus: "The space of language today is not defined 
by Rhetoric but by the Library; by the ranging to infinity of 
fragmentary languages substituting for the double chain of 
rhetoric the simple, continuous, monotonous line of language left 
to its own devices..". Language. Counter-Memorv. Practice, p. 67.
30.See "Certainty and Human Action: Wittgenstein", being Chapter 
Four of Newell's Objectivity. Empiricism and Truth, for a fuller 
statement of the above paragraph and the drawing of this out in 
the case of Wittgenstein.
31.See, for instance, the criticisms in Nicholas Krittrie's The 
Right to be Different.
The whole movement for a 'rights orientation1 in Juvenile 
Justice draws upon a critique of paternalism and the 
administrative tribunal (and hence anti-legalist) ethos of 
Juvenile Courts/Child Welfare Tribunals, see, for example, 
M.D.A.Freeman, The Rights and Wrongs of Children. Francis Pinter 
Publishers, London/Dover N.H., 1983. Paternalism does still have 
some supporters; Herbert Morris has recently proposed a 
philosophy of punishment based upon paternalism, as was a strong 
strand of H.L.A.Hart's thinking. See Hilary Allen, Justice 
Unbalancedf for a critical and deconstructivist analysis of 'male 
consideration for the female offender1.
32. See the use Weber makes of Traditional, Charismatic and 
Rational features of authority in the modern state in Economy and 
Society. W.F.Murphy in Elements of Judicial Strategy. Chicago 
University Press, Chicago, 1964, at pp. 12-13, specifies that 
the traditional and the charismatic complement the supposed 
legal-rationality of organizational legality. See in general for 
the ideological and symbolic features of the Judge, R.B.M. 
Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: an introduction, pp. 241-253.
33.Richard Sennett, Authority. Knopf, New York, 1980, Ch.l.
34.Habermas, The philosophical Discourse of Modernity, p.209. For 
Habermas rhetoric is "subordinated to the discipline of a distinct 
form of argumentation", a disciplining which holds philosophy to 
the task of solving life's problems [implicitly 'correctly'] 
(rather than the playful destruction of the 'literary' texts of 
other 'experts' in that shared culture for instance), thus moral 
rhetoric provides argument to or from beliefs about what is right 
or wrong, just or unjust, good or evil; it serves a role as 
energising the constituting process of the social world.
35.H.L.A. Hart and A.Honore, Causation in the Law. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1959 (2nd Ed. 1985).
36.P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment. Methuen, London, 1974.
455
37.Especially the approach Wootton outlines in Crime and The 
Criminal Lawr Hamlyn Lecture Series, Stevens & Sons, London, 
1963.
38.The literature which asserted the adequacy of determinism in 
the modern period to stipulate judgement under the dictates of 
the facts of social theory is vast and the picture was drawn in
the last chapter. For a picture of the force of its rhetoric in
practice the defenses of Clarence Darrow in maintaining the 
incompatibility of moral responsibility and determinism are apt. 
His general position was that "Man is in no sense the maker of
himself and has no power than any machine to escape the law of
cause and effect. He does what he must. Therefore, there is no 
such thing as moral responsibility in the sense in which the 
expression is ordinarily used". Clarence Darrow, Crime: Its Cause 
and Treatment. Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York, 1922, pp. 274- 
275. His defence of Leopold and Leod argued that hereditary and 
environmental factors had prevented them from developing normal 
emotional reactions, and so they should be pitied for their 
crime, not blamed.
39.All quotes from Freedom and Resentment. pp.1-34, this quote 
is from p.13..
40.Wootton, Crime and The Criminal Law, pp.102-3.
41.Ibid.r pp.103-4.
42.J.Q.Wilson, Thinking About Crime. Vintage Books, New York, 
1977, p.58.
43.Treatment in this context includes specific ‘deterrence'. 
Wootton realises the dilemma with general deterrence which may 
pull against the decision a specific deterrent or treatment 
measure might indicate. See also the brief discussion in Walker, 
Sentencing: Theory and Practice, pp. 74-84.
44.The desire for a rational, scientific system along the Wootton 
lines is apparent not only in strictly "positivist" texts but 
also in some legalist texts such as that of Rupert Cross. Cross 
describes the present system as "based on a number of different 
impressionistic ranges of sentences for the different offenses 
based on a notion of gravity which turns out, on analysis, to be 
popular morality with a strong admixture of expediency: anything 
less scientific would be difficult to imagine". By comparison 
"the scientific control of crime" by a system of prison sentences 
"would entail the use of empirically verified generalizations 
.. however, there is at present no such thing as the scientific 
control of crime through the imposition of prison sentences of 
varying lengths because there are no empirically verified 
generalization such as those which have just been mentioned". 
Rupert Cross, The English Sentencing System. 3rd ed., 
Butterworths, London, 1981, p. 199.
45.Ibid.f p.56.
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47.B. Wootton, Social Science and Social Pathology. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, 1959, p.252.
48. In Crime and the Criminal Law Wootton uses a limiting 
principle as "to take the minimum action which offers an 
adequate prospect of preventing future offenses".(p 95) She 
admits that "imprecision lurks in the word ' minimum' and that 
this word also implies a moral judgement", which she gives as 
"that freedom to live one's life after the fashion of one's 
choice is of value in itself". Thus "even in the case of 
offenders any restriction of this freedom must always be weighed 
against the possible social damage which might result from 
further offenses". This is a "qualification".
49.See the discussion in Michael Moore, Law and psychiatry: 
rethinking the relationship, pp. 233-43. His analysis of 
taxonomies of punishment demonstrates how a mixed theory of 
punishment actually reduces to a sophisticated retributionism 
with a bow to utilitarianism as the cost of organised society. 
In his thought experiments the mixed theory only appears to 
qualify utilitarianism when it is obvious that no punishment is 
justified, when however, it appears that punishment is justified 
on moral reactive grounds but no socially purposeful net social 
gain is the outcome the two aspects of the mixed theory appear 
in direct contradiction.
50.Leonard Leigh in Strict and Vicarious Liability. Sweet and 
Maxwell, London, 1987, argues that if proof of intention were 
needed for prosecution in the cases Strict Liability requirements 
were to cover the law would be simply unenforceable. The argument 
is consequentalist are firmly in line with the acceptance of 
those features which are best suited to the 'rational 
organization' of the criminal justice system as a social control 
mechanism.
51.There are of course utilitarian arguments against Strict 
Liability. Namely that the evidence actually demonstrates in any 
case that the imposition of Strict Liability did not result in 
people being more careful and so forth.
52.Walter Berns, Capital Punishment. Basic Books, London, 1979, 
p.155.
53.Ibid.. p.174.
54.Berns does a service by arguing through this notion but it is 
an implicit reason for punishment of a range of scholars who 
share an empiricist imagination. Leo Katz, in the midst of a work 
upon the jurisprudence of the criminal law written in a style 
somewhat removed from the clashes of life, simply states that 
criminal action is that action whose harm "arouses our emotions". 
Thus we punish the successful offender more than he who only made 
an attempt as "only he provokes anger. His punishment serves to 
still that anger." He further grounds distinctions upon the
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question "why are we less angry with... than with.. .?" But such 
a rationale for punishment is never fully drawn out. Leo Katz, 
bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago/London, 1987, p. 216.
55.Strawson gives an individualistic reading to the reactive 
attitudes. They do not cover accidental situations, or rather, 
the reactive attitude is substantially different in such situa­
tions. Accidental situations provide occasions where we continue 
to view the person as one for whom reactive attitudes are ap­
propriate but wherein the injury caused by the act is part of an 
inappropriate situation for resentment to be focused. It is not 
the actual harm in material terms that is being the subject of 
our reactive attitudes but the ascription of these acts as the 
result of some form of willed activity, individualistically 
willed activity. Berns own project appeared to reduce the range 
of reactive attitudes to one dominant form but this is not neces­
sary - even empirically, as Hume and Smith told us, pity and com­
passion do occur, moreover Kant did not simply deny the 
occurrence of any kind of emotionality with moral action. But for 
Kant if moral action was actually emotionality, than morality was 
reducible to natural causes and effects, i.e. to the epis- 
temologically empirical science of 'natural' morality, rather 
than a rational science.
56.See John Lachs, Responsibility and the Individual in Modern 
Society. Harvester Press, 1981.
57.As Nietzsche put it in the Genealogy of Morals the notion 
central to modern political theory and contractual obligations, 
the notion of the autonomous individual was a result of social 
forces, see previous quote our Chapter Two. He goes on to say: 
"To breed an animal with the right to make promises - is this not 
the paradoxical task nature has set itself in the case of man? 
Is this not the real problem regarding man?" On The Genealogy of 
Morals. Essay II, sect 2.
Moreover, this entire edifice of social evolution comes 
about as a result of man's desires, of man's willing courses of 
development, but the philosophy neglects this in his anti­
pragmatic abstractions. Nietzsche puts the pragmatic perspective 
in Beyond Good and Evil: "In all willing it is absolutely a
question of commanding and obeying, on the basis... of a social 
structure composed of many 'souls', hence a philosopher should 
claim the right to include willing within the sphere of morals - 
morals being understood as the doctrine of the relations of 
supremacy under which the phenomenon of 'life' comes to be." 
(W.Kaufmann trans., Random House, New York, 1966, at 19.)
58. B.F.Skinner "Humanism and Behaviorism": "What we feel when
we have feelings and what we observe through introspection are 
nothing more than a rather miscellaneous set of collateral 
products or by-products of the environmental conditions to which
behaviour is related  Do I mean to say that Plato never
discovered the mind? Or that Aquinas, Descartes, Locke and Kant 
were preoccupied with incidental, irrelevant by products of human 
behaviors? Yes I do. And I put the matter strongly because if we
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are going to sole the problems that face the world today, this 
concern for mental life must no longer divert our attention from 
the environmental conditions of which it is a function." In A.J. 
Ayer (ed.) The Humanist Outlook. London, 1968, p. 101.
59.The response of neo-Aristotelians is to talk of actions having 
their own ends - to term then 'activities' . Activities are self- 
contained and satisfying with a co-penetration of means and ends.
60.See Limits to Pain. and also Beyond loneliness and 
institutions: communes for extraordinary people. Norwegian
University Press, Oslo, 1989.
61.For an interesting portrayal of this see Nils Christie, "Crime 
Control as Drama", Journal of Law and Society. Vol. 13, No.l 
(1986).
62.By social distancing I refer to differences in class, culture 
and gender intra-ethnic group, differences intensified when 
ethnic differences are present.
63.Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Suffering, p.185.
64. For some idea of the variability of the experiencing of 
imprisonment in England see Jail Journeys: The English Prison 
Experience 1918-1990. P. Priestly, Routledge, London, 1989.
65.Wittgenstein, Culture and Value. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, p. 
40e.
66.My quotations are drawn from the introductory quotes in 
Chapter 1 of R.W. Newell's Objectivity. Empiricism and Truth. 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London/New York, 1986. I draw extensively 
upon this work throughout the remainder of this chapter: I place 
it as a work within the pragmatic imagination. Another work in 
this area from which I have benefited and which also seeks to 
destroy the polar opposites of subjectivity - objectivity is Max 
Deutscher, Subjecting and Objecting: An Essav in Objectivity, 
Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.
67.This a central notion in the analysis of Morse Peckham in 
Bevond The Tragic Vision.
68.Quoted in Bottomely, Decisions in the Penal Process, p.63.
69.The strong environmentalist appreciation of this holds that 
what a judge will do is almost entirely determined by his 
personal history and social position. See, for example, 
J.Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary. Fontana, (3rd ed. ) 
1985.
70.This version of objectivity stresses the cognitive 
transparency of the subject matter of the act of judging (the 
theories of criminology, the offender, law) : but with the 
cognitive transparency of that object questioned (dissolved), 
neutral observation has no essence which is not conceptually
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embedded to identify, subject related features become 
constitutive within the process, and the language game embraces 
expressive and interpretative features.
71.Importantly the pragmatic perspective turns around the focus 
of questioning, for having asserted the impossibility of claiming 
that some things are simply true for men whether they realize 
them or not, the questioning shifts to the reasons for any belief 
being held. Emphasis shifts from the question "Is such and such 
a proposition correct or not?" to the question "Why should a 
person become convinced of such and such a thing?" The reason for 
the first is the traditional concern with elucidating the nature 
of the "justified" in the ascription of knowledge as "justified 
true belief" and the creation of further objective standards for 
the gauging of this; but in the pragmatic position, the search 
for the justified grounds for the holding of beliefs ends in the 
practices and actions of the holders. In this way opening up the 
opportunity to argue that there is no reasoning without 
reasoners, and that reasoners are people acting under the con­
straints of their current stock of opinions. A situation which 
the objectivist, in his attempted imposition of knowledge claims, 
will attempt to drag apart this mode of acting, but which is 
also one where in response the pragmatist can safely place on the 
agenda arguments about the style, quality and ethics of these 
practices on an equal footing to the arguments that we are to be 
led by "knowledge".
72.See our earlier discussion of Suicide.
73.See, for example, Lacey in state Punishment. Political 
Principles and Community Values.
74.T. O'Hagan, The end of law?. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984. 
75.See, Passion: an essay on personality.
76.The terms come from Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of 
Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy. 
Butterworths, London/Edinburgh, 1989.
77. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass., 1985. See in particular Chapter 2. "The Forum 
of Principle".
78.After Virtue, p.253.
79.See Law's Empire, Chapter Seven, "Integrity in Law".
80.Law's Empire, p.407.
81.Others implicitly state the same thing. Nicola Lacey in State 
Punishment. Political Principles and Community Values, certainly 
argues that any discussion of the philosophy of punishment is 
necessarily a discussion of the 'parent' socio-political 
philosophies. In Lacey's community justification for punishment 
it is implicit that the justified protection of the community
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against 'subversion1 is expressly a protection of the socio­
political structures of that society. When the universalistic 
pretensions of modernity's discourse is subjected to pragmatic 
understanding social defence is the defence, and affirmation, of 
particular arrangements and relations of subordination or 
equality.
82.Sociological Justice, p.6.
83.Ibid.. p .94.
84.Ibid.. p.101.
85.See our earlier discussions, the work of Foucault and 
Garland's Welfare and Punishment.
86. In Becoming Deviant David Matza drew a contrast between 
'correction' and 'appreciation' as differing stances to deviant 
phenomenon. The correctional attitude comes about when we 
investigate "enterprises that violate cherished and widely shared 
standards of conduct and morality" and we slip our activities of 
investigation into a meta-narrative where the worth of our 
results lies in the enhanced ability of society to rid itself of 
the enterprises being studied. "The goal of ridding ourselves of 
the deviant phenomenon, however utopian, stands in sharp contrast 
to an appreciative perspective and may be referred to as 
correctional." (p.15) The correctional perspective experiences 
a 'lose of phenomenon1 by "reducing it to that which it is not". 
The overriding concern with causation or 'etiology' 
"systematically interferes with the capacity to empathize and 
thus comprehend the subject of inquiry. Only through appreciation 
can the texture of social patterns and the nuances of human 
engagement with those patterns be understood and analyzed".
The appreciative attitude is on the other hand a subjective view; 
it demands a committment to render the phenomenon with fidelity 
and without violating its integrity.
"It delivers the analyst into the arms of the subject who 
renders the phenomenon, and commits him, though not without 
regrets or qualifications, to the subject's definition of 
the situation. This does not mean that the analyst always 
concurs with the subject's definition of the situation; 
rather that his aim is to comprehend and to illuminate the 
subject's view and to interpret the world as it appears to 
him". (p.25)
The weakness in this position is that it is not possible to 
escape to an innocent set of the 'subject's own definitions'; the 
language of inferiority comes from the outside. The act of self 
description and of self analysis of one's situation is 
necessarily conducted in the language of the 'other'. What is 
possible is playing with alternative sets of language games, of 
not obeying the dictate to speak only in the language of the 
scientist but to be open to the potentiality of alternative forms 
of language games to inform and move us as 'criminology'.
461
87.Sykes and Matza in their "Techniques of neutralization: a
theory of delinquency", show how a distorted version of this 
occurs when individuals outflank assertions of personal guilt or 
wrongdoing by turning explanatory hypothesis into justifications 
which serve to demonstrate their personal normalcy.
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89.Trials and Punishments, p.143.
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91.Ibid.r p.p. 260-1.
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94.See Nikolas Rose, Governing the soul: The shaping of the
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95."Replies to my Critics", in Schilpp, (ed.) The Philosophy of 
Karl Popper. Open Court, La Salle, 1974, p.982.
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in modernity. In other words reflexive understanding of the 
present needs to become pragmatised - a precondition, pace 
MacIntyre, for dialogue and translaterability between traditions, 
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sentencing decisions, the Government also proposes that the 
legislation should place a new duty on the secretary of state to 
inform the courts annually of the costs of implementing 
penalties and to publish information about the costs of the 
criminal justice system for the attention of those who take the 
decisions in the system...
The courts as well as other services, should know the costs 
of the decisions they take. Financial considerations can never 
be the deciding factor in sentencing. Even so, the courts should 
take some account of the costs of implementing their decisions 
when they sentence, especially when they have a choice of 
suitable penalties." (p.10)
116.Again F.Cullen and K.Gilbert, Rehabilitation Reaffirmed. 
Anderson, Cincinnati, 1982.
117.Visions of Social Control, p.250.
118.Hence the frequent allusions to George Orwell and Clockwork 
Orange in certain recent texts.
119.See, for example, the criticism by Jessica Mitford, The 
American Prison Business. Allen & Unwin, London, 1974.
120.Nils Christie sums the movement up as Beccaria rides again. 
See his comments in Limits to Pain, prev. cit. Barbara Hudson 
agrees adding that it is a return "to a Kantian view of morality 
and the moral need for punishment" (as opposed to the image of 
Freud) with a return to a Hobbesian view of the State. Barbara 
Hudson, Justice Through Punishment: A Critique of the Justice1 
Model of Corrections. Macmillan, London, 1987.
Although Just Deserts claims the 'moral high ground' 
R.A.Duff's reading of Kantian philosophy (in Trials and 
Punishments) . which this text agrees with in the main, is 
dramatically different from the Just Deserts outcome however, 
which leads to the suspicion that expediency and the desire for 
an uncomplicated machine, which is Christie's analysis, is 
stronger than the moral position.
121.The Society of Friends' document, noted previously, makes the 
point. In protesting the "correctional approach" they say, "The 
whole person is not the concern of the law". They say, in other 
words, that it is morally right that decisions as to the disposal 
of offenders should be made on the basis of limited information.
465
122. Andrew Von Hirsch makes use of this distinction in his 
analysis of the difference in perspective these opposing
tendencies engage in his Past or Future Crimes: Deservedness and 
Danqerousness in the Sentencing of criminals. Rutgers University
Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1985. (U.K. ed., Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1986.)
123.An early formulation of this argument is that of Sheldon Amos 
who stated that one could not discuss the theory of punishment 
in isolation as it belonged "as much to Ethics and Politics as 
it does to jurisprudence". Its primary end was to enforce
universal obedience to the criminal law and not the reformation 
of the criminal, which was a secondary end stating that "the two 
cannot even be put on the scales over against one another. They 
are incommensurable qualities." Sheldon Amos, A systematic View 
of the Science of Jurisprudence. 1872 and The Science of Law.
1874. Quoted in Leo Radzinowicz and Roger Hood, A History of 
English Criminal Law and its Administration from 1750: Vol 5. The 
Emergence of Penal Policy. Stevens and Sons, London, 1986, at
p.16.
124.See writing following Lemert' s-distinction of primary and 
secondary deviance. Human Deviance. Social Problems and Social 
Control, Prentice Hall, New York, 1967, particularly E. Schur, 
radical Non-intervention. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 
1973.
125.This summary of the debate draws upon Leslie Wilkins, 
particularly his paper "Rationality and Morality in the Criminal 
Justice Process", in Effective. Rational and Humane Criminal 
Justice. HEUNI Publications series No 3, Helsinki, Finland, 1984, 
pp. 96-106, and Consumerist Criminology. Heineman, London, 1986.
126.One reason for Just Deserts is to outflank the need for a 
'true' expertise as in the case of diagnosing "dangerousness". 
The Just Deserts advocates claim the errors of predictive 
statements are avoided because they do not make any forward 
judgments - only relating their decisions to the past. In 
particular they point to the "false positives' which arise when 
predictive, or prognostically, based decisions are made.
A false positive occurs when a prognosis is made that the 
individual will "fail" (e.g. recidivate etc), but, in fact, he 
does not. A false negative occurs when the prognosis indicates 
success, but the individual, in fact, fails.
127.For example, each of the recently proposed American 
'strategies' structures the range of relevant information 
differently. Just Deserts plays primarily with a conception of 
the seriousness of the crime, but in practice adds to this 
information as to prior convictions.[See the appendix on the 
"Minnesota sentencing guidelines and commentary" to Sentencing 
Reform: Guidance or Guidelines?. Ken Pease and Martin Wasik
(eds.), Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987, at pp 183- 
205.]
Strict deterrence (general) rationale has no interest in the 
offender's prior record but should consider information as to the
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operationality of deterrent sentences in managing the social: 
normally it does not. Incapacitation, particulary in its 
"selective" variants attempts to combine the rhetoric of 
deinstitutionalisation, economic calculation as to the best use 
of resources, and 'diagnostic' prediction as to subsequent 
offending risk for individuals. Thus the expert has a crucial 
technical role of providing a selection process giving relevant 
information giving "the classification for risk... and the 
concomitant development of criteria on the basis of which a 
process of de-institutionization - or at least a substantial 
population reduction - can be implemented." This "classification 
system should seek to identify those offenders who commit serious 
predatory crimes and violence, in order to separate them from 
offenders who do not represent any serious risk to the public". 
[E.E. Flynn, "Classification for Risk and Supervision: A
Preliminary Conceptualization", in J.Freeman fed.). Prisons Past 
and Future. London, Heinemann, 1978, pp 134-5.]
128.For the pragmatic imagination what is an 'efficient system' 
is a matter of the range of presuppositions and foundational 
claims the users of that system adopt. To seek efficiency in the 
direction of Just Deserts makes sense in the light of a 
particular configuration of such suppositions, however, they are 
just that - others could be added, and efficiency aligned more 
to other sorts of considerations, as, for example, Duff outlines, 
i.e. participation in the process by the 'offender', 
communication, and a reflection on the circumstances, both moral 
and sociological, of both his predicament and that of the social 
body.
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Chapter Ten: Conceiving of the context of criminological
pragmatism.
I
We have identified the traditionally dominant movement of 
criminological self-consciousness as the period of 'progressive 
humanism' . This saw criminology and penology as a journey of 
enlightenment where emotion and irrationality gave way to 
rationality and the scientific approach to criminal justice 
uncovering knowledge which guided social practice towards a more 
humane and efficient epoch. Most texts until the late 1960's give 
this but prominent examples are the texts of Barnes and Teeters, 
Sutherland, and the first edition of Void. Criminological change 
is explained by progress in knowledge and social consciousness - 
the point of criminology is 'the scientific study of crime'; 
penology is society humanising its penalty structures by applying 
the resulting understandings and knowledges. Implicit in these 
approaches is also a social theory - a social theory which 
assumes a deep structural foundation to social change which is 
progressive and within which the criminal justice system is a 
functional entity. Society is moving through stages, there are 
law-like generalisations to be uncovered - generalisations of the 
truth of human nature and social organisation, criminology 
applies this to one area. The progress of human societies 
represents the progress of a natural order, the supremacy of the 
west, the proof of western social evolution.
A second development, roughly called critical or radical, is 
found partially in the ..later editions of Void's Theoretical 
Criminologyr Radzinowicz in his Ideology and Crime and, more 
explicitly, in the works which, like the New Criminology, adopt 
an historical awareness for criminology and criminal justice 
which is derived from marxism. There is a division between the 
Radzinowicz style account and that which is marxist influenced. 
The former keeps the humanist accent but strengthens it with an 
allowance that the production of criminological discourse comes 
not only from the predominantly secular context of naturalism but
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must be understood in the context of a developing state and 
society under liberalism.1 The latter is partially anti-humanist 
in that it relegates humanism to a determined position and 
locates 'humanitarian progress' as a functional element within 
a vague positioned general social theory. While texts such as The 
New Criminology, the work of Pearson2 or Platt would agree with 
Poggi3 in placing an emphasis on class struggle as the driving 
force of early liberalism the liberal state is seen as 
constructed to favour and sustain through the acts of rule the 
class domination of a developing bourgeoisie over the society as 
a whole. Marx's dictum that legal ideology was a "veritable 
garden of Eden of the bourgeois rights of man" implies that it 
was for class purposes that the institutional rules of state 
organization were ultimately directed and their contrast with the 
structures of the previous society must be understood in this 
light.4 The abstract rights of individuals, for instance, 
facilitated the process wherein labour power is sold for wages 
through individual employment contracts. Moreover the equality 
of all individuals before the law made sense as a constitutional 
principle because, as a matter of course, the legal protection 
of private property which directed the order-keeping, 
law-enforcement and repressive activities of the police and 
courts favoured the interests of the propertied groups. Thus is 
introduced the phenomena of politics. This politics is not, 
however, a freely productive politics. Politics here is mankind 
acting within the structural games of deeper forces and human 
conflict is the medium of other deeper and mor important 
'material' forces. Politics is only a reflection of nature. From 
one perspective the liberal view naturalises the institutions of 
society, seeing the institutions as reflections of the very 
nature of free and democratic modern societies. Although he may 
recognise these institutions as formed through the compromises 
of conflicting perspectives, as with tolerance itself, the 
resultant state of affairs easily becomes defended as the 
structure of a free society. The organisational formations of 
these so-called western-liberal-democratic societies are seen as 
representing and reflecting the most socially progressive modes
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of human life and coexistence, their dominance evidence of the 
triumphant march of modernity's apex. Evidence of the power of 
a totality founded, it appeared, on a coherent set of activating 
principles and corresponding to a distinct stage in the material 
and moral history of mankind. From the marxist perspective these 
same institutional and organisational formations are subsumed 
under a general type of social organisation that represents a 
particular and-demarcated stage of world history.
A third period of interpretation has grown up in the wake of the 
work of Foucault and emphasizes the social control functionality 
of criminal justice (examples are texts such as Garland and 
Young, The Power to Punish; S. Cohen, Visions of Social Control: 
Cohen and Scull; Social Control and the State. Lowman et al, 
Transcaration: essays in the sociology of social control).
Strangely, although this work is expressly hyper-critical in its 
tone, it appears to take the normative assumptions of criminal 
justice texts at their face, to assume, that is, that the spoken 
normative desires of criminal justice reformers and 
administrators, for example to order society, to render society 
governable, to locate criminal justice and punishment as a solely 
instrumental function engaged in the magnification of productive 
forces, actually empirically describe criminal justice and 
punishment as the vehicles of instrumental plans that are 
functioning. They thus tend to suffer from an overstatement of 
social control rationality, of a new monolithic paradigm for 
punishment.
It appears that having deconstructed the 'wigg' view of criminal 
justice history the temptation within criminological revisionism 
is to fall back into a new form of essentialising - to forget 
Nietzsche and the demand for multiple perspectives in favour of 
reading Nietzsche's imitator Foucault as not only offering, at 
least on a crude neo-Hegelian reading, the image of a theory of 
'power' as the spirit of this revised history, but actually 
producing it as the new 'supra-text'. Admittedly this statement 
stylises somewhat and an increasing reflexivity is apparent in
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the later works of this area.5 There is, alternatively, a lot to 
be gained in a reconstitution of much of the themes offered in 
both Wiggism and marxism, i.e. that criminal justice and 
punishment encompasses a range of factors, desires, emotional 
states, conflicts and power games. To give a pessimistic reading 
to social control in modernity is to ignore the extent to which 
the institutions of modern, so called 'liberal-democratic' 
societies are an attempt to 'do justice* to human desires, fears, 
hopes and aspirations. The Popperian understanding of modernity, 
that modern western societies are the most free, most equal, most 
opportunist in history has some force as Marx well understood. 
This latter period of revision does, however, implicitly capture 
a tension partly expressed in the whole mind-body dichotomy - the 
fact that man's longing, man's dreaming, man's desires never seem 
to be able to be matched by the products of his labour and the 
functioning of his body. Whatever the context the mind reserves 
the ability to transcend and the desiring, to hoping, the 
striving, the effort for 'better' social arrangements never seems 
to gain a full satisfaction. The experiencing of the created 
formations, the life of modernity, is a mixture of pride, 
reflection, dissatisfaction and movement. In this third set of 
writings the deconstruction of moving behind the narrative of 
progress and the distress of uncovering fables is a tension in 
criminology between telling narratives which point to loyalty to 
society, loyalty which can point to the extremes of an authority 
structure where criminology teaches an acceptance of an 
authoritarian model of society, and a transformative idea. A 
transformative idea where criminology is part of constructing the 
new and thus must depart from the authority of the present.
II
Each approach stresses different elements, different themes of 
the self-description of modernity. Around the axis of 
construction, control, nature, lies a melange of concepts and 
perspectives. Each in turn tells some story, grants some
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illumination, stylises some relationship of humanity to society 
to nature - creates some formation of perceived reality via the 
objectification of concepts.
Battles of perspectives are fought, for example, over 
reductionism,6 which also become battles over the participation 
of actors and their effectuality.7 Can social thought actually 
change the world, what are the tactics of intellectuals and how 
much of constructionism is actually preservation?8 All are 
questions of praxis. All movements, all disruptions of the 
routine of societies operation, however, create effects. The 
vastness of the range of effects and contingent variables entails 
that the scope of the effects is unpredictable. For example in 
the abstract universalism of early modernity a concomitant 
happening is that all activities not directly implicated in the 
state are best left to obey their own markets, their own internal 
dynamics. The dominance of state power then exists alongside a 
range of semi-autonomous spheres and an increasingly articulate 
.'public sphere1 of intellectual and artistic discourses which is 
actually a mixture of sub-spheres. Modernism consists of 
differentiated spheres of influence and expertise, spheres, 
however, which overlap, interact and co-influence in terms, not 
of a stratification and hierarchy, but, of perceived 
functionality. The search for the 'determinate entity1, the 
specific motor force of modern society, is thus doomed since the 
'laws’ of change and movement must exist as a result of causal 
interactions of what, in the final analysis, are 
probabilistically random exchanges.9 The product of such searches 
is only the temporality of a symbolically generalised motif.
In depicting the contingency of social order as the present 
finding of pragmatic social theory, the dilemma of macro- 
sociological conceptions of the social context of change is 
raised. How is it possible to both conceive of social change and 
the contextuality of practice without closing off the varieties 
of transformative desire into units which are submissive to the 
requirements of a deep structural theory of society and social
472
change? How is it possible, in other words, to rescue the dream 
of philosophy, that man can normatively arrange the world, from 
the rigours of sociology, that things are connected to the 
operation of the natural world and are required to be a 
functional fit? Whilst, at the same time, avoiding the trap of 
philosophy, i.e. rationalism. The perspective that there is a 
normative deep structure of reason which lies behind the chaotic 
empirical appearances and structures which can be known by 
sociology. Or of sociology, i.e. a deep empiricist faith that 
only those things which are a functional fit to the naturalist 
foundation determined by general laws and inflexible constraints 
are possible? Reflexive pragmatism offers hints of a modality for 
answering this.
Ill
Reflexive pragmatism argues that a post-modernist social theory, 
one that aims at being truly explanatory, has a closer connection 
to, and greater room for, man's normative arguments than the 
foundationalist preconceptions of rationalism or empiricism 
allow.
Reflexive pragmatism asserts the social order is made and is not 
a development of some scheme of naturalist progression. It 
rejects the empiricist idea that there is a natural scheme of 
coordination and association for the entities of the social world 
and that the structure of that scheme is inherent in the 
experience of the common life, in the operation of the 'normal' 
social order. It denies also that society moves to its ideal, or 
highest, form under a transcendant imposition of a grand template 
of pure coherence. The empiricist idea is rejected in favour of 
a radical contingency in social formations, the rationalist is 
seen to appeal to an immanent moral rationality in history whose 
destiny is the fate of the human spirit, an uplifting ideal whose 
reality is normative rather that believable. To hold either 
position is to believe forms of neo-creationism.
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Instead the pragmatist takes seriously the dicta that 'God is 
dead1, and with her death all forms of conceptualization beyond 
those systems of articulation that man can create are 
illusionary. If social reality is not 'God's problem1 neither is 
it man's - social reality is 'mystery' not 'problem' . The meaning 
to 'reality' can never be reflectively told, it can only be 
expressively created. No meta-correction of articulation, or 
final statement, is possible - only historical interplay. The 
correction of meaning lies in the reflexive questioning of social 
context and structure - the ongoing demand 'was this really what 
we wanted?' and the pragmatist suspects that the answer will 
always be 'nor. The pragmatist asserts that the questioning and 
the answer are necessarily part of the structure of development, 
a process which can escape the trap of freezing construction into 
naturalism only through the realization that all activity is 
contextually bound.
The paradox of structure, of contextualism, is that it can never 
be finally transposed., overcome, or transcended but that it 
always is in the state of being so. Man's transcendence of 
context, of structure, begins in the first moment of questioning 
the naturalism of that context - of questioning whether the 
experiencing of the context adequates the normative 
interpretation of its existence. Thus pragmatism, the- non­
naturalist but human status of foundations and thus the reality 
of the social world as artifact, and a ref lexivity; which 
operates within the pragmatism of reality, that is in the 
imaginative context that the understanding of social context, the 
system of representation and relationship which opens up the 
possibilities for dreaming a transformation, is a context rather 
than a natural order, combine as a mechanism of social change. 
Under reflexive pragmatism explanation and social change are 
insuperable.
To reflexive pragmatism both empiricism and rationalism deny the 
conditionality of social worlds when they claim to do any more 
than offer us morsels, altarage of human striving.
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Reflexive pragmatism presents a sociology of language games and 
their change. For their inhibitors language games, the settled 
routine of social existence, represent time-spacial locations 
wherein social relationships appear fixed, and, through this 
fixity and closeness, take on an aura of naturalness, of being 
the normal order of things. The in-built tendency is, therein, 
to see the present as the natural, as the logical and necessary 
codification of the form of existence. The reflexive awareness 
of a pragmatic epistemology undercuts this. It gives instead an 
awareness that the foundations are artifice and neither a 
structure of reason illuminated in one or other of the possible 
sets of human existence, or a stage of naturalist progression in 
the evolutionary sequences of the natural order. The disclosure 
of the relativity of foundations, and their human origin, 
highlights the contingent, malleable and perilous nature of 
social formations. The fixed therefore, begins to be understood 
as the fixed only because of the strength of its context.
The settled, the life of language games, is thus the product of, 
and dependant upon, formative contexts. What is the regular 
today, the norm, the accepted, may truly have been a paralogy 
yesterday, and the contingency of its future, its labelling as 
progressive or deleterious, is not escaped by the phraseology 
'being ahead of its time'. Which, as in Durkheim's structurally 
progressive conception of positive deviancy, merely indicates a 
neo-creationist metaphysic of history lurking behind this theory. 
Instead reflexive pragmatism asserts the routine of today was 
both constructed and largely unplanned, both created and 
undesigned. Its totality, and the interaction of its 
differentiation, defies prediction.10
The formative context revealed here, a pragmatic development of 
Durkheim's later idealist functionalist without foundational- 
structure commitments, is neither a choice in a world revealing 
structures of reason, or a stage in a predetermined sequential 
evolution, but a temporal configuration resultant from 
probabilistic chance exchanges. iThe social world has the
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characteristics that it has today is not predetermined and would 
have been impossible to predict. Moreover, the daily entities of 
the human world, for example human and legal rights, although 
perhaps functional expressions of dominant self-conceptions of 
modern humanity, are 'accidents' of history because even the 
basic physical structure of modern humanity is 'accidental' . [The 
use of accidental here denotes that present humanity and social 
structure is a result of chance, the features which define modern 
humanity can be seen as unessential qualities or properties.11 
Unessential in the sense that there is no essence to humanity, 
no inherent structure which is objectively the basic forms of 
mind and behaviour, no arrangement of social organization which 
is incorrigibly definite, no statement of human purpose which is 
non-revisable. There are also not 'accidental' in the sense that 
the retention 9f contingency, its transformation into routine 
requires the proactive use and embedment of paralogies.12 After 
all, in terms of the language of time we use to describe the 
universe the amount of time which separates 'us' from the 
'ancient greeks* is only a minute unit.] Although, as with the 
interiority of conceptual schemes, the routine interiority of a 
formative context exhibits a functional linkage, the openness of 
possible formative contexts means that the number of possible 
social systems and evolutionary paths is open-ended.
Thus there is no master-plan to social evolution, no template to 
be uncovered. This is both cause for optimism and melancholy. 
Freeing, uplifting, in that there is always the possibility of 
future social .reality being, 'better' than the optimism and 
pessimism of today's imagination. Melancholic in that there is 
no guarantee that the 'achievements' of today are secure since 
they are neither the products of the true empirical flow of 
natural order and progress or the reflection of the structure of 
reason. Their reality as human 'pragma' is also their weakness - 
their only guarantee is human objectivity, that is human 
involvement.
The understanding that the routine games of today were deviant
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moves of yesterday upsets the comfortable marcations of the 
common life. Politics becomes, not just state affairs but the 
foundational basis of what is now accepted as the common life. 
The state civil society divide is revealed as problematic. We 
need only touch on the penal aspects of this understanding. 
Punishment in modernity is a phenomena conceptually bound to the 
state - to the relationship of state to populace. Forms of 
punishment are thus implicated in forms of state organization. 
On the one hand we can recognise this as expressed in the marxist 
meta-narrative where the marxist post-modern, i.e. the communist 
society, was to be both a stateless society and a society without 
punishment. On the other hand contemporary 'liberal1 writers who 
cannot imagine the disappearance of the state, such as Rawls or 
Van de Haag, also cannot imagine the disappearance of punishment 
and formal criminal justice. For Rawls the threat of punishment 
and the presence of the criminal justice system is necessary to 
guarantee the social contract which men enter into in the 
constitution of the just society. Rawls is with Hobbes in that 
he assumes a characteristic of human nature that men will always 
seek more than their share of social resources.13 For Van den 
Haag criminal justice and punishment protects the distributive 
system which is perhaps 'unjust' but the best there is.14 But in 
this situation the character of punishment and criminal justice 
must necessarily be implicated in the distributive system in 
operation and the ideologies of the relationship of individual 
to state. This may sound banal but it also means that its 
operations, that is the formations of penalty, are compatible 
with these relations - not only this but also that the formations 
of penalty are implicated in the socialising of power forms 
within the society.15 Law's implication with power is as a 
medium. Thus the close connection of law with the two dominant 
definitions of power. One stresses coercion or command and is 
expressed in Austin's conception of legality, the ability to get 
someone to do something against their will, the other sees power 
as a capacity created by social agreement, and the 
instrumentality of law as the structuring of this agreement. Yet 
this agreement may be seen as a form of ideology (marxism),
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power/knowledge/rationality complexes (Foucault), or subject to 
the hegemony of monopolist tendencies. In the first stylisation 
of power stand off positions can result which rob social dynamics 
of directive energy, while with the second if agreement can 
successfully place ideological, political and economic power as 
non-contradictory, perhaps sharing the narrative of moving in the 
same direction (progress), it is likely that social energy can 
be increased. Agreement need not be narrowly construed as the 
pluralist formations of liberal modernity witness. What is also 
witnessed in liberal modernity is a form of agreement, 
narratively inspired, that the application of political, and 
economic power and thus the formations which reinforce such 
political and economic power, i.e. the use of force both 
militarily and internally to the nation state via the criminal 
justice system, is progressive. That is an agreement between 
forms of ideological power, expressed in the narratives of 
progress via secularity, industrialism, urbanization, social 
engineering and so forth, political power and economic power. The 
internal socio-political battles of modern western society, 
battles over rights and distributive policies, many of which 
originate locally and have wider repercussions, follow Kant's 
prescription on the organization of unsocial sociability of man 
which converts the antagonism of civil society into the ethical 
state via the adherence to the idea of lawful society. Put 
another way, the legal framework of modernity enables the 
institutionalization of the class struggle but this may depend 
on the one hand on an agreed narrative positioning of progress, 
on the idea of modernity itself, and the normative overcoming of 
tradition and arbitrary community by law and universality. On the 
idea that this institutionalization is to achieve something.16 
Nowhere is this illusion more apparent than in neo-liberals such 
as Hayek and the new model of society as the free market 
guaranteed by the rule of law and the strict reciprocity of 
crime-punishment for what this model disregards is that the 
institutions of modernity are in place as part of the narratives 
of progress and achievement. Narratives which have linked desires 
for equality and liberty (including in 'critical' thought
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emancipation) to collective modalities and public goods. The 
withdrawal from the social projects of modernity in the name of 
an individualism responsive only to the rule of law, conflates 
freedom solely to privacy. It denies that the privacy of the 
individual is linked to and is a product of the structuring of 
the social. It claims that to conceive individual man as 
necessarily the product of politics, and thus as a recipient of 
the burdens of political promise, a carrier of socio-political 
obligations, is to unjustly burden private individuals with 
public obligations. This position neglects, therefore, the ‘ fact' 
that modern individuality is a socially produced public creation.
In looking back at the tradition of the classical polis Hannah
Arendt put an opposing view:
"Without a politically guaranteed public realm, freedom 
lacks the worldly space to make its appearance. To be sure 
it may still dwell in men's hearts as desire or hope or 
yearning; but the human heart, as we all know, is a very 
dark place, and whatever goes on in its obscurity can hardly 
be called a demonstrable fact. Freedom as a demonstrable 
fact and politics coincide and are related to each other 
like two sides of the same matter."17
II
The example of humanitarian rationalism and bodily punishment: 
a site for forces both internal to criminal justice and external 
to interpenetrate.
Throughout Discipline and Punish Foucault drew clear distinctions 
in order to impress the occurrence of a "transformation". This 
has become a subject of controversy and in commenting upon 
Foucault Minson,18 for example, draws out how Foucault conflates 
various elements to construct clear images of legal as opposed 
to a disciplinary mode of power. Drawing upon Langbein's work on 
legal history19 Minson argues that the 'transformation' out of 
reliance upon physical pain can be seen as resulting from subtle 
changes in the law of evidence (proof). Namely, the move to
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accepting more circumstantial evidence which removed the 
necessity for torture for confession (which was a personal
statement of 'truth' ), the rise of the jury as a forum of
judgement and the emergence of new penalties such as galley
service or incarceration in workhouses which cannot be credited 
either to humanitarianism or corrective designs per se.
Foucault thus appears to overstate the reformers' role in
securing the abolition of torture. Instead of torture being a 
product and continuation of the ancient symbolisms of blood, 
Langbein argues it was part of a move away from the foundation 
of Divine guidance that underpinned the trial by ordeal while at 
the same time retaining some Divine status for 'evidence' which 
circumstantial evidence, involving the total reliance upon human 
judgement, replaces with the contingency of human judgement. This 
move was also linked to necessary changes in the legal system as 
it became geared to handling rather petty offences as its norm 
rather than the capital offence.
While Spierenburg agrees that to see the abolition of torture 
during the Enlightenment as a logical consequence of the age "is 
simply not true" and that the works of the rationalists restated 
arguments that had been advanced against torture earlier, he 
argues, however, that it was not mainly as a consequence of the 
old law of proof losing its force but a situation where "the 
rationalist critique, which had never been successful before, 
could acquire a new effectiveness because of a change of 
sensibilities" .20
Spierenburg' s work outlines an increased sensibility to the sight 
of-corpses - a question often not only of sight and sound but 
also of a bourgeois concern with the value of real estate close 
to the gallows as towns expanded. Part of the explanation for the 
decline of physical punishment and the public spectacle is the 
changing attitudes towards death:
"in the long run familiarity with death and the infliction
of pain decreased". (S. p . 191)
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An encompassing process of privatization was in play wherein the
territory of a developing private life began to hide scenes and
actions directly related to the human body. From the 5th century
to 1850 Western Europe experienced a "promiscuity between the
living and the dead", which became superseded by a general
privatization. Poggi reminds us that in the absolutist state the
ruler, such as the King of France,
"was thoroughly, without residue, a p u b l i c ’ personage. His 
mother gave birth to him in public, and from that time his 
existence, down to its most trivial moments, was acted out 
before the eyes of attendants who were holders of dignified
offices When he died (in public), his body was promptly
and messily chopped up in public, and its severed parts 
ceremoniously handed out to the more exalted among the 
personages who had been attending him throughout his mortal 
existence."
The royal court was constructed so as to magnify and display his 
existence in a visible world of privilege, conveying a symbolic, 
ritualised splendour.21
For Spierenburg from the mid-nineteenth century the stage managed 
theatre of repression - the symbolism of public punishment - 
became part of a process of privatization. Repression as a 
phenomena moved on to a period of more impersonal and less 
visible modes of control. Control and repression which, however, 
still needed in the nineteenth century a minimum of exemplary and 
openly repressive character. Prisons tended to be located on a 
conspicuous spot where a road or a railway entered a town and 
indirect knowledge of the death penalty, carried out within 
prison walls remained alive. Against the Foucaultean picture of 
sudden 'transformation' Spierenburg presents a picture of gradual 
change, of social privatization at the same time that the system 
of public order maintenance was depersonalised and acquired a 
more bureaucratic character. While enthusiasm for 'moral 
treatments' prevailed in the first half of the nineteenth century 
"the penitentiary cannot be considered as the successor to public 
executions", instead "classical nineteenth century imprisonment 
represented an experimental phase contemporary to the last days 
of public executions". The new penal measures had their own set
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of justifications. The heyday of the penitentiary and solitary
confinement was the middle of the century after which enthusiasm
declined - such experimental penal methods and public executions
were both generally superseded by the century's end:
"routine imprisonment succeeded - with capital punishment 
indoors for a few heinous offenses - to the top of the penal 
system.
....feelings of sensitivity did not vanish... every modern 
western society witnesses the conflict between a perceived 
necessity of punishment and an uneasiness at its practice."(S . 
p.206)
Why had the play of power in the public execution been necessary? 
Spierenburg combines a description of the rise of the state and 
the sensitivities of the populace. Central to criminal justice 
is the relationship of subordination. Criminology recognises this 
in two major forms:
1) the central theme of the concept of 'punishment' is an
evil applied by a person of authority over the receiver - if
there is no such relationship then it is not punishment but 
vengeance or feud.
2) in the creation of the legal enactment, the proclamation 
of norms, the criminal law places the power of definition as 
central. This is recognised by both 'Conflict' and 'Labelling' 
schools. The result is a process of definitional stabilization 
and colonization of the social by the power of the state.
The social terrain of 'the penal/criminal justice system' is
effectually created with the emergence of the feudal system 
setting up a complex web of subordination with the King at the 
top (incidently the only person for whom wergeld [compensation 
for assault and injury] was impossible as he had no equal). The 
journey of the criminal justice system is the journey of the 
central authority of society - in time the 'state1.
Early in the development of this terrain the offender is 'placed 
at the mercy of the L o r d 1 and here the implication is that a 
religious notion has entered criminal justice since "mercy was 
an attribute of God, the ultimate judge". The relationship of all
482
people to God was one of subordination, hence God was able to 
punish and to show mercy. By analogy this line of thought was 
given to the territorial lord. By the twelfth century private 
vengeance had been pushed back to a degree but continued in 
abated form and the various courts were not in a very strong 
position often acting as mediators between the parties involved. 
Criminal justice evolved as the formation of the state took place 
and also as urbanization took place. The town represented a 
geographical locality in which traditional relationships of 
subordination were disrupted and in time new systems of 
stratification emerged. Private vengeance was transferred to the 
authorities of the towns; any prosecution policy', however, was 
confined to the major crimes, with reconciliation and mediation 
surviving in cases of petty theft and minor violence. The 
mediators were not the courts but prestigious members of local 
communities and this infra-judicial resolution of conflict 
prevailed beneath the system of justice from above. This form of 
infra-judicial resolution survived until the end of the 'ancien 
regime', which meant that preindustrial repression was never the 
automatic response to all sorts of illegal acts. For Spierenburg 
the increase in frequency of corporal and capital penalties from 
the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries was not a reflection of 
any increase in taste for the sight of violence and suffering but 
primarily a consequence of the growth of the system of criminal 
justice.
"Physical punishment was simply introduced into a world 
which was accustomed to the infliction of physical injury 
and suffering. In that sense it was not an alien element. 
The authorities took over the practice of vengeance from 
private individuals. As private retaliation had often been 
violent, so was the penal system adopted by the authorities. 
Similarly, as the first had always been a public affair, so 
was the second. Attitudes to violence remained basically the 
same."(S. p.12)
This expropriation of private vengeance by the medieval rulers 
explains much of the theatrical nature of public punishment in 
that they were drawn into a display which served the double 
function of warning potential transgressors of the law that 
criminal justice would be practised and warning everyone to
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remember who practised it. In that it retains the symbolism of 
the early displays of righteousness', part of the edifying 
aspect is of punishment suffered humbly and dutifully; ideally 
the offender himself recognises his mistake in breaching the 
order of things (thus it is a penitent and edifying death that 
is witnessed). The power of the display tells the populace that 
'justice1 reigns in the particular locality (the town) and the 
reign of justice implies the presence of persons powerful enough 
to catch and punish transgressors of the law. The element of 
exemplariness is clearly the purpose of actions performed on dead 
bodies (for example, the hanging of the body of the suicide 
'offender') and the exposure of dead bodies secured a degree of 
permanence for the example. For instance, in a town the 
executions themselves were primarily meant as an example to the 
inhabitants and the exposure of corpses along the roads was a 
special warning directed at non-residents.
The abolition of the exposure of the criminals' bodies comes 
about at the end of the 'ancien regime'. It is not simply from 
an increased sensitivity of the populace linked to feelings of 
stronger inter-human identification, but with the early 
beginnings of the nation-state the image of a city of law lost 
its meaning and it was easier to abolish the display of dead 
bodies. Spierenburg states: "no political counter-argument
opposed the demands of increased sensitivity". We may restate 
this in terms of political arguments that complemented the 
demands of increased sensitivity. The tracts of both Hume and 
Beccaria, for instance, explicitly use the concept of sensitivity 
and intra-human identification (also involved in the use of 
'sympathy') at the same time as change is demanded in the name 
of progress and reason.
Although Spierenburg is correct in attacking Foucault's image of 
a sudden transformation, and perhaps implicitly for seeing that 
the concept of power is too weak a notion to solely base the hold 
knowledge and discourse have over social change, his arguments 
neglect the fact that Foucault is especially interested with
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highlighting matters of criminal justice and social control in 
the 'modern age of communications' and 'disciplinary 
information1 . The message is of the power of language and of 
social theory, 'disciplinary power’, the ability of the 
suppositions of a modernity to see its image as progressive 
growth through knowledge, to shape the practice and composition 
of the world in a flow of power reminiscent of Weberian 
domination:
"The situation in which the manifested will of the ruler or 
rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more 
others and actually does influence it in such a way that 
their conduct to a socially relevant degree occurs as if the 
ruled had made the content of the command the maxim of their 
conduct for its own sake."22
Thus the open commands of the sovereign give way to the supposed 
'objectivity' of rational discourse and democratic consent.23 
Spierenburg's analysis is not such a contradiction of Foucault 
as he appears to believe since he also demonstrates the 
rationality of what traditional criminology had treated as 
'irrational barbarity' and locates its expressions in the context 
of the theologies (metaphysics) and ethics or ordinary life; a 
context which is the arena of communication and symbolism. 
Foucault's example of punishment in the Ancien Regime had, after 
all, not been a normal crime but parricide. The rationality of 
the horrific public punishment inflicted in that case is that 
parricide openly offends against 'the order of things' - it is 
an upsetting of the sovereignty/obedience hierarchy of power and 
the accepted metaphysics of life (the backdrop of the cosmic 
order). It does not matter that the mass of crime may be intra­
group or between people similar in status, and perhaps basically 
'unreported' and unpunished or arbitrated, since, at least 
individually, they are not threats to that order.
Similarly, the punishments of today link to a changed theology 
and ethics of everyday life as well as the changing position of 
the ordinary life. In modernity the everyday life, the common 
life which Hume champions, becomes more important than the 
'other'. The other, the pursuit of abstract contemplation, the
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concern with the 'after life1, or the refined life of scared 
mediation in a structured community, of which MacIntyre ends 
After Virtue with an image, becomes subjected in modern life to 
the creation and betterment of one's individual space within the 
plays of ordinary life (production, consuming, marriage, the 
career). The image of penal power which modern life offers then 
should be congruent with the sensibility of that ordinary life 
(as is indicated by Foucault's emphasis on 'normalization' as the 
dark side of this relationship). As the ordinary life gains in 
sensitivity to violence so must the state lower the violence of 
penalty but this lowering of violence is as a result of social 
processes which it only becomes aware of under reflexivity. A 
reflexivity which threatens to rob modernity of its confidence 
in its humanitarian progress. The ordinary life, as it were, 
becomes so over burdened as a creation of modernity, that it can 
not stand the self-realization that it was not 'ordinary'.
Ill
The necessity for the partial self-regulation of the 
ordinarv/common life in modernity.
H.L.A.Hart was clear about the relationship of criminal justice
to the features of modern man and what particular feature
'liberal' criminal justice was congruent with:
"even if things go wrong. . . a man whose choices are right 
and who has done his best to keep the law will not 
suffer. . .Our system does not interfere till harm has been 
done and has been proved to have been done with the 
appropriate mens rea. But the risk that is here taken for 
granted is not taken for nothing. It is the price that we 
pay for general recognition that a man's fate should depend 
upon his choice - and this is
to foster the prime social virtue of self-restraint."
This mirrors the preface he wrote with Honore to the second 
edition of Causation in the Law were the argument was that 
irrespective of the epistemological status of legal notions of 
responsibility the adherence to legal notions rather than social
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science reinforced responsible behaviour.25
What is the formation of 'responsible behaviour' is not placed 
within a social theory in such legalist texts. Conversely 
Foucault's analysis portrayed modern humanitarianism, the growth 
of knowledges of the self, the use of these knowledges to gain 
self-control, and the socializing of self-restraint in the 
individual and the civilizing of the state, as a kind of 
stratagem of a new growing structure of control. In a different 
project Norbert Elias offers a grand overview of 'the civilizing 
process' which highlights aspects of the relationship between the 
'civilizing' of punishment, social control, and the civilizing 
of the state.
In The History of Manners26 Elias set out an account of the 
internalisation or growth in self control of conduct and 
sentiments. The rationalization of man consisted in an increase 
in self-restraint and calculation concerning longer term goals, 
concomitantly the more 'animal' activities were increasingly 
forced out of the norm of man's communal life and invested with 
shame. The structural-functional account of this process of 
spread of the personality of what Hume called the modern 
'middling class' lies in the development of the changing position 
and demands on individual life inside the process of formation 
of the modern centralised states.27
In State Formation and Civilization28 the process of state 
formation relies upon establishing a central monopoly on official 
or legitimate violence and taxation - the driving force for 
change is the continuous competitive struggles between 
individuals and between larger social groups bound up with each 
other by functional interdependencies. The modern state allows 
a particular, stratified, competition for resources which are 
largely controlled by the monopoly unit (the nation state) which 
is itself in a field of competition with other units (other 
nation states). The modern state retains its stability as a 
consequence of its combined monopoly on violence and taxation and
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of the enhanced functional differentiation of society. The 
process of functional differentiation is intensified by the 
state's pacification of its territories and its role as 
superordinate coordinator. The state strengthens its stability 
while operating to secure the space for functional 
differentiation to develop further.
In the ordinary life of modernity the individual is exposed to 
different constraints from those of the smaller and local 
societies - the increase in the range of interdependency and 
functions of people necessitates a changed and increased degree 
of regulation of conduct and relations; this regulation is 
increasingly self centred with the individual being compelled to 
regulate his conduct in an increasingly differentiated, more even 
and stable manner. It is a form of regulation which increasingly 
comes to take the form of correct socialization in the early 
years of the individual.29
The civilizing of the individual and the civilizing of the state 
are thus co-dependent. The state is required to act in a stable 
and even manner to facilitate the process of competition and 
functional differentiation within it; the individuals are 
required to act in an even and stable manner to facilitate the 
operation of functional differentiation and to ensure that civil 
society remains free from the state's direct intrusion as a 
dominate and visible player rather than as a superordinate co­
ordinator. The state is itself dependent upon the functioning of 
society and from being a monopoly formation governing in the 
interests of a small minority the state comes to govern on behalf 
of 'the system' - organising as a superordinate co-ordinator and 
mediating the various interests and demands of individuals 
organised according to specifically functionally bound interests. 
It is this process which writers such as Foucault and Garland 
grapple with.
Foucault, for instance, says of this connection between the 
inputs and desires of these differentiated groups of individuals
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in the field of philanthropy' in the early nineteenth century:
"people appear who make it their business to involve 
themselves in other people's lives, health, nutrition, 
housing: then, out of this confused set of functions there 
emerge certain personages, institutions, forms of knowledge: 
public hygiene, inspectors, social workers, psychologists."30
It is precisely at this "compromised form of knowledge" which 
Garland directs his attack in The Power to Punish and later 
analyses in more depth in Punishment and Welfare. The point here 
is that these analysts cannot, and do not in the main, assert 
that the development and use of these knowledges and forms of 
regulation is a simple plot laid by any particular group, rather 
the model of change is more the Elias model of demands and 
interests arising out of the differentiated body of society which 
require to be mediated, analyzed, and integrated into operative 
formations (under the guise of the rationally organised 
managerial state).
Garland's understanding of this however, appears to be that the 
power to punish operates as a mechanism of control and Foucault's 
early understanding is that this results in a constellation of 
domination not humanitarianism, a functional fit to a certain 
constellation of power. This requires some reduction, implicitly 
at least, to a historically evolving hierarchy of power which is 
highly questionable and illegitimate on Foucault's own terms 
(since his thesis claims to refuse to hierarchise). Although 
Elias sees the development of the modern state as tending towards 
monopoly formation, the general form of that analysis proposes 
that the 'civilizing process' is an auto-dynamic societal 
development which cannot easily be reduced to a dominant 
directional dynamics, but which produces a modern mode of life 
whose 'pleasures' it constitutively develops, reinforces and 
which it responds to. The two poles of the civilizing process, 
the evolution of a state monopoly on violence and the development 
of a psychic discipline, are ambivalent.31 The monopoly on 
violence grants to the state a power to implement one-sided 
interests which coincide to its monopoly formation, yet the 
psychic self-disciplining of the individual has not only resulted
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in a production of behaviour commensurate with the requirements 
of the external monopoly and the development of repressions and 
sublimations but has also created a relative autonomy for 
individuals which also serves as a focus for resistance.32
The escape of individuality from structure is enabled by 
reflexivity. Since reflexivity, as understood by 
ethnomethodology, consists of routine self-accounting behaviour 
which can lead the individual onto new patterns of action 
otherwise structured from without.33 Luhmann has put forward this 
dialectic of reflexivity - new form of behaviour, as the motor 
force of social change. Although it has been argued that reading 
the functionalist social theory of Luhmann, one "must confront 
the contempt for the subject characteristic of the stoicism of 
Luhmatnn's social technology",34 in Luhmann's analysis of "love as 
passion" reflexivity functions as the methodology by which 
resistance to structure is accomplished and change generated. 
Almost paradoxically, reflexivity occasions change, by revealing 
the 'soft foundations' and uncertainty endemic in analyzed social 
life.35
Luhmann chooses to take modern love as his example since from the
point of view of systems theory:
"Intimate relationships are social systems which are 
expected, particularly by the participants, to do complete 
justice to the views and needs of those involved." (L as P. 
p.172.)
The social system of intimate relationships is thus then a micro­
example of the striving for justice in the social system of a 
society.
The modern appearance of love as passion is socially induced - 
the vocabulary and modes of communication which constitute 
feelings and modalities of expression, for example, courting, 
living together, marriage, are at one and the same time provided 
by society and manufactured in the dialectics of individuality 
and sociality. The interaction.of two individuals is within the 
universality and giveness of social structure but in their
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attraction, in their interaction, they find socially provided 
methodologies, vocabularies, for mutual absorption, for example, 
'being in love', which differentiates the formed 'couple' from 
'society' . This potentiality for differentiation, this difference 
from the social, is, however, provided by the codified 
conventionality of the social. The codes of love's vocabulary 
provide a mechanism by which the experiences of the self, 
attraction, intimacy, desire, can be understood. Understood in 
the vocal expressions 'I'm in love'/'we are in love'/'we are now 
a couple', and yet socially affirmed in these expressions since 
the conditions for the interiority of the private experience 
conditions the mechanisms for positive feedback both to the 
individuals and to the social. That is, the couple receive or are 
denied social acceptance of the 'match'* 'you are good
together'/'he is not right for you', and data on this aspect of
the health of the population is produced for state organizations, 
namely, social research on the stability and demands of 'love
relationships'.
Passionate love is thus a relationship in which individuals' 
private feelings can be understood and expressed in such a way 
as to be socially affirmed. Furthermore in the sociality of the 
code the 'others' gain understanding and commensurability of the 
private experience of the individuals. The others understand that 
'they are in love', which is something that the sociality of the 
code entails is a possibility, if not already experienced for the 
others who may say: 'I was in love once'. Yet this arouses an
impossible tension, since it demands both constant scrutiny which 
calls into play reflexivity. Reflexivity, both for the individual 
constituting the 'couple' and the others. 'Are we still in
love?', 'is that the behaviour of true love?', 'were we really 
like that?' are questions which continually surface. This self 
accounting, aroused by the differentiation of the other, impacts 
upon the self denying the possibility of stability. Some change, 
therefore, of states of awareness, or of action, ensures. Further 
the very existence of the code provides the conditions for the 
uncertainty of the ontology of the relationship. 'Is this really
491
love?' is always the question. Empassioned love is never static,
or certain but in movement. Becoming intensified, enhanced, or
downgraded by the reflexivity of the couples use and embedment
in the social code which provides the modality for the expression
and affirmation of their relationship to each other. The richness
of the codes of love, found in common sense, religiosity, prose,
poetry and economics, provide the material for all the excesses
and mundaneness, for the idealizations and bitterness, and for
the expansionism and finiteness, of the human activity to be
expressed. Under the impact of authenticity, under modernity's
dictates of subjectivity, a code is utilized
"which attempts to express that the lover himself is the 
source of his love, this also being what spontaneity must 
now mean. Love should not wait for an inquiry before making 
itself known; it must pre-empt every wish and question so as 
not to seem like a duty or a conciliatory gesture." (L as P.
p.166)
The lover preserves his own freedom and self-determination by 
anticipating the wishes of the person who is the centre of his 
attention:
"And then the paradox of voluntary submission, of wanting to 
stay in chains, is also lifted, and one sees what is most 
important in everyday life: being able to act as the self of 
one's own ego, as the source of one's own love." (L as P. 
p . 166 )36
This throws up, however, the problem of "sincerity in
communication between lovers", since Luhmann has asked us "to
understand intimacy as interpenetration", and again this
interacts with reflexivity. How can one truly be certain that the
communication is actually taking place - how can one calm the
ambiguity of the others'*and’one1s own gestures and utterances?
For Luhmann this uncertainty is contained by "self-referential
systematization".
"Self-referential systematization increases in direct 
proportion to the improbability of communicative success and 
the uncertain fate of the social relationship. The more 
uncertain one is of how the other will adapt to 
expectations, the more indispensable it becomes to a system 
within which one can interpret one1s own utterances and the 
ensuring reactions to them." (L as P. p. 30.)
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The preservation of true love becomes a problem when the couple 
realise the instability of passion. Realizing the problem of 
preserving the relationship, transforms the relationship, when 
the couple learn that marriage is a viable solution. Marriage is 
codified as the solution to preserving empassioned love, and is 
freely entered into by the couple, in their acceptance of the 
necessity for self-preservation. For self-preservation as a 
couple. The uncertainty of ontology under reflexivity creates 
codified institutionalization.37 By extension the solution to 
the uncertainty of the ontology of the social world, the 
undecidability of 'mystery1, is patterned institutionalisation.
IV
Luhmann on law and social systems.
Luhmann's analysis of modern Western societies is similar to 
Elias; they are "centerless". 'Sociologically' the 
distinctiveness of modernity is the creation of societies of high 
differentiation which are composed of a complex of relatively 
autonomous sub-systems which interact creating a whole which is 
better viewed as a sort of evolutionary terrain rather than some 
determinate system easily definable into a set of dominant 
productive forces.38
Furthermore, Luhmann's denial of the possibility of uncovering 
'objective society1, his construction of interactional, 
differentiated 'mystery1 to replace the transcendental illusion 
of grand theory, grants to the subject the being of mystery 
itself. It is not possible for the subject to 'know' reality 
since the very possibility of the subject is only occasioned in 
the meaning of the process which locates the meaningful itself. 
This, apparently tautological proposition, follows from the 
absolute repudiation of anything outside of the 'system' . Neither 
a stance to grant positivistic 'objectivity' to reality, or a
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determinate motor is locatable. Neither a grand history to 
penality (to borrow Garland's term), or a definite meaning to 
punishment, is possible. In the penality/punishment complex, 
within the interactions of normative theory, sociological 
empirical observation, humanitarian passion, and metaphysical 
horror, undecidability is a consequence of the process of modem 
social transformation. Since the differentiation of criminal 
justice, which is part of the process of the differentiation of 
modern social development, inevitably throws up problems of 
procedure. These problems occur because the procedures or 
conventions which codify and stylise social conduct are seen to 
be self-referential. All activities of social existence, 
activities of social identity, are activities of meaning in 
socially generated codes. The differentiation of totality, a 
totality which holds out the dream of definite definition, and 
thus of a philosophically mediated unity to existence, at the 
same time as all attempts to encompass this totality throw up 
perspectivism and disciplinisation, entails instead a unity only 
of difference. The total is a totality only because it is other 
than the differentiation of spheres.
For luhmann, social claims, expectations, desires and fears are 
expressed in four societal media: 1) political power relations,
2) monetary, exchange and market relations, 3) cultural norms and 
socialization relations, 4) the medium of truth or knowledge. 
Society has evolved from basically a kinship-orientated, 
segmentally differentiated form to become characterised by 
functional differentiation, with the development of multiple sub­
systems exhibiting both relative autonomy and interdependence.
The complexity of this social formation demands law; law 
functions as the congruent generalization of normative behaviour 
expectations.39 This version of 'sedimentation theory1 gives to 
law the effect of reducing complexity in social formations, 
assuring predictability, and allowing reciprocal presumptive 
behaviour. We have come from Hume through Durkheim to a new form 
of grand social unification. In the coordination mechanisms of
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Luhmann, however, functionalist reductionism ends not in an 
underlying natural flow but in unpredictability and 
undecidability. The paradox of this social theory is that the 
very structures which create predictability ensure an ongoing 
developmental undecidability and unpredictability to social 
evolution. Put another way, the pragmatisation of grand theory 
results not in the solution of the 'problem' of social being, but 
in its 'mystery'.
The reflexivity of social structure provides the route to this 
unpredictability. This reflexivity occurs when individuals 
operating a media seek to understand the 'truth' of their 
performance. Law is a facilitative mechanism and a media of 
understanding and structuring predictability in the increasing 
differentiated social system. It is a mechanism which responds 
to the demand for expectational structures. Law's existence is 
not reducible to a tool of coercion. Nor is it reducible to 
economic determination. Law is not simply the extension of a 
central coercive apparatus. Law is not the grand imposer of 
social control. Law's existence minimises the openness of social 
'reality' which otherwise would be a infinite spiral/regress of 
interactional interpretative 'expectations of expectations' 
constituted and reconstituted in interaction. The existence of 
law means that individual interaction is rescued from multiple 
realities by the constructive reality of law. In Luhmann's 
analysis social life-worlds tend to complexity, contingency and 
randomness.of combination under differentiation whilst law tends 
to simplicity, order, and predictability. Thus two key postulates 
exist in his overall scheme. First, social evolution tends to 
greater differentiation, and greater complexity. Conditions which 
appear to go against the human demand for stability. Second, the 
human demand for stability creates the myth of the one, of the 
absolute. This demand establishes the unescapable mythical and 
irrational basis to 'rationality'.40 The universality implicit 
in rationalism and empiricism is mythical.
Law's undecidability results from a reflexive analysis of society
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attempting to impose a universal binary code to structure
predictability in differentiated societies. The binary code of
legality contains an unremovable paradox, however, since what is
the right is definable only in relation to the other, to the
wrong and not to any supra-code reality. Thus even when the Rule
of law replaces certain traditional paradoxes by distinctions,
for example, the old paradox of the right to change the law, the
advent of reflexivity ensures that the problem is only moved
backwards in a regress and not removed. In the case of the right
to change the law, the old paradox of turning the right into
wrong, is resolved in modernity with the distinctions political-
legal and the resolution to the problem of change where "the
legal system may recognise political motives as sufficient for
changing the law - but only at the level of legislation and not
at the level of adjudication11.41 However, this new distinction
between the legal and the illegal, between the constitutional and
the unconstitutional, (or, put another way, adherence to Hart's
secondary rules guaranteeing the primary rules) merely transfers
the paradox. Since, in addition to the doubt that not all legal
paradoxes can be replaced by distinctions, we have
"the paradoxes implied in using distinctions, the paradoxes 
of the same that is treated as different? And above all, 
what about the paradox of defining the law by the 
distinction of legal and illegal?"42
Put another way, does not Hart's system of the creation of valid
law depend upon the prior acceptance of a legal and illegal
process of creation? Reflexivity comes about in the question:
"how can society enforce a binary code? How can one ever be 
sure that the true is not untrue and the right is not 
wrong...what happens within a legal system when the society 
enforces its code?"43
The procedures or conventions which codify social conduct are 
found to be self-referential. The solution is pragmatic 
consistency, the grammertization of words into life forms. 
Codified convention is thus both self-referenced and fed into 
life in a meaning-in-use, as opposed to under the dictates of a 
'right' above right and wrong, for no such super-right exists. 
Instead:
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"the validity of a programme depends on its own execution. 
The execution of the programme becomes a condition of the 
execution of the programme. Hang the man if - and only if - 
you hang him. This instruction, of course, would make 
issues undecidable.1,44
V
A concluding reading on prospects for contemporary penal change. 
So we have come to the situation of pragmatism: the splitting of 
universalistic claims into paradigmatical references. The 
splitting of the social, of the concept of society into 
differentiated spheres and processes of monopolistic formations. 
The pragmatist has lost the goal of the clearly designed, 
utilitarian functioning, fully commensurable totality as the 
dream of social engineering. We are left with tactics, 'steering 
mechanisms' and the allure of pluralism. The image gives some 
hope for the pragmatist in the field of social control for if the 
social is a collection of differentiated spheres, opportunities 
for experimentation and diversity of social life may occur. 
Stanley Cohen identifies seven possible "semi-autonomous fields", 
that is:
"social units which can generate rules, customs and symbols 
internally and which have the means to induce compliance -
but which are vulnerable to rules and decisions from the 
outside world."45
These are:
1. Experiments in community control and informal justice;
2. Self-help and mutual-aid organizations (the diverse forms 
include the 'anonymous deviant' groups, alternative health 
centres, shelters for women);
3. Systems of private and work-place justice (including 
workers courts, workers councils);
4. Organizations possessing internal justice mechanisms (for 
example, the army, professional associations, and educational 
institutions);
5. Communes and other 'utopian1 social collectivities;
6. 'Spontaneous1 forms of living and working communally; and
7. Previous societies where entire non-centralised, non­
statist forms of social control existed (such as acephalus 
societies).
4 9 7
If these fields may help to realise certain 'human' values,46
Cohen's conclusion
"is rather simple and predictable: the further away we move 
from the discourse of criminal justice, the more likely we 
are to find the conditions for realising those values... 
....You cannot, that is have it both ways: statist criminal 
law and decentralization. To be realistic about law and 
order must mean to be unrealistic (that is, imaginative) 
about the possibilities of order without law. To take 
decentralization seriously means that you must be an 
abolitionist." 47
Accepting the Elias analysis, however, runs counter to this 
aspect of Cohen's practical conclusion. For these are examples 
of forms of social control and collective expression in the 
nature of semi-autonomous fields which, if they are to exist in 
modified form, must exist in the shadow of the state. When Cohen 
categorises the criminal law as "a state run organization which 
maintains the monopoly on defining certain behaviour as criminal 
and then organising the punishment of such behaviour by the 
deliberate infliction of pain", he also neglects the work of 
'living law' which takes Ehrlich as its distant founder48 - 
everyday negotiation of normative behaviour is not necessarily 
encompassed in the hegemony of law. Moreover, the strategy under 
the Elias analysis instead of abolitionism would be a question 
of limiting the intrusion of the power to punish under the 
criminal law by convincing the state that the civilizing of the 
social is better achieved by alternative means which leave intact 
those crucial aspects of the state's domain (i.e. the monopoly 
over violence and taxation). The structural conditions for the 
limiting of the state's power to punish is the balanced self­
regulation of the social which makes illegitimate the overt 
intrusion of the state.
As to understanding the role of the state in contemporary penal 
practice Elias and Luhmann are underdeveloped in their impact 
upon legal theory or criminological discourse. The intellectual 
narratives used in locating the phenomena of the changing mode 
of involvement of the state are more delineated and stylized. 
Kamenka and Tay, for example, set out a threefold typology of
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Gemeinschaft (organic communal-familial), Gesellschaft
(contractual commercial-individualist), and Bureaucratic-
administrative types of regulation. In his analysis of trends in
juvenile justice Pratt recognises that the 'back to justice’
demands espouse Kamenka and Tay's Gesellschaft model which
"emphasizes formal procedure, impartiality, adjudicative 
justice, precise legal provisions and the rationality and 
predictability of legal administration. It distinguishes 
sharply between law and administration, between the public 
and the private, the legal and the moral, between the civil 
obligation and the criminal offence."49
However, as Pratt also understands, the complex happenings around 
the 'return to justice' do not amount to a Gesellschaft position 
but correspond more to bureaucratic-administrative law. The 
features which Pratt outlines in contemporary juvenile justice, 
i.e. an increase in cautioning and pre-court disposal of cases, 
the growth of inter-agency co-operation, the development of 
alternatives to care/custody programmes, a decline in personal 
autonomy of decision makers, an increase in the role of the 
voluntary sector, the development of a juvenile justice 
technology and bifurcation, depict a situation where
"the presupposition and concern is neither an organic human 
community nor an atomic individual; the presupposition and 
concern is a non-human abstracted ruling interest, public or 
on-going activity of which human beings and individuals are 
subordinates, functionaries or carriers... [the object of 
the regulations is] ..the efficient execution of tasks and 
the attainment of goals and norms. . . which are set by the 
authorities, or the 'community', or the bureaucracy as its 
representative. "50
The relationship is not, however, fully controlled, the 
discourses of the delinquent refuse to become silent. Delinquency 
'fights' back. The various arenas where decisions are made 
present opportunities where discourse on delinquency can arise 
anew, discourses which come out of the pragmatism of the sites 
which new frameworks provide. Pratt turns to the third element 
in the typology which Unger provides (the rule of law, welfare 
law, and corporatism), viz. corporatism, as a 'third model of 
juvenile justice'. Unger's picture of corporatism is the 'post­
liberal state' whose attributes are
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"the gradual approximation of state and society, of the 
public and the private sphere. For one thing the state’s 
pretence to being the neutral guardian of the social order 
is abandoned. For another thing, private organizations are 
increasingly recognised and treated as entities with the 
kind of power that traditional doctrine viewed as the 
prerogative of government. People may become 
conscious...[that] society consists of a constellation of 
governments, rather than an association of individuals held 
together by a single government.
The state that has lost both the reality and the 
consciousness of its separation from society is a corporate 
state. "51
Corporatism is a development, it is not a return. The penology 
of Just Deserts is not the situation of classicism where the 
tariff may be thought to be the work of a group dominating the 
state. It is perhaps one instead where the populace have 
democratically affixed the tariff - by voting for instance on 
mandatory penalties (or, alternatively, the corporatism of the 
proposed 'sentencing tribunal'). The catch is that this democracy 
will enforce the messages by which the populace vote. Nor is 
rehabilitation wholly expunged, it is not converted into an 
'other' by which the purity of the normal is to be judged, for 
there are places where rehabilitation is the normal and places 
where it is the 'other* and both are within the complexity of the 
social body.
Just Deserts also comes about with the realization that the 
things done in the name of 'treatment' and 'expertise', although 
taken from the prerogative of the 'political* state and handed 
to spheres of expert competence, do not transcend the political 
but are necessarily an extension or effect of state 
organization.52 Under corporatism the state attempts to regulate 
the workings of these non-state bodies which now operate in a 
interdependent relationship (in British Juvenile Justice 
regulating 'diversion' in the criteria of diversion, cautioning, 
for instance53).
In the general concept of diversion, namely cautioning for 
juveniles as mentioned above, the range of Intermediate Treatment 
schemes in British Juvenile Justice and in some aspects of
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Intensive Supervision or Community Service we see the dialectics 
of state decentralization. Criteria of decision making are 
imposed, criteria, which are, however, at least claimed to be 
wide enough to allow scope for variation on the local level. This 
is, however, a controlled diversity. The diversity of 
operationality in Community Service, for example, may be 
curtailed in the name of creating a form of 'punishment in the 
community*,54 In general, however, the persistence of some forms 
of rehabilitative ethos in these areas becomes understood under 
the social theory of Elias as something which is not merely an 
ally of the welfare state or the social engineering aspect of 
modernity. It is rather a necessary condition of the complex 
functional differentiation of modern society - part of the 
preparation of a specific type of late modern individuals. In 
advanced modern societies, where the government plays the role 
of a super-ordinate coordinator of the sub-spheres of civil 
society, complex, detailed and highly advanced technologies will 
increasingly be utilised - technologies which intensify even 
further individuals interdependence upon each other. These 
societies will require that the individuals in this situation 
exercise a high degree of self discipline and self motivation as 
well as respect for others and the institutions that they deal 
with. Conversely, these new technologies applied in social 
control will make it both increasingly possible to observe what 
citizens are doing and less possible to understand what they are 
doing. Thus normative training, or training in sets of reciprocal 
expectations, will be required, such training must encompass the 
youth in delinquency and offender groups. This prognosis or 
macro-sociological picture of post-modernity, of the post­
industrial advanced societies, is thus one of the need for a new 
form of rehabilitation, of social training for citizens adjudged 
deviant or delinquent.55
It is as well to note that recent writings have stressed the 
degree to which the 'sciences of rehabilitation' cannot be 
separated out of their life as part of general sciences of the 
human self. Sciences which play their part in the socio-econ-
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political government of modern population. Techniques of
psychotherapeutics, for example, are argued by Rose to be in
accordance with political rationales for the government of
conduct, for semi-political projects for forming specifically
'modern' selves able to occupy the historically open space of
choices of modernity.
"They are characteristically sought when individuals feel 
unable to bear the. obligations of selfhood, or when they are 
anguished by them. And the rationale of psychotherapies - 
and this applies equally to contemporary psychiatry - is to 
restore to individuals the capacity to function as 
autonomous beings in the contractual society of the self. 
Selves unable to operate the imperative of choice are to be 
restored through therapy to the status of a choosing 
individual....
The psychotherapies provide technologies of individuality 
for the production and regulation of the individual who is 
'free to choose1"56
In the life situations of 'delinquents1, a situation Matza
characterised in terms of 'drift* and 'subterranean values', the
establishment of regimes of choice and operation of life projects
appears to be demanded by the prospect of post-industrial
society.57 There are grounds, therefore, to expect some form of
resurgence in rehabilitation. This process does have its price,
partly the effect of rehabilitation would be to enable the
individual to play the other games of regulation not so visible
in modernity. To an extent writers such as Foucault are correct
to stress the degree to which regulation of social thought in
late modernity does not occur through the law, since,
"the same forces that de-legitimate 'public' interference in 
'private' life open the details of wishes, desires, and 
pleasures to a plethora of new regulatory forms, no less 
powerful for being 'decoupled' from the authoritative 
prescriptions of the public powers. Television, advertising, 
magazines, newspapers, shop windows - the signs and images 
of the good life were being inscribed on every surface that 
could carry their .imprint. The new technologies of 
citizenship formation were to gain their power through the 
subjective commitment to values and ways of life that were 
generated by the technologies of choice and consumption."58
The rehabilitated offender is to take his place in this 
environment and hence the previous statement must be strongly 
qualified.59 The contention that modern society requires a new
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form of rehabilitation concerns those citizens that a society 
needs and it is possible that advanced post-modern societies 
economically do not need as many employed citizens as previously. 
If so, and there is grounds for believing that this is the case 
already, the client group for penality will increasingly come 
from the 'underclass1,60 a redundant group who may offer a 
political positive usage in the imagery of punishment - their 
usefulness to the state may lie in their resource as a symbolic 
scape-goating group. As the source of the 'other* who may be seen 
as that entity which threatens the stability of society for the 
'supra-class* and whose existence provides an opportunity for 
state authoritarianism.61 From our understanding of modernity, 
however, we also conclude that state authoritarianism stifles 
growth, stifles economic welfare - hence it is in the interests 
of the supra-class to avoid authoritarianism.
Thus a careful balancing act of state and civil society over 
crime prevention, re-training, and socialization is functionally 
required in post-modernity. However, this does not resolve the 
practical problem of epistemological orientation. For, it is one 
thing to identify the structural necessity for a balanced 
connection of state and civil society it is yet another to 
determine the rhetoric of the political connection. In his 
analysis Cohen recognised that an element of transcendence is 
required to interact between sub-spheres and the super- 
coordination of the state, possibly "the overriding criterion of 
an independent critical relationship to the state criminal law 
system".62 In empirical observations on after care in a post­
borstal era, for instance,
"it would seem that in the experience of the change from 
borstal to youth custody, probation officers will find 
little evidence that rehabilitative methods may be preserved 
in the : absence of an unequivocal commitment to
rehabilitation as a sentencing goal."63
Yet how, in light of the critique of rehabilitation, can 
practically such a commitment be entered into, or, for that 
matter, normatively be said to be the right thing? Reflexivity 
cannot be escaped from, and thus the uncertainty, and
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undecidability, as to 'true' ontology and 'correct' praxis must 
be lived with. But this does not negate the socio-political 
domain of the attempts to satisfy, or give practical life to, the 
desires and dissatisfactions which have driven modernity, and 
which, within the meta-narratives of modernity, the 
constructivist projects of modernity were meant to satisfy. That 
is to recognise, in parallel fashion to the pragmatic recognition 
that knowledge spheres are founded upon suppositions and 'value 
decisions' concerning man's relation to the world, that so too 
are spheres of action concerned with value positions. The 
commitment to knowledge was a commitment to a value position. 
That this commitment has brought us to the reflexivity of a post­
modern condition may illustrate both change through reflexive 
pragmatism and the need to bring to light not the basic structure 
of human nature, or the structure of transcultural Reason, but 
the value positions and political arrangements we may find, 
temporarily, satisfactory.
That this is not a matter of grasping onto the 'essential' truth 
of mankind's meaning is obvious to the pragmatic imagination. It 
can only be a task of working on what has been done before and 
paralogising the games we are in at present. It is a task of 
reading, and 'mis-reading' the narratives and texts, the 
discourses, we are situated within, it involves the task of 
seizing the minor and jumping the marcation into the major.
Thus, as at present the rhetoric of imprisonment presently is of 
'control and maintenance* and increasingly progress seen in 
alternatives of 'punishment in the community1 coupled with the 
procedural formalism of mandatory sentencing under Just Deserts, 
one must raise the easily overlooked consideration that the 
arguments for strict procedural safeguards through criminal 
justice and the championing of Just deserts were not what much 
of the charges against the treatment model were about. The 
charges may also be read as concerned with achieving equity, for 
instance, with protesting the unjust nature- of the particular 
things done in institutions legitimated by the oversweep of
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treatment philosophies of punishment, rather than pro-formalism.
As Unger puts it:
’’formality is the willingness to allow the rights and duties 
of the parties to be determined by the presence or absence 
of external solemnities... Both formality as rules and 
formality as ceremony appear to make it possible to 
ascertain entitlements and obligations without evaluating 
the goodness or badness of particular results. This 
intention to find the legal antidote to the subjectivity of 
values is what unites the two senses of formality.”
For Unger equity is the polar opposite of the formalist 
justification by rules. Yet in criminal justice the replacement 
of the rehabilitative stance by a formalist justice model, 
resounding with the rhetoric of Kantian morality, can be seen as 
the submergence of the theme of equity. A commitment to equity 
as a procedural criteria which may focus not only on the 
situation of the offender and feel an unease now at his fixed 
punishment (wishing to introduce some positivistic notions which 
it previously felt unable to do at the prospect of unbridled 
determinism and the rhetoric of doing good to the offender 
actually 'excusing' the crime), but also upon the victim. In 
Unger’s scheme equity stands close to the informal justice of the 
living community - the localised, particular resolutions which 
necessarily cause that evil of modern formalism, sentencing 
disparities.64
For Unger equity is the opposite of the imposition of objectivity 
via formalism and the collateral of equity is solidarity. Human 
solidarity becomes again, as it was for Durkheim, the task for 
social theory. Achieving solidarity the task for criminologists 
writing about the individual and the social, about the state and 
power, about cruelty and suffering; but this time the task is 
radically different, for we neither know the confidence that 
society actually exists as an ontology, nor do we even know that 
we are justified in using the 'we'. Each expression that we use 
is but an articulation, a move in the games of epistemological 
constitutionalism, a move of formative action which instantly 
becomes subject to a constant self-doubt, to a scrutiny of how 
it performs. The world becomes the target of a different form of
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objectifying gaze devoid of any certainty apart from human 
commitment.
NOTES.
1.The level of analysis of what Liberalism is, however, is quite 
low, never approaching that now assessable in texts like Anthony 
Arblaster's The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1984.
2.G.Pearson, The Deviant Imagination. Macmillan, London, 1975.
3.Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: a 
Sociological Introduction. Hutchinson, London, 1978.
4.Quoted in Stuart Hall and Phil Scraton, "Law, class and 
control", in Crime and Society.
5.See Ignatieff's revision of his own earlier work and critique 
of Foucault in "State, Civil Society and Total Institutions" in
5. Cohen and A. Scull (eds), Social Control and the State, and 
David Garland is presently working on a more 'eclectic' approach 
which revises his own earlier 'neo-marxist' perspective (Garland, 
personal communication, 1989) . Stanley Cohen revises his position 
in "The Critical Discourse on 'Social Control': Notes on the 
Concept as a Hammer", International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law, 1989, 17, 347-357.
6.In understanding the complexity of modernity and seeking its 
deriving force sophisticated, yet non-marxist, interpretations 
of the liberal state, such as Poggi, resist reducing the state 
to sets of economic demands which so dominated the second period 
of criminological histories or to the role of the supervisor of 
a growing system of social control. [See Stuart Hall and Phil 
Scraton, "Law, class and control", in Crime and Society, for a 
later more revisionist text noting how critical arguments slowly 
distanced itself from crass 'functional fits' between the law and 
the economic interests of capital to a recent position of 
"marxism without final guarantees".] The pre-Foucaultean 
character of "the invention of Delinquency" in Platt's The Child 
Savers: the Invention of Delinquency, for instance, saw the
'invention of the pathology of delinquency' and the establishment 
of courts and reformatories as instrumental for semi-coercive 
class control. [A. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of 
Delinquency. Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1969, p.15.] For 
Poggi-style readings this can only be a partial approach since 
Poggi presents a model where the political structure develops a 
fluid body of 'interests' unable to be .simply reduced to a 
monolithic narrative. Complementing economic considerations the
506
political sphere takes on a set of desires and aspirations which 
have a separate character and effect.
7.In the heyday of classical criminology, for example, the actors 
of the political stage occupied a political role in a political 
terrain limited in inclusion, due to the restricting of suffrage 
to men possessing property and/or educational qualifications, and 
predominantly concerned with the rise of capitalist-bourgeois 
institutions and values. At such a time 'politics', as the 
activity of a limited political realm, i.e. the concentrated area 
of Parliament and Crown executing, and enhancing the spread of, 
state-wide policies, may be clearly definable. It is 
understandable then that the path to a fully rational society 
will be seen as enshrining as the peak of glorious reason the 
state acting in the name of a rational sovereignty (as in Hegel) 
and the fully rational development of Aufheben (rational raising 
of principle to light) govern philosophical penalty. This 
development of the 'public' sphere contrasts with the desire that 
the bourgeois 'private' realm be a realm of autonomous 
development, for example that of free contract, employment 
differentiation, the pursuit of artistic fashion and the family. 
The bourgeois citizen is emancipated by freedom of contract and 
property law whose social interactions are governed by the 
control of the 'hidden hand' of the market operating inside a 
framework of law and moral operation defended by the state as 
sovereign. The state is to address the populace in a set of 
capacities as taxpayers, subjects, potential offenders, but not 
as participators in the active political part of rule - civil 
society is the object of rule not a co-determiner of the activity 
of rule. The subsequent development of modernity demonstrates 
that this narrow conception of citizens' rights became seen as 
inadequate to ensure fair participation in an unequal market - 
under the ideals of fraternity, equality, and opportunity a 
redefinition of citizens rights came to include political, 
welfare, social and civil rights reinforced substantively by the 
development of the institutions of the welfare state. Currently 
the neo-classical approach criticises both the operation of the 
institutions of the welfare state, and the spread of such claims 
to rights, as a diluting of the meaning of rights and an 
overburdening of citizenship.
8.In the early modern stages of this development the change of 
'absolutism' into 'enlightened despotism1, through in part the 
injection of discourse such as Beccaria's, can be seen not so 
much as a forced movement arising from protest but as a process 
of accommodation with actors demanding a more active and decisive 
role in the political process. This accommodation preserves and 
develops the achievement of the absolutist state over the feudal,
i.e. the creation of an agency which can exercise rule from a 
unified centre structurally apart and over all social groupings 
in a distinctive publicly sovereign sphere of its own, while 
avoiding direct interference in the activities of the mechanism 
of interchange increasingly viewed as essential to social 
progress, i.e. the market. It would be content to set out a 
framework for and to tax the interactions of the market, thus 
allowing the bourgeoisie freedom to draw upon the increasing
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benefits of capitalist industrialization without necessarily 
claiming a full political participation. The opposing neo- 
Aristotelian visions of constructing socio-political life, which 
served to provide a contrast and which desired the satisfactions 
of participation in the life of politics, is rendered deviant, 
constituted as a counter culture to commercial, capitalist 
modernity.
9.That is to say that given the 'entire1 course of history the 
probability of this particular event or interaction occurring in 
exactly this form is mathematically (close to) zero.
10.For example, the rhetoric of universalism inherent in the 
discursive stratagems of the public spheres of modern reason, 
albeit based on the symbolic generalization of particular traits 
of modernity, provides by its very nature a contrast to the 
particular interests which power was held to serve in the 
absolutist state. In other words 'universalism', as the essence 
of the reason of modernity's progress, has the functionality of 
self-constituting modernity. Under this 'ideal' the exercise and 
acknowledgement of power needed to be legitimated by a framework 
able to withstand the^attention of the public realm of reason. 
For instance, Beccaria and the classical school mount both an 
appeal to the practices of the absolutist state and also a claim 
that the self constitution of the modern age can make a new 
beginning through philosophy. The rhetoric of this claim becomes 
the power of its production - a production which is so meaningful 
in itself that its philosophy only requires coherence to a part 
of the outside world (it ignores thus the realm of things non- 
philosophical, i.e. the positivist, or enters into schemes of 
translaterability of the positive into the philosophical, thus 
containing the possibility of discourse). The programme of the 
classical school, essentially a philosophical vehicle, does 
contain, however, enough elements of a scientific theory (the 
postulate of crime causation) and a sociological thesis (the 
state, civil society division), to be largely self-sustaining and 
they become the early generalizations of modernity in their areas 
which are to be discarded when the complex is shown as wrong. 
That is, when the search for 'knowledge' disturbs the intimacy 
of its power complex with the inflow of new knowledges, new 
'discoveries of truths'. Yet:it can, perhaps, adequately be held 
that the philosophical programme for the beginning of the modern 
age 'failed' because its preconditions and expressive outcomes 
were superseded by social change. The conditions of that change 
were, however, the products of that programme - the structural 
conditions of the free space to pursue knowledge in criminology, 
the rise of the professional, the self-image of state rationality 
which requires knowledge.
Although the reasoning public did not openly claim for itself the 
right to rule (i.e. as a class), as the personalistic claims of 
absolutism had, the recognition of the ruler's claims to rule was 
to be increasingly in terms of the reason articulated in the 
process of rule, i.e. it became the process of governing as 
Foucault put it. Whatever structural changes in the positioning 
of individuals and groups occur there is already a complex change
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in the legitimation of power. For if power is to be responsive 
to the demand of legitimation by reason then the reasoning 
activities of the populace as 'publics' are not simply to 
critically monitor the operation of the state but to play a part 
in the demand for and direction of action. The legitimation of 
such action is the expression of the reason arising out of civil 
society and, as the generalization of a later sociology of this 
phenomena's positivity, i.e. marxism, notes, since the bourgeois 
class was the dominant class within civil society the reason 
arising out of civil society would reflect the institutions and 
projects initiated by the bourgeoisie. Or to put it another way, 
the prejudices (opinions) of the bourgeoisie would become 
powerful influences upon the reason of the state. Yet this is 
also to say that the mode by which the knowledges of modernity 
implant themselves and achieve change is via the cosmos' dominant 
social interface, i.e. humans. The statements of this 'Reason' 
must be the assertions of mankind, of individuals and groups. The 
assertions need to establish themselves as more than mere 
utterance, they need to become information, knowledges, to 
partake of a universalism beyond the power of the utter (and thus 
to converse is to seek consensus on the basis of the discourse, 
facts, theorems, and truths, rather than through the powers of 
the individual, i.e. status, sexuality, physical dominance).
Theoretical assertions, which purport to be analysis, for example 
a reactive discovery of the inherent rights and features of man, 
are also proactive, they are strategies of development; their 
entities are constitutive of social change. Reflexively, for 
example, this means that the rights of man are not discovered, 
but created - a self-awareness which if known earlier would have 
rendered the rhetoric of the production sterile but whose delay 
in coming to consciousness robs reflexivity of negativity in the 
face of the 'reality' of such rights, that is in the face of 
their role in modern language games as a result of successful 
positing.
The changes in the legitimation of expression and communication, 
which in turn constitute the ontology of rights now impact upon 
structural change. One structural change concerns the growing 
possession throughout the nineteenth century of civil rights by 
the populace. These rights give the disfranchised a toe-hold in 
the clearly political activities of the larger society and are 
a means of taking part in 'public activities' with the end of 
gaining political rights. In the area of the 'social problem' of 
criminality a nineteenth century example is the increasing view 
of this area as a social problem offering an avenue of activity 
able to be engaged in by women taking on the role of social 
reformers. [A. Platt, The Child Savers. pp. 75-100; see also Tove 
Stang Dahl, State intervention and social control in nineteenth- 
century Europe. Institute for Kriminologi og strafferett, Nr.21, 
Stensilserie Universitetet i Oslo.] In turn the temperance 
movement functioned both as a vehicle for social reform and an 
opportunity for semi-political involvement for women. The 
development of non-political associations formed among people 
sharing interests and views produces over time coalitions or 
organizations which represent and mobilise interests of such
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magnitude that they become capable of engaging various state 
organs in a developmental 'pressure' or 'interest' politics. (In 
the twentieth century penal reform becomes a movement in which 
the Home Office, as a state organ, is successfully pushed, 
pulled, or mediates across what sociological commentators call 
the state/civil society divide. [For an in-depth study see Victor 
Bailey's Delinquency and Citizenship: Reclaiming the Young
Offender. 1914- 1948.])
11.Any thought experiment demonstrates this. For example, 
according to our current descriptions from 'hard sciences1 some 
thousands of years ago our globe experienced an amount of 
volcanic activity which released a certain quantity of 
radioactivity on to our planet - if the amount had been ten times 
what it was, for instance, the entire course evolution would have 
been different. Subsequent forms of 'life' that were 'functional' 
would have been vastly different and that which evolved into the 
'dominant' life form, which we currently call, humans, certainly 
would not have exhibited the characteristics that 'we' currently 
exhibit. Of course any attempt by 'rationalists' to claim that 
human rights have always existed, and which also define human 
rights substantively by direct reference to the current 
capacities of humans, are simply mystifications of what such 
entities 'actually' are - temporal entities of language games 
brought into existence by politics and maintained by politics.
12.See last note.
13.John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1973.
14.Earnest Van den Haag, Punishing Criminals. New York, Basic 
Books, 1975.
15.There are of course different forms of stylising our 
understanding of power, the three forms previously mentioned by 
Etzioni are typologies of involvement, complemented by typologies 
of social action such as ideological, political and economic 
power.
16.See Kant's "Idea for a General History" previously referred 
to; "The struggle for the Social Contract" being Chapter 3 of 
Ralf Dahrendorf, Law and Order.
17.Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. Viking Press, New York, 
1954, pp. 148-9.
18.In Genealogies of Morals.
19.John Langbein, Torture and The Law of Proof: Europe and
England in the Ancien Regime. London, 1977.
20.Pieter Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Suffering. Executions and 
the evolution of repression: from a prehistorical metropolis to 
the european experience. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1984.
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21.The Development of the Modern State, pp. 68-70.
22.Economy and Society. Vol. 3, p. 953.
23.If we need to state again the difference between Foucault and 
Habermas: for Habermas the true validity of social norms is
ideally not to rest on coercive sanctions and open power, but on 
the consensus of those affected which is reached by rational 
debate and on the strength of plausible reasons; for Foucault 
this process can never be free from domination.
24.Punishment and Responsibility, p.182.
25.See reference and brief discussion in Nelken, "The Truth about 
Law's Truth", University College Working Papers No.7 . 1989, at 
pp.44-5.
26.Norbert Elias The Civilizing Process. Vol 1, The History of 
Manners, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978.
27.As Elias put it in Vol II. State Formation & Civilization. 
"Just as the personality structure characteristic of a particular 
stage of social development, so specific traits of civilized 
conduct are at the same time a product of and a lever in the 
workings of the larger social process within which individual 
classes and interests form and transform themselves. 
Civilization, and therefore rationalization, for example, is not 
a process within a separate sphere of 'ideas' or 'thought'. It 
does not involve solely changes in 'knowledge*, transformations 
of ' ideologies' , in short alternations of the Qf 
consciousness, but changes in the whole human make-up, within 
which ideas and habits of thought are only a single sector. We 
are here concerned with changes in the whole personality 
throughout all its zones, from the steering of the individual 
himself at the more flexible level of consciousness and 
reflection to that of the more automatic and rigid level of 
drives and affects." pp.283-4.
28.The Civilizing Process. Vol 2, State Formation and 
Civilization. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.
29.In The History of manners Elias documents "the advance of 
shame and embarrassment frontiers" which amounts to "a pronounced 
shift towards the internalisation of fears". In the linkage of 
the development of shame on exposure of the human body to 
location in types of social structure, the feudal experiencing 
of shame at exposure only among equals or an inferior to a 
superior changes "only when the walls between estates fall away, 
when the functional dependence of all on all increases and all 
members of society become several degrees more equal, does such 
exposure, except in certain narrow enclaves, become an offence 
in the presence of any other person. Only then is such behaviour 
so profoundly associated with fear in the individual from an 
early age, that the social character of the prohibition vanishes 
entirely from his consciousness, shame appearing as a command
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coming from within himself." State Formation and Civilizationf 
pp.295-6.
However: "Nowhere in human society is there a zero-point of 
fear of external powers, and nowhere a zero-point of automatic 
inner anxieties. Although they may be experienced as very 
different, they are finally inseparable. What takes place in the 
course of a civilizing process is not the disappearance of one 
and the emergence of the other. What changes is merely the 
proportion between the external and the self-activating fears, 
and their whole structure....
...today, as formerly, all forms of adult inner anxieties are 
bound up with the child's fear of others, of external powers." 
State formation and Civilization, p.300.
30.Power/Knowledgef p.62
31.The theories of Elias make visible the dilemma of the state: 
for the state to intrude too obviously into the regulation of the 
social would disrupt the complex processes of differentiation, 
experimentation and pluralistic market mechanisms whereby 
modernity energises itself. The balance depends on the social 
largely self-regulating itself, via the creation of civilized 
behaviour. Yet more and more of the mechanisms whereby the social 
regulates and civilizes itself are meditations of the state - the 
school, the medical clinic, welfare, and the subsidized 
institutions of culture, for example the arts, the opera - thus 
the state/civil society divide continually dissolves and 
reconstitutes itself. This manifests itself with state-mediated 
social control in the twin features of the present situation 
which we have called the duality of Just Deserts - an expanding 
institutionalization (i.e.prisons) with a return to formal 
legality in punishment coupled with widespread 'diversion' 
programmes aimed at activating the resources of the 'community* 
(the social). As Morris, Giller et al, put it in Justice for 
Children:
"We suggest that justice and fairness should be key concepts 
in any new system, and that the juvenile justice system 
itself should be but a small part of a broader system of 
responses to criminal behaviour, the aim of which is social 
education. An overriding concern, supported by empirical 
data, is the need to minimise the harm likely to accompany 
coercive intervention." FJustice for Children, p.52.]
Understanding Elias alerts us to the thesis that the harm in 
question is to the legitimacy and operation of the state as well 
as to the individual. These authors stated their intention as: 
"1. to persuade the community, family and school to respond 
informally to lawbreaking;
2. to emphasise positive and constructive responses to 
delinquency (e.g. reparation by the offender to the victim 
or to the community);
3. to engage, where possible, the victim directly in working 
out a settlement (either informally through the parents or 
formally through the independent sift);
4. to emphasise the responsibility of the offender (in a way 
in which we feel formal processing often ignores);
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5. to provide the offender with guidance, supervision and 
other assistance in coping with any difficulties he may feel 
he has." fJustice for Children, p.65.]
32.Two final questions before we leave this area. First, what 
then is the status of those disciplines which arise out of middle 
class interaction in civil society in the nineteenth century and 
which continue now, i.e. positivist criminology, vis-a-vis the 
Foucaltean assertion of their role as a modern form of despotic 
control? Second, is the Foucaltean/Nietzschean (Romantic) notion 
of modern society being created at the cost of repudiating or 
repressing whole areas of our inner nature accurate, or at least 
of value?
Concerning the first, the question of knowledge is far more 
ambiguous and interactional than any submission to domination 
could hold. One point is that these knowledges have fed back into 
and sustained much of what modernity is and much of modernity is 
a product of desire; desires which may partly be a response to 
the control of the previous order but which cannot all be simply 
related to the status of instruments of new technologies of 
control. Furthermore these new knowledges, these forms of self- 
knowledge and of self-discipline (of understanding of one's 
history, social position, childrearing practices, psychology) 
have made possible new forms of social life with more space for 
individuals (as well as new 'individuals' for space) and more 
avenues for participation (through praxis as doctors, 
researchers, workers, sportsmen and so forth) in the operation 
of the social body. The disciplines thus straddle, while not 
necessarily positioning themselves at either extreme, a line 
which moves from structures of domination to being the basis for 
individual/collective action. They may demonstrate at a 
particular time the tendency to go to one extreme, or the absence 
of 'faith' in such knowledge may allow a structure of domination 
to fill the gap, but the point is that the disciplines can 
function in both ways and it is the combination of context- 
knowledge-practice which sets this out, not the inherent nature 
of the disciplines themselves. It is the 'pragma', not the 
'theory', the making sense in actuality not the 'contextless 
discipline1 which gives a progressive programme. But it is also 
true that the contextless discipline is only an idea, it never 
exists other than as an idea, Popper's World Three objectivity 
is an idea not a reality. The reality is that all disciplines are 
situated, engaged and engaging - the philosophy of knowledge 
undercuts itself into the human locus. Another point relates to 
reflexivity for it is an unavoidable feature of Foucault, or 
Santos, or Feyerabend, that their denial of the discipline's 
legitimacy is only listened to because of their status as master 
of a discipline. Santos' declared movement beyond true/false in 
favour of collective action is itself legitimated by his 
disciplinary (sociological) analysis of the fate of 'the 
scientific paradigm of knowledge' and of the domination implicit 
in its epistemological hold over action (thus this is itself an 
example of a discipline being used as an instrument of collective 
action).
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There appear two prongs to the second question: a general
suppression of key features of humanity throughout the social 
body, and an objectifying and domination of the individual's 
inner nature through training in an interiorization of certain 
disciplines. What Foucault denies at the same time as he offers 
this assertion, as opposed to critical theory which rests on the 
presupposition that it can be uncovered, is that we can come to 
express our 'true' nature. To Foucault to talk of gaining freedom 
for our 'true* desires, our true expressions of ourselves, is to 
fall into the trap of one or other technology of control. We are 
left with an impasse (which he may have been moving to resolve 
in his later works on 'the care of the self1 when he died) of 
domination with no liberation possible, no such emancipation, 
which critical theory is premised upon as its normative 
prescription, is possible.
The response of the pragmatic perspective is apparent from the 
earlier discussion of the notion of human nature. It also asserts 
the impossibility of some transhistorical human nature, of some 
pure essential structure of natural human nature - but it then 
replies to Foucault 'what is wrong with giving up the notion of 
liberation and of freedom, of emancipation in the absolute sense 
that these notions have been used in the past?1 What is wrong 
in attempting to develop modes of comprehension which allow us 
to see that various things are suppressed, various created, 
highlighted, emphasised and constituted, as the mode of being?
That is to state that human nature is created in techniques of 
subjection, of promotion, or reactive control and proactive 
expression? This would mean, certainly, to give up the absolutism 
of the Romantic wing of the Enlightenment's notion that the true 
nature inside us must come to expression. A notion which is 
reflected in the rationalist claim that our true nature 
corresponds to certain objective principles a priori to context 
and experience, or the empiricist claim that our true nature is 
such as can be objectified and known by the bio-human sciences. 
The task is to replace this notion with a pragmatism wherein 
socio-human nature is a product of processes of intensifying, and 
in turn defending, certain plays, moves, features, of activities 
in life and countering others. And further developing the 
collective consciousness that what we call human nature and human 
society is a result of our choices in the past, of our projects, 
and of the interaction of these in the contexts of the past and 
present.
33.See H. Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice Hall, 
New Jersey, 1967.
34.Karl Heinz Bohrer, "The Three Cultures", in Observations on 
'The Spiritual Situation of the Age1. Jurgen Habermas (ed),MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, 1985, p.152.
35.Niklas Luhmann, Love as Passion. Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1986, references to this work are annotated in the text as (L as 
P. P..)
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36.Luhmann draws much of his analysis of differentiation from 
Durkheim and here we can see a refined meaning given to 
Durkheim's claim that:
"The individual submits to society and this submission is the 
condition of his liberation. For man freedom consists in 
deliverance from blind, unthinking physical forces; this he 
achieves by opposing against them the great intelligent force 
which is society, under whose protection he shelters. By putting 
himself under the wing of society, he also makes himself also, 
to a limited extent, dependent upon it. But this is a liberating 
experience. There is no paradox here." Sociology and Philosophy, 
p.72.
37.Of course Luhmann has loaded the dice to some extent; his work 
is a thesis on the "semantics of love" but these are not the only 
codes which are in play. The language games and codes which 
'couples' are situated within and engage with are not restricted 
to those of love but are also those of economics, careers, and 
self-advancement to name a few. Luhmann also assumes a form of 
equality between partners, in his work they appear to come from 
the same culture. These reservations do not, however, lesson 
Luhmann's impact since the difficulties of communication, of 
reading gestures and degrees of intensity, as between Greek, 
English, Jamaican, and New Zealand individuals can only increase 
the strength of his analysis.
38.See Elias, State Formation and Civilization. Also Luhmann, The 
Differentiation of Society. 1982, and the commentary by Tim 
Murphy, "Niklas Luhmann on Law, Politics and Social Theory", 47 
Modern law Reviewf pp. 603-20.
39.See Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law. Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, 1985, ch. 2.
40.As Kolakowski put it in Metaphysical Horror:
"the gods in various mythologies are not necessarily good either 
in the sense of being kind and helpful to people or that of 
providing us with models or moral conduct; some are, some are 
not, and many display both good and evil sides in their 
adventures. But good in mythologies seems to be invariably linked 
with peace and harmony, evil with war, chaos and destruction. 
Once the myths are sublimated into metaphysical speculation, 
these elementary insights tend to achieve a complete conceptual 
consistency: if good equals peace and harmony, perfect good
equals perfect peace and harmony, and this means the perfect 
absence of tension, and thus, ultimately, absolute 
undifferentiation and immobility, or One. The more unity, the 
more goodness... And so, when the good reaches the point of 
completeness, it loses any recognizable quality of goodness; by 
achieving perfection, the goodness vanishes. Since the One 
remains impossible in its total unity, it seems to be severed 
from any reality other than itself. Life, at least in the sense 
we are able to conceive, involves differentiation and tension; 
one reaches a complete peace by reaching lifelessness." pp.39-
40.
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The point can be made of Law and life. Law’s rationality is 
established at the cost of law's removal from life - hence the 
study of criminal law is the study of House of Lord's judgments, 
not of magistrates decisions.
41.Luhmann, "The Third Question: The Creative Use of Paradoxes 
in Law and Legal History", Journal of Law and Society. Vol 15, 
No. 2, 1988, p. 160.
42.Ibid.. p.155.
43.Ibid.r
44.Ibid.r p.160.
45.Stanley Cohen, "Taking Decentralization seriously", 
Transcarceration: Essays in the sociology of social control. John 
Lowman et al, Gower, Aldershot, 1987, p.371.
46.Cohen quotes Abel from Informal Justice: "the preference of 
harmony over conflict, for mechanisms that offer equal access to 
the many rather than unequal privilege to the few, that operate 
quickly and cheaply, that permit all citizens to participate in 
decision making rather than limiting authority to 
'professionals', that are familiar rather than esoteric and that 
strive for and achieve substantive justice rather than 
frustrating it in the name of form." Transcarceration... p.368- 
9.
47.Transcarceration.... 374.
48.Ehrlich, E. Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, 
W. L.Moll (trans.), Arno Press, New York, 1975 [1936].
49.Kamenka, E, and Tay, A. E-S, "Beyond Bourgeois Individualism" 
in E.Kamenka and R. Neal, (eds.) Feudalism. Capitalism and 
Beyond f quoted in Pratt, "Corporatism: The Third Model of 
Juvenile Justice".
50.Ibid.f p. 246.
51.Unger, Law in Modern Society, p.193.
52.See our earlier quotation from the 1990 White Paper Crime« 
Justice and Protecting The Public, and the obvious necessity felt 
in this document for the Government to claim both that it is 
embarking on a positive campaign against crime, and that it is 
merely coordinating the activities of the Judiciary (i.e. the 
Court of Appeal guidelines and magistrates' Association work), 
public feelings, and moves in civil society for crime prevention. 
See Chapter One, Introduction, in this respect.
The 'Just Desserts' introduced by this Document is 
distinguished from the American, it is not to be as rigid. One 
central reason given for this is that would not fit perceived 
public conceptions. "The Government rejects a rigid statutory 
framework, on the lines of those introduced in the United States,
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or a system of minimum or mandatory sentences for certain 
offences. This would make it more difficult to sentence in 
exceptional cases. It could also result in more acquittals by 
juries, with more guilty men and women going free unjustly as a 
result." (pp. 8-9 emphasis added)
53.For the development of cautioning and its subsequent 
regulation see "The Police and Diversion", being Ch.5 of A. 
Morris, H. Giller, Understanding Juvenile Justice. Croom Helm, 
London, 1987. in Crime. Justice and Protecting The Public, the 
pre-sentence report prepared by the probation service is to be 
structured by new National Standards and the purpose of the 
report directed to giving information relating the offender to 
specific non-custodial measures rather than making 
"recommendations as to sentencing or to be a plea in mitigation", 
(see pp.13-4)
54.Corporatism can be seen in the recent moves to structure of 
community service orders. Prior to Government "Guidelines" for 
operation (namely, Criminal Law of England and Wales, Community 
Service Orders Rules, 1989, Statutory Instrument, No. 191, 1989; 
National Standards for Community Service Orders, 1989.) the 
experience which an offender may undergo with a Community Service 
order could demonstrate considerable variation both in the type 
of placement offered to him/her and the degree of participation 
in decision making the local area allowed him/her in the course 
of the order. Community Service orders began experimentally and 
local diversity was a result of the considerable discretion 
afforded regional probation services, responses to the potential 
sites of work at local level and local initiative. The attitudes 
and operational ideologies of Community Service (C.S.) staff 
could have an important influence upon the actual 'grammar' of 
the 'universal' order. What it actually meant in terms of the 
offender's experience to be sentenced to 200 hours community 
service could therefore vary considerably. In investigating C.S 
operationality Tzannetakis stylised the administrative operation 
of C.S in reference to three models: 1) a personalised,
individualist, 'treatment' model where great attention was paid 
by C.S staff to the perceived needs of the offender and when 
there was extensive participation of the offender, a search for 
varied projects utilizing individual placements characterised 
this model; 2) a order and security orientated model which 
emphasised uniform handling of offenders and which was not really 
interested in the benefit for him/her of the type of experience 
the individual offender encountered, rather routine group 
placement work characterizes this model; 3) a mixed work 
orientated model where a variety of projects were undertaken but 
where the operational orientation was very much concerned with 
the successful completion of the hours worked with as low an 
amount of breach proceeding as possible.
The guidelines introduce a standardised approach to the 
administration of C.S. Orders and regulated matters such as 
breach proceedings, they limit local discretion. Although they 
were expressly stated to be "reflective of the best schemes in 
operation", they actually amount to a socio-political choice of
517
some aspects of the models over the other possibilities. In 
effect the first model is severely curtailed.
Some aspects of this can be noted: There appears a clear 
attempt to structure the discourse of C.S. to gain the confidence 
of the Courts and the Public that this is 'punishment in the 
community’ . Retribution and reparation to community are expressed 
as goals. Furthermore the standardising enables the system to 
gear up to handling potentially larger numbers^of offenders; 
reduced time and resources per offender seem likely with a speed 
up of response time. A systems approach is clearly evident in the 
demand for feedback of information on costs and rates of breach 
and hours served to the courts and co-operation between agencies 
involved. The public is presented with an image that the type of 
work involved is heavier and a greater control over C.S appears 
to have been gained by the state via rules. The result appears 
to fit Kamenka and Tay's 'bureaucratic-administrative' model of 
social change. For Tzannetakis to understand the operationality 
of the change in C.S and its concrete operation, recourse to 
traditional 'philosophies of punishment1 will not suffice. 
Instead 'questions of administration1 are paramount; including, 
at least to some extent, the demands of the organisation itself. 
The guidelines appear to establish a greater amount of control 
over C.S both over the offender and over the staff operating the 
schemes. But is this degree of control, introduced partly at 
least, in the name of accountability, really necessary? One 
consequence is that control over the offender during the course 
of the order is, in terms of Etzioni^ typologies mentioned 
earlier, heavily coercive (i.e. a reliance upon external 
control). One question which arises is, is this external coercive 
control compatible with the type of control of offenders which 
is best suited to enable the successful completion of orders, 
and, furthermore, what effect, if any, does it have on offenders 
self-discipline as a result of completing the order. Cf. A. 
Tzannetakis, "Operational Diversity in Community Service", 
University of London Phd Thesis (in preparation).
In Crime. Justice and protecting The Public, the issue of 
Standards of practice was addressed as follows:
"The Government wishes to encourage local initiative and 
flexibility, but sees a case for developing greater consistency 
in the basic elements of supervision." Variation was concerned 
with breach procedures, attendance, frequency of supervision, 
unit costs and quoted the Audit Commissions report on "The 
Probation Service: promoting value for Money" that "it would be 
inappropriate to fix rigid guidelines to be followed in all 
cases, since flexibility is required ti fit programme to the 
needs of individuals, but it is reasonable to expect similar 
cases to be treated in similar fashion in different areas. 
Strategies which promote greater consistency between services, 
taking account of 'best practice1 identified through evaluation 
are needed." The document went on: "Some variations in practice 
are necessary to fit local circumstances (e.g. the differences 
between urban and rural areas). But it is unjust if court orders 
are much less demanding in some parts of the country than others. 
Certain ground rules and minimum standards should apply 
everywhere."(pp.37-8) Not only does this concept of 'demand1 
appear to contradict their more individualised concept elsewhere
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in the document but to the pragmatic imagination what exactly 
determines the 'similar cases'. The categorising of cases may be 
as mush the result of the questions and perspectives of the 
probation service, i.e. the administration. The uniformity of 
offenders may be a characteristic imposed by administration.
55.The White Paper Crime. Justice and Protecting The Public.is 
illustrative. As a mode of control deterrence is seen as limited. 
We are not offered strict classicism, the distance from Bentham 
and Beccaria is now mediated by Matza as well as opportunity 
theory. Thus we read:
"Deterrence is a principle with much immediate appeal. Most law 
abiding citizens understand the reasons why some behaviour is 
made a criminal offence, and would be deterred by the shame of 
a criminal conviction or the possibility of a severe penalty. 
There are doubtless some criminals who carefully calculate the 
possible gains and risks, but much crime is committed on impulse, 
given the opportunity presented by an open window or unlocked 
door, and it is committed by offenders who live from moment to 
moment; their crimes are as impulsive as the rest of their 
feckless, sad or pathetic lives, it is unrealistic to construct 
sentencing arrangements on the assumption that most offenders 
will weigh up the possibilities in advance and base their conduct 
on rational calculation, often they do not." (p.6)
Instead the tactics are varied:
1) encouragement of reporting of serious, particulary 
violent crimes, so that realistic indices are created and the 
possibilities of locating 'dangerous' offenders intensified;
2) the incarceration of the violent, serious, and dangerous;
3) the development of target hardening measures and inter­
agency co-operation with work on offenders;
4) a concentrated effort on young offenders.
This later point is expressly to be done in conjunction with the 
primary means of installing self-discipline, the family. Thus we 
are told: "When effective family control is lacking, children 
are more likely to grow up without self-discipline and a sense 
of concern for others. They are more likely to commit crimes." 
It is proposed to construct "arrangements which allow parents' 
diminishing responsibility for their children's behaviour as they 
grow older to be balanced by placing increased responsibility on 
the young people themselves." This includes involving parents 
more in the operation of criminal justice, for example, entering 
into a recognisance to take proper care and to exercise proper 
control over their children, or night restrictions or curfews. 
See Chapter Eight.
56.Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul, pp. 227-8
57.Compare Matza's picture of the chaotic 'free will' of 
delinquency aided by 'techniques of neutralization' to Rose's 
assertion of the demands on the truly modern self.
"However constrained by external or internal factors, the 
modern self is institutionally required to construct a life 
through the exercise of choice among alternatives. Every aspect 
of life,like every commodity, is imbued with a self-referential 
meaning; every choice we make is an emblem of our identity, a
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mark of our individuality, each is a message to ourselves and 
others as to the sort of person we are, each casts a glow back, 
illuminating the self of he or she who consumes.
The self is not merely enabled to choose, but obliged to 
construe a life in terms of its choices, its powers, and its 
values. Individuals are expected to construe the course of their 
life as the outcome of such choices, and to account for their 
lives in terms of the reasons for those choices. each of the 
attributes of the person is to be realised through decisions, 
justified in terms of motives, needs and aspirations, made 
intelligible to the self and others in terms of the unique but 
universal search to find meaning and satisfaction through the 
construction of a life for oneself." Governing the Soul, p.227.
In Crime. Justice and protecting The Public, the theory of 
delinquency appears Matzeran. Thus the effect of "supervision" 
is defended against being an easy ride since "the best 
supervision makes real demands on offenders as well as 
restricting their liberty by cutting into their spare time. It 
does this by imposing the discipline of regular reporting to the 
supervising officer. For many offenders whose lives are chaotic 
and impulsive, this requirement alone can be most testing of all, 
because they have to discipline themselves. The courts may also 
require the offender to take part in additional activities or 
undergo a 60 day course at a probation centre. All of this may 
be more demanding on some offenders than custody which removes 
them from the responsibilities, problems and temptations of 
everyday life."(p.36)
58.Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul. p.225.
59.The examples which Crime. Justice and Protecting The Public 
give of the success of supervision concern a) 19 year old 
convicted of handbag snatching and estranged from his parents ho 
was at first very difficult under supervision but then "settled 
down under this supervision, began seeking work and resumed 
communication with his parents." B) A 30 year old offender with 
many convictions put on probation for burglary and theft. "Much 
of his offending was due to his poor control over his temper. The 
day centre programme helped him to control his temper better, to 
think more about the consequences of his actions, and to make 
sensible plans for his future." (p.36-7)
The features are: developing a state of self-discipline, an
control of emotions and response; a familiarity of the
difference' of others, i.e. the appreciate the possible effects
of one's action on others whom one isxseparated b^ social 
distance and functional differentiation. \
60.For example, L. Curtis, "The March of Folly: crime and the 
underclass", in Tim Hope and M. Shaw (eds.)J Communities and 
Crime Reduction. HMSO, London, 1988. /
61.This is felt across a range of perspective see Dahrendorf, Law 
and Order, the warning in Roshier, Controlling Crime, Phil 
Scraton (ed.) Law. Order and the Authoritarian State.
62.Transcarceration.... p.375. 
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63.Judith Rumgay, "Taking Rehabilitation Out of After-care?", 
Brit. J. Criminology. Vol 30, No.l. (1990)
64."The polar opposite to justification by rules is equity, the 
intuitive sense of justice in the particular case. The formalist 
views equity as amorphous because it cannot be codified as a 
system of rules and as tyrannical because all moral judgments are 
subjective even if they are widely shared. Hence, the most that 
can be granted to equity is the role of tempering the 
consequences of formalism that seem intolerably harsh in the 
light of prevailing moral ideas. "TLaw in Modem Society, p. 205.]
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Conclusion.
This work has offered readings on the theme of criminal justice, 
epistemology, and modernity. To give it a conclusion as if there 
was a 'problem* and it had offered a 'solution* would offend its 
own canons. Some final reading can, however, be told simply. The 
epistemology of criminal justice has come to share in the 
fundamental paradox of modernity, that is of a system which is 
characterised by complex differentiation, interconnection and 
interdependency. As modernity has outgrown the narratives which 
created the freedom to become modern, so has our pursuit of truth 
and the search for absolute foundations of our assertions and 
claims gone beyond the confidence of rationalism and empiricism 
into the much more ambiguous space of pragmatism.
Modernism gave an enthusiasm for the good society, a society 
which was to be built - artificially designed and constructed 
whereby mankind was to be freed from the tutorage of nature by 
subordinating nature to human desires and needs and creating an 
abundance of goods via science and technology. The anchoring 
points of this process, the security of human subjectivity and 
the reference of truth, have in their turn been undercut by their 
very products. That is by the processes of authenticity and the 
reflexivity, or self-accounting, which accompanies modern 
development. The product of this reflexivity is an uncertainty 
as to foundations - the templates of rationalism and the deep- 
structural images of empiricism no longer appear to have 'truth* , 
even if they have metaphysical appeal. The human foundation to 
the social world becomes undeniable to the pragmatic imagination. 
To conceive of the social world, in the terms of the pragmatic 
imagination is to live in a radically ambiguous environment. The 
problem of constructing the Grand Society which provides the 
'fit' to true human nature, or realizes the absolute potential 
of mankind's rational structuring, is unresolvable. The meaning 
of humanities existence is not a problem to be solved but a 
mystery to lived and no set of meanings can be enjoyed as the 
final reading, no construction of social life is to be viewed 
other than as 'experimental', as temporary. All are both natural
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and unnatural. Mankind is both without a home and always with 
one. Accompanied by human yearnings which are irreconcilably 
unquenchable, human desires which can neither be satisfied by 
stylised marcations in the name of the natural, or the rational, 
or by their exhaustion for what of expression.
Epistemologically the pragmatic realisation is that the 'truth*, 
or 'warranted assertability', of assertions and claims depends 
on their coherence to the range of suppositions and procedures 
for testing which are internal to a system, i.e. to a discipline 
or tradition. Correspondingly, the practical task of judging 
societal concepts, for example, progress, justice, fairness, lies 
in their coherence to values and suppositions as to the modality 
and conduct of human life. In the grammaticization of concepts, 
the performability of hope and desire in the concrete 
experiencing of pain, pleasure, cruelty, suffering, joy, 
satisfaction and despair, lies the ultimate test of thought. 
Therein lies the substance of humanity.
Ultimately pragmatism's metaphysical message is simple, there is 
not, and never was any 'God' whose wishes we explore, depart from 
and find our repentant way back to. There is not, and never was, 
any structure of Reason whose template human activity 
dialectically encompasses, slowly, hesitantly, and often 
mistakenly, but inevitably 'progressively*, and which, in time, 
we will come to know fully. There is not, and never was, a 
foundational operation to 'natural order1 which the apparently 
haphazard operation of human experiencing functionally reflects 
its deep structure and which functionally guides onwards social 
evolution and with the knowledge of which we could construct the 
grand society. There is instead only the centrality of the human 
focus to social change, only the objectivity of human 
involvement. Only the dialectics of contingency.
Present criminal justice inhabits the complex space of the 
juncture when modernity reflexively seeks its self- 
consciousness, the impossibility of its desires and lurches in
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search of new conceptions. The mistake would be to continue the 
illusion of the solution, the notion that arrangements, that 
rules, are anything more than socio-cultural, historical 
structures of being. Historical creations which may have great 
worth, but which equally may prevent future worth. Instead of the 
search for the solution to self-contained 'problems', as if that 
would uncover sections of final ontology to be co-operatively 
joined together in the interdisciplinary task of uncovering the 
framework of the grand society, pragmatism the understanding that 
in this process the ontology of social being would itself become 
more, forever eluding its final reading.
In the face of the ambiguity and complexity of the present, the 
pragmatic imagination takes hope in realising the extreme 
complexity and differentiation, the pluralism of the changing 
present. The paradox of the totality to being which is 
understandable only through difference.
The concern of criminological theorists must be two fold. Since 
Durkheim's claim that the operation of legal structures reflected 
social solidarity and state organization is apt. Thus, if Human 
societies, and all that 'we' may find of value in the expressions 
of those entities, are historical contingencies the role of 
analysis, of social theory, becomes important not only to 
understand but to help construct. The task of realising better 
forms of human solidarity. To help build and defend the 
construction of greater and better tools by which the manifold 
'mystery' of being may be granted terrain and energy for 
expressive creation, for positive paralogy. For the 
procedualisation of living that 'we' may find expressively 
worthwhile, and in whose reflexivity, is discovered the currency 
of the 'we' . And if to the sceptic that task lacks a foundational 
security, an absolute guarantee, that is not its weakness, but 
its strength, for the paradox of reflexive pragmatism may be that 
in the dialectic of assumed ontology, reflexive questioning, 
uncertainty, developmental practice, ontological confidence, 
reflexivity... lies the 'nature' of social constructivism.
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